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condemnation proceeding in which part of an 53.---Mortgagee.--Where a mortgagee inabutting owner's lot is taken.-Oil Fields & S. sures his own interest at his own expense, payF. Ry. Co. v. Treese Cotton Co., Okla., 187 Pac. ment of a loss before the mortgage is paid is 201.
not a payment on the mortgage, and, converse40. Executors and Administrators-Consider ly, a mortgagor, insuring his separate interation. A written instrument, assuming debt of est, is entitled to the insurance proceeds, but, a female servant, on consideration of faithful where the mortgagor effects insurance payable services and "other valuable considerations," to the mortgagee as his interest may appear, supported by affidavit of correctness on filing the policy is for the benefit of both parties.instrument as claim against estate of promisor, Sisk V. Rapuano, Conn., 108 Atl. 858. cannot be defeated on theory of want of consid 54. Interest-Damages for Breach--While ineration, decedent having a perfect right to di terest will, in absence of contract therefor, be rect disposition of his estate.--Brickell v. Hen
allowed after maturity for an obligation to dricks, Miss., 83 So. 609.
pay money, it is so allowed for damages for the 11.- Estoppel.An executor or administrat breach of the obligation, while interest before or by his acts or omission may raise an estoppel maturity rests solely upon contract, and can against the estate.---Baber v. Houston Nat. never be collected, unless the obligor has conExch. Bank, Tex., 218 S. W. 156.
tracted to pay the same.—Lines v. Potter, S. D.,
176 N. W. 150. 42. Explosives-Failure to Guard.Leaving dynamite caps exposed and unguarded in an
55. Intoxicating Liquors-Unlawful Possesopen drainage dipper near a public highway, sion.-Mere possession not made unlawful by where many persons were liable to pass, jus statutes.-Reed v. State, Ind., 126 N E. 6. tified a jury finding of negligence.- Erickson y. 56. Joint Adventures-Partnership.-An arW. J. Gleason & Co., Minn., 176 N. W. 199.
rangement, whereby plaintiff was to purchase Fraud-Reliance. One making false as
timber lands as defendant's agent, and the profits sertions or representations as to the character and losses were to be shared, was more nearly of land, which are unqualified and without res
a joint adventure than a partnership, where ervation, and of a character to induce reliance
plaintiff could not bind defendant to any purthereon, is liable, though acting in good faith.
chase or sale without defendant's authority in -Perkins V. Orfield, Minn., 176 N. W. 157.
each specific transaction.-Donahue v. Haskamp.
Wash., 187 Pac. 346. 44. Frauds, Statute of-Party Wall. Where an oral agreement between adjoining owners
57. Judgment-Conclusiveness.-A judgment that one of them might build a party wall on that is not in rem is never conclusive except the division line and own the whole wall until
upon the very matter in judgment and between the other paid one-half of the cost had been the same parties or their privies, either in blood fully executed by the parties building the wall.
or estate. -Kimball y. New York Life Ins. Co.. and they were in possession as owners, equity
Vt., 108 Atl. 921. would recognize and protect their rights, though 58. Landlord and Tenant-Abandonment.-the agreement was within the statute of frauds. Where tenants paid rent up to the time they -Hanson V. Beaulieu, Minn., 176 N. W. 178.
abandoned their contract, the abandonment suf45. Gifts-Condition. That donor. in making
ficiently terminated the lease without giving gift of money with intent that it should be an
days' notice.-Lee V. Sumter Pine & Cypress absolute gift, required the donee to pay her in
Co., S. C., 102 S. E. 2. terest on the sum given during her lifetime, or 59.-- Assignment of Lease. No assignee of even give her back some of the principal if a lease or subtenant can be heard to say that desired, did not affect the validity of the gift. he was ignorant of the terms on which the lesGould V. Van Horne, Cal., 187 Pac. 35.
see held possession.-Smith v. Roberts, Tex.. 218 46. Fiduciary Relation.-One who occupied
S. W. 27. a fiduciary relation to the donor and was in 60.- Eviction.-There was no eviction of control of the donor's property has the burden tenant under a lease providing he might carry of showing that a gift was free and voluntary. on a general retail liquor business, a permisGiltz v. O'Malley, Md., 108 Atl. 878.
sive rather than a restrictive provision, by an 47. Good Will— Stockholder.--A stockholder
ordinance of the city rendering it impossible in a corporation has no interest in the good will
for the tenant to conduct a liquor business;
he not being restricted in the use of the premof the corporation which he can sell.-Wylie V. Wylie Permanent Camping Co., Mont., 187
ises for other businesses.---Security Trust & Pac, 279.
