neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised that it should be done." Gen. Keyes, commanding the 4th army corps, testifies as follows before the Committee: "During the time that the subject of the change of base was discussed, I had refused to consent to the Peninsula line of operations until I had sent word to the Navy department and asked two questions: First, whether the Merrimac was certainly neutralized, or not? Second, whether the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently with the army to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester point? To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative; that is the Merrimac was neutralized, and the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester point." Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the United States corps of engineers, to visit Manassas Junction and its vicinity for the purpose of determining upon the defensive works necessary to enable us to hold that place with a small force. The accompanying letters from Col. Alexander will show what steps were taken by him to carry into effect this important order. I regret to say that those who succeeded me in command of the region in front of Washington, whatever were the fears for its safety did not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and instructions to them. Had Manassas been placed in condition for a strong defence, and communications secured as recommended by Col. Alexander, the result of Gen. Pope's campaigu would probably have been different. "WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862. "SIR: You will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment as practicable and mark on the ground the works for the defence of that place, on the positions which I indicated to you yesterday. You will find two carpenters, experienced in this kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of the Treasury extension. "The general idea of the defence of this position is, to occupy the fringe of elevation which lies about half way between Manassas depot and the junction of the railroad, with a series of works open to the rear, so that they may be commanded by the work hereafter to be described. There will be at least four of these works, three of them being on the left of the railroad leading from Alexandria, at the positions occupied by the enemy's works. The other on the right of this road, on the po sition we examined yesterday. The works of the enemy to the north of this latter position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieut. Com. stock's sketch, may also form a part of the front line of our defence; but the sides of these works looking towards Manassas station should be levelled, so that the interior of the works may be seen from the latter position. "Embrasures should be arranged in all these works for field artillery. The approaches should be such that a battery can drive into the works. The number of embrasures in each battery will depend upon its size and the ground to be commanded. It is to be supposed there will be from four to eight embrasures in each battery. "The other works of the enemy looking towards the east and south may be strengthened so as to afford sufficient defence in these directions. The work No. 3 Lieut. Comstock's sketch may be also strengthened and arranged for field artillery, when time will permit. This work is in a good position to cover a retreat, which would be made down the valley in which the railroad runs towards Bull run. "At Manassas station there should be a fort constructed. The railroad will pass through this fort, and the depot, if there should be one built, should be placed in its rear. This latter work should be regarded as the key to the position. It should be as large as the nature of the ground will permit. "By going down the slopes, which are not steep, it may be made large enough to accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the position need not be cut away; it will be better to throw up the earth into a large traverse, which may also be a bombproof. Its profile should be strong, and its ditches should be flanked. It should receive a heavy armament of 24 or 32 pounders, with some rifled (Parrott) 20 or 30 pounders. Its guns should command all the exterior works, so that these works could be of no use to the enemy should he take them. In accommodating the fort to the ground this consideration should not be lost sight of. "After tracing these works on the ground, you will make a sketch embracing the whole of them, showing their relative positions and size. This sketch should embrace the junction of the railroads and the ground for some distance around the main work. It need not be made with extreme accuracy. The distances may be paced, or measured, with a tape line. The bearings may be taken by compass. "Having located the works and prepared your sketch, you will report to Capt. Frederick E. Prime, of the corps of engineers, who will furnish you the means | time, and skirmishes frequently occurred, of construction. "It is important that these works should be built with the least possible delay. You will, therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. S. ALEXANDER, "Lieut.-Col., Aide-de-Camp. "Capt. FRED. R. MUNTHER, Present" “WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862. "SIR: I enclose you herewith a copy of the instructions which I gave to Capt. Munther, in reference to the defences of Manassas. "As there has been a new department created, (that of the Rappahannock,) it is possible that you and I, as well as Gen. McClellan, are relieved from the further consideration of this subject at the present time. "I will, however, state for your information, should the subject ever come before you again, that in my opinion the communication with Manassas by land should be secured. "To effect this in the best manner, so far as my observations extended, I think the bridge over Bull run, near Union mills and just above the railroad bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly repaired, and that a small work, or two or three open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent heights to protect it as well as the railroad bridge. The communications by land would then be through or near Centreville, over the road used by the enemy. "I write this for fear something should detain me here; but I hope to leave here to join you to-morrow. My health is much improved. 66 Very respectfully, your obedient ser- I may be permitted also to mention that MILITARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD. Before taking up the history of the emparcation and Peninsula campaign, I should remark that during the fall and winter of 1861-'62, while the army of the Potomac was in position in front of Washington, reconnoissances were made from time to which were of great importance in the One of the most brilliant of these affairs was that which took place at Drainsville on December 20, 1861, when the 3d brigade of McCall's division, under Brig.-Gen. E. O. C. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed and pursued four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces. The operations of Brig.-Gen. F. W. Lander on the upper Potomac, during the months of January and February, 1862, frustrated the attempts of Gen. Jackson against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, His constitution Cumberland, &c., and obliged him to fall back to Winchester. was impaired by the hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d of March the fearless Gen. Lander expired, a victim to the excessive fatigue of the campaign. SECOND PERIOD. CHAPTER I. The council composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the army of the Potomac upon Richmond. For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation, it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neighborhood, and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison. In addition to the land forces, the cooperation of the navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James rivers for the protection of our flanks, and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the enemy, it became more convenient to embark the troops and meterial at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given. your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between In making the preliminary arrangements the two divisions, it will be best to place for the movement it was determined that one on each road. It will be best to rethe first corps, Gen. McDowell's, should main pretty near the fort for