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Graham, 1st artillery, arrived, and was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon silenced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy fire soon ensued between the battery further to the right and our own. Capt. Graham's battery was bravely and skillfully served, but unable to reach the enemy, who had rifled guns of greater range than ent smooth-bores, retired by order of Gen. Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice of men and horses. The brave general was himself mortally wounded while per sonally directing its