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tension of the kingdom of God in a certain man government agents during the World War church, held not an absolute gift to the person
removes it from the mater15 The World War
om the category of illegality named, but an attempted bequest in trust for
Frost v. Carse; N. J., 108 Atl. 642. the purpose stated in the will and invalid be
26. Courts-Rules of.-Court rules must not cause the beneficiaries were not certain or ca
be arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to a stalpable of being made certain.-In re Ford's Es
ute, nor of a nature to deprive a party or a tate, Minn., 175 N. W. 913.
legal right.-State ex rel. Caldwell . Cock16. Collision - Maritime Law. Negligence
rell, Mo., 217 S. W. 524. with which the law maritime concerns itself, as 27. Covenants-Adjoining Proprietor.–Plainin the case at the law of negligence everywhere,
tiff's right to relief from violation by defendant, is not negligence, but negligence which contrib
an adjoining proprietor, of restriction directly utes to the injury done; and hence a vessel is
affecting her lot, being a limitation on the disnot liable for negligence which did not contrib
tance from side lines within which buildings ute to the collision.--The Shawmut, U. S. D. C.,
might be erected, was not forfeited by a mere 261 Fed. 616.
failure to object to similar violations by others Commerce--Telegram.--Under Act Cong.,
in the neighborhood covered by the common June 18, 1910, c. 309, a telegram from a point in
building scheme.--Goulding V. Phinney. Mass.. one state to a point in another is interstate com
125 N. E. 703. merce, and the rights and liabilities in connec
28.- General Warranty.-Where land is sold tion therewith depends on the acts of Congress,
in bulk for a lump sum and not by the acre the contract contained on the telegram blank,
with the quantity warranted, the general warand the common-law principles accepted and en
ranty of title does not include a warranty of forced by the federal courts.- Western Union
the quantity of the land conveyed.-Nicholson Tel. Co. v. Norman, Miss., 83 So. 465.
v. C. C. Slaughter Co., Tex., 217 S. W. 716. 18. Contracts-Contingent Fee.-An agree 29. Criminal Law-Drunkenness.--Drunkenment of attorney to share his contingent fees ness as an excuse for the commission of an with one not an attorney for looking after and unlawful act is no defense.—Hall v. State, Fla., procuring evidence is against public policy. 83 So. 513. Johnson v. Higgins, Del., 108 Atl. 647.
30.-------Insanity.-To determine the issue as to 19.- Delivery.-No written contract is com
whether an accused was insane at the time of plete without delivery, and delivery consists
the alleged commission of an offense, testimony not in a mere nominal act of passing the paper
tending to show the mental condition of the acinto the hand of another, but the essence of
cused both before and after the commission or delivery is the intent of the parties, and it is
the act is competent.-McCully v. State, Ark., competent for them to attach thereto any con
217 S. W. 453. ditions upon which they agree.-Herron v. Brinton, Iowa, 175 N. W. 831.
31.— Principals in Misdemeanor.-Those who
procure or participate in the commission of a 20.---Option.-An option to renew a contract misdemeanor, or who assent thereto, are indictrequires the execution of a new contract, and able as principals.-Hager v. State, Ark., 217 S does not constitute a present demise; while an W. 461. option to extend the term is a present demise,
32.— Similar Acts.-Evidence of similar acts extending the term of the original agreement,
is competent and relevant upon question of which then becomes a contract for both the
knowledge, intent, plan, or design.-Bruno v. original and the extended term.—Helena Light
People, Col., 186 Pac. 718. & Ry. Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Mont., 186 Pac. 702.
33. Crops Reservation in Deed.-As between
the grantor and the grantee, growing crops will 21.- Rescission.-One of the elements re
pass to the grantee under a warranty deed withspecting a fraudulent statement warranting a
out reservations.-Hill v. Brothers, Mo., 217 S rescission of a contract is that the one making
W. 581. it must either know that it is false, or make it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth
31. Deeds-Condition Subsequent.-Acondiand as a positive assertion.-Palmiter v. Hack
tion subsequent in a deed that the property ett, Ore., 186 Pac. 581.
should not be occupied by a person not of Cau
casian birth, being not a restraint upon aliena22. - Seal.-An instrument under seal im
tion but upon the use of the property, is valid. ports consideration.-Morrison v. Boston Ins. -Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, Cal., 186 Pac. Co., Mass., 125 N. E. 698.
