1. Bailment-Ordinary Care.-While the destruction or loss of property in hands of bailee is not conclusive on question of bailee's negligence, the failure to return the property requires bailee to show that it exercised ordinary care while property was in its custody.-Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., N. C., 102 S. E. 313.

2. Bankruptcy-Adjudication. A bankrupt cannot waive and thus nullify the provisions of the bankruptcy law, an adjudication in bankruptcy operating not only for the benefit of the bankrupt, but also for his general creditors.Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. McVay, Ark., 219 S. W. 34.

3. Concealment. Omission from a bankrupt's schedules of corporate stock having no possible value held not a concealment of assets which defeats the right to discharge.-In Hughes, U. S. C. C. A., 262 E. 500.

re

4.- -Preference.-Where insolvent who afterwards became a bankrupt, having sold to defendant forged notes and mortgages purchased by defendant as an investment for his wife, was forced to refund the payment made, evidence held to show that such payment did not constitute a preference; defendant having no more than a suspicion that the seller was then insolvent.-Craig v. Sharp, Mo., 219 S. W. 98.

5. Banks and Banking-Depositor.-A bank becomes the absolute owner of money deposited

with it. to the general credit of a depositor, in the absence of any special agreement importing a different character into the transaction. -Johnson v. Barton, Fla., 83 So. 722.

trans

V.

6. Bills and Notes-Transfer.-The feree of a negotiable paper before it is 'due cannot be affected by any agreement or understanding between other parties thereto, unless notice of such agreement or understanding is brought home to transferee.-Hart Metropolitan Discount Co., Ga., 102 S. E. 375. 7. Burglary-Burden of Proof.-In a prosecution for breaking and entering a railroad car belonging to one company in possession of another, the state has the burden of showing such possession.-State v. Dolson, Iowa, 176 N. W. 678.

The common carrier

9. Carriers of Passengers-Baggage. common-law rule is that a of passengers carries the ordinary baggage of passengers as an incident to the contract of passenger carriage; and the limitation of liability to a loss of baggage exclusive of merchandise follows from the nature of the contract.-McQuat v. Cook's Taxicab & Transfer Co., Minn., 176 N. W. 763.

10. Commerce-Telegraph Messages.-In an action for a penalty under Rev. St. 1909, § 3330, for failure tlo promptly transmit and deliver telegraph messages, where it appeared that the message was sent from a point within the state to another point within the state, but routed through a point in another state from which it was relayed to its destination, the message was an interstate one governed by the Laws of Congress, and the state special penalty statutes were not applicable.-Foster V. Western Union Telegraph Co., Mo., 219 S. W. 107.

11. Compromise and Settlement-Accord and Satisfaction.-While the holder of a tax bill offered to accept less than was due-that is, the face of the bill exclusive of interest-but withdrew the offer before any payment was made thereon or even proper tender of payment, if the transaction was a compromise, there was no sufficient settlement, if an accord, no sufficient satisfaction, to make the new agreement a merger of the old demand and to bar all action thereon.-Chapman v. Adams, Mo., 219 S. W. 132.

12. Contracts-Construction.-Where an instrument is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would make it legal and the other illegal, the former construction should always be adopted by the court.-Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, Tex., 219 S. W. 254.

13. Substantial Performance.-"Substantial performance" means not doing the exact thing promised, but doing something else that is just as good, or good enough for both obligor and obligee.-Dorrance v. Barber & Co., U. S. C. C. A. 262 Fed. 489.

14. Corporations-Accepting Benefits.-Where a private corporation accepts the benefits of a contract made on its behalf by an unauthorized agent, and thereby ratifies the contract in its entirety, it is bound to perform the obligations provided by the contract to be performed on its part.-Chafin v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., W. Va., 102 S. E. 291.

15. Foreign Corporation.-A foreign corporation, as such, is subject to foreign attachment.-Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Skeele Coal Co., Pa., 109 Atl. 160.

