strongest, best appointed, and most efficient in every respect, that had at any time been assembled to act under the American flag. Indeed, a greater one could hardly have been equipped; for, with the exception of the United States, Chesapeake, New York, Adams, and Boston, it comprised, it is believed, the entire navy of the country.*

His

Preble, as has been frequently mentioned, had but one frigate, while there were now six, and this force included all his brigs and schooners, and a twelve gun brig besides. His borrowed bomb-vessels, as we have seen, were small, and but poorly adapted for service; but two new ones were now added, which had been purchased specially for the purpose. borrowed gunboats were inferior to the bombvessels; but ten were now added, which were built in the United States. They were large, regularly and carefully constructed, and most of them mounted two heavy thirty-two pounders, while his six carried but one gun each, and of a smaller calibre. The vessels of this squadron cost nearly a million of dollars more

* See a list of the vessels and commanders, in the Appendix. The Commodore, Samuel Barron, was suffering from indisposition when Preble left the Mediterranean, and, not recovering, the command was formally transferred to Commodore Rodgers, the officer next in rank.

than Preble's, and the annual expense of maintaining his force at sea was less by full half a million of dollars, even though the Philadelphia be considered as in service up to the termination of his command.

It was generally and justly expected, that, when almost the whole naval strength of the United States had been sent to the Mediterranean, Tripoli would have been subdued. Yet the treaty made with that power on the 4th of June, 1805, or nearly nine months after Preble's retirement, gave the Bashaw sixty thousand dollars ransom money. This arrange

ment, as well as other stipulations as objectionable, created much dissatisfaction. But it is not consistent with the design of this memoir to open the controversy anew. While it is sufficient to say, that our government ratified the treaty, and that upon the administration of the time the responsibility rests, it is still pertinent to ask, why, and for what purpose, the larger part of the armed marine of the nation was equipped, combined, and despatched some four thousand miles. Preble could have effected the release of his countrymen at five hundred dollars each; and was it necessary to send out and maintain a squadron in distant seas, at an expense of nearly a million per annum, to drive a bargain, to save

the difference between the sum which the Bashaw asked of that officer, and what was finally paid? Preble contended for a principle, and fought many hard battles, and incurred much personal hazard, to win for his country, once and for ever, the rights and usages of civilized nations. Except for considerations of national honor and respect, he would not have allowed the officers and crew of the Philadelphia to remain in prison for a single day. If a particular sum of money had been the point at issue, the fourth squadron needed not to sail from home; and had it been kept in the United States, the treasury would have been saved a large and a useless expenditure. It is difficult to conceive the motives of the government in making this, its only energetic demonstration throughout the war, in putting in commission so formidable an armament, after permitting so small a one to contend against odds so great for a whole year; and still more difficult to imagine why, when that small force had reduced the Bashaw's pretensions to the single question of ransom, it should have accepted and ratified conditions, which the Secretary of the Navy clearly and strongly condemned, and which Preble had repeatedly assured his Highness, the Bashaw, would not

be listened to for a moment after a reinforcement should arrive in the Mediterranean.

It has been suggested, however, that our rulers, deeply commiserating the condition of Bainbridge and his fellow-sufferers, may have been induced "to forego abstract considerations, with a view to their relief." In closing the chapter and the subject, we may hope, that such was actually the case. Yet, were this the fact, the thought will probably occur to the reader, that a positive order to Preble to close with the Bashaw's best terms of ransom would have accomplished the release of the prisoners much more speedily, and quite as certainly, as a fleet of additional ships. I will only add, that it seems to rest on credible testimony, that, from some cause or other, the fourth squadron, formidable as it was, did not so much as assemble and show itself in force off Tripoli from the time of its organization to the close of the negotiations for peace.† The war, then, was finished in 1804, by the third squadron; and the treaty might as well have been concluded in that year, as in 1805.

* Cooper's Naval History, Vol. II. p. 85.

† American State Papers, "Foreign Relations," Vol. II. p. 719.

CHAPTER VII.

Preble's Force inefficient. -Want of Support from Home.Left to create a Force for himself. His Squadron not well manned. Anti-naval Spirit of the Time. The public Ships not well equipped. No Duels, or Courts-martial, while Preble commanded.

It has been frequently but incidentally mentioned, that Preble's squadron was far too small for the service required of it. Something further should now be said on a subject so necessary to form a just estimate of the activity and energy of character, for which, it has been shown, he was remarkable.

Only six days after his arrival in the Mediterranean, on the 18th of September, 1803, he became convinced, that his force was inadequate; and he made known to the Secretary the importance of sending out a thirty-two gun frigate, a sixteen gun brig, and a fourteen gun schooner; and this, it will be borne in mind, was before misfortune had deprived him of any part of his original command. "Give me these additional vessels," said he, "and I can effectually blockade Morocco and Tripoli, and, by hiring a few gunboats, bring them both