596. 23. Corporations-Inspection of Books.-A
35.--Reservation.-A reservation in favor stockholder has the right to examine corpora
of the grantor is to be construed more strictly tion books regardless of his purpose in so do
than a grant.-International Lumber Co. v. ing.–Jameson v. Hanawalt, Col., 186 Pac. 717. Staude, Minn., 175 N. W. 909.
24. Preferred Stockholder. - Preferred 36. Descent and Distribution-Posthumous stockholders whose dividends are in arrears had Child.-An action to quiet title is an approprino enforceable claim against the corporation
ate remedy for the determination of title to unless and until a dividend should be declared
land, as between a posthumous child. claiming by the directors, and so are not "creditors."
as heir at law, and one in possession, having a Wilder v. Trefry, Mass., 125 N. E. 689.
life estate in the land and asserting ownership. 25.- Voting Trust.-A voting trust of a sub -Gillespie v. Truka, Neb., 175 N. W. 883. marine boat corporation formed from the aggre 37. Divorce-Collateral Attack.-Decree of gate stockholders to preserve the identity of divorce obtained in a foreign state may be colthose who formed and developed the company | laterally attacked to show that the court which and to protect the stock from purchase by Ger rendered it had no jurisdiction, even though it
recites all necessary jurisdictional facts.-Richmond v. Sangster, Tex., 217 S. W. 723.
38. Ejectment-Adverse Possession.-One acquiring title to land by adverse possession can successfully defend an ejectment action brought by the owner of the record title.-Looney v. Sears, Ore., 186 Pac. 548.
39. Electricity-Failure of Performance.Where a power company agreed to provide such electric power as might be required for a certain purpose during a certain period, consumer not to take less than a certain amount in any one month, the power company could not excuse failure to give constant service, as agreed, by the fact that certain supplies could not be procured by reason of the World War,-Coal District Power Co. v. Katy Coal Co., Ark., 217 S. W. 449.
40. Eminent Domain-additional Burden. A municipal council may raise the grade of a street, and such action constitutes the imposition of no additional burden upon surrounding property.---Ukase Inv. Co. v. City of Portland, Ore., 186 Pac. 558.
41.- Enhanced Value.-The general enhancement of values in land in the vicinity of a railroad because of its construction is not a proper element of benefit to be allowed in condemnation proceedings.-Gallatin Valley Electric Ry. v. Neible, Mont., 168 Pac. 689.
42. Evidence-Judicial Notice. The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the fact generally known that a five-passenger Ford touring car, 1918 model, used six weeks and sold by the parties who stole it, for $200, was worth more than $20.-State v. Phillips, Kan., 186 Pac. 743.
43. Execution--Vacation of Judgment.-The vacation or reversal of a judgment operates to vacate an execution sale made thereunder as between the parties, where the execution plaintiff is the purchaser.-Hays v. Sound Timber Co., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 571.
44. Explosives-Misdemeanor.-Seller of a shell or cartridge to a boy less than 1 of age, in violation of Act June 10, 1881 (P. L. 111), § 1, making such a sale a misdemeanor, thereby made himself liable for any natural and probable result which might follow his wrongful act. --Shaffer v. Mowery, Pa., 108 Atl. 654.
45. Fraud-Reckless Statement.-If a party is so reckless as to make a statement which in fact is untrue and while negotioations are in progress he discovers it is not true, it is his duty to state the whole truth to the other party.
Palmiter V. Hackett, Ore., 186 Pac. 581.
46. Fraudulent Conveyances-Deed of Gift.Deeds of gift are constructively fraudulent and void as to prior claims of indebtedness against the grantor.-Boutwell v. Spurlin Mercantile Co., Ala., 83 So. 481.
47.- Preferred Creditor.-A husband honestly indebted to his wife may give her a valid preference, either by transfer of money or property in payment, or by giving security to the same extent that he may prefer any other creditor, and such a preference is not of itself fraudulent as to other creditors of the husband.Ebel v. Rock Island Implement Co., Col., 186 Pac. 719.
48. Guaranty - New Consideration. -- There must be a new consideration moving either to the principal or to the sureties, or to both, or a detriment to the obligee, for a bond guaranteeing the payment of a past indebtedness of the principal.-John A. Tolman & Co. v. Peterson, Wis., 175 N. W. 916.
49 Homestead Head of Family - Even though the head of the family at time of his execution of a security deed represented to grantee that there were no incumbrances, it would not affect the interests of the beneficiaries in the land, or estop grantor from interposing a claim in their behalf against a levy under execution on a judgment on a note secured by the deed.---McNair v. Fortner, Ga., 101 S. E. 772.
