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ceived late last evening. The troops proposed for Thoroughfare gap will be sent to that place whenever you are in position for their co-operation, as previously stated, but no new regiments can be sent from here to the upper Potomac. The guarding of that line is left to your own discretion with the troops now under your command.

"H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. "Major-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

I accordingly left the 12th corps at Harper's Ferry, detaching one brigade to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. Gen. Morell was placed in command of the line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland; Gen. Slocum in command of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the Antietam.

The orders given to these officers were as follows:

*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Oct. 29, 1862-1 P. M. "The general commanding directs that you send one brigade of your corps to march at once to the position now occupied by Gen. F. J. Porter's corps, in front of Sharpsburg, to watch and guard the line of the river, the ford near the mouth of the Antietam creek to the mouth of the Opequan creek.

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river, from the mouth of Antietam to Cumberland, as well as any other troops that may hereafter be sent for the protection of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier within the limits of the lines herein specified. The force which has been left to guard the line is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that the commanding general feels authorized to detach from the army of the Potomac at the present time, and it devolves upon you to make the best use of this force in your power. You will have four cavalry regiments under your command, which should be so distributed along the river as to Watch all the available fords, and give timely notice to the infantry of the approach of any force of rebels.

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You will afford all the protection in your power to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

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"You will take steps to have all the sick and wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel army within our lines, properly taken care of until they can be sent to general hospitals, or discharged, or paroled.

"You will make your headquarters at Hagerstown, and occasionally visit the different parts of your line.

"The officer in command will also take steps to afford proper protection to the "You will please report promptly to sick and wounded in the hospitals in these headquarters everything of importthe vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boons-ance that occurs within the limits of your boro'. The regiment now at Boonsboro' command. will be placed under his orders. Gen. Kenley, at Williamsport, will guard the river from the mouth of the Opequan alone, including the ford at the mouth of the Opequan.

"The commanding general also directs that you take immediate steps to establish the remainder of your corps as follows, viz.: one brigade on Maryland heights, one brigade on Loudon heights, with the remainder on Bolivar heights and at Harper's Ferry.

"These dispositions should be made at once, so that Gen. Couch can move with his corps. Please acknowledge the receipt

of this.

"R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. "Gen. H. W. SLOCUM,

"Com. Army Corps, Harper's Ferry." "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Oct. 31, 1862. "GENERAL; I am instructed by the commanding general to say to you, that he has selected you to perform the highly important and responsible duty of taking charge of and commanding the troops left or the defence of the line of the Potomac

"The three brigades now at Cumberland, Williamsport, and Sharpsburg, including the fifty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cumberland, will be under your command. They are commanded by Gens. Kelly, Kenley, and Gordon. "Very respectfully, your obedient serS. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adj. Gen.

vant,

"Gen. G. W. MORELL,

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Commanding Upper Potomac."

On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was constructed, there being already one across the Potomac, and another across the Shenandoah, at Harper's Ferry.

On the 26th two divisions of the ninth corps, and Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville.

The first, sixth, and ninth corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin between the 26th of October and the 2d of November.

The second and fifth corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of October and the first of November. Heavy

rains delayed the movement considerably in the beginning, and the first, fifth and sixth corps were obliged to halt at least one day at the crossings to complete, as far as possible, necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period. The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main army; seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the eleventh corps and Sickles's division near Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap railway was reached; when that occurred the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction.

It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear.

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by striking in between Culpepper Court House and Little Washington, I could either separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I aprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria railroad beyond Culpepper.

On the 27th of October, the remaining divisions of the ninth corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleasonton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. The concentration of the sixth corps, delayed somewhat by intelligence to the movements of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this day, and the first corps was already in motion for Berlin.

On the 28th the first corps and the general headquarters reached Berlin.

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovettsville. Stoneman's division, temporarily attached to the ninth corps, occupied Leesburg; Averili's cavalry brigade moved towards Berlin from Hagerstown; two divisions of the ninth corps moved to Wheatland, and one to Waterford. The second corps commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east of Loudon heights.

