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But this is not all that is to be con- | freight and passenger rates how some of sidered. The employes are at present de- | the benefits of these vast economies will be manding that, unless the government given to them. Therefore, in a pamphlet substantially reduces the cost of living, which has been distributed throughout the advances in wages shall be made which country the Plumb Plan League says: “Unhave been estimated by the director gen der this plan passenger rates of 1/2 cents eral of railroads at $800,000,000 a year. and lower and the reduction of freight Do you have the slightest doubt that if rates by 40 per cent would be reasonable.” the Plumb plan were adopted they would at once give to themselves these advances
We have already shown that if the adin wages which they now say the gov
vances in wages the employes are now deernment should give them? If these ad manding were made, as under the Plumb vances in wages were made the railways plan they doubtless would be, the governwould start under the Plumb plan with ment after paying interest on its investa deficit exceeding one billion dollars a ment in the railroads, would have a deficit
of at least $1,000,000,000 to $1,200,000,000
a year. A reduction of passenger rates to The railways now pay about $200,000,
1/2 cents a mile and of freight rates by 40 000 a year in taxes. Some of this goes to
per cent would reduce the present earnings the federal government, but most of it
of the railroads to the extent of about $1,goes to the states. If they should contin
| 800,000,000 a year, and this added to the ue to pay this amount under the Plumb
deficit already incurred, would make a total plan the deficit would be increased by an
deficit of about $2,800,000,000 a year. The other $200,000,000. But it is not contem
total earnings of the railroads after these plated by the Plumb plan that under em
reductions in rates had been made would ployes' management the railroads shall |
be about $3,200,000,000 a year. The wages continue to pay taxes. Under that scheme
of the employes are now running at the all the taxes now received by the states
| rate of at least $2,750,000,000 a year, and from the railroads, which constitute a
| if they should be increased by the $800,000,very large part of their total annual rev
| 000 which the employes are now demandenues, would be wiped out and the bur
ing, total wages of employes would be at den of these taxes would have to be trans
least $3,350,000,000 a year. Therefore, afferred elsewhere. I should think the peo
ter the advances in wages for which the ple of the United States would be interested
employes are now asking and the reducto learn that after they have bought the
tions in rates which Mr. Plumb has intirailroads and turned them over to the em
mated would be made under his plan, the ployes to manage the employes intend to
earnings of the railroads would be $300,have the public not only pay in taxes what
000,000 a year less than the amount necesever deficit may be incurred in the opera
sary merely to pay the wages of the emtion of the railroads, but also entirely to re
ployes, leaving nothing to cover the cost move the railroads from the class of prop
of fuel, the cost of materials and supplies erty which can be taxed to maintain the
and interest on the investment of the pubstate.
lic in the railroads! Since the advocates of the Plumb plan advertise that under their plan they would | It seems so obvious that the claims made -effect enormous economies, consistency re- as to what could be accomplished under the quires that they shall show those who pay | Plumb plan are preposterous that I confess
I cannot understand how there can be much-abused railroad property investment found men of intelligence to seriously make account has increased 80 per cent and that them.
the number of railroad employes has in
creased 82 per cent. Meantime, the amount Why are the railroad labor organizations
of operating income, from which all interopposing a return to private operation of
est and dividends on the investment in railrailroads and advocating the Plumb plan?
roads must be paid, has increased less than Their spokesmen say, and we suppose |
99 per cent and the annual compensation many of the employes believe, that private
of railroad employes has increased 391 per management has resulted badly for them
cent. Surely with an increase of only 81 because it has given opportunity to the rich
per cent in the number of employes in the capitalists, who are supposed to own the
last 19 years, and an increase of 391 per railroads, to make huge profits at the ex
cent in the annual wages paid to them, pense of the employes and the public. Now,
there is no reason for believing that railwhat are the facts about this? In the last
road employes cannot get fair treatment ten years of private operation the property
without the adoption of the Plumb plan. investment account of the railroads increased 38 per cent. Every dollar which reaches the security owners of the rail The most specious argument made in faroads must be paid out of operating in- vor of the Plumb plan is that it would be come, and in that same ten years the in- | the application of "industrial democracy” crease in operating income was less than to the railroads. It is said that we now 41 per cent. Meantime, the number of rail have political democracy and that we ought road employes increased only 3.6 per cent, to have democracy in our industries. I am and the total compensation paid to them in favor of industrial democracy, and one annually increased 62 per cent. Surely of the principal reasons why I am opposed there is nothing in these figures to indicate to the Plumb plan is that it would apply that during this period the employes were industrial autocracy and not industrial dembeing unjustly exploited. Meantime, both ocracy to the railroads. Where is the demthe average passenger rate and the average ocracy in a plan under which the 110,000,freight rate declined. It would appear, 000 people of the United States are to buy therefore, that the public was not being the railroads and assume complete responseriously exploited.
