to assault the position. Two 20-pounder Parrotts of Simmonds' battery and two sections of McMullin's battery were left in the rear in position near the turnpike, where they did good service during the day against the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road, with the object of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the enemy, who was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment on the right of the brigade. Colonel Crook's brigade marched in columns at supporting distance. A section of McMullin's battery, under Lieutenant Crome (killed while serving one of his guns), was moved up with great difficulty, and opened with canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, by whom, after having done considerable execution, it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. One regiment of Crook's brigade was now deployed on Scammon's left and the other two in his rear, and they several times entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Simmonds' battery was brought up and placed in an open space in the woods, where it did good service during the rest of the day.

The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which the rest of the corps was coming up. General Willcox's division was the first to arrive. When be reached the base of the mountain, General Cox advised him to consult General Pleasonton as to a position. The latter indicated that on the right, afterwards taken up by General Hooker. General Willcox was in the act of moving to occupy this ground when he received an order from General Reno to move up the Old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox, at his request. One section of Cook's battery was placed in position near the turn of the road (on the crest), and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road, when the enemy suddenly opened (at 150 yards) with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a temporary panic, in which the guns were nearly lost. But the Seventyninth New York and Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the guns, with which Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under the shelter of the hillside until the whole line advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front, but also to that of the batteries on the other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily. Shortly before this time Generals Burnside and Reno arrived at the base of the mountain, and the former directed the latter to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Willcox, and to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that General Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on the right) was well advanced up the mountain. General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction, of affairs, the positions having been explained to him by General Pleasonton. Shortly before this time I arrived at the point occupied by 4 B B-VOL XIX, PT I

General Burnside, and my headquarters were located there until the conclusion of the action. General Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p. m., and reached the scene of action about 3.30 p. m. Clark's battery, of his division, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and two regiments (Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire) were detached by General Reno and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Willcox's, and Rodman's division was divided; Colonel Fairchild's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Harland's, under General Rodman's personal supervision, on the right.

My order to move the whole line forward and take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed, and fled.

Our chief loss was in Willcox's division. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry, but its position was made untenable, and it was hastily removed and not again put in position near us; but the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell.

General Willcox praises very highly the conduct of the Seventeenth Michigan in this advance-a regiment which had been organized scarcely a month, but which charged the advancing enemy in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops; and also that of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front.

Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis' division was moved to the front of Willcox's, occupying the new ground gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an effort to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's battery.

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another effort to regain the lost ground, attacking along Sturgis' front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, and we finally occupied the highest part of the mountain.

General Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a reconnaissance to the front, and the command of the corps devolved upon General Cox. In General Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave and honest man.

There was no firing after 10 o'clock, and the troops slept on their arms ready to renew the fight at daylight, but the enemy quietly retired from our front during the night, abandoning their wounded, and leaving their dead in large numbers scattered over the field.

While these operations were progressing on the left of the main column, the right, under General Hooker, was actively engaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, and its advance reached the Catoctin Creek about 1 p. m. General Hooker then went forward to examine the ground.

At about 1 o'clock General Meade's division was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. The following is the order seut:

Major-General HOOKER:

SEPTEMBER 14-1 p. m.

GENERAL: General Reno requests that a division of yours may move up on the right (north) of the main road. General McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the movement, and taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and Banks' corps have commenced arriving. Let General MoClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement.

GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Aide-de-Camp

Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about 2 o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main road on the Old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor Church, where General Hooker was, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about 1 miles from the turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery (B), First Pennsylvania Artillery, was placed in position on high ground at about 3.30 o'clock. and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of General Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The First Massachusetts Cav. alry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and one regiment of Meade's divis ion was posted to watch a road coming in the same direction. The other divisions were deployed as they came up, General Hatch's on the left and General Ricketts', which arrived at 5 p. m., in the rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's center up the main road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed. The First Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Seymour's brigade, were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was in force. Meade was then directed to advance his division to the right of the road, so as to outflank them, if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was directed to take with his division the crest on the left of the Old Hagerstown road, Ricketts' division being held in reserve. Seymour's brigade was sent up to the top of the slope on the right of the ravine through which the road runs, and then moved along the summit parallel to the road, while Colonel Gallagher's and Colonel Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the slope and in the ravine.

The ground was of the most difficult character for the movement of troops, the hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls and timber. The enemy was very soon encountered, and in a short time the action became general along the whole front of the divis ion. The line advanced steadily up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance, Colonel Gallagher, commanding the Third Brigade, was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson.

General Meade, having reason to believe that the enemy was attempting to outflank him on his right, applied to General Hooker for re-enforcements. General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive until the close of the action. It was advanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened.