50. Homicide-Manslaughter.-It is the infliction of death by culpable negligence that constitutes manslaughter in the second degree, under Gen. St. 1913, § 8612, subdiv.--State v. Goldstone Minn., 175 N. W. 892. * 51. Seduction.-The law of Mississippi does not permit the relations of seduced young Wo
men to kill the seducer.- Doran v. State, Ark., 217 S. W. 485.
52. Husband and Wife-Alienation of Affections.-A married woman could not sue her father-in-law for alienation of her husband's affections; married women having no right to sue for alienation of affections, except as such right is given by Rev. St. c. 66, § 7, and such statute permitting suit against a female defendant only.-Farrell v. Farrell, Me., 108 Atl. 648.
53. Domicile.-In Texas an erring wife, by leaving her husband, cannot fix his domicile at the place of her own residence, to enable her, after removal to a foreign state, to make accurate affidavit of his residence there in her divorce suit, based on substituted service.-Richmond v. Sangster, Tex., 217 S. W. 723.
54. Indemnity- Primary Duty. The primary duty to maintain a pipe leading from a customer's service pipe to the surface in a safe condition being upon the water company, and the city being chargeable with negligence only for failure to exercise ordinary care to require the company to remedy or remove the defect, the city could recover from the company the amount paid in settlement of a claim for injuries, as the city was not in pari delicto.-City of Des Moines V. Des Moines Water Co., Iowa, 175 N, W. 821.
55. Injunction - Threatened Loss, -- Equity will enjoin threatened loss or destruction of personalty, as an heirloom, wedding present, or an article of negligible value, dear to the owner only acting in such matters only where the injury will be irreparable, or there is a lack of adequate remedy, or the injunction will avoid a multiplicity of suits; special reasons being shown by the proof.--Hill v. Brother, Mo., 217 S. W. 581.
56. Insurance-Attorney's Fee.- Where a fire policy was issued from the office of the agent of the insurer in Kansas, and covered property in such state, where the loss occurred, and the cause of action accrued, payment of attorney's fee was part of the performance of the contract, governed by the law of Kansas, and the fee was improperly allowed under the law of Missouri. -Ayers v. Continental Ins. Co., Mo., 217 S. W. 550.
57.- Cancellation.--Insured can cancel the policy only in the manner provided in the policy, requiring premium to be first paid.-Home Ins. Co. v. Fleeman, Mo., 217 S. W. 536.
58.- Indemnity. Where the contract between the master and insurer is one of indemnity against actual loss from personal injury to servants, there can be no liability of insurer until the master has suffered loss by payment of judgment for such injuries. -Owens V. Jackson-Hinton Gin Co., Tex., 217 S. W. 762.
59.- Insurable Interest.-If plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, a policy of fire insurance never attached, and plaintiff cannot recover on draft given in settlement for loss.-Morrison v. Boston Ins. Co., Mass., 125 N. E. 698.
60.- Lightning.–Under an ordinary fire policy, which provides that insurer shall not be liable for loss by lightning. the insurer is liable for loss by fire started by lightning, although not liable for damages caused by the lightning itself. -Maxwell V. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Springfield, Mass., Ind., 125 N. E. 645. 61. Landlord and Tenant-Common Stairway.
Where a tenant rented and had exclusive possession of only one of the rooms reached by a common stairway and platform. the fact that the other rooms were vacant did not relieve the landlord of his obligation to look after the safety of the stairs.-Dillehay v. Minor, Iowa, 175 N. W. 838.
62.-_Privity.-Privity of estate. by which one is made liable to perform covenants of a lease that run with the land, requires a transfer of the legal title by the lessee and its ceptance by the assignee.-Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Security Savings & Trust Co., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 575.
63. Larceny-Circumstantial Evidence. In a prosecution for the larceny of an automobile wherein the state relied on the circumstantial evidence, and it was shown that defendant was found with possession of car and did not satisfactorily explain his possession of it and that it had been changed in several parts, and defendant's conduct of an innocent man, a conviction
of guilty will not be overturned.--State V. Pack, Kan, 186 Pac, 742.
61.- Innocent Taking.- Where the taking is open in the presence of others, not amounting to a robbery, and there is no concealment, or where an innocent taking is presumed, and there is nothing from which a jury may legitimately infer a felonious purpose, a verdict against accused cannot be sustained.-Gunn v. State, Fla., 83 So. 511.