the present, move as a unit first, and effect a landing in order to give the impression that our either at the Sand-box, some four miles object is to attack Norfolk rather than south of Yorktown, in order to turn all Yorktown. You will do well, however, the enemy's defences at Ship point, How-to push strong reconnoissances well to the ard's bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should front to ascertain the position of the enemy existing circumstances render it preferable, and his pickets. I will, as soon as possiland on the Gloucester side of York river ble, re-enforce you by the 3d division of and move on West Point. your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarcation is completed, and you will be informed accor dingly. The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army by divisions, as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarcation, convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the first corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarcation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. On the 17th of March, Hamilton's division, of the 3d corps, embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with the following orders: "WASHINGTON, D. C., March 17, 1862. "You will, on your arrival at Fort Mouroe, report to Gen. Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. 'R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. "Gen. C. S. HAMILTON, Com. Division." On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, Gen. Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. Gen. Heintzelman was ordered to accompany it under the following instructions: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Seminary, March 22d, 1862. "GENERAL: Upon the disembarcation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe, I have to request that you will move your two divisions, Porter's and Hamilton's, some three or four miles out from the fort to find good camping places, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where "My desire would be to make no impor tant move in advance until we are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. "The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from Gen. Van Vliet. "It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay. Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies. "I am very truly yours, "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major-Gen. Com. "Brig.-Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN, "Com. 3d Corps." The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied. On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. In consequence of the delay in the arri val of the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disembarcation I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and the 5th regular cavalry; the 2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st So few had arrived, but not disembarked. wagons had arrived that it was not possi ble to move Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of Gen. Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York river, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of Gen. J. B. Magruder. Maps which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under Gen. Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick river was represented as flowing parallel to, but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed Gen. Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of Gen. Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000 It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to re-enforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay The accompanying map of Col. Cram, U. S. Topographical Engineers, attached to Gen. Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design. It was also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, Howard's bridge, Ship point, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Young's mills, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the first corps could arrive Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarcation of the cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders of march were given for the following day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d corps, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named, in all about 58,000 men and 100 Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Ft. Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under Gen. Wool a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. During the night of the 3rd I received a telegram from the Adj. Gen. of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all control over Gen. Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. .This order left me without any base of operations under my control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the conFlag-Officer federate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac; and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James river, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparantly wellgrounded expectations. I determined then to move the two divisions of the 4th corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg road, to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the 3d corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown; the reserves moving so as to support either corps as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the 1st corps, re-enforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his positions. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. On the 3d, the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th: "Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Averill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedwick's division of the 2d corps, under Brigadier General Heintzelman, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division with Averills's cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the Newmar ket and New bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road, a sufficient force to hold that point, and cut off the garrision of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's bridge "Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. by the New bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's creek. "Sedwick's division will march at 8 a. m, by the Newmarket bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's bridge. "Brig. Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's division at 6 a. m., (Smith's division in ad vance,) by the James river road. The 5th regular cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's mills, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick, Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's creek. "The reserve cavalry, artillery and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m., by the New. market bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march, it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division." The following is an extract from the or der issued on the 4th, for the march of the 5th: The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th:) "Gen. Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 a. m., via Warwick Court House and the road leading near the old ship yard, to the Half-way house' on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. "Gen. Couch's division will march at 6 a. m., to close up on Gen. Smith's division at the Half-way House.' "Gen. Keyes's command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the Half-way House,' so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in. "Gen. Heintzelman will move forward Gen. Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m., upon the advance guard. when the entire will advance to a point about two and three quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north, and where a road comes in from Warwick Court House. "Gen. Hamilton's division, will move at 6 a. m, and follow Gen. Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. Gen. Sedgwick's division, will march at 5 a. m., as far as the Warwick's road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Power's house, and will await further orders. "The reserve will march at 6 a. m., upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Powers's house; the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. "Gen. Sedgwick's division, will for the present, act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters." In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to aban don those at Howard's bridge, and the |