17TH.-At Headquarters Station, near Sharpsburg, Md. To Major MYER: We have found General Slocum. He is near us. (Received.) To General MCCLELLAN: PIERCE AND BARRETT. The infantry are not engaged on our right, but are preparing to do so. (Received.) WILSON. To General MCCLELLAN: 17TH. There is no change in the position of troops. We are holding our own beautifully. WILSON. To General MCCLELLAN : (Received.) We have just heard from the front. General Hooker is wounded. General Sumner is in command. PIERCE AND BARRETT. (Received.) To General MCCLELLAN : Re-enforcements are badly wanted. Our troops are giving way. I am hunting for French's and Slocum's divisions. If you know where they are, send them immediately. General SUMNER. To General MCCLELLAN : (Received.) Do you think it proper to countermand the order to send Slocum's division to Richardson's support, as I shall need it on the right if I advance! To General MCCLELLAN: (Received.) General SUMNER. 18TH. The rebels sent flag of truce this morning, asking to bury their dead. Flag was sent back. To General MCCLELLAN : (Received.) General SLOCUM. All quiet this morning so far. The enemy's pickets are in the front of me. The station at Maryland Heights reports a force of 5,000 infantry and 60 wagons at Charlestown. Look out for station near Williamsport. You will have to look from the tree. Major MYER. To General E. V. SUMNER: (Sent.) Have your command ready to move with your train to Harper's Ferry to-morrow morning at daylight. Order sent by orderly. R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. Major MYER. General SUMNER. 22D. To Major MYER: Order out of chaos. Communication with General Couch and Maryland Heights. All right. (Sent to MBN Station.) FISHER. Can you send a message to General Couch now! Do not say yes unless you are certain. Major MYER. MBN STATION. Ascertain and report if any movements of the enemy have been visible near Williamsport to-day. Major MYER. There have been no movements visible. I reported to Couch. Franklin is in com. mand. TO CLARKE and BARRETT: (Sent.) OWEN. 23D. Any report from General Couch this morning? Try and get three reports per day of the state of affairs on the right and send them in. (Sent to Maryland Heights.) FISHER. Cut trees down to see station at general headquarters, a mile and a half to your right of the river. I have just sent yon an order to move your command to near Bakersville; General Coach to Downsville, on the same road. You can move at once. The orderly will meet you. (Sent.) R. B. MARCY, Look out for a call from Wicker. Major Myer and I are going there, and will report To PAINE: to you. FISHER. To General MCCLELLAN: (Received.) Clouds of dust running parallel with mountains a little north of west are seen. It goes north. JEROME. The general says can you give more definite information. How far off was the dustthis side of Martinsburg or the other! To General MCCLELLAN: (Received.) P. The dust appears to be on a line between Williamsport and Martinsburg, about 11 miles from Sharpsburg, between the mountains and the river, going southwest, now extending a long distance. JEROME. CLARKE. Go with them and open communication with the MBN, if possible, when they stop. STRYKER. To MBN: (Sent.) 24TH. You will daily send to these headquarters three reports and one during the night-at 7 a. m, 1 p. m., 6 p. m., and 12 p. m. If the state of the weather precludes the possibility of these reports being made precisely at these hours, they will be made as soon as possible thereafter. Give signatures to reports. B. F. FISHER, Captain, Commanding Signal Detachment. (Received.) 25TH. To General MCCLELLAN : A very considerable movement and much dust S. 15° W. from this mountain, apparently 5 miles distant southwest from Shepherdstown. Smoke of encampment and dust are seen in the vicinity of Martinsburg. The dust seen near Shepherdstown is close to a sharp cut in the woods, like one made for a railroad. I can see no enemy east of Shepherdstown or south of Martinsburg. (Received-12 and 6 report.) Major MYER. All quiet. Fog precluded the possibility of any report sooner emanating from here. Another exhibition of such gross negligence will compel me to prefer charges of incompetency. The guard must not be permitted to leave the glass until relieved. No report. The smoke hides everything, and has all day. (Received 7 a. m.) All quiet. Clarke not visible. FISHER. 