Savings Bank v. Claussen, Cal., 187 Pac. 140.
- Termination of Tenancy. In order to 48. Husband and Wife-Coercion by Husband. There is no longer a presumption as at com
terminate a tenancy from year to year the law mon law that a married woman who commits
only requires reasonable notice. -- Robison V. a crime conjointly with or in the presence of
Barton, S. C., 102 S. E. 16. her husband acts under his corercion, since Ky. 62.- Undisclosed Principal.- Where agent St. &$ 2127, 2128, providing that wife holds and who did not have authority in writing as reowns all of her separate estate and may con quired by Rev. St. 1909, $$ 2781-2783, leased tract, etc., destroy such presumption.-King v. realty of his undisclosed principals for a term City of Owensboro, Ky., 218 S. W. 297.
greater than one year, the contract was not 49. Estoppel.-A wife who allows her hus
void, but created an estate at will, which hy band to use her property for a long time as his
reason of entry and payment of rental by the own land will not be allowed to claim it as
month made a valid lease from month to month, against his creditors.--Irwin V, Dugger, Ark.,
binding upon the principals.-Kreppelt y. Greer, 218 S. W. 177.
Mo., 218 S. W. 354.
63. Libel and Slander-Printed Defamation. 50. Indictment and Information-Signing by Stamp.-Attachment of prosecutor's name to af
Defamatory matter printed and published may fidavit by rubber stamp sufficient.--Zoller v.
be per se actionable, while the same matter oralState, Ind., 126 N. E. 1.
ly published would not be 80.- Baker v. Clark,
Ky., 218 S. W. 280. 51. Injunction-Irreparable Injury.-A Court
64. Limitation of Actions-Tolling Statute.of equity will not interfere to enjoin an owner of lands from exercising his lawful rights as
Payment of interest after running of limitations owner, nor from doing that which admi
removes bar.-Spencer v. McCune, Ind., 126
N. E. 30. i9 wrong, unless it is first shown that the wrong has been threatened, and that it is his 65. Malicious Prosecution-Malice.-Out of intent to carry the thre
the commencement and prosecution of a cause. irreparable injury of complainant.-Mumford y. less action by one person against another, the Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, U. S. C. C. A., 261 presumption of malice may arise from proof of Fed. 842.
the fact of a want of probable cause for the
institution of such action-Black 52. Insurance - Assignment. - Ordinarily,
v. Knight, where an insured assigns a life policy for ben
Cal., 187 Pac. 89. efit of creditors without any consideration pass
66.- Probable Cause.---Want of probable ; ing at the time, the assignment will be regarded
cause cannot be inferred from malice.- Camas security only and upon payment of the debtsmander V. Provident Relief Ass'n, Va., 102 S. insured is entitled to a return of the policy or
E. 89. its remaining proceds.--Landrum V. Landrum's 67. Mandamus - Administrative Body - Will Adm'x, Ky., 218 S. W. 274.
not lie to usurp functions vested in adminis
trative bodies.-Luginbuhl v. State, Ohio, 126 N. E. 71.
68.--Inspection by Stockholder:--Remedy not afforded stockholder desiring access to books except in case of serious prejudice by denial.Shea v. Parker. Mass., 126 N. E. 47.
69. Master and Servant--Assumption of Risk, --- Where there is no negligence on the part of the master, assumption of risk has no place in the case.—Southern Pac. Co. v. Stevenson, Tex., 218 S. W. 151.
70.-- Malicious Acts.-A master is liable for the wanton or malicious acts of his servant if committed when the servant is acting in the execution of his authority and within the course of his employment, but the master is not liable where the servant is not acting in the execution of his authority and without the course of his employment.-Archuleta V. Floersheim Mercantile Co., N. M., 187 Pac. 272.
71. Municipal Corporations Police Power.Whether an ordinance enacted in the exercise of the police power is calculated to promote the object of its enactment, or the municipal legislative will has been clearly expressed, is not a question for the Court.-Ex parte Lerner, Mo., 218 S. W. 331.
72.- Ratification.-Ratification of a contract binding a city can only be by the city council acting as a body and may be effected by any action or contract which gives to the contract the stamp of approval, and this may be done by acquiescence with knowledge of the facts.Tracy Cement Tile Co. v, City of Tracy, Minn, 176 N. W. 189.