sibility for their operating expenses and
fixed charges and are then to turn them The guaranteed return being paid to the
over to less than one-fiftieth of the people railroad companies under government operation is less than the operating income that
to manage as they see fit? True industrial
democracy would involve the purchase of they actually earned in 1917. On the other
the railroads by the employes with their hand, in less than two years of government
own money and not with other people's operation the number of railway employes
money. It can be demonstrated by a very has increased about 7 per cent and the total
simple calculation that if the employes annual wages paid them has increased
would save only one-fifth of their present about 63 per cent. Chiefly in order to pay
annual wages and buy railroad stock with this large increase in wages it has been nec
their savings and with the dividends on essary to make large advances in rates.
their stocks they would in five years be the When we look back over the entire owners of a majority of the present stock period from 1900 to 1919 we find that the l of all the railroads of the United States
and in nine years they would own all tho , STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - DISABILITY
OF INFANCY. stock now outstanding. It would be democratic, it would be American and it would
HENDERSON et al. v. FIELDER et al. be sound economically for the employes to acquire control of the management of the
215 S. W. 187. railroads by becoming the owners of a ma
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 24, 1919. jority of their securities. It would be perfectly safe to entrust the management of Where the 15-year statute of limitations on
actions to recover real property (Ky. St. $ 2505). the railroads to them if they had acquired
began to run in favor of an adverse occupancy ownership of them by the investment of during the lifetime of plaintiffs' ancestor, the
minority of plaintiffs after her death did not their own savings and knew that they stood
arrest it; the bar of the statute being as comto lose if the properties were inefficiently
plete as if she had lived through the whole time
of the statutory period. managed as well as to gain if they were efficiently managed. They would then have QUIN, J. Appellants (plaintiffs below) are every incentive that the present owners the children and heirs at law of Orthernile have to put and keep the ablest men avail
Henderson, and as such they alleged they were
entitled to a one-fifth interest in the real estate able in direct charge of the management
owned by their grandmother, Eleanor Hender. and to oppose every method which might son, at the time of her death in 1900. It is reduce the efficiency of operation or unduly alleged that other children of Eleanor Henderincrease expenses.
son sold their interests to defendants, and
therefore the parties are joint owners of the The Plumb plan would not be Amer
land in question. Defendants denied that ican because American institutions are
plaintiffs had any interest in the land, and founded upon private property. The Plumb affirmatively alleged they were the sole owners plan would not be democratic because
of said land, alleging in an amended answer
that on January 19, 1897, Eleanor Henderson it would involve the management by
sold and conveyed the land in contest to her 2,000,000 people of property belonging to son, Joshua T. Henderson, by deed recorded in 110,000,000 people without any responsi
November, 1900. A demurrer to this answer
having been overruled, the plaintiffs replied bility on the part of those who managed the
that the deed from their grandmother to property to those who owned it for results.
Joshua T. Henderson was procured through The Plumb plan would be absolutely un fraud and undue influence, was without considsound economically because no property
eration, and because of these facts and the
infirmities of old age said instrument was not ever was or ever will be efficiently man
the act and deed of their grandmother, and aged which is not managed either by the passed no title to the land. It is also alleged owners of it or by persons who have and that after the grandmother's death, suit was feel a sense of responsibility to the owners
filed by some of the children to set aside the
deed; but this suit was later dismissed, and the and who can be ejected from the manage
children, other than the father of plaintiffs, ment by the owners at any time they are | joined in a deed to Joshua T. Henderson. The found to be incompetent or to be abusing 10 and 15 year statutes of limitations are relied their trust. When the true character of
upon by defendants. The lower court dismissed
the petition, and we think this judgment is corthe Plumb plan becomes generally under
rect for two reasons: stood it will not only be rejected by an 1. It is well settled, subject to few excepoverwhelming public sentiment but among tions, that when limitation begins to run those who will oppose it will be the intelli
against the right to enforce a cause of action,
the running of the statute is not interrupted by gent and conservative railroad employes of
reason of any subsequent event or condition, this country.
and the death of the ancestor will not stop the SAMUEL O. DUNN. running of the statute. This suit was not filed Chicago, Ill.
| until July 9, 1912, more than 15 years after
January 19, 1897, when the deed was executed. the suit In discussing the point in question Section 2505, Ky. Stat., provides:
the court says: "An action for the recovery of real property “But according to the statements contained can only be brought within fifteen years after | in their bill, their right to relief, if any they the right to institute it first accrued to the had, must have accrued to their ancestor in his plaintiff, or to the person through whom be lifetime, and of course the limitations of time claims."