16.- -Inspection of Books-A stockholder has the right to know how the affairs of the company are conducted, and whether the capital is being prudently and profitably employed, and to inspect the books to obtain such knowledge; the right resting on the fact of ownership.-Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scherich, Ky., 219 S. W. 191.

17. Slander.-A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation, and within the scope of the duties of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question.-Headley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, Ga., 102 S. E. 374.

18. Covenants-Personal.-A covenant against incumbrances is not a covenant running with the land, but in the nature of a personal covenant.-Levine v. Hull, Md., 109 Atl. 141.

19. Criminal Law-Accomplice. An accomplice cannot be corroborated by proof of his own acts and statements in the absence of the accused, nor can an accomplice corroborate himself. Fitzgerald v. State, Tex., 219 S. W. 199.

20. Accomplice.-To sustain a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the accomplice testimony, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty. -Roberson v. State, Ga., 102 S. E. 378.

21. Confession.-A confession is an admission or acknowledgment of guilt of the very offense charged which may be made by accused's statement in the form of a conclusion that he is "guilty" or by his admission of the essential facts constituting the crime; but an admission of the truth of facts not in themselves sufficient to constitute the alleged offense is not a confession of guilt, although the admission as to the facts may be admissible in evidence in support of the charge.-State v. Cook, Iowa, 176 N. W. 674.

23. Death-Eye Witness.-One instantly killed at railroad crossing, no witness seeing the tragedy, is presumed to have been in the exercise of due care; that is, such care as a reasonably prudent person, in his situation and with his knowledge, would ordinarily and reasonably exercise.-Tibbels v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., Mo., 219 S. W. 109.

24. Deeds-Conflicting Provisions. In the construction of deeds, the intention of the grantor, if it plainly appears from an inspection of the instrument, will overcome contradictory or conflicting stipulations or conditions, and control the construction absolutely. -Preston v. Wells, Ky., 219 S. W. 173.

25. -Public Policy.-Where grantors had been indicted for murder, deed in consideration of grantee's agreement to get them out of trouble held void as against public policy; the consideration being an agreement to defeat the administration of criminal laws.-Mounts v. Charles, Ky., 219 S. W. 184.

26. -Trust Fund. Where a person dies owing a debt his creditors may in equity follow assets left by such person in the hands of a distributee, and where the assets received by the distributee are sufficient to pay the debt, the creditors may obtain a personal judgment against the distributee for the amount of his debt in view of Civ. Code 1910, § 3785.-Morrison v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, Ga., 102 S. E. 354.

27. Divorce Cruelty.-It is only when cruelty becomes a danger to life that a cause of action accrues therefor.-Hickman v. Hickman, Iowa, 176 N. W. 698.

28.—Perjury.-False swearing or perjury upon the original case is not such fraud as will alone justify the vacation of a judgment and the granting of a new trial upon a petition in equity filed after the term at which judgment was entered.-Holmes v. Holmes, Iowa, 176 N. W. 691.

29. Equity-Laches.-To make applicable the law of laches it should appear that defendants had been led into changing their cond:tion with respect to the property, so that it would be inequitable to allow plaintiffs to be preferred on their legal rights.-Lesser v. Reeves, Ark., 219 S. W. 15.

30. Multifariousness.-Bill Dy minority stockholders to restrain corporation from paying excessive salaries to directors not multifarious. Almy v. Almy, Bigelow & Washburn, Mass., 126 N. E. 417.

31. Relief.-Equity looks to substance rather than to form, and will not sanction an unconscionable result merely because it may have been brought about by means which simulate legality. (Per Walker, C. J., and Williamson and Williams, JJ.)-Johnson v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, Mo., 219 S. W. 38.

32. Executors and Administrators-Funeral Expenses. Expenditures for publishing cards of thanks in newspapers and mailing them to sympathetic friends for the purpose of expressing appreciation constitute no part of the funeral expenses, and was not a proper charge against the estate of the deceased as a part of the "funeral expenses."-Oster's Ex'r v. Ohlman, Ky., 219 S. W. 187.