65. Libel and slander-Qualified Privilege. The difference between a qualified and absolute privilege is that malice destroys the first but does not affect the latter.-McLean V. Merriman, S. D., 175 N. W. 878.
66. Mandamus-Judicial Discretion.--Mandamus is a discretionary writ, and it should not issue to compel the performance of an act which would be fraught with danger to life and property.--Kolster V. American Gas Co., Kan. 186 Pac. 738.
67. Master and Servant - Inspection. --The failure of a master to inspect a set screw to see that it was tight will be deemed negligence, where injury mnight well be foreseen as a natural consequence of the loosening of the screw. ---Barker v. Hemphill Lumber Co., Mo., 217 S. W. 585.
68.---Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is seldom applied between master and servant, and is only applicable where the evidence shows that the accident is necessarily the result of defective conditions and can be explained on no other reasonable hypothesis.--Louisville & N. R. Co. 1. Campbell's Adm'r, Ky., 217 S. W. 687.
69.- Safety Appliance.- Where disregard of the Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. $ 8605 et seq.) causes loss to one of the class for whose special benefit it was enacted, his right to recover damages is implied.-Lang v. New York Cent. R. Co., N. Y., 125 X. E. 681.
70.- Workmen's Compensation Act. For the purposes of the Work men's Compensation Act. the relation of employer and employe is created in every instance by contract, either express or implied.-Nissen Transfer & Storage Co. V. Miller, Ind.. 125 N. E. 652.
71. Mortgages-Default.---Where a mortgage was authorized to declare the entire debt due on failure to pay purchase-price instalments and to foreclose under power of sale, the mortgagee's estate became absolute on default in a purchase-price instalment, subject only to an equity of redemption in the mortgagor, and mortgagee was then absolutely entitled to the land and its possession.-Hughes & Tidwell Supply Co. v. Carr, Ala, 83 So. 472.
72.- Outstanding Title-Grantee agreeing with grantor to satisfy mortgage on the premises cannot deny the validity of the mortgage. as by setting up, as superior thereto, an outstanding title which such grantor had acquired to protect her interest and had conveyed to such grantee.---Barry V. Garth Educational Soc., Ky., 217 S. W. 674.
73. Negligence-Assumption of Risk-The law of assumed risk in this state has narrow limits, and applies generally, if not always, to those danger's attendant on the act or method, when done in a manner free from negligence. Oxford v. Dudley, Mo., 217 S. W. 607.
74.-__-(ontributory Negligence.—The question of contributory negligence must be determined without regard to any negligence on the part of defendant.-Moss V. H. R. Boynton Co., Cal., 186 Pac, 631.
75.-- Imputability-One invited unconditionally to ride with the driver of an automobile as a guest, returning from a picnic attended by the parties is not engaged in a joint venture or common enterprise so as to be chargeable with the driver's negligence.---Wagner v. Kloster, Iowa, 175 N. W, 840.
76. Payment Place of, Where an agreement to pay is made and no place of payment is mentioned, the debt is payable where the creditor resides, as a general rule.-Moherstadt v. Harry Newman, Inc.. Motor Cars, Mo., 217 S. W. 591.
77. Principal and Agent--Gratuitous Agent A gratuitous agent is bound to use the same degree of good faith toward his principal as an agent for compensation.- Ward V. Andrews. Cal., 186 Pac. 605.
78.---Secret Profit.-An agent who makes a secret profit in the execution of his trust as such agent may be compelled to account to his principal.-Thimsen V. Reigard, Ore. 186 Pac, 559.
79. Principal and Surety-Subrogation.-A surety paying debt of his principal is subrogated to the security held by the creditor, and the latter's voluntary surrender of the same to the debtor discharges the surety pro tanto. -Dejance Mach. Works v. Gill, Wis., 175 X. W. 940.
80. Sales-Oral Acceptance -A contract of sale was completed when the seller orally accepted the buyer's offer, and its subsequent reduction to writing added nothing to its valid. ity.-E. F. Spears & Sons v. Winkle. Ky.. 217 S. W. 691.
81. Specific Performance Agreement Between Heirs.--Agreements between heirs providing for settlement of decedent's estate, as by exchanging consents to treat an informal paper left by him as a valid will, are proper subjects for specific performance, if not void for any legally sufficient cause.-Capen V. Capen, Mass., 125 N. E. 692.
82. Statute of Limitations--Trustee.- Where sons in the management of a partnership business acted as trustees of their mother's interest without questioning her right thereto, the statute of limitaions would not run against her claim of an interest in the business.-Dovey T. Schlater, Neb., 175 N. W. 888.
