It would seem from the report of General Stoneman that the disposi tion he made of his troops previous to the arrival of Stuart was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth of the Monocacy and two regiments at White's Ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former only 3 miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, some 6 miles distant. General Pleasonton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced until the enemy were across the river was about four and a half hours. General Stoneman states that he started the reserve from Poolesville at about 9 o'clock, but it appears from the report of General Pleasonton that it did not reach him until 1.30 o'clock. At the time I received the order of October 6 to cross the river and attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensa ble articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, who believed that the neces sary articles could be supplied in about three days. Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already sent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps were forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washington, and I expected that the articles would reach our depots during the three days specified; but day after day elapsed and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from the quartermasters that they might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates, sent the trains for them, which, after waiting, were compelled to return empty. Several instances occurred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots as often as four or five different times without receiving their supplies, and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had traveled over 150 miles to and from the depots before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac and was moving into Virginia; General Reynolds' corps was delayed a day at Berlin to complete its supplies; and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly, and I was repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington and that the supplies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us, and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representation of this condition of things to the General-inChief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the QuartermasterGeneral, who constantly replied that the supplies had been promptly ordered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our depots. The following extracts are from telegrams upon this subject: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington: We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that they have been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad management ou the roads, or from some other cause, they come in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Commander-in-Chief, Washington: I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exists in some of the corps in this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculation upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes. Everything has been done that can be done at these headquarters to accomplish the desired result. I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible. Col. R. INGALLS, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Care of Colonel Rucker, Quartermaster, Washington: General Franklin reports that there is by no means as much clothing as was called for at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had better have additional supplies, especially of shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. R. B. MARCY, Col. R. INGALLS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Care of Colonel Rucker, Quartermaster, Washington: General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows: "My quartermaster reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes." Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Col. C. G. SAWTELLE, Depot Quartermaster, Washington: You did right in sending clothing to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send too much or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, canteens, &c., very much. RUFUS INGALLS, Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. Capt. AUGUSTUS BOYD, Quartermaster, Philadelphia: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Shipments to Hagerstown must be made direct through to avoid the contemptible delays at Harrisburg. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suffering and impatience are excessive. Capt. GEORGE H. WEEKS, RUFUS INGALLS, Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Depot Quartermaster, Hagerstown : Has the clothing arrived yet? If not, do you know where it is? What clothing was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg? Did they capture any property that was en route to you? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send an agent over the road to obtain information, and hurry up the supplies. Reply at once. RUFUS INGALLS, Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. General INGALLS: SHARPSBURG, October 15, 1862. I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I have been for the clothing for the corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trousers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter-tents. Will you please tell me where and when the balance can be had? Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The corps surgeon has just made a requisition for forty-five hos pital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry? Colonel INGALLS, Quartermaster : FIELDING LOWRY, Captain and Quartermaster. HAGERSTOWN, October 15, 1862. I want at least 10,000 suits of clothing in addition to what I have received. It should be here now. General INGALLS, Chief Quartermaster, &c.: G. H. WEEKS, Assistant Quartermaster. HARPER'S FERRY, October 22, 1862. We have bootees, 12,000; great-coats, 4,000; drawers and shirts are gone; blankets and stockings nearly so; 15,000 each of these four articles are wanted. ALEX. BLISS, Captain and Assistant Quartermaster. MCCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS, Capt. D. G. THOMAS, October 24, 1862-11 a. m. Military Storekeeper, Washington: Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, 10,000 blankets, 12,000 caps, 5,000 overcoats, 10,000 pairs bootees, 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots, 15,000 pairs stockings, 15,000 drawers, and 15,000 pants. The clothing arrives slowly. Can it not be hurried along faster? May I ask you to obtain authority for this shipment! RUFUS INGALLS, Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. Colonel INGALLS: HAGERSTOWN, October 30. Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken by rebels. Shall I supply Frank lin, and retain portions for Porter and Reynolds until called for? The following statement, taken from a report of the chief quartermaster with the army, will show what progress was made in supplying the army with clothing from the 1st of September to the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st of October, and that a greater part of the clothing did not reach our depots until after the 15th of October: Statement of clothing and equipage received at the different depots of the Army of the Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October 31, 1862. Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his report upon this subject, says: There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The orders were promptly given by me and approved by General Meigs, but the roads were slow to transport, particuarly the Cumberland Valley road. For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th of October for the corps of Franklin, Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there until about the 18th, and by that time, of course, there were increased wants and changes in position of troops. The clothing of Sumner arrived in great quantities near the last of October, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived and partly in store. The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already been recited. The difficulty in getting new supplies from the usual sources led me to apply for and obtain authority for the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their own horses. The following are the telegrams and letters on this subject: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief : It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is 1,050 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. From this number the artillery draw for their batteries. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, The General-in-Chief, in a letter to me dated Washington, D. C., October 14, 1862, replies to this dispatch in the following language: I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be investigated. In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues for the last six weeks have been 8,754, making an average per week of 1,459. One thousand and fifty is the number stated in the original dispatch, now in my possession; and as not only figures were used, but the number was written out in full, I can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief: With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watch the line of the Potomac properly or even make the reconnaissances that are necessary for our movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much by extending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, should be largely and immediately increased, under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river or advance on the enemy, or both. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. The following is an extract from the official report of Colonel Ingalls: A Immediately after the battle of Antietam, efforts were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when they left Washington. most violent and destructive disease made its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported perfectly well one day would be dead lame the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, but could not be worked. I made application to send West and purchase horses at once, but it was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided for enough; but they were not delivered sufficiently fast nor in sufficient numbers until late in October and early in November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late in October, but the delivery was not completed until in November, after we had reached Warrenton. In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of October and addressed to the General-in-Chief, it is stated: There have been issued, therefore, to the Army of the Potomac since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 9,254 horses. What number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Washington I have no means of determining; but the following statement, made upon my order by the chief quartermaster with the army, and who had means for gaining accurate information, forces upon my mind the conclusion that the Quartermaster-General was in error: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Chief Quartermaster's Office, October 31, 1862. Horses purchased since September 6, 1862, by Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.. 1,200 |