33. Frauds, Statute of-Fraud.-In order to prevent a statute intended to prevent fraud from being the means of perpetrating fraud. the law treats as a nullity a written contract fraudulently obtained.--Suber v. Parr Shoals Power Co., S. C., 102 S. E. 335.

by parol evidence.-Blythe, Markley, Rule & Smith v. Cummins, Iowa, 176 N. W. 688.

36. Fraudulent Conveyances. Badge of Fraud.-The transfer of substantially all of the property of the judgment debtor when embarrassed financially; the transfer by the debtors in anticipation of a suit; failure to put conveyances on record under certain circumstances; the unexplained retention by grantors of the possession of property transferred-are badges of fraud.-Central City Sav. Bank v. Snyder, lowa, 176 N. W. 695.

37. Bulk Sales Law. A sale of a stock of goods in violation of the Bulk Sales Law is fraudulent and void.-Peters Branch International Shoe Co. v. Gunn, Miss., 83 So. 742.

38. Garnishment-Agent.-An agent of the defendant may be held as garnishee for property or moneys of the defendant in his possession.-Dakota Nat. Bank v. Brodie, N. D., 176 N. W. 738.

39. Homestead - Abandonment.

- Any duration of absence from a homestead is not in itself conclusive of the fact of abandonment.Warner v. Hopkins, S. D., 176 N. W. 746.

43. Injunction -Easement. An injunction will lie to prevent a wrongful act, if the continuance of such acts will in time ripen into an easement in favor of defendant, which will operate to deprive plaintiff of the use of his property, or

where some part thereof, or takes from him the substance of his estate, though the immediate damage inflicted is inappreciable.-Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court of Tulare County, Cal., 187 Pac. 1056.

44. Peaceful Picketing.-Peaceful picketing engaged in for purpose of persuasion may be enjoined. Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local No. 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Stablemen and Helpers of America, N. J. 109 Atl. 147.

45. Insurance-Accident.-There can be no recovery under an accident policy if the insured does a voluntary act the natural, usual, and tobe-expected result of which is to bring injury upon himself; injury or death so occurring not being produced by "accidental means" in any sense of the word, legal or colloquial.-Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., Cal., 187 Pac. 1070.

46. Cancellation.-Where insurer gave notice that on a fixed date it would cancel the policy, and insured accepted the notice as a cancellation and retained the unearned premium returned to him, he is bound by the acceptance.Malin v. Netherlands Ins. Co., Mo., 219 S. W. 143.

47. Forfeiture.-There is no forfeiture or denial of liability when the insurer treats the policy sued upon as a valid or binding contract. -Dodder v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, Neb., 176 N. W. 730.

48.Insurable Interest.-The owner of a vendor's lien on real property owns an insurable interest therein, where there is no provision in the contract of insurance, providing that

the insurer shall own the exclusive or unconditional title in the property.-Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Hodges, Ark., 219 S. W. 13.

49. Oral Contract.-An oral contract witn an insurer's agent for the renewal of a fire policy at its expiration is binding on the insurer and sufficient, although it was not reduced to writing until after the fire.-American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, Tex., 219 S. W. 277.

50. -Waiver.-Acceptance of premium after it became due could not be a waiver of such provision, where insured was sick at the time and the insurer did not know it, as a waiver cannot exist without knowledge of the facts.Wiser v. Central Business Men's Ass'n, Mo., 219 S. W. 102.

51. Judgment-Collateral Attack.-A decree of a court having jurisdiction in a proceeding, in all respects regular on its face as to parties, cannot be attacked collaterally.-Stocks Stocks, N. C. 102 S. E. 306.

V.

52. Default.-Where the defendant was of sound mind, and, though his bodily infirmitles confined him, carried on business and defended other suits, a default judgment against such defendant will not be vacated on account of excusable neglect, because of his infirmities.Jernigan v. Jernigan, N. C., 102 S. E. 310.