73. Negligence- Attractive Nuisance. — An open, unguarded stope in a dark abandoned mining tunnel, connected with a new tunnel, with a track for small push cars, left outside of the tunnels, unfastened and uninclosed held to constitute an attractive nuisance, rendering the mine owner liable for the death of a boy 11 years old, who fell into the stope while playing on the cars.--Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., Cal., 187 Pac. 101.
74.- Child.--Child of five not guilty of contributory negligence. - Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. V. Stevenson, Ind., 126 N. E. 34.
75.-— Licensee.- Persons soliciting one for the use of his automobile to take them to picnic grounds and return are mere licensees, to whom he owed only the duty of refraining from wantonly or willfully injuring them. — Lutvin v. Dopkus, N. J., 108 Atl. 862.
76.— Statutory Violation.--It is essential to the maintenance of an action for damages for personal injury, founded on the violation of a statute, to establish not only the violation, but that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury.---Waterman Lumber Co. v. Beatty, Tex., 218 S. W. 363.
77.- Ultimate Purchaser.---The manufacturer of an automobile, who fails to use reasonable care in inspecting and testing the wheels, is liable to a purchaser, injured by the breaking of a defective wheel, though such purchaser bought from a dealer.-Johnson V. Cadillac Motor Car Co., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 878.
78. Parent and Child-Negligence of Child Parent not liable for personal injury by an automobile negligently driven by son on the ground of agency.-Elms v. Flick, Ohio, 126 N. E. 66.
79. Partnership-Individual Act.-The working member of a nontrading partnership to grow potatoes could not bind the firm by his individual act in borrowing money for it and incumbering its property.-Gordon v. Aumiller, Wash., 187 Pac. 354.
80. Principal and Agent-Declarations by Agent.-Declarations of agent inadmissible to prove authority.--Bankers' Surety Co. v. German Investment & Securities Co., Ind., 126 X E. 6.
81.- Retaining Benefits.--A principal retaining the benefits obtained for him by his agent cannot repudiate the acts of the agent inducing the other party to the contract to enter into it on the ground that such acts were unauthorized, as by accepting the contract he takes it w whatever taint attached to its origin, and by retaining the benefits he assumes the same responsibility therefor as though such acts had
been authorized.-Roseberry v. Hart-Parr Co. Minn., 176 N. W. 175.
82.- i'ndisclosed Principal.-An undisclosed principal is bound by simple contracts made by his agent when the acts done by the agent are within the scope of his authority and in the course of his employment.-Bankers' Surety Co. v. Willow Springs Beverage Co., Neb., 176 N. W. 82.
83. Principal and Surety-Release of Surety. --If owner made a side agrement with contract. or modifying the building contract as to making of payments, but did not disclose exisience of such agreement to contractor's surety, the side agreement would be a fraud upon and would release surety.-Union Oil Co. of California V. Pacific Surety Co., Cal., 187 Pac, 14.
84. Railroads--Custom and Usage.--Custom and usage of railroads using a yard not to require warning signals that cars on a general delivery track were being repaired did not excuse the repair man of a road in voluntarily and unnecessarily risking the known and obvious danger of having a car moved upon him by the other road in switching, by getting under it without displaying the usual repair signals.Lavelle's Adm'r v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., Vt., 10$ Atl. 918.
85.---Trespasser.-Railroad's duty to trespasser on tracks is merely to exercise ordinary care for his preservation after discovery of his peril, and to refrain from inflicting willful or wanton injury.--Carr v. United Rys. & Electric Co. of Baltimore, Md., 108 Atl. 872.
86. Sales Conditional Sale.-A conditional vendee cannot before title is vested in him, re. cover general damages for a breach or warranty.-Baca v. Fleming, N. M., 187 Pac. 277.
87.— Executory Contract.-An executory contract for the future sale of a commodity is not enforceable, unless by the terms of the contract it is so intended, and there is certainty as to the subject-matter and price.-Tift v. Shiver & Aultman, Ga.. 102 S. E. 47.
88.- Express Warranty. A warranty is 'express" when the seller makes an affirmation with respect to the article to be sold, pending the treaty of sale, upon which it is intended that . the buyer shall rely in making the purchase. Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co., Wash., 187 Pac. 319.
