be already familiar to him, then the language of the Poet may be understood; though many other, very many ideas must be united to these, to produce that richness and tenderness of feeling, which the whole is calculated to excite; and which, it is highly probable, that no description whatever could create in his breast. Again, we cannot doubt but that the Georgics and Bucolics of Virgil will be better understood, and more highly relished, by a cultivated mind that is acquainted with rural scenes and rural affairs, than one wholly a stranger to them. And for no other reason than because those scenes, and the objects of those affairs, have frequently interested his senses. And how differently does the description of a battle impress the mind of a common reader, and that of an old Soldier? How vague is the conception entertained by a Countryman of a first rate line of battle ship, or an East Indiaman! Whilst no language could have raised in the minds of the Greenlanders, visited by Captain Parry, an image at all commensurate with the appearance of the vessel itself. But, perhaps, the most striking instances of the inadequacy of language is to be found in Definition. We all remember the elaborate definition of network by Dr. Johnson; and we cannot but know, that that definition would fail to convey any idea of the thing itself, whatever Genius there might be in the mind of him to whom it was addressed. And what words can describe a Sloth, a Lobster, or a Bat?

These, and a thousand other objects, must be seen, or at least correct representations of them, before they can be understood. Sense here also reigns absolute.

I now come to the consideration of the last source of knowledge alluded to in this Essay, and which Locke has denominated reflection; and which he, as well as some other metaphysicians before him, considered as distinct from, and independent of sensation. As the reasoning of this Essay depends, in some measure, upon the removal of reflection, as a peculiar source of knowledge, I must intreat your patience whilst I advert to that metaphysical subject. I will endeavour to be as brief as is consistent with perspicuity.

Descartes, with whom this opinion respecting reflection originated, asks, in his second meditation, this question, "What am I?" to which he answers, "A thinking being; that is, a being doubting, knowing, affirming, denying, consenting, refusing, susceptible of pleasure and pain. Of all these things, I might have had complete experience without any previous acquaintance with the qualities and laws of matter; and, therefore, it is impossible that the study of matter can avail me aught in the study of myself."

Of these remarks Dugald Stewart observes, "they form the greatest step ever made in the science of the mind by a single individual." From this doctrine and opinion of these profound meta

physicians, rash and dangerous as it may seem, I cannot help dissenting. It quite surprises me that Descartes should assert, and that Dugald Stewart should approve the notion, that " doubting, knowing, affirming, denying," &c. are powers or properties of mind, of which, in the language of the French Philosopher, he "might have had complete experience without any acquaintance with the qualities or laws of matter."

What, let me seriously ask, is "doubting," independently of some thing, or some question, arising out of the relations, accidents, or circumstances of matter, respecting which we entertain a doubt? What is "knowing," abstractedly of something, or some truth to be known? What "affirming," if there be not some proposition to be affirmed? And, similarly, I might ask of all these supposed properties or powers of the mind.

I feel myself quite incapable of thinking of these intellectual operations, called "doubting, knowing, affirming," &c. without fixing upon something material, or some abstraction, which is formed out of material objects, of which I doubt, which I know, or which I affirm. They resemble, indeed, very much the abstract ideas of the metaphysicians; such as whiteness, swiftness, roundness, &c.; and let any one attempt to think of whiteness without thinking of something that is white, or of swiftness without thinking of something that is in motion, and he will immediately perceive that it

cannot be done so these acts or operations of the mind, are not properties of mind capable of existing independently of matter, but states or conditions of mind, arising out of a perception of its peculiar relation to matter, or a relation of objects to one another. And it seems to me most clear, that the mind would never have doubted, known, affirmed, &c. at all, if it had not first had a conversancy with external nature: or, as follows from Mons. Trembley's observation, if we were deprived of sense, we should be deprived of knowledge; and what, under such circumstances, would remain to doubt, to know, to affirm, &c.?

Of conception, memory, judgment, volition, &c. upon which knowledge of this kind is said to depend, it will not be necessary, after what has already been advanced, to add much more.

In conception, the mind is simply conscious of the former existence, and manner of existence of some material object; or, rather, it may be considered as a consciousness of some impression once made upon the senses. When there coexists a consciousness of the first impression, it is called memory. Upon what power, whether mental or physical, this faculty depends, I shall not here attempt to explain. They who have attempted it, have left it as they found it, quite inexplicable. The cells of Descartes are as rational, or as absurd, as any thing that has been offered upon the subject. How it may be improved, will form

D

a topic of enquiry in the subsequent part of this Essay.

In judgment, two objects are perceived together, and the relation subsisting between them. And what seems to distinguish man from animals, as respects this power of the mind, consists in a command over a larger range of ideas; which, at his will, appear in succession, and undergo this mentally visible comparison: whilst in animals it is much more restricted. Whether they can create a single new association, by bringing together any two independent ideas; or whether, when any object addresses itself to their senses, they have the power of tracing its resemblance, connection, dissimilarity, &e. with ideas previously received, I shall not undertake to determine; but the free and extensive exercise of this power, appears to confer on man his chief superiority.

How volition determines the mind to action, or communicates motion to matter, we know nothing. We cannot, in human language, speak of mind in its independent state of existence; it is ever associated with material objects. With Lactantius we must confess, "nec quid sit mens, nec qualis, intelligi protest."*

* I cannot forbear to quote a few words from this elegant writer; which, had they been remembered by Locke, when he wrote his admirable Essay on the Understanding, would have secured him from the unguarded expression, that "the power