53. Intervention.-Where a suit is brought on behalf of all persons similarly situated, such persons are quasi parties, and may intervene and make themselves actual parties when necessary for the protection of their interest, and they are bound by the decree.-Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court of Tulare County, Cal., 187 Pac. 1056.

54. Res Judicata.-A fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties, even if the second suit is for a different cause of action.-Lyons v. Empire Fuel Co., M. S. C. C. A., 262 Fed. 465.

55. Landlord and Tenant — Dispossession.— Where a third person officiously and mischievously attempts to dispossess a tenant by denying the lessor's title and raising doubts in minds of tenant and negro subtenants on a plantation as to whether, in view of pending or threatening litigation, they will realize anvthing from improvementt of labor, with resulting failure of lessor to receive share of crop agreed on as rental, he may recover in an action in damages.-Martin v. Sterkx, La., 83 So. 776.

56. Guests.-Guests and members of family of tenant have no greater rights against landlord than has he.-Angevine v. Hewitson, Mass., 126 N. E. 425.

57. Surrender.-No surrender in absence of abandonment of possession by lessee.-People's Express v. Quinn, Mass., 126 N. E. 423.

58. Libel and Slander-By Innuendo.-Words not in themselves conveying any defamatory meaning may by innuendo be shown to charge commission of a crime, but for such purpose new matter cannot be introduced, and the actual meaning of the words cannot be enlarged. -Fuson v. Abilene Gas & Electric Co., Tex., 219 S. W. 208.

59.- -Privilege.-Fair criticism of qualifications and conduct of officials and candidates for public office is qualifiedly privileged.—State v. Greenville Pub. Co., N. C., 102 S. E. 318. 60. Limitation of Actions. Discovery Fraud.-A fraud concealed, or committed such a way as to conceal itself, will toll the limitation statute until discovery of the fraud. -U. S. v. Woolley, U. S. D. C., 262 Fed. 518.

of in

61. Partial Payments.-Partial payments by maker of note not .binding on comaker for purposes of interrupting statute.-Fletcher v. Sturtevant, Mass., 126 N. E. 428.

62. Marriage Annulment.-A marriage can be set aside on the ground of fraud only on proof of deceit touching matters constituting the essentials of the marriage relation, and a woman cannot procure annulment of a marriage

because of the falsity of the man's representations as to his character, social standing, and fortune. Jakar v. Jakar, S. C., 102 S. E. 337.

63. Master and Servant-Contributory Negligence.-The distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk depends on whether the servant has made a careless choice between safe and unsafe ways of discharging his duties, or whether he has failed to take some precaution outside of the discharge of those duties.-Anzolotti v. McAdoo, U. S. D. C., 262 Fed. 568.

a

64. Proximate Cause.-Negligence of railroad employe in entering a tank car with torch, causing an explosion and a fire, cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of the death of another servant who was injured and overheated while subsequently fighting the fire.Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, Tex., 219 S. W. 197.

65. -Safe Working Place.-It is the employer's duty to use ordinary care to provide employe a safe working place.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Long, Tex., 219 S. W. 212

66. Mechanie's Lien-Priority.-The mechanic's lien which attaches prior to the purchase of the property is superior to the homestead claim of the purchaser's wife.-Ketcham Cunliff, Okla., 187 Pac. 1095.

V.

67. Mortgages-Estoppel.-The rule that one buying a non-negotiable security, such as a mortgage, takes it subject to all equities existing between the original parties, is inapplicable where the original parties have by their conduct, acts, or omissions estopped themselves from asserting existence of such equities.

Middleton v. Cockfield, S. C., 102 S. E. 328.

68. Setting Aside Sale.-Collusion between the trustee and mortgagee or management of the sale to preclude fair competition in bidding, particularly when the purpose is to favor some would-be purchaser, is cause for setting aside a sale by the trustee under trust deed.-Borth v. Proctor, Mo., 219 S. W. 72.