83. Time - Computation. Where time is counted from a day. the day is excluded: but, where it is counted from an act, the day on which the act is done is included in the count. ---McKinster v. Shaffer, Ky., 217 S. W. 676.
84. Trover and Conversion-Special Property. -It is a principle of the law of trover and conversion that a plaintiff who has only a special property or qualified interest in the goods which have been converted can recover only the value of such property or interest.-Bruce v. Crysler, Mo., 217 S. W, 563.
85. Vendor and Purchaser-Instalment Payment. The title of the purchaser of land under an executory contract providing for payment in instalments, deposit of the deed in escrow, and forfeiture of partial payments for default was an equitable one enduring only SO long as the requirements of the contract were promptly met.-Wright Land & Investment Co. V. Even, Mont., 186 Pac. 681.
86. Tender of Deed. Where no time for performance was fixed in a written agreement for sale of land, the delivery of the deed and the payment of the purchase price were to be concurrent acts, and the purchaser could not be in default until the vendor had tendered a deed. -Bergeron y. Redfern, R. I., 108 Atl. 650.
87. Wills - After Declaration.-Post testa. mentary declarations of testator are admissible to prove the existence or contents of a will alleged to be lost.-In re Johnson's Estate, Wis., 173 N. W. 917.
88. Child or Children. The rule at common law was that the ordinary meaning of "child"* or "children" was the legal meaning, and that such words meant immediate offspring and did not include grandchildren.--Hoggatt v. Clopton, Tenn., 217 S. W. 657.
89.- Imbecility.-Extreme old age, resulting in defective hearing and eyesight and decrepit physical condition, is not of itself sufficient to prove incapacity to make a will.-Frazie's Ex'x V. Frazie, K ., 217 S. W. 668.
90.- Saying of Masses.-A bequest in trust for masses to be said in a Catholic church for the repose of the soul of a specific person is a trust for "charitable uses," within the meaning of Civ. Code, $ 1313.-In re Hamilton's Estate. Col., 186 Pac. 587.
91. Witnesses-Competency of Child.-An intelligent girl eight years, old is competent to testify to occurrences which she remembers, though they happened three years before, when she was too immature to testify.Maynard V. Keough, Minn., 175 N. W. 891
92.- Physician.-A physician cannot testify. without patient's consent, that he treated patient for a certain ailment.-City of Princeton V. Fields, Ind., 125 N. E. 653.
93.-_Refreshing Recollection.--A witness may use ledger entries made by himself as inemoranda to refresh his recollection, although such entries are not the original entries of the transactions in question.---Boutwell V. Spurlin Mercantile Co., Ala.. 83 So. 481.
Central Law Journal.
plaintiffs non-intoxicating beverages with
out due process of law in violation of the ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 2, 1920.
fifth article of amendment to the Constitu
tion." CONSTRUCTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH The Court in the Feigenspan case fully AMENDMENT.
discusses and denies the efficacy of each
point in plaintiff's brief. We can here do The decisions which have been handed no more than quote briefly from the Court's down recently touching the subject of na- opinion. As the first point of attack upon tional prohibition of the liquor traffic are all the validity of the amendment the Court exbased on a construction of the Volstead presses great surprise. The plaintiff's conAct and of the Lever Act and not of the tention was that an amendment to the ConEighteenth Amendment. The opinion institution must be germane to the purposes the recent case of Teigenspan v. Bodine, | of that instrument and in harmony with the however, rendered by Judge Rellstab in the | nature of the compact entered into between United States District Court (Dist. of N. | the states and that all other amendments J.) is a full discussion of practically all the | are void. "If the plaintiff is right, says the objections raised against the validity of Court, there is no way to incorporate it and this Amendment.
