to abide in his own country so long as he pleases, unless driven from it by sentence of law. Exile and transportation being unknown to the common law, no power, save parliament, can send a subject out of the land against his will. The king himself could not send any man out of the realm, even upon the public service, excepting sailors and soldiers, or compel him to become a foreign ambassador. See 1 Bl. Com. 137-8.

Sec. 266. SAME SUBJECT-HABEAS CORPUS. Two points are requisite to constitute the injury of false imprisonment: 1. The detention of the person, and, 2. the unlawfulness of such detention. And we have seen in the preceding section that the common law gives two remedies, the one by habeas corpus to remove the injury, the other by an action for false imprisonment giving satisfaction in damages.

The writ of habeas corpus, which Blackstone justly describes as the most celebrated writ in English law, was made use of in various forms by the early English courts at Westminster, and was denominated according to the purpose for which the prisoner was removed from one court to another. But the form that came to be used as the great and efficacious writ for the testing of all sorts of illegal confinements, is that of "habeas corpus ad subjiciendum," directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that behalf. This was a high prerogative writ issuing

out of the court of king's bench, both in term time and in vacation, by an order from the chief justice or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the kingdom, commanding the production of the person detained. The writ was returnable to the court or judge awarding it, and was decided by him.* (3 Bl. Com. 128-31.)

Many pitiful evasions and abuses of the manifest purpose of this writ by mercenary courts and judges led to the passing of remedial and enlarging statutes, the most important of which, called the Habeas Corpus Act (31 Car. II, c. 2), defines the methods of securing and limits the time of the return of the writ, and so clearly points out the duty of the courts or judges, and specifies which of them shall issue the writ, that it has ever since been a most effectual and powerful instrument to check arbitrary imprisonments and secure the personal liberty of the individual. See 3 Bl. Com. 133-8.

Sec. 267. SAME SUBJECT-FALSE IMPRISONMENT.-The "satisfactory" remedy for the injury of false imprisonment is by an action of trespass by force and arms, usually called an action for false imprisonment, wherein the party recovers damages for the injuries he has received.†

*The writ of habeas corpus, whether at common law or under 31 Car. II, Ch. 2, does not issue as a matter of course upon application in the first instance, but must be grounded on an affidavit, upon which the court are to exercise their discretion whether the writ shall issue or not. (Cooley's Bl. Com. III, 132n.) 3 Bl. Com. 138. See I Hill on Torts, 231. Addison on Torts, Ch. 12.

Sec. 268. PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES.-By the Declaration of Independence, which may be regarded as our Magna Charta, it is declared "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." And this admission of fundamental rights is incorporated in various State constitutions in almost identical language. But neither the National nor State constitutions stop at declaring the equality of citizens and specifying general rights; they proceed to deny certain powers to their governments and to establish safeguards to protect the declared rights of mankind.

A well-known and capable author considers under the following heads the securities which protect the personal liberty of the individual: 1. Equality; 2. Corporal Liberty; 3. Religious Liberty; 4. Liberty of Speech and of the Press.* This arrangement we shall follow, and discuss briefly such liberty of conduct, choice and action as the law gives and protects.

Sec. 269. SAME SUBJECT-EQUALITY.— The language of constitutions declaring the equality of men is not construed to mean that all men are absolutely equal in every respect, or that government should

*Walker's American Law, 193.

secure them exact conditions, opportunities, occupations, or properties. Judge Walker thus states the true meaning to be "that equality of civil and political rights is the birthright of all men." (Am. Law 192.) And Judge Cooley states, "that all men are equal before the law in rights, privileges, and legal capacities. Every person, however low, or degraded, or poor, is entitled to have his rights tested by the same general laws which govern others." (Cooley, Principles, 3d ed., 247.)

The chief provision designed to secure political equality is that of the Federal constitution, which prohibits both the United States and the individual States from conferring, and all citizens from receiving, titles of nobility, or other hereditary distinction. So the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect primarily the emancipated slave in his rights as a freeman, and to prevent discriminations against him on account of his color. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.)*

A further limitation to this doctrine of equality is, that it only requires that the laws shall not exclude any persons coming within the principle of their operation, so corporations with special privileges are not unconstitutional if their charters exclude no class of persons

"It is in vain that Blackstone and others insist that the distinctions of rank and honors is necessary in every well-governed state;' for experience proves that men will of themselves create all the distinctions required, without the aid of government, to perpetuate them in the blood. We acknowledge no nobility but that which nature gives, and no distinctions but those which men themselves achieve." (Walker, Am. Law, 192.)

from becoming members. But everything in the shape of a monopoly is prohibited by the spirit, if not the letter of the constitution. (Walker, Am. Law, 193; II Pet. 420.)

Sec. 270. SAME

SUBJECT-CORPORAL LIBERTY.-Corporal liberty is described under our government, as the liberty to go wherever, or do whatever, one chooses, provided one does not interfere with the rights of others. Here we see that corporal liberty is but natural liberty so far restrained as is necessary for the general advantage.

Prof. Walker observes that individuals may be deprived of corporal liberty in three classes of cases: 1. By arrest in civil cases; 2. by arrest in criminal cases; 3. by standing toward another in the relation of subjection. Let us notice briefly each of these cases.

1. Arrest in Civil Cases. The common law which permitted arrest for debt has been modified by statute in all of the States of the Union. Where statutes provide for arrest for fraud or misrepresentation, a method is provided by which the debtor, by surrendering up his property, or, if he has not more than is exempt, may be discharged under the insolvency laws.

2. Arrest in Criminal Cases. When an individual commits a crime, thereby infringing the personal security of others, he forfeits for a period his corporal liberty. This forfeiture is the will of society, and is for the good of every member of society. The period of the forfeiture is graduated according to the gravity of the offense, which, being known to all, does not come