27TH. JEROME To General MCCLELLAN : 28TH. Saw to night, 3 miles northwest of Falling Waters, two squadrons of enemy's cavalry marching north. No signs of troops from this point except pickets half mile [of] river. DENIČKE. To General MCCLELLAN: 29TH. Heavy dust seen south-southwest, about 10 miles from Shepherdstown. Cannot make out anything in it. JEROME. Great smoke at the foot of the mountain, southwest of your headquarters. Extends along several miles. (Sent.) JEROME. Lieutenant Jerome will report the distance and the bearings of the smoke from Shepherdstown. Major MYER. It must be about 8 or 9 miles south-southwest from Shepherdstown. (Received.) JEROME. Cannonading heard 30 northwest of Shepherdstown and about 5 miles from that place. JEROME. P. Á. TAYLOR, I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, First Lieut. Forty-ninth New York Vols., Actg. Signal Officer. Capt. B. F. FISHER, Commanding Signal Detachment. No. 9. Report of Lieut. J. Gloskoski, Twenty-ninth New York Infantry, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army, of operations September 16-November 29. CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, November 29, 1862. SIR: Agreeable to your circular, requesting us to make report of the service performed by us, "the difficulties we have met," and "of all that may be necessary for the Chief Sigual Officer to know," I.have the honor to submit the following: On the 16th of September I accompanied the Chief Signal Officer to the summit of Elk Mountain, Maryland, for the purpose to establish signal station there and observe the enemy's movements. The point chosen for observations was an excellent one, and messages sent from it very important. From there we had full view of the enemy's lines. We have reported immediately the positions and each change of position of all their batteries and their forces. From that point I have communicated to five different stations, viz, one at General McClellan's headquarters, one at General Burnside's (left wing), one at General Hooker's, and two in the center of our lines. Same day we reported to General McClellan : An immense train of the enemy's wagons is moving on the road from Sharpsburg to Shepherdstown. They cross the Potomac and halt about a mile south of Shepherds town. September 17 we received from General Burnside this: Can you see any movements of the enemy on the road or elsewhero! To General B.: General BURNSIDE. Yes; they are moving now a strong force of infantry from Shepherdstown into the woods west of Sharpsburg and northerly to our right. Y. Y. Y. Can you see any movement of the enemy, particularly in rear of the corn-field in front of us! General BURNSIDE. I can see no movement, particularly in rear of that corn-field. Y. Y. Y. This last message, although insignificant now, was very important then, as it gave assurances that there was no immediate danger to be apprehended from that particular place. At 3 p. m. same day we sent: To General BURNSIDE: Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction. Y. Y. Y. This warning was in time, and it was noticed by General Burnside, as at that hour, I think, General A. P. Hill arrived with his forces from Harper's Ferry to re-enforce the enemy. These are all the messages I could preserve from that day, as then we had no tents on stations, no wagons, exposed for days and nights to constant rain, and consequently all papers, as everything else in our possession, must have been wet and destroyed. From that time until the 28th ultimo I was posted on different signal stations, changing them almost every day, until we came to Rectortown, Va. From that place I was ordered to proceed with Lieutenant Owen to Thoroughfare Gap, and "open communication with Water Mountain, Warrenton" (9 miles distant, air line), and "observe the line of railroad." The highest point iu that vicinity is on the Bull Run Mountain, called the "Leather Coat Hill," north of the gap, but unluckily the woods on the mountains north and south of that gap were set on fire, and it was impossible for any one to ascend the summit without being roasted. The other hills there are of so almost equal height that it was no easy task to find the proper one to answer our purpose; still, I have found such, as I had the honor to report at that time. We have not sent any reports from that station, because there was nothing to report then; yet that station was very important, and, I think, if it had been allowed to remain there longer, our troops would not have left the gap in such a great haste as they did. A signal flag is a great annoyance to the enemy, as we have seen from their reports after the battle of Antietam, and also inspires our troops with confidence; when seen by them on some high point, or near them, they know that those near that flag are on the lookout, and look with better eyes than they have. As a proof of this, I will relate a circumstance from the battle at Gaines' Mill, on the Peninsula. When the battle raged in its greatest fury, a few pieces of artillery from General Smith's division opened fire across the Chickahominy upon the enemy. All saw the smoke, but not many could tell where the shells fell or who fired, as the pieces were hidden by woods from our view. Our soldiers began to murmur, "The rebels are outflanking us." All eyes turned in that direction, when a signal flag emerged from the woods and began |