69. Negligence. Unavoidable Accident. Damages for injuries proximately resulting from unavoidable accident are damnum absque injuria.-Crow v. McAdoo, Tex., 219 S. W. 241. 70. Patents-Interference.-In patent interference cases where a patent has issued to the senior party before the junior party files his application, the junior party must establish that he is the inventor beyond reasonable doubt.Braun v. Wiegand, D. C., 262 Fed. 647.

71. Patentability.-Failure to appreciate the patentability of an invention does not excuse either failure to reduce it to practice or making timely application for letters patent.— Reichel v. Dorset, D. C., 262 Fed. 652.

there 72. Partition-Equity.--Where is a partition in fact between tenants in common and a part performance, court of equity will enforce such partition.-Sowers v. Keedy, Md., 109 Atl. 143.

73. Partnership-Settled Account.-A written agreement between partners concerning previous transactions in the practice of law, fixing the amount due in respect to such transactions, examined and signed by the partners. whereby one of the partners promised to pay the balance shown to be due from him to the other, created an account stated, and not a "settled" account as that term is generally understood, since the balance was not in fact paid.Dempsey v. McGinnis, Mo., 219 S. W. 148.

74. Principal and Agent.-Ratification—A transaction entered into by one in reference to the property of another, although without authority, must be ratified or repudiated as a whole, and a benefit cannot be accepted under it without being subject to its burdens.--Wilkins-Ricks Co. v. Welch, N. C., 102 S. E. 316.

75. Quieting Title-Cancellation.-To entitle one to maintain a bill for the cancellation, as a cloud on his title, of a deed purporting to convey the minerals in his land, he must show himself to be the owner of such minerals.-Feather v. Baird, W. Va., 102 S. E. 294.

76.

Railroad-Negligence per se.-An automobile driver, who attempts to beat an approaching train across a crossing, is negligent as a matter of law.-Puhr v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Wis., 176 N. W. 767.

77. Signals.-The failure to give notice of a train's approach to a much-used public crossing by sounding the whistle or bell is negligence.-Goff v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., N. C. 102 S. E. 320.

78. Sales-Contract. In action for failure to deliver a quantity of molasses to be manufactured, that defendant did not make enough molasses to fill his contract is not an excuse for failure to perform; the written terms of the sale being unconditional and for a fixed quantity at a definite price, and it being the seller's duty to see that the purchaser understood any conditions which seller wished to impose.Penick & Ford v. C. Lagarde Co., La., 83 So. 787.

79.

Installment Deliveries.-A contract for sale and purchase of 12,000 tons of coal per year for three years, 1,000 tons to be delivered each month and paid for the succeeding month, and further providing that, if the mines were unable to operate, or output was curtailed, from causes beyond seller's control, it should not be liable for failure to make shipments "during such periods," held severable as to each month's deliveries.-Atlantic Steel Co. v. R. O. Campbell Coal Co., U. S. D. C., 262 Fed. 555. 80. Sunday-Completion of Contract.-Where negotiations for a contract are made on Sunday, and on a subsequent secular day an act is done by the parties which completes the void Sunday contract, the Sunday negotiations are deemed reaffirmed on such subsequent secular day, and thus form the basis of either validating the void Sunday contract or of showing llability for a tort which induced the execution of the new or completed contract on the secular day. Mann v. Becker, Wis., 176 N. W. 765. 81.

Taxation-Domicile.-The personal property of a deceased person in the hands of his executors during the settlement of the estate is taxable at the place of the domicile of the decedent, if a resident of the state.-City of Blakely v. Hilton, Ga., 102 S. E. 340.

82. Vendor and Purchaser-Rescission-A party who desires to rescind his contract for the purchase of land, on the ground of fraud, must act promptly after discovering the facts. -Fleming v. Harris, Ark., 219 S. W. 33.

testa

83. Wills. Acknowledgment.-Where tor requested a justice of the peace to take his acknowledgment to the singnature of a will, and the justice did so, appending his signature as justice, that the justice was of opinion that he was not requested to sign as a witness did not prevent his signature from so operating.-Tilton v. Daniels, N. H., 109 Atl. 145.

