by showing that he was under duress in committing them.1

Sec. 401-27. SAME SUBJECT — LIABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN FOR THEIR TORTS. -Under the rules of the common law the wife was so far presumed to be under the control of her husband, or to have her identity as a person so merged in his as to be exempt from suit for her torts committed jointly with the husband or in his presence. So that in such cases the action would be against the husband alone, unless the wife survived him, in which case it might be brought against her. Bishop states the rule to be:

"That when the husband is present during the commission of a tort by the wife, whether himself actually participating in it or not, prima facie the wrong shall be deemed his alone; but both in civil and criminal causes this prima facie case may be rebutted, and each of the two may be deemed, in law, the doer of the wrong the same as though they were unmarried."5

These rules of the common law are greatly modified in many jurisdictions by reason of the enlarged property rights given to married women and the abrogation

4 Waller v. Parker, 5 Cold. 476. But where the act is done by the authority of a military superior, or is subsequently ratified by the government or sovereign power it would constitute a defense. See, Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115.

5 Law of Married Women, Vol. 2, Sec. 258; Ball v. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427; Strouse v. Leiff, 101 Ala. 433; Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273; Hildreth v. Camp, 41 N. J. L. 306; Holz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23.

by statute of many of the former common law principles. Thus it is said by the Supreme Court of Indiana:

"Where the wrong relates to the use or management of their separate estates, as in this case, the torts of married women, committed by the violation of any duty imposed upon them by law with respect to such estates, create the same liability against them as if they were unmarried.

Having been relieved of their disabilities, and empowered to own and control separate estate as femmes sole, they take the right with all its incidents, and must, therefore, like all other persons, use their property with due regard for the rights of others."

So where the husband is liable for the torts committed by his wife, the liability only continues during coverture, and terminates on his death or the divorce of the parties.

7

Sec. 401-28. SAME SUBJECT — LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR THEIR TORTS.In the commission of torts and their responsibility therefor a corporation is governed by practically the same rules as an individual. They cannot excuse their acts of wrongdoing on the ground of their being foreign to the purpose of their creation, or under the doctrine of ultra vires. And the only case in which they are exempt is where their agents or servants commit a wrong or breach of duty "which from its nature could

6 Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 337.

7 Capel v. Powell, 17 C. B. N. S. 743; Kosminsky v. Goldberg, 44 Ark. 401.

not be imposed upon or discharged by a corporation." "The rule of liability embraces not only the negligence and omissions of its officers and agents who are put in charge or employed in the corporate business, but also all tortious acts which have been authorized by the corporation, or which are done in pursuance of any general or special authority to act in its behalf on the subject to which they relate, or which the corporation has subsequently ratified."8

The courts incline to the liberal construction of corporate authority when the question of its proper exercise by its officers, agents and servants is in question, and will hold the corporation liable for all their acts within the most extensive range of the corporate powers. Thus a corporation has been held liable for an assault and battery committed by one of its agents while he was performing an act within the scope of his authority,

8 Cooley on Torts, 137; Weckler v. Bank, 42 Md. 581; Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110; Nat. Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699. So where a corporation assumes to do unauthorized acts, and in the doing of them commits torts it is liable, and it is said that a corporation is liable for the consequences of tortious acts done by its authority, though not within the scope of its powers, express, implied or incidental. Central R. R., etc., Co. v. Smith, 76 Ala. 572. Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495. To fix the liability it must appear that the officers were expressly authorized to do the act, or that it was done bona fide, in pursuance of a general authority, in relation to the subject of it, or that the act was adopted or ratified by the corporation. Central Ry. Co. v. Brewster, 78 Md. 394. Kansas L. Co. v. Bank. 34 Kan. 635.

but wrongfully and with excessive force."

Also for a

libel, published by its authority or subsequently ratified by it."10

A corporation has also been held liable for a malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and for fraud under proper circumstances which showed that the act had been done with its authority or subsequently ratified by it.' But a corporation organized and conducted for charitable purposes exclusively is held not to be liable for the negligence or wrongful acts of its agents while discharging their duties.2

Public corporations, though arms of the state or

9 Ramsden v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117; Atlantic etc., R. R. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio, 162; Denver, etc., Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597; Dillingham v. Russell, 73 Tex. 47, 3 L. R. A. 634; Central, etc., Ry. Co. v. Brown, 113 Ga. 414.

10

Fogg v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co., 148 Mass. 513; Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444; Peterson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 75 Minn. 368, 43 L. R. A. 531; Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 101 Va. 443. Phila., etc., R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202.

1 Vance v. Erie R. R. Co., 32 N. J. 334; Boogher v. Life Ass., 75 Mo. 319; Jordan v. R. R. Co., 74 Ala. 85; Penn., etc., Co. v. Weddell, 100 Ind. 138; Frost v. Domestic, etc., Co., 133 Mass. 563; Bieswanger v. Bonding Co., 98 Md. 287; Ranger v. Great Western R. R. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 71; N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; Am. Nat. Bank v. Hammond, 25 Col. 367.

2 Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98. The same rule applies to societies and institutions created by the state for public purposes, as asylums, agricultural societies, industrial schools, and the like. Overholser v. Home for Disabled Soldiers, 68 Ohio St. 236; Williamson v. Louisville Ind. School, 95 Ky. 251; Hern v. State Ag. Soc., 91 Ia. 97; White v. Insane Hospital, 138 Ala. 479.

national government, are liable for the torts of their officers, agents and servants in the same manner as private corporations, when the wrong done is within the corporate authority.3

In

Sec. 401-29. CONCERNING JOINT WRONGS OR TORTS.—A joint wrong or tort is one in which more than one person has participated in the wrongdoing and has thereby become liable for the damage resulting. It is pointed out that some torts are in their nature individual, while others, as conspiracy, are joint, because several are required to accomplish them.* this action it is said a civil action cannot be brought unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would give a right of action. That is, the damage is the gist of the action and not the conspiracy, and the conspiracy having been formed the person injured has a right of action against all persons participating in the conspiracy, though not otherwise connected with the wrong. The wrong being independent of the conspiracy, a recovery may be had against the actual participants in such wrong though the proof of the conspiracy fails, or a recovery may be had against the single individual responsible for the wrong.

5

3 Horton v. Newell, 17 R. I. 571; Robertson v. Marion, 97 Ill. App. 332.

4 Cooley on Torts, 142.

5 Patten v. Gurney, 17 Mass. 186; Lasher v. Littell, 202 Ill. 551; Buckley v. Mulville, 102 Ia. 602; Laverty v. Van Arsdale, 65 Pa. St. 507; Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407; Severinghaus v. Beckman, 9 Ind. App. 388. The conspiracy need not be shown except to secure a joint judgment; Lubricating Oil Co.