On the 30th the first corps crossed at Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville, and the second corps completed the passage of the Shenandoah. The fifth corps commenced its march from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry.

On the 31st the second corps moved to the vicinity of Hillsborough; the sixth corps reached Boonsboro'; the fifth corps reached Harper's Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah.

On the 1st of November, the first corps moved to Purcellville and Hamilton; and second corps to Woodgrove; the fifth corps to Hillsborough; the sixth corps reached Berlin, one division crossing. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philomont, having a sharp skirmish there and at Bloomfield.

On November 2d, the second corps occn. pied Snicker's gap; the fifth corps, Snickersville; the sixth corps crossed the Potomac and encamped near Wheatland; the ninth corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union and Philomont. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Union. Averill was ordered to join Pleasonton. The enemy offered no serious resistance to the occupation of Snicker's gap, but advanced to gain possession of it with a column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, who were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled guns.

On the 3d, the first corps moved to Philomont, Union, Bloomfield, &c., the second corps to the vicinity of Upperville; the fifth corps remained at Snicker's gap; the sixth corps moved to Purcellville; the ninth corps moved towards Upperville. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Upperville after a severe fight.

On the 4th, the second corps took possession of Ashby's gap; the sixth corps reached Union; the- ninth corps, Upperville; the cavalry occupied Piedmont. On the 5th, the first corps moved to Rectortown and White Plains; one division of the second corps to the intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's road; the sixth corps to the Aldie pike, east of Upperville; the ninth corps beyond the Manassas railroad, be. tween Piedmont and Salem, with a brigade at Manassas gap. The cavalry under Averill had a skirmish at Manassas gap, and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory over superior numbers at Barber's Cross Roads. Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skirmishing in front of them.

On the 6th, the 1st corps advanced to Warrenton; the 2d corps to Rectortown; the 5th corps commenced its movement from Snicker's gap to White Plains; the 9th corps to Waterloo, and vicinity on the Rappahannock; the 11th corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hope

woll's gaps; Sickles's division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas Junction towards Warrenton Junction; the cavalry near Flint hill; Bayard to cut off what there might be in Warrenton, and to proceed to the Rappahannock station.

November 7th: Gen. Pleasonton was ordered to move towards Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards Culpepper Court House.

November 8th: the 2d corps moved half way to Warrenton; the 5th corps to New Baltimore.

November 9: the 2d and 5th corps reached Warrenton; the 6th corps, New

Baltimore.

Late on the night of the 7th, I received an order relieving me from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over to Gen. Burnside, which I at once did.

I had already given the orders for the

movement of the 8th and 9th; these orders were carried into effect without change.

The position in which I left the army, as the result of the orders I had given, was as follows:

The 1st, 2d, and 5th corps, reserve artillery and general headquarters, at Warrenton; the 9th corps, on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the 6th corps at New Baltimore; the 11th corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare gap; Sickles's division of the 3d corps, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock, at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel river, facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpepper Court House; Bayard near Rappahannock sta

tion.

The army was thus massed

near War

upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction
with the rest of the army.

Pleasonton:
The following is from the report of Gen.

"At this time and from the 7th instant, my advance pickets were at Hazel river, ing my flank pickets towards Chester and within six miles of Culpepper, besides havThornton's gaps extended to Gaines's Cross Roads and Newby's Cross Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville.

"The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet, with his command, being at Culpepper while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah valley, on the westter and Thornton's gap, and expecting us ern side of the Blue Ridge, covering Chesto pass through and attack them.

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As late as the 17th of November, a con

traband just from Strasburg came in my
camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps
railroad to Mount Jackson.
was two miles beyond that place. on the
tearing up the road and destroying the
Hill was
bridges, under the impression that we in-
tended to follow into that valley, and was
en route for Staunton.

burg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P.
"Jackson's corps was between Stras-
Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were
scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep
moving to obtain them."

have made the attempt to divide the eneHad I remained in command I should my, as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies. I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our

army.

This indicates the relative position of our army and that of the enemy at the time I was relieved from command.