84.- -Condition Precedent.-No particular or technical words are necessary in a will to constitute a condition, either precedent or subsequent, and it is not necessary that a right of reentering be reserved or that a forfeiture be provided in express terms.-Nolfe v. Byrne, Tenn., 219 S. W. 1.

85.-Fee Simple.-Under a will devising testator's land to his wife, free of all charge and limitation for her use and benefit forever for her use. to dispose of by will or otherwise as she deemed proper, she took a fee-simple title to the land and was expressly empowered to dispose of it by will or otherwise.-Denton v. Parsons, Ga., 102 S. E. 353.

86. Life Estate.-A bequest to a daughter of certain property "free from all debts. liabilities and obligations of any husband she may have, and after her death said property to go to her children," imported merely a life estate which was not enlarged into a fee by the further provision. "in event that said daughter should die without children. then I invest her with the right to dispose of such property by deed. will. or otherwise as she may think proper."-Mathis v. Glawson, Ga., 102 S. E. 351.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 21, 1920.

CAN Y BE CONSTITUTIONALLY TAXED TO PROVIDE A FARM FOR X?

Against the tide of socialistic or quasisocialistic legislation, being proposed by the legislatures of many states, the courts are setting up no serious obstacles. They are construing state and federal constitutions with a liberality that would have astounded the fathers.

For this observation we find an interesting illustration in the recent case of State v. Clausen, 188 Pac. 538, in which the State Reclamation Act of the State of Washington was held to be constitutional. This act created a Reclamation Board with authority to select public lands and to purchase undeveloped private lands believed to be available for settlement; to subdivide such lands into smaller tracts suitable for farms; to improve such farms with houses, barns and other accessories to a good farm; to sell and lease such farms on reasonable terms to desirable tenants, showing preference to soldiers; to extend credit on such purchases for a period not to exceed forty years; and to provide free instruction for settlers so as to render them better qualified for the cultivation of their lands. To test the validity of the tax levied for this purpose a friendly suit was instituted by the Board against the auditor to compel him to issue warrants in their favor against the fund so created.

It is elementary law that a tax may be levied and collected only where the fund so created is expended for a public purpose. A tax which directly bestows a purely private benefit upon some individual is clearly outside the powers of any legislature to levy. This principle is fundamental; unless it is strictly observed, the strongest social organization will fall apart. If the state can tax A to enrich B then it is possible for

any majority. or even a plurality to tax the minority-or even a majority to enrich those specially favored by the party in power.

We are aware of the difficulty of setting up a test to determine what is a public use; we are familiar with the fantastical argument of Justice Ladd in the celebrated case of Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514, who claimed that the Court's idea of a public use was no better than that of the legislature; we appreciate Dean Roscoe Pound's argument that judges must keep step with social conditions and adapt the law to the new demands and necessities of the people; but taking into account all of these elements we do not believe that a court has a right to shirk its duty to investigate carefully the purpose for which any fund created by taxation is to be used and, if found to be for a private purpose, fearlessly to use its power to protect those whose property is being taken away and given to others.

Because it is so difficult to determine what is a public use the danger is very great that gradually we will be led to give up those choice guarantees which are ours under the Constitution and which now so effectually protect us in the enjoyment of the things we call our own. There must therefore be set up somewhere a limit beyond which a legislature may not go in arbitrarily defining a public use. That limit, it is true, will not be the same in every age. The automobile for instance, has made necessary great state and national highways which in the day of horse traffic were not necessary. Congregation of large masses of people in large cities has resulted in a sharp curtailment of constitutional rights of private property in favor of the common welfare and the people have been properly taxed to remove garbage, to provide a water supply, and to do many things which, because of the great congestion and dependence of the people on each other, cannot be done by each individually, but can