The husband's liability varies to some extent when his wife lives with him and when she does not, and according to the cause of their separation. These distinctions we shall notice briefly.

Sec. 315. SAME SUBJECT-WIFE'S NECESSARIES WHEN LIVING WITH HER HUSBAND.-When husband and wife are living together it is generally presumed that the wife has implied authority to make purchases of necessaries, and for such goods supplied her in good faith the husband is prima facie responsible. (Clifford v. Laton, 3 Car. & P. 15.) But the husband's liability is based upon his implied or express authority, and may be rebutted on proof that he has supplied her with necessaries or gave her the ready money to make the purchases, or supplied her through other agents. (Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109.) So, if the husband is willing to provide the necessaries at his own home he is not liable to provide them elsewhere, and, in general, while living together and the wife is properly supplied, the husband will not be liable for other debts made by her on account, without his previous authority or subsequent sanction. (Morgan v. Hughes, 20 Tex. 141; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 63.)

style of dress which the husband sanctions, especially if not wholly ornamental. The following were held not to be necessaries: A $350 watering-place outfit for the wife of a poor barrister; the expense of an indictment against the husband for an assault on wife; services of a clairvoyant; a church pew; a ball dress worth $80; pipes, tobaccoes and cigars; counsel fees in a suit for divorce.

The husband may also give notice directly to the persons furnishing the goods not to supply the wife on his credit, and not afterwards be bound. A written notice to the dealer is sufficient, but a notice published in a newspaper is not unless it was actually brought to the attention of the creditor. (Walker v. Leighton, 11 Fost. (N. H.) 111.) After such notice the seller to bind the husband must show that the articles were necessaries and that the husband has not properly supplied the wife. (Barr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 577.)

The husband may ratify the purchase and will be bound the same as if he had given authority, and this ratification may be implied unless his dissent is expressed in an effectual and positive manner. If he has notice of the purchase or debt being made he should positively refuse to pay. (Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380; Conrad v. Abbott, 132 Mass. 330.)

Sec. 316. SAME SUBJECT-WIFE'S NECESSARIES WHEN LIVING APART FROM HER HUSBAND.-As a general rule the husband is liable for the wife's support if they are apart by his fault, but not otherwise. (Browne 22.) (Browne 22.) The separation by the fault of the husband may arise in three ways: First, where the husband unlawfully abandons the wife; second, where he turns her out without reasonable cause; third, where his ill-treatment makes it necessary for her to leave him. When the wife is thus apart from her husband without provision for her support, he is liable for necessaries furnished her, and she may pledge his credit therefore by virtue of the marriage obligation,

her authority sometimes being called an authority of (2 Kent Com. 146-7; Schoul. Dom. Rel.,

necessity.

Sec. 66; Eiler v. Crull, 99 Ind. 375.)

In the first two cases above the husband's own act imposes the necessity and the wife's conduct is involuntary. But in the third case the wife's conduct is in a sense voluntary, and must be founded on a just apprehension of personal violence, or because the house has been rendered unfit for her as a modest and chaste woman. (Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Pa. St. 360.)

When the wife has been compelled to leave by the fault of her husband, his notice to individuals, either directly or by publication, will not relieve him from the responsibility of her debts contracted under such circumstances. (Watkins v. DeArmond, 89 Ind. 553.) It is sometimes held that only what would be cause for a divorce "a thoro" will justify her leaving him. (Thorpe v. Shapleigh, 67 Me. 235; Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367.) It is held that if she leave him without sufficient cause, and afterwards returns, and her husband refuses to receive her, she can go away and bind him for necessaries, provided she has conducted herself properly in her absence. (Howard v. Whetstone, 10 Ohio 365; 11 Johns 281.) But if the wife elopes and commits adultery, the husband is not liable for her necessaries, though he refuses to take her back. (Oinson v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 73.)

Where the husband and wife live apart by mutual consent, and the husband regularly pays the wife a

reasonable allowance, or a decreed alimony, he will not be liable for necessaries. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 68.)

Sec. 317. SAME SUBJECT-SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES.-1. While the husband and wife cohabit, it is usual for the husband to show want of authority in the wife to purchase necessaries; when they are apart the seller must prove authority, or that the wife needed the goods, and was not at fault.

2. The wife's right to bind her husband results from two considerations: (a) That the husband has failed in his duty to furnish her proper support, without any fault on her part absolving him. (b) That as the authorized agent of her husband she has the right to bind him within the scope of her authority, like other representatives.

3. Parties cohabiting as husband and wife, whether actually married or not, come within the provisions of the above principles, and the man will be bound for necessaries furnished to the woman whom he has held out to society as his wife. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Secs. 69-71.)

HUSBAND'S

Sec. 318. LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S WRONGS.-At common law the husband is liable in all civil suits founded upon the wife's torts 'or wrongs committed before or during coverture. But in this case they must be validly married and not merely cohabiting, the responsibility being different from that in the case of necessaries. For the crimes of the wife the husband is not punishable unless committed in his presence and by his direction, when she is presumed to

act by his coercion. But the presumption of coercion may be disproved and the wife made responsible; and for her more serious crimes she is always responsible. (1 Bl. Com. 444; Browne Dom. Rel. 26.)

By statute now, in some States, the husband is not liable for the acts of the wife. (Rev. Stat. Ohio, Sec. 3115.) In others he is liable in case the wrong was committed under his coercion, or where he would be liable if they were not married. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., 5th ed., Sec. 170n; 32 Kans. 409.)

The common law gave the husband a right of action for injuries to the wife's person or character, and a separate action for the loss of her society and the expenses caused. But neither could recover damages for the instantaneous death of the other, caused by the negligence of a third person. But this action is now given by statute. (Browne, Dom. Rel., 27-8; Green v. Railroad Co., 23 Barb. 9; Dickens v. Railroad Co., 28 Barb. 41.) For injuries to the person or character of the wife, the husband and wife should sue together. (60 Tex. 331; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 77.) It is to be observed that State statutes in many instances completely reverse the old rules of the common law.

Sec. 319. THE WIFE'S PROPERTY.-The property of the wife affected by her marriage is either real or personal property; and personal property is either in possession, or in action. We shall inquire how these species of property were treated after marriage, both at common law and in equity.