others of like character, into the national The objections raised were to the Amend organic law, except through revolution. ment itself and to the Act of Congress pro This is so startling a proposition that the viding for its enforcement. These objec judicial mind may be pardoned for not tions were prepared and briefed by Hon. readily acceding to it, and for insisting that Elihu Root and Mr. William D. Guthrie, cnly the most convincing reasons will justoth of New York, and will be interesting, tify its acceptance." The Court further no doubt, to lawyers who desire to keep in said that “the definition of the word 'amendtouch with the manner of attack that is ment' includè additions to as well as corto be made upon the Amendment and upon rections of matters already treated, and the legislation passed in pursuance thereof. there is nothing in its immediate context The attack is made in two divisions. The
(Article V) which suggests that it was used first division advances its argument against
in a restricted sense.” the "alleged invalidity of the Amendment;" | The Court further declared that "the the second, against the "alleged invalidity of right of the people by their representatives the National Prohibition Act.” The first acting in accordance with Article V to division is again divided into the following write legislation into their organic law is units: That the Amendment is invalid, not without precedent. A striking example first, “because of its subject matter;" sec- is found in the thirteenth article of amendond, “because Congress failed to propose ment, prohibiting slavery throughout the the amendment in the only way authorized | United States. Abhorrent as it is to us by Article V;" third, “because the amend of this day, the doctrine that one human ment has not been ratified by the requisite being might have ownership in another and number of states.” The second division is traffic in him as if he were a chattel had a subdivided as follows: The National | legal basis. * * * By substituting 'Slaves' Prohibition Act is invalid, first "because in the thirteenth amendment for 'intoxicatthe act lacks the concurrence of the State ing liquors for beverage purposes' in the of New Jersey;" second, “because its eighteenth amendment, we have in legal efdefinition of intoxicating liquor is whollyfect the same kind of mandatory prohibiwithout basis in fact, and, therefore, arbi- tion. Every argument advanced here to trary and oppressive;" and third, “because deny the power to incorporate the eighteenth it takes without compensation and destroys ' amendment into the Constitution could be
applied equally against the power to ordain the prohibited business is carried on exthe thirteenth amendment.”
clusively within a state or extends be
yond. * * * The Court passes the point that the
“This power so to enforce is granted to amendment was not properly adopted by
both Congress and the states. The word Congress with slight comment and indicates
'concurrent' does not divide the power, but that it regarded it as being wholly without authorizes them both to exercise it by ‘apmerit. The third point was treated as be- propriate legislation.' * * * The failing equally untenable. The ratifications by ure of Congress to enact enforcing legisla
tion would not effect the right of the the requisite number of legislatures can
states to do so. * * * not be affected by state constitutional pro
“But when Congress acts to enforce this visions imposing further restrictions before
| amendment, its command extends throughan act of the legislature shall be binding, out the Union.” for the reason, as the Court thinks, that the In relation to the objection that Congress states cannot of their own motion amend has no right to define the word “intoxicatthe federal Constitution which requiresing," Judge Rellstab holds that it is true only the assent of the legislature and not only with respect to an unreasonable inof the people of the state.
clusion in the definition of that which is Judge Rellstab evidently believes, as many clearly not intoxicating. But within the iawyers believe, that the strongest point of rule of reasonableness, Congress, the Court attack on the 18th Amendment is not as believes, has a wide discretion in defining to its validity but upon the construction of the terms of a Constitutional Amendment the word "concurrent" and the power of which specifically empowers Congress to enCongress to define the term "intoxicating force the constitutional amendment by suitliquors," for on these two points the Court able legislation. The Court then examines goes into a full and careful analysis of the definition itself and declares that in the the meaning of the Amendment. As to the | light of the expert evidence produced by meaning of the word “concurrent” the both parties, the test of one-half of one per Court says that if it means “acting to- cent of alcohol as a test of the intoxicating gether" then Congress and the legislatures quality of a liquor "cannot be said to be of the several states would have to agree arbitrary.” The scientific test, the Court upon every phase of the intended enforcing said, seems to vary according to the physilegislation. “To impute to Congress," de- cal characteristics of those on whom the clares the Court, "and the ratifying states test is made and depends on "such a vasuch an impracticable purpose in the use riety of conditions as absolutely to defy of that word, is unthinkable, and such im- exact definition.” putation is not to be accepted unless no other meaning of the word is permissible or it clearly appears that such restricted meaning was the only one in the mind of | NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. Congress when this section was framed.”
The Court believes that the word "con LIABILITY OF THE OWNER OF A RESERcurrent" should have the second signifi
| VOIR FOR BREAKING OUT OF WATERS.cation given in the Century Dictionary:
One of the natural rights of every land owner
is to have his land free from any unnatural "Contributing to the same event or effect.”
or artificial precipitation of water. And the On this point the Court further said:
complementary right also exists to have sur“The prohibition of the first section of face water flow off one's land according to the amendment is self-executing to the ex the ordinary course of nature. But when one tent that it outlaws the manufacture of and dams up a stream to make an artificial lake commerce in intoxicating liquors as a bev | upon his land and the dam breaks and floods erage throughout the entire nation. It the country below, is the owner liable? The takes no note of state boundaries, whether Supreme Court of California declared in a re