89. Specifie Performance Injunction. Where a married woman's suit for specific performance of a land contract is pending and defendant sues out a warrant to evict plaintiff's husband, with whom plaintiff resides as a tenant holding over, injunction will issue at plaintiff's instance to restrain execution of the warrant, if it appears that the specific performance suit is prosecuted in good faith and is well founded.Dowling v. Doyle, Ga., 102 S. E. 27.
90. Street Railroads-Last Clear Chance.If a pedestrian, about to cross the track of a street railroad sees a car coming at such distance that he has reasonable ground to suppose that he can cross in safety, he is justified in making the attempt; and if the operator of the car sees him, it is his duty to give him a reasonable opportunity to cross. - Ploxin v Brooklyn Heights R. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 854.
91. Theaters and Shows-Police Power --As the amusement business is a private business, and not a business affected with a public interest, it may be exercised under the police power of the state. -O'Neil v. Providence Amusemnt Co., R. I., 108 Atl. 887.
92. Trusts_Trust Fund.—A cestui que trust may trace and recover trust funds unlawfully diverted by his trustee.-Stokes v. Burlington Count Trust Co., N. J., 108 Atl. 863.
93. Usury_Pari Delicto.-The parties to 3 uusurious transaction are not regarded in equity as in pari delicto.-Ice v. Barlow, W. Va., 103 S. E. 127.
94. Wills---Ademption.- Where the purchaser's rights were based upon a written agreement to convey and not upon a codicil subsequently executed by the vendor, the fact that the vendor agreed to convey to another after making his codicil does not defeat the purchas. er's contract rights under the principle of ademption.- Lynam v. Harvey. Del.. 108 Atl. 850
taxation in this way even if not required Central Law Journal. taxatior
to do so? Perhaps these are the real federal
questions which may arise, the only other ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 23, 1920.
question being whether the New York
court will continue to construe the state SHOULD THE FEDERAL INHERITANCE statute as ignoring the federal tax as a
TAX BE DEDUCTED BEFORE COMPUT proper deduction, regardless of the unjust ING THE STATE TAX ON INHERIT results which follow that decision, when ANCES?
the practice in other states, as in Massachusetts, for instance, allows the federal
tax as a reasonable and a proper deducThe lawyers of New York and Massachusetts are debating the question whether 1 In 90 Cent. L. J. p. 39 (issue of Jan. 16, in computing the state inheritance tax on 1920) we called attention to the opinion of a legacy it is proper first to allow a deduc- | Justice Hand in the case of Prentiss v. tion of the federal tax on inheritances. In
Eisner, 260 Fed. 589. In this case the Massachusetts the practice is to allow such
| peculiar character of the tax on inherita deduction; in New York it has been held
ances is explained. The chief peculiarity by the Court of Appeals that “our tax is of this form of taxation is that it is not to such a fraction of the gross estate as is
against the legatee or the legacy but is a arrived at by making calculations in which
reservation to be held out of the estate the federal tax is not declared.”
before it is transferred to the legatee and A writer in the Massachusetts Law Quar
such reservation is a condition to the vestterly calls attention to the injustice that
ing of the legacy. In other words a legatee results from this lack of uniformity in the
does not inherit the amount of the legacy computation of the inheritance tax where
as fixed by the testator, and a distributee in one case the federal tax is deducted and
does not receive the amount fixed by the in another, it is not. He wishes to know
Statute of Descents and Distributions, but whether a federal question is presented by
in either case the legacy or distributive share such a situation. He says:
is the amount so fixed in the will or statute
after first deducting the amount of the tax. "Suppose the act of congress had said
| In the case of a devise the devisee in effect in so many words the federal estate tax
gets only an equity, the inheritance tax being hereby imposed is intended as an excise, or cutting out, from the entire estate of an
a prior lien on the property so devised and amount which shall be deducted before not a charge imposed upon the devisee. This any similar taxes are imposed by the state. is also the view taken by the New York Could congress say this effectively under Court of Appeals in Matter of Swift, 137 the Federal Constitution as part of the su
N. Y. 77, where that Court declares that preme law of the land binding upon the State of New York? Has it said so? The
by virtue of the inheritance tax, “the state question whether it has said so seems to be reaches out and appropriates for its a federal question as to the proper interpre use a portion of the property at the tation of the federal statute imposing the
moment of its owner's decease, allowestate tax. If it has said so, the question
ing only the balance to pass in the whether it can say so legally seems to be a federal question under the Constitution of
way directed by the testator or perthe United States. On this question of mitted by its intestate law.” power, while it has been decided that “ex We do not see that a federal question is cises," etc., must be "uniform” only in a
created by the construction of the New geographical sense, I do not understand that congress cannot so provide that they shall
York courts in refusing to permit a deducbe uniform in some other sense. Has not
tion of the federal inheritance tax before Congress the power to protect from double I computing the state tax. Both taxes operate in the same way, on the same 1 It is desirable, however, that in the matestate at the same time. Both demand the ter of assessing inheritance taxes the states reservation of a fixed amount from a legacy should adopt a uniform practice on the or distributive share before it can properly question of deducting the federal tax bebecome the property of the legatee or dis fore assessing the state tax. The Confertributee. The right of inheritance and the ence of Commissioners on Uniform State right to take under a will are privileges Laws might very properly be asked to created by law and can be made subject recommend a uniform law establishing the to whatever conditions the legislatures, both | practice in this regard to be observed by federal and state, having jurisdiction over all the states. the property of the decedent, may seek to impose. The jurisdiction of the federal government is co-ordinate with that of the state government and neither is restricted
NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. by the action of the other. The tax is computed in whatever way each jurisdiction
IS AN ORDER OF A COURT OF BANKmay determine without regard to what the RUPTCY, DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS other may ,do.