General Meade speaks highly of General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade on the extreme right, securing by his maneuvers the great object of the movement-the outflanking of the enemy.

While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right, General Hatch's division was engaged in a severe contest for the possession of the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up the mountain in the following order: Two regiments of General Patrick's brigade deployed as skirmishers, with the other two regiments of the same brigade supporting them; Colonel Phelps' brigade in line of battalions in mass at deploying distance; General Doubleday's brigade in the same order bringing up the rear. The Twenty-first New York, having gone

straight up the slope instead of around to the right, as directed, the Second U. S. Sharpshooters was sent out in its place. Phelps' and Doubleday's brigades were deployed in turn as they reached the woods, which began about half-way up the mountain. General Patrick with his skirmishers soon drew the fire of the enemy, and found him strongly posted behind a fence, which bounded the cleared space on the top of the ridge, having on his front the woods through which our line was advancing, and in his rear a corn-field full of rocky ledges, which afforded good cover to fall back to if dislodged.

Phelps' brigade gallantly advanced under a hot fire to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing on both sides (in which General Hatch was wounded while urging on his men) the fence was carried by a charge, and our line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doubleday's brigade, now under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann (Colonel Wainwright having been wounded), relieved Phelps, and continued firing for an hour and a half, the enemy, behind ledges of rocks some 30 or 40 paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge on the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Colonel Christian's brigade, of Ricketts' division, came up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, which fell back into line behind Phelps'. Christian's brigade continued the action for thirty or forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having made an attempt to flank us on the left, which was repulsed by the Seventy-sixth New York and Seventh Indiana. The remaining brigade of Ricketts' division (General Hartsuff's) was moved up in the center, and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's right. We now had possession of the summit of the first ridge, which commanded the turnpike on both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to hold their positions until further orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the afternoon General Gibbon, with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery (B, Fourth Artillery), was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's center. He advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers and followed by the other two regiments in double column, the artillery moving on the road until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing on the column from the gorge.

The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it from his positions in the woods and behind stone walls until they reached a point well up toward the top of the pass, when the enemy, having been reenforced by three regiments, opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy being entirely repulsed, and the brigade, after having suffered severely, and having expended all its ammunition, including even the cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'clock, when it was relieved by General Gorman's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps (except the Sixth Wisconsin, which remained on the field all night). General Gibbon, in this delicate movement, handled his brigade with as much precision and coolness as if upon parade, and the bravery of his troops could not be excelled.

The Second Corps (Sumner's) and the Twelfth Corps (Williams') reached their final positions shortly after dark. General Richardson's division was placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position to support our right, if necessary. The Twelfth Corps and Sedgwick's division bivouacked around Bolivar, in a position to support our center and left. General Sykes' division of Regulars and the Artillery Reserve halted for the night at Middletown. Thus, on the night of the 14th the whole

army was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, in readiness to renew the action the next day or to move in pursuit of the enemy.

At daylight our skirmishers were advanced, and it was found that he had retreated during the night, leaving his dead on the field and his wounded uncared for.

About 1,500 prisoners were taken by us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy in killed was much greater than our own, and probably also in wounded. It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner's Gap consisted of D. H. Hill's corps (15,000) and a part, if not the whole, of Longstreet's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's, probably some 30,000 in all. We went into action with about 30,000 men, and our losses amounted to 1,568 aggregate (312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing).

On the next day I had the honor to receive the following very kind dispatch from His Excellency the President:

Major-General MCCLELLAN :

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, September 15, 1862-2.45 p. m.

Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

A. LINCOLN.

ANTIETAM.

On the night of the battle of South Mountain orders were given to the corps commanders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was ordered-the cavalry under General Pleasonton and the three corps under Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield, the latter of whom had arrived that morning and assumed command of the Twelfth (Williams') Corps by the National turnpike and Boonsborough, the corps of Generals Burnside and Porter (the latter command at that time consisting of but one weak division, Sykes') by the Old Sharpsburg road, and General Franklin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry; Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsborough to Rohrersville, were to re-enforce Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Franklin moved toward Brownsville and found there a force of the enemy, much superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsborough, made a daring charge, killing and wounding a num ber, and capturing 250 prisoners and 2 guns. General Richardson's division of the Second Corps, pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonsborough and Keedysville, and came upon the main body of the enemy, occupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond the latter place.

It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the 15th. Accordingly, instructions were given that if the enemy were overtaken on the march, they should be attacked at once; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be placed in position for attack, and await my arrival. On reaching the advanced position of our troops, I found but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes', in position. The other troops were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. The enemy occupied a strong position on

* But see revised statement, pp. 184–188.