should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James river.

"To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of

in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named, from the mouth of Wormley's creek to the Warwick road, opposite Winn's mills. Sumner's corps-Sedgwick's division only having arrived-on the left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick and opposite to Winn's mills works. Keyes's corps (Smith's, Couch's and Casey's divisions,) on the left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's operations, and from the army of the Potomills, &c., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Keyes's corps.

mac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James river, for fear of the Merrimac.

"The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Maj. Gen. McDowell and Brig. Gens. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Maj. Gen. McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under Gen. Keyes, and afterwards the left wing, under Gen. Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched upon the right bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of defence, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut off Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under Gen. Heintzelman were engaged in similar "I command the James river column, efforts upon the works between Winn's and I left my camp near Newport News mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report the morning of the 4th instant. I only sucof the 16th of April, enclosing reports of ceeded in getting my artillery ashore the brigade commanders engaged in reconnois- afternoon of the day before, and one of my sances up to that day, said, "that no part divisions had not all arrived in camp the of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) day I left, and for the want of transporta line, so far as discovered, can be taken by tion has not yet joined me. So you will assault without an enormous waste of life." observe that not a day was lost in the adReconnoissances on the right flank dem-vance, and in fact we marched so quickly, onstrated the fact that the Warwick was and so rapidly, that many of our animals not passable in that direction, except over were twenty-four and forty-eight hours a narrow dam, the approaches to which without a ration of forage. But notwithwere swept by several batteries, and in-standing the rapidity of our advance, we trenchments which could be filled quickly with supports, sheltered by the timber immediately in rear.

Gen. Barnard, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, expressed the judgment that those formi. dable works could not, with any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried by assault. Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, after the examination of the enemy's defences on the left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official, it describes the situation at that time in some respects so well, that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here:

were stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown, and the other ending in the James river, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either.

"The approaches on one side are gene rally through low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving re-enforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to any invading "MY DEAR SENATOR: The plan of cam-force in any country.

"HEADQUARTERS, 4TH CORPS, "Warwick C. H., Va., April 7, 1862.

64

paign on this line was made with the dis- You will, then, ask why I advocated tinct understanding that four army corps such a line for our operations? My reashould be employed, and that the navy sons are few, but I think good.

"With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any force opposed to us on Warwick river, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if the enemy should retreat-and retreat he must-he would have a long way to go without rail or steam transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed.

"Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Richmond.

"Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James river, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies.

"If we break through and advance both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out, and the ene my, equal if not superior in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army.

"The greatest master of the art of war has said, that if you would invade a country successfully you must have one line of operations, and one army, under one general.' But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix.

"The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the rebellion will be crushed-if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to tell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain.

"You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army "It is no doubt agreeable to the comcorps necessary when I supposed the navy mander of the 1st corps to have a separate would co-operate, and when I judged of department, and as this letter advocates the obstacles to be encountered by what his return to Gen. McClellan's command, I learned from maps and the opinions of it is proper to state that I am not at all officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and influenced by personal regard or dislike to from all other sources, how much more any one of my seniors in rank. If I were should I think the full complement of to credit all the opinions which have been troops requisite now that the navy cannot poured into my ears, I must believe that, co-operate, and now that the strength of in regard to my present fine command, I the enemy's lines and the number of his owe much to Gen. McDowell and nothing guns and men prove to be almost immeasu- to Gen. McClellan. But I have disrerably greater than I had been led to ex-garded all such officiousness, and I have pect. The line in front of us, in the opinion of all military men here, who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get command of either York river or James river. The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe.

"An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong gunboats could be sent up the James river also, our success will be certain and complete, and the rebellion will soon be put down.

"On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great waste of time, life, and material.

from last July to the present day supported Gen. McClellan, and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as he is my commander. And I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and without modification the enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success.

"Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowing upon me. I am working now to my utmost.

66

Please show this letter to the Presi

dent, and I should like also that Mr. Stan- | even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old posi-
ton should know its contents. Do me the tion.
honor to write to me as soon as you can,
and believe me, with perfect respect,

"Your most obedient servant,

"E. D. KEYES,

"Brig. Gen. Com'dg 4th Army Corps. "Hon. IRA HARRIS, U. S. Senate."