must have commenced running against him, The cause of action, if any, accrued dur
and, having commenced running in his lifetime,
it must necessarily have continued to run after ing the lifetime of Eleanor Henderson, and the
his death, notwithstanding the subsequent disstatute having commenced to run upon the exe ability of the heirs." cution of the deed, her death did not suspend To the same effect see Langford's Adm'rs v. or interrupt the running of the statute. The Gentry, 4 Bibb. 468; Clark's Ex’r v. Trail's minority of the children or other heirs will not Adm’rs, 1 Metc. 35; Salve v. Ewing, 1 Duv. 271; arrest it; the bar being just as complete as if Fox v. Hudson's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 115, 150 S. W. the grandmother had lived through the whole 49, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 832. time of the statutory period of limitations,
It is not disputed that in January, 1897, plaintiffs had no greater rights than if Eleanor
Orthernile Henderson, father of appellants, was Henderson had lived. By the descent cast, the dead, and that his widow and children were liv. heirs were placed exactly in the shoes of their
ing and free from any disability, except that ancestor, and, the statute having commenced
some of the daughters were married and some running as to her in her lifetime, it continued
of the children were infants. The deed was to run without let or intermission.
recorded in November, 1900, more than 10 years The accrual of a cause of action means
prior to the institution of this suit. The chilthe right to institute and maintain a suit, and, dren of Orthernile Henderson unquestionably whenever one person may sue another, a cause took as a class, and when limitation began to of action has accrued, and the statute begins to run against some of them it began to run run. 25 Cyc. 1066. Any cause of action to set against all. In Moore v. Calvert, 6 Bush 356, it aside the deed in question, having accrued Jan is said: uary 19, 1897, and no suit having been brought
"By a long line of adjudication it was deterwithin 15 years thereafter the action was mined, under said act of 1796, that where the barred.
right of entry descended to heirs who were all 2. It is sought to set aside the deed on the
within the exception, they had the time allowed
after the disabilities were removed from all to ground of fraud, and here again we find the
begin their action; in other words, if at the statute puts an absolute bar to the maintenance death of the ancestor all his heirs were under of this action. Section 2519 of the Ky. Stat. disabilities, they would have the time allowed provides:
after the removal of such disabilities from all
to make their entry or bring their suit; but if "In actions for relief for fraud or mistake, one of the heirs labored under no disability at or damages for either, the cause of action shall the ancestor's death, the disability of the other not be deemed to have accrued until the discov heirs did not prevent the statute from running, ery of the fraud or mistake; but no such action nor bring any of them within its saving. And shall be brought ten years after the time of this principle pertained alike to joint tenants making the contract or the perpetration of the and coparceners.” fraud."
This case has been followed in a number of There is no escaping the conclusiveness of subsequent opinions, notably May v. C. & O. Ry. the statute. Limitation runs from the time of Co., 184 Ky. 493, 212 S. W. 131, wherein the the execution of the conveyance, or the perpe court cites practically all the cases in this state tration of the alleged fraud. Dorsey v. Phillips, on the question. 84 Ky. 420, 1 S. W. 667, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 405.
For the further reason that, as certain heirs Death of the grandmother did not interrupt the
and beneficiaries of Eleanor Henderson were running of the statute. Castro v. Geil, 110 Cal.
joint tenants with the appellants, and were not 292, 42 Pac. 804, 52 Am. St. Rep. 84. Besides
laboring under any disability when cause of more than 10 years elapsed between the grand
action accrued in 1897, the action is barred. mother's death and the filing of the petition.
Finding no error in the judgment appealed Haddix's Heirs v. Davison, 3 T. B. Mon. 39,
from, the same is affirmed. is a case similar to the present one. This was an attempt to set aside a deed on the ground of
Note-Disability of Infancy Interrupting Runfraud; and there, as here, it was shown by the
ning of Statute of Limitations. The broad heirs that at the time of their ancestor's death principle stated by the instant case, that being a they were infants of tender years, and had not case of intervening infancy, has, we believe, many
exceptions. Thus, under the limitations act of arrived at full age before the commencement of
1623, which is the pattern of most, if not all, of
American limitations acts, provides that re-entry Since the ruling in Meiggs v. Hoagland supra, into lands may be made within twenty years after statute provides for raising the rights of infants right of entry shall have accrued, feme coverts as to title descending to them during infancy and persons non compos mentis and those impris when their rights are extended. Scallon v. Manoned or beyond the seas being enlarged beyond hattan R. Co. (1906), 185 N. Y. 359, 78 N. E. 284, that time. 21 Jac. 1, Ch. 16.
