inhuman treatment; 2. Such conduct on the part of the defendant as will render it unsafe for the plaintiff to live or cohabit with defendant; 3. Abandonment of plaintiff by defendant, or neglect of the husband to provide for the wife. This is also regulated by statutes in the various States. But in general any conduct in one of the parties which, to the reasonable apprehension of the other, renders cohabitation physically unsafe to a degree justifying a withdrawal therefrom, is a good cause. (Evans v. Evans, 1 Hag. Con. 310; Bish. M. & D. 153.)

Sec. 335. DEFENSES TO A SUIT FOR DIVORCE.-Quite uniformly the statutes require the causes upon which the divorce is granted to be made out by other evidence than that of the injured party, and this whether the defendant contests or not. So a suit for divorce may be defeated because of the connivance or collusion of the parties, or by showing that the specified offense has been condoned by the complaining party, or by recriminating the plaintiff.

1. Connivance is the corrupt consent of a party to the conduct of the defendant, of which he or she afterwards complains. The libellant or plaintiff desires and intends, or at least is willing that the other party should err. When this corrupt intention appears on both sides the divorce will be refused, as it is only to be granted for cause and not by the consent of the parties. (140 Mass. 530.) But connivance at one act is not a bar to a divorce for a previous act. (142 Mass. 863.)

2. Collusion in marital law is an agreement between

husband and wife for one of them to commit, or appear to commit, a breach of the marital duty in order that the other may obtain the legal remedy of divorce or separation as for the real injury. This collusion may be either active or passive. Active, as where one party agrees to commit an offense to give grounds for a divorce. (L. R. I. Pro. Div. 121.) Passive, as where the libellee agrees to suppress facts which might constitute a good cause of defense. (3 Hag. Ec. 76.) Where such collusion of the parties can be shown it is a bar to divorce.

3. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission by the husband or wife of a marital offense which the other has committed. This forgiveness is construed to be upon the condition of being ever afterwards treated with conjugal fidelity, and hence, while a complete defense to past acts, a subsequent breach by the party revives the original remedy. (2 Bish. M. & D. 269.) Condonation may be express or implied from the subsequent cohabiting of the parties. But a single act of intercourse, or a limited return home may not be enough to condone the offense. (27 Wis. 252.) And the remission must be made and accepted with the intention of conforming to the conditions. (29 Ga. 718.) The husband or wife must have knowledge of the act condoned, and the forgiveness must be free and not obtained by fraud or false promises. (73 Ill. 497.)

4. Recrimination is a counter charge by the libellee or defendant of a cause for divorce against the libellant.

The rule being that where both parties are in default neither can obtain a divorce. (124 Mass. 395; 72 N. C. 530.) The recrimination must be in kind to be a defense in some jurisdictions. (Terhune v. Terhune, 40 How. Pr. 258.) And in the absence of statutes it can be no defense to a cause for a nullity of marriage only. (2 Bish. M. & D., 77; Schoul. Hus. & Wife, Secs. 533-556.)

Sec. 336. EFFECT OF DIVORCE.-The effect of a valid and complete decree of dissolution, or absolute divorce, upon the property rights of the parties is substantially that of death, or, rather, annihilation. Schoul. D. Rel., Sec. 221.) And unless statutes prescribe a division of the property, or a decree of alimony is rendered, the guilt or innocence of either spouse does not affect the case. The divorce bars dower and courtesy, right of administration, and property rights under the statutes of distribution. Local codes usually save certain rights to the guiltless party. (Jordan v. Clark, 81 Ill. 465; Hunt v. Thompson, 61 Mo. 148; Rev. Stat. Ohio, Secs. 5699, 5700; 111 U. S. 523.)

A partial divorce from bed and board with provision for the payment of a gross sum as alimony does not bar dower (Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N. C. 418); but where both remarry a decree in favor of the wife with provision for permanent alimony, bars dower. (Tatro v. Tatro, 18 Nebr. 395; S. C., 53 Am. Rep. 820.)

Sec. 337. ALIMONY.—Alimony, in divorce law, is the means of support which the court compels the offending party to give the other spouse. It may be

given temporarily or permanently, and before or after a final decree. Permanent alimony may be enlarged or diminished by decree, and may continue after the death of the offending party. (77 Me. 373.) If the wife granted alimony remarries the court may revoke or reduce her alimony. (Beadleston v. Beadleston, 103 N. Y. 57.) By statute, provision is made for securing a decree for alimony, though no divorce is sought, and the grounds for granting it are specifically stated. (Rev. Stat. Ohio, 5702; Graves v. Graves, 36 Ia. 310.)

Sec. 338. VOID DIVORCES.-Divorces may be impeached for want of jurisdiction, since a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction against a party not resident there, and not personally served with process, and who has not appeared, is void. (People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78; Roth v. Roth, 104 Ind. 35; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30.) So an absolute divorce secured by fraud is void. (108 Mass. 590.) Only the parties can question the divorce, and even the children are not permitted to inquire into them. (Baugh v. Baugh, 35 Mich. 59.)

*

*In the present work many things found in other books have been omitted, partly to reduce the size of this book, partly because this subject is one regulated largely by statute in the different States, and as it is impossible to give them all in detail, only the general principles have been presented. The student is referred to the statutes and decisions in his particular State for local law.

PART II.

PARENT AND CHILD.

CHAPTER I.

Sec. 339. PARENT AND CHILD AS A DOMESTIC RELATION.-The second of the domestic relations is that of parent and child, and, as a legal topic, consists of those natural and legal rules which fix and govern the respective rights and duties between parents and their offspring. It is the most universal relation in nature, observes Blackstone, and immediately derived from that of husband and wife. (1 Bl. Com. 446.)

Sec. 340. LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.-All children are not born in lawful wedlock, and the law which aimed to protect another legal relation, that of marriage, did not scruple to deprive offspring born out of wedlock of all their natural rights. Hence children at common law, and now, are either legitimate or illegitimate, and the relation of parent and child, which by law of nature and reason should apply equally to these two sorts of children, as a matter of law does not, as we shall see. But first of legitimate children.

A legitimate child at the common law is one who is born in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time