A PETITION, REVIEWABLE BY AN APPEAL
OR A PETITION TO REVISE?-Whether one We believe that this conclusion is sus who is aggrieved by the action of the District
Court in a bankruptcy proceeding has a right tained by the decision of the Supreme
of appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals (Sec. Court in United States vs. Perkins, 163 U.
24a) or is limited to a petition to revise (Sec. S. 625. In this case a testator domiciled in
24b) is not infrequently a difficult question to New York gave a legacy to the United decide. The right of appeal is given in respect States. New York sought to impose an
to any decision of a controversy arising in
bankruptcy proceedings of which the Court of inheritance tax on the legacy, which was
Appeals would have had appellate jurisdiction resisted as a tax on the federal govern
if it had arisen in any other case in a federal ment. The Supreme Court denied the con
Court. The right to revise is a summary jurtention of the government on the isdiction given to the Court of Appeals to corground that the tax was not imposed rect the errors of law of the District Court
in bankruptcy proceedings, that is, the ordinary on the United States but on the New
steps taken in such a proceeding to determine York testator's right to dispose of
the fact of bankruptcy and administer the eshis estate. The Court declared that
tate of the bankrupt. "the legacy becomes the property of the
The difficulty in determining the proper remUnited States only after it has suffered a
edy in such cases is illustrated by the recent diminution to the amount of the tax.”
decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals (2nd Cir.)
in the case of In re Dressler Producing Corpora. It seems therefore clear that the state in tion, 262 Fed. Rep. 257. In this case appellant, assessing and computing an inheritance tax Marie Dressler, owning one half of the stock is in no way concerned with the fact that
of the alleged bankrupt corporation, instituted
| a proceeding in the New York Supreme Court the federal government also exacts a similar
to dissolve the corporation and to appoint a tax upon the same rights and privileges.
receiver. The directors subsequently filed in There is no rule of priority to be observed the federal Court an admission of bankruptcy, but each jurisdiction proceeds independent and asked to be declared a bankrupt. They of the other. The fact that this results in
further prayed that the proceedings in the state
Court be stayed. The District Court, against double taxation is no objection to the legal
the prayer in the intervening petition of apity of the tax, although it might be a
pellant, assumed jurisdiction and stayed the proper basis for an appeal to the legislature
proceedings in the state Court. The ground or to Congress.