7 Am.' Cas. 168. This also has been decided to In Stowel v. Zouch (1797), 1 Plowd. 353, the
be the rule in Massachusetts. Melvin v. Whiting rule stated in the instant case was applied. And
(1832), 13 Pick. 184. And so in Louisiana, Couin Garner v. Wingrove (1905), 2 Ch. 253, 74 L. 1
sins v. Kelsey (1881), 33 La. Ann, 880. J. Ch. N. S. 545, 93 L. T. N. S. 131, 3 B. R. 737,
We think it to be true by the great weight it was said that "the protection afforded by the
of authority, both English and American, that statute is for those to whom the right or title
for a limitation statute to be interrupted after first accrues.” Many American cases support
once it has begun to run, the statute must spethis rule. E. G. Oates v. Beckworth (1895), 112
cifically so provide. This is a principle taken Ala. 356, 20 So. 399; Bender v. Bean (1889), 52
'from our common law, which would have to be Ark, 132, 12 S. W. 241 ; Castio v. Geil (1895), 110
negatived, if statutory language would authorize Cal. 292, 42 Pac. 804, 52 Am. St. R. 84; Doe and
its being recognized. A statute of limitations Jem. Lynch v. Roe (1886), 7 Houst. (Del.) 386,
does no more than provide a rest, and it must 32 Atl. 391; Futch v. Parslow (1912), 64 Fla.
be pleaded. 279, 60 So. 343; Dawson v. Edwards (1901), 189 III, 60, 59 N. E. 590; Grether v. Clark (1888), 75 Iowa 383, 39 N. W. 655, 9 Am. St. R. 491; Robinson v. Allison (1905), 192 Mo. 366, 91 S. W. 115; Lyons v. Carr (1906), 77 Neb. 883, 110 N.
HUMOR OF THE LAW. W. 705; Munroe v. Wilson (1896), 68 N. H. 580, 41 Atl. 240; Chancey v. Powell, 103 N. C. 159, 9 S. E.; Fore v. Berry (1913), 94 S. C.
"The Germans are always being misunder71, 78 S. E. 706; Patton v. Dixon (1900), 105 Tenn. stood, and this misunderstanding is always to 97, 58 S. W. 299; Pickens v. Stout (1910), 67
the poor fellow's disadvantage.” W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354; Swearingen v. Robertson (1876), 39 Wis. 462, and Harris v. Mc
The speaker was Adolph Junck, the millionGovern, 99 U. S. 161, 25 L. Ed. 317. But it was aire dye importer of Duluth. ruled in Meiggs v. Hoagland (1902), 74 N. Y.
"I know a German motorist,” he went on, Supp. 234, 68 App. Div. 182, that if a person is under 21 years when he becomes entitled to
"who arrived one June evening at a crowded sue as successor to original owner, the statute country roadhouse. When the clerk told him will not begin to run until he attains his major the house was full he said, desperately: ity. The court said: "John F. Cleu died in August, 1866. Marie, one of his daughters, Marie
"'Can't you at least give me a bundle of hay Philomerca, the mother of Anita, became of full somewhere?' age February 1, 1884. Allowing ten years for the ""There ain't a thing left, mister,' said the statute to run against her, it would have run
clerk, but a bit of cold mutton stew.'” out in 1894. She, however, died in 1891, leaving Anita, her infant daughter, then about three years of age. Of course, the statute will not
St. Peter looked with wonder at the two begin to run against her until she becomes of age. Code Civ. Proc., § 375.” This evidently
rusty coppers which the passing soul had is based on a statutory provision.
dropped into his hand. At an early day in South Carolina, it was “Why, my good man,” he asked, "what is held under statutory construction that infancy
this for?” of an heir would interrupt the statute upon the death of the ancestor against whom it had
"War tax," murmured the soul gloomily as it begun to run. Rose v. Daniel (1814), 3 Brev. passed through the heavenly gate.-The Home 438. (verruled in Faysoux v. Prather (1818). 1 Sector. Nott & McC. 296, 9 Am. Dec. 691. See also Fore v. Berry (1913), 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706.
In Fore v. Berry supra the brief of appellant A man was brought into court recently under cites Rose v. Daniel supra and several cases of
the new anti-loafing law. The judge looked at State Supreme Court thereafter down to Sutton v. Clark, 59 S. C. 440. But in that case it was
him for a moment and then asked: expressly held that “when the statute has com "What is your occupation?" menced to run, no subsequent disability will arrest "I am a musician, your honor," was the reply.
"In that case I'll have to find you guilty of In Everett v. Whitfield (1859), 27 Ga. 133, the statute specifically provided, that when the stat
loafing." ute begins to run it shall not so operate as to "But, your honor," protested the man, "I'm defeat interests acquired by infants after its com
regularly employed by the Methodist Church as mencement, but the time of their disability shall
an organist." not be counted. Later it was said that if prescription against ancestor is not complete and his
"That only confirms my opinion," said the estate is not represented by an administrator suf- | judge. "The law requires every man to work, ficiently long to complete it, the infant heir may | but your occupation requires you to play.”— have additional time to sue. Buchan v. William
| Cartoons Magazine. son (1908), 131 Ga. 501, 62 S. E. 815.