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Gens. Hooker, Richardson and Casey, I received the following despatches from the President and Secretary of War:

Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

'Washington, April 6, 1862–8 P. M. "Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. "I do not forget that I was satisfied Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, with your arrangement to leave Banks at and Woodbury's brigade, under your Manassas Junction; but when that arrangeorders, is not, and will not be, interfered ment was broken up, and nothing was subwith. You now have over one hundred stituted for it, of course I was constrained thousand troops with you, independent to substitute something for it myself. And of Gen. Wool's command. I think you allow me to ask, do you really think I better break the enemy's line from York- should permit the line from Richmond, via. This will Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entown to Warwick river at once. probably use time as advantageously as tirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorThis is a question ganized troops? which the country will not allow me to evade.

you can.

"A. LINCOLN, President. "Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

"WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862-p m. "The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. Gen. Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.

"E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War. "Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's works, and the obOn that day I stacles to be overcome. received the following letter from the Pre

sident:

"WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.
"MY DEAR SIR: Your despatches com-
plaining that your are not properly sus-
tained. while they do not offend me, do
pain me very much.

"Blenker's division was withdrawn from
you before you left here, and you know
the pressure under which I did it, and, as
I thought, acquiesced in it-certainly not
without reluctance.

"After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When 1 telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from with your own returns, making 108,000 then you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

"As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has time. And if so, I think it is the precise gone forward for you is with you by this time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon youthat is, he will gain faster by fortifications And once more let and re-enforcements than you can be reenforcements alone. me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation

|

fectly secure; and it is recommended that, |
on the upward passage, a few heavy guns
and some troops be left at the pilot station
(at the forks of the river) to cover a retreat
in the event of a disaster. These troops
and guns will, of course, be removed as
soon as the forts are captured.

"Should the navy fail to reduce the
works, you will land your forces and siege
train, and endeavor to breach the works,
silence their fire, and carry them by
assault.

The next resistance will be near the
English Bend, where there are some earth-
Here it may be necessary
en batteries.
for you to land your troops and co-operate
with the naval attack, although it is more
than probable that the navy, unassisted,
can accomplish the result. If these works
are taken, the city of New Orleans neces-
sarily falls. In that event, it will probably
be best to occupy Algiers with the mass
of your troops, also the eastern bank of
the river above the city. It may be neces-
sary to place some troops in the city to
preserve order; but if there appears to be
sufficient Union sentiment to control the
city, it may be best for purposes of disci-
pline to keep your men out of the city.

"After obtaining possession of New
Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all
the works guarding its approaches from
the east, and particularly to gain the
Manchac pass.

reduction of New Orleans and all its ap-
proaches; then Mobile and its defences;
then Pensacola, Galveston, &c. It is pro-
bable that by the time New Orleans is
reduced, it will be in the power of the
government to re-enforce the land forces
sufficiently to accomplish all these objects.
In the mean time you will please give all
the assistance in your power to the army
and navy commanders in your vicinity,
never losing sight of the fact that the
great object to be achieved is the capture
and firm retention of New Orleans.
"I am, &c.,

66

"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Major-Gen. Com'g U. S. Army.
'Major-Gen. B. F. BUTLER,

"U. S. Volunteers."

The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as well. It was my intentention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in cooperation along the whole line. If this prove that it was not, then it is unneces plan was wise, and events have failed to enabled the army of the Potomac to persary to defend any delay which would have form its share in the execution of the

whole work.

But about the middle of January, 1862, found that excessive anxiety for an immeupon recovering from a severe illness, I diate movement of the army of the Potothe administration. mac had taken possession of the minds of

vessels.

office

"Baton Rouge, Berwick bay, and Fort Livingston, will next claim your attention. "A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not A change had just been made in the call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock War Department, and I was soon urged you can on the different railways, and of immediate steps to secure the re-opening obtaining control of the roads themselves. by the new secretary Mr. Stanton, to take of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force should be ac-free the banks of the lower Potomac from complished as soon as possible after you the rebel batteries which annoyed passing have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves.

"I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are, first, the

upon Very soon after his entrance I laid before him verbally my design as to the part of the plan of the campaign to be executed by the army of the Potomac, which was to attack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. He instructed me to The result was, that the President disapdevelop it to the President, which I did. 1862, substituted one of his own. proved of it, and by an order of January 31, 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued without consultation with me:

On the

[President's General War Order No. 1.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.
"Ordered, That the 22d day of Feb-
ruary, 1862, be the day for a general
movement of the land and naval forces of