of appellant's intervening petition was that the
corporation was not insolvent and that the ad- the distinction between the two remedies is mission of bankruptcy was made for the fraud. carefully set forth. The Court said: ulent purpose of defeating the state Court's
"Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals rightjurisdiction. The appellant sought a review
ly sustained its jurisdiction turns upon whether of the trial Court's action and filed both an this is one of those 'controversies arising in appeal and a petition to revise. On the ques. bankruptcy proceedings' over which the Circuit
Courts of Appeals are invested, by section 24a tion of the proper appellate procedure the Court
of the Bankruptcy Act, with the same appellate of Appeals held that a defeated party in a
jurisdiction that they possess in other cases bankruptcy proceeding could not take advan under Judicial Code, 128 (Comp. St. § 1120), tage of both remedies for review but must or is a mere step in bankruptcy proceedings the
appellate review of which is regulated by other choose the proper one. In this case the Court
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act? If it is held that the proper method of review was by
a controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedpetition to revise, which brought up only ques. ings, the jurisdiction of that Court was proptions of law. On this interesting point, the erly invoked, as is also that of this Court. Court said:
We entertain no doubt that it is such a controversy. It has every attribute of a suit in
equity for the marshaling of assets, the sale "We have considered the cause as coming to
of the incumbered property, and the application us pursuant to a petition to revise, rather than
of the proceeds to the liens in the order and an appeal. Summary proceedings are review
mode ultimatey fixed by the decree. True, it able only by a petition to revise. In re Gold
was begun by the trustees and not by an adstein, 216 Fed. 887, 133 C. C. A. 91; Gibbons
verse claimant; but this is immaterial, for the v. Goldsmith, 222 Fed. 826, 138 C. C. A. 252.
mortgagees, who claimed adversely to the trusWhere the Court of bankruptcy has erroneously
tees, not only appeared in response to notice retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights
‘of the trustees' petition, but asserted their of an adverse claimant itself, the action may
mortgage liens and sought to have them enbe reviewed by a petition to revise. Mueller
forced against the proceeds of the property conv. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L.
formably to the contentions before stated. This Ed. 405; Shea v. Lewis, 206 Fed. 877, 124 C. C.
was the equivalent of an affirmative intervenA. 537; In re Gill, 190 Fed. 726, 111 C. C. A.
tion, and, when taken in connection with the 454; In re Vanoscope Co., 233 Fed. 54, 147 C.
trustees' petition, brought into the bankruptcy C. A. 123. There is a clear distinction between
proceedings a controversy which was quite 'controversies arising in bankruptcy proceed.
apart from the ordinary steps in such proceedings' and 'bankruptcy proceedings.' Bankruptcy ings and well within the letter and spirit of proceedings, broadly speaking, cover questions
section 24a.” between the alleged bankrupt and include the matters of administration generally, such as appointments of receivers and trustees, allow
A WIFE RECEIVING SEPARATE MAINTEance of claims, and matters to be disposed of summarily. All of these matters occur in the
NANCE CAN RECOVER UNDER WORKsettlement of the estate. In re Friend, 134 MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.-The WorkFed. 778, 67 C. C. A, 500. The determining fac men's Compensation Acts usually provide that tor or the important considerations for ascer
compensation in the event of workman's death, taining to which class the particular application belongs is to determine the object and
shall be paid to his dependents; and among character of the proceedings sought to be re those usually listed in the catagory of dependviewed. If it is a controversy arising in bank. ents is a wife "living with her husband or for ruptcy proceedings, the Circuit Courts of Ap
whose support such husband was legally liable peals exercise their jurisdiction as in other cases, under section 24a (Comp. St. $ 9608).
at the time of his death." It was recently conIf the controversy pertains to proceedings in
tended that this language did not include a bankruptcy relative to the adjudication and the wife living apart from her husband with a desubsequent steps in bankruptcy, it is one which
cree for separate maintenance but the Supreme may be reviewed in matters of law upon notice and a petition by the aggrieved party.”
Court of California held that since the husband,
by virtue of the decree of maintenance, is "le In the earlier cases these two remedies for gally liable" for his wife's support, the wife in review of bankruptcy proceedings were regard. such a case is entitled to the benefits of the ed as cumulative and not exclusive. In re Lee, Workmen's Compensation Act as a dependent. 182 Fed. 579; In re Flatland, 196 Fed. 310;
The Court said: In re Holmes, 142 Fed. 391. In the Lee case it was said that “an aggrieved party often has
"There are cited in petitioner's behalf au. a choice of these methods."
thorities to the effect that, when there has been But the later au
a divorce a mensa et thoro with a decree of thorities hold that the remedies are exclu maintenance to the wife, the common-law oblisive. Salsburg V. Blackford, 204 Fed. 438; gation of the husband is supplanted by the obli. Barnes v. Pampel, 192 Fed. 525; Bothwell v.
gation of the decree and the husband's respon. Fitzgerald, 219 Fed. 408. In Moody v. Century
sibility is measured by the decree. This is
true in the sense that the husband's obligation, Savings Bank, 239 U, S. 374, 36 Sup. Ct. 111,' previously indefinite as to the amount of sup