protect the wife leaving her husband for cause, but must give her up whenever she wishes to return to her husband. Schouler states the legal doctrine to be, that honest motives may shield a parent from the consequences of indiscretion, while adding nothing to the right of actual control-the intent with which the parent acted being the material point, rather than the justice of the interference; that a husband forfeits his right to sue others for enticement, where his own misconduct justified and actually caused the separation; but that otherwise his remedy is complete against all persons whomsoever, who have lent their countenance to any scheme for breaking up his household. (Dom. Rel., 5th ed., Sec. 41; White v. Ross, 47 Mich. 172.) An action for debauchery or enticement with bad motives may accrue without the wife actually leaving the house. (Rhinehart v. Bills, 82 Mo. 534.)

The action by the wife for the enticement of her husband was undeveloped at the old common law, and while now quite generally admitted, is opposed in a few States. (Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374; Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503.) See Note to Schoul. Dom. Rel., 5th ed., Sec. 41.

SERVICE.-The

Sec. 305. SUPPORT AND husband is bound to provide the family support and means of living, and the wife for her part must render such services as are incident to the care of the house and its contents; the one is equivalent of the other, and the wife is not entitled to compensation for taking

care of an insane husband. (Grant v. Green, 41 Ia. 88.)*

The support which the husband is to furnish includes food, clothing, lodging, medical attendance and the like, suitable to his condition in life and his income. Mere inability to support, proceeding from no unkindness or indifference, is not a ground for divorce. (Skean v. Skean, 33 N. J. Eq. 148; Bruner v. Bruner, 70 Md. 105.) Nor is his saving and frugal disposition, when he could afford to be liberal. (Runkle v. Runkle, 96 Mich. 493.)

As an incident to his duty to support the household the husband has the right to prescribe rules for the conduct of the house and the regulation of expenses. He is also entitled to choose the persons who shall share the hospitality of his home, even if he restricts the guests to those alone who are agreeable to him. (Evans v. Evans, 1 Hag. Con. 115; Fulton v. Fulton, 36 Mo. 517; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 46.). And by the early common law to moderately chastise the wife. (1 Bl. Com. 444-5.)

Sec. 306. HUSBAND AND WIFE AS WITNESSES.-As a rule of the common law husband and wife cannot be witnesses or testify for or against each other, and the rule holds though both parties consent. (Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Tr. 678.) And the rule holds

"The husband must support himself, his wife, and his minor children out of his property or by his labor. If he is unable to do so, the wife must assist him so far as she is able." (Rev. Stat. Ohio, Sec. 3110.)

after the dissolution of the marriage by death or di(1 Greenleaf Ev., Sec. 340.)

vorce.

Blackstone bases the rule on the unity of the spouses; other writers find the reason of the rule to be that public policy requires that the marital relation which demands unlimited confidence between the spouses be protected by law, and the confidence of the parties in each other be encouraged by knowing that it may not be divulged, willingly or unwillingly. (1 Bl. Com. 443; 2 Kent Com. 178; 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 254.)

But modern statutes have to some extent changed this rule, and a husband may be a witness in reference to transactions concerning his wife's separate property, as here they have separate interests to maintain. (61 Ill. 26.) So where the conversation between husband and wife was in the presence and hearing of a third party the confidential nature ceases and either party may testify. (Sessions v. Trevitt, 39 O. St. 259.) And by statute husband and wife are made competent as witnesses in behalf of each other in all criminal cases, or for cruelty to minor children, provided that they shall not testify concerning any communication made or act done during coverture. They are also allowed to testify in proceedings for divorce. (Rev. Stat. Ohio, Secs. 7284, 5697.) The statutes changing the rule are not harmonious and must be examined. (92 N. Y. 554; Bitner v. Boone, 128 Pa. St. 567; Blanchard v. Moors, 85 Mich. 380.)

Sec. 307.

HUSBAND'S

LIABILITY FOR

WIFE'S DEBTS BEFORE MARRIAGE.-At

common law, immediately upon the marriage the husband becomes liable for the debts of his wife contracted while she was single, for as Blackstone observes, he has adopted her and her circumstances together. This liability for the wife's previous debts is a sort of recompense for taking her property, but he is liable though the wife has no property and concealed the debts from him. (1 Bl. Com. 443; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 56.)

The obligation extends only to her legal debts, but may not be relieved or modified by an agreement between husband and wife before marriage or during coverture. (Harrison v. Trader, 27 Ark. 288; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 57.) The suit to charge the husband for such debts of the wife must be brought during the coverture, and must be brought against them jointly, and not against either separately. So, if the husband dies and the wife's debts while single have not been paid, his estate is not liable, and this is so though she has brought him property. (2 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 204.) If the wife survives she becomes liable again for her previous debts.

SAME

Sec. 308. SUBJECT-STATUTORY CHANGES.-State statutes quite generally release the husband from liability for the debts of the wife contracted before marriage. In a few States he is still liable for such debts; first, to the extent of any property acquired from the wife by an ante-nuptial agreement; second, to the extent of any property received by him from or through the wife.

Sec. 309.

HUSBAND'S

LIABILITY FOR

WIFE'S DEBTS AFTER MARRIAGE.-After marriage, at common law, the legal identity of the wife is merged in that of her husband, and while the husband is bound for all just debts incurred in her support, and may be bound by her contract for necessaries, the wife cannot make a contract so as to bind herself. The general rule being that a married woman cannot make a valid contract of any description in relation to real or personal property. (1 Bl. Com. 442.) The husband alone is liable for the frauds and injuries of the wife, committed during the marriage, and may be sued either alone or jointly with her for the damages resulting. But he also has the benefit of the right to sue for and recover damages for any injury done to her. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 54; Goodrich v. Tracey, 43 Vt. 314.)

To illustrate the wife's disability at common law, Schouler cites these cases: "She cannot earn money for herself. She cannot, jointly with her husband or alone, sign or endorse a promissory note, so as to bind herself; nor execute a bond or other instrument under seal; nor purchase on her own credit; nor agree to keep a money deposit payable on demand; nor be surety for her husband or another; nor bind herself by a recognizance; nor execute a letter of attorney; nor otherwise make a valid contract." (Dom. Rel., Sec. 58, and cases there cited.) She is permitted to pass title to her real estate by joining in a deed with her husband, but she would not be bound by her covenants therein. (Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 167.) All such