On the 10th of November Gen. Pleasonrenton, ready to act in any required direc-ton was attacked by Longstreet, with one tion, perfectly in hand, and in admirable division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, condition and spirits. I doubt whether, but repulsed the attack. during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When I gave up the command to Gen. Burnside, the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front, near Culpepper; Jackson, with one, perhaps both of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's gaps, with the mass of their force west of the Blue Ridge.

The reports from Gen. Pleasonton on the advance indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to fall back at least

It would be impossible to participate in operations, such as those described in the foregoing pages, without forming fixed opinions upon subjects connected with the organization of our armies, and the general conduct of military operations.

This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to some general considerations which have been firmly impressed upon me by the events which have occurred.

our armies is the absence of system in the To my mind the most glaring defect in

appointment and promotion of general and other officers, and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of the army war so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course than that which was pursued; but the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide against their recur

rence.

I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent one; that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for life; and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du corps and procure efficiency, should be followed by us.

All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit--that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade-will insure to them advancement in their profession, and can alone secure it

for them.

Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff officers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers having a military education, or who have seen actual service in the field.

The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once increased to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the institution. The regular army should be increased and maintained complete in numbers and efficiency.

A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction should be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and supply promptly the losses arising from battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, from the beginning of the war, have rendered great services, and which have never been fully appreciated by any but their comrades. We need also large bodies of well instructed engineer troops.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more competent than a soldier to determine the political objects and direction of a campaign; but those once decided apon, everything should be left to the responsible military head, without interference from civilians. In no other manner is success probable. The meddling of

individual members of committees of Congress with subjects which, from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, and which they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalculable mischief.

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary to their suecess, to any want of confidence in me; and it only remains for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head of his armiescounsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns.

service competent to direct its military If the nation possesses no generals in affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position the better will it

be for its fortunes.

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum submitted by me to the President on the 4th of August 1861; my letter to him of July 7, 1862; and other similar communications to him and to the Secretary of War. I have seen no reason to change in any material regard the views there expressed.

After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject-a subject which demands the closest thought on the part of every true lover of his country-I am convinced that by the proper employment of our resources it is entirely possible to bring this war to a successful military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the confederates; and that such a result should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory measures; and that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union-a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other.

In this report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of such facts as are necessary for the purposes of history.

Where it was possible, I have preferred to give these facts in the language of dis

patches, written at the time of their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation.

The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, recite what time and space would fail me to mention here: those individual instances of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To them I must especially refer, for without them this narrative would be incomplete, and justice fail to be done. But I cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders, and to other general officers under them, such ample recognition of their cordial co-operation and their dovoted services as those reports abundantly avouch.

I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife.

It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters involved.

This report is, in fact, the history of the army of the Potomac

During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the fortifications of the capital were in progress; and under the discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sustain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to the realities of

war.

States. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign, which might and would have been successful, if supported with appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure of promised support. at the most critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordinary description Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm reflection,when the nation shall be looking back to the past from the midst of peaceful days.

For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades were victorious on every field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a single corps accomplished the object of the fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory.

The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my command of the division of Gen. Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain department, under Gen. Fremont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a despatch revok ing a previous order giving me the command at Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to take ten thousand tions. Then, when under fire before the men from that point to aid in our operadefences of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of Gen. McDowell's ted the overthrow of the original plan of corps of about 35,000 men. This completire army (five divisions out of fourteen, the campaign. About one-third of my enone of the nine remaining being but little larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York river, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, and when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, When at length the army was in condi- surrounded with fortifications, and guarded tion to take the field, the Peninsula cam- by an army larger than our own; but the paign was planned, and entered upon with prospect did not shake the courage of the enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this brave men who composed my command. campaign been followed up as it was de- Relying still on the support which the signed. I cannot doubt that it would have vastness of our undertaking and the grand resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, results depending on our success seemed and the permanent restoration of the pow-to insure us, we pressed forward. The er of the government in Virginia and North weather was stormy beyond precedent; the Carolina, if not throughout the revolting | deep soil of the Peninsula was at times

The army grew into shape but slowly; and the delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 1861-'62, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsula campaign, some of the finest regiments were without rifles; nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service.

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