All the information I could obtain previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and Stanton; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts

from the direction of Hanover Court

House. He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from Col. Kenley's Mary land regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which he

left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jack

son's troops were then, as he said, moving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia Central railroad. for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. I immediately despatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascertain the truth of the statement. They were unable, how ever, to get beyond Hanover Court House, where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were forced to turn hack without obtaining the desired information. On that day I sent the following despatch:

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 24, 1862-12 P. M. "A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewell, (fifteen brigades,) at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jack son, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen.

The following is his reply:

rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelly, that Ewall was advancing to New creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Laury; of his whereabouts. Within the last two the people decline to give any information (2) days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the purported to be dated Gordonsville on the actual attack was designed for Washing ton and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces ment now is toward Richmond. It came me to suspect that Jackson's real movefrom Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also regarded. I will transmit to you any furbe a blind, that it could not safely be disther information on this subject that may

be received here.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Sec'y of War. 'Maj. Gen. McCLELLAN."

On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement.

Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williamsburg road was a large open field; beyond that. a swampy belt of timber, some five hundred yards wide, which has been disputed ground for many days. Further in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy.

It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground, and to place Gen. Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the Old Tavern, on the 26th or 27th, by Gen. Franklin, by assailing that position in the rear.

the line, and contested the advance stubboruly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of Heintzelman's orps, Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of Keyes's corps, and a part of Richardson's division of Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to the report of Gen. Heintzelman.

The casualities (not including those in Palmer's brigade, which have not been reported) were as follows: officers killed, 1; wounded, 14; missing, 1; enlisted men killed, 50; wounded, 387; missing, 63; total, 516.

The following telegrams were sent to the Secretary of War, during the day, from the field of operations.

"REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862, 1.30 P. M. "We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still continues.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com. "Hon. E. M. STANTON."

"REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862, 3.15 P. M.

"The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket's lines. Kearney's and one-half of Hooker's are where I want them.

"I have this moment re-enforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all well. We hold every foot we have gained. "If we succeed in what we have undertaken, it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by Gen. Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual-that is, most splendidly.

goes

"On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War." "REDOUBT No. 3, June 25, 1862-5 P. M. The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Capt. De Russey brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven from the camps in front of this place, and is now quiet.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War.

Also, on the same day, the following:

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'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

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Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862-6.15 P. M. "I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson.

"Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond, yesterday.

"I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand (200,000,) including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack.

"I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

"Since I commenced this I have received

additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for re-en

forcements.

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj Gen. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War."

The report of the chief of the "secret service corps," herewith forwarded, and dated the 26th of June, shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report puts his numbers, on the 26th of June, at about 180,0000, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report shows the following organizations, viz. two hundred regiments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell, just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops; five bat

talions of artillery; twelve companies of infantry and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery; amounting, in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many others whose designations we did learn.

The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had been completed for the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns.

On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply.

The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsula campaign.

I notified the Secretary of War in the following despatch:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862-12 M. "I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advanced guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to out-manœuvre, out-wit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even York

town in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.

received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the government to send you any more re-inforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them.

"Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth, Shields's division and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.

E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War. "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN." "WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862-6 p. M.

'Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand (5,000) Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, men as fast as they can be brought from which can be done sooner than to wait for will be followed by more, if needed. Metransportation at Fredericksburg. They Dowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your condition.

"EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

But 5,000 of the re-enforcements spoken of in these communications came to the army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's bar, after the seven days.

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our should render it advisable, I had made aroperations to James river, if circumstances

point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course.

In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps, on the 19th of June, Gen. Reynolds's and Gen. Seymour's brigades, of Gen. McCall's division, (Pennsylvania reserves,) were moved from Gaines's farm to a position on Beaver Dam creek, Gen. Meade's brigade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a

nition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's station, by way of Bottom's bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all your supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our de. pots on James river without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment.'

Up to the 26th of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. The reasons (the President's anxiety about covering Washington from Fredericksburg, McDowell's promised co-operation, partial advance, and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of approach, and our continuance upon it, have been attended to above. The superiority of the James river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation by land of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James river, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith.

On the same day Gen. Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my orders, telegraphed to Col. Ingalls, quartermaster at the White House, as follows: Run the cars to the last moment,

All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

Gen. Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell back upon the White House, and thence to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated.

On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by the appended telegrams. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direc tion of Gen. Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further orders.

At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 P. M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regi ment and battery at Mechanicsville with drawn.

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the action.

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanics

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed.

At 3 P. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by Gen. Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss.

A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by Gen. Seymour with heavy slaughter.

The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 P. M., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow bridge and at Mechanicsville.

The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many of the wagons of the 5th corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter carried out my orders to that effect.

It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam creek was commenced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed.

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground; Seymour's brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Capts. Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat closely, and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him.

About this time Gen. Porter, believing that Gen. Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could.

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position al ready mentioned, Gen. Porter telegraphed as follows:

"I hope to do without aid, though, 1 request that Franklin, or some other command, be held ready to re-enforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line."

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed.

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege guns were still in position at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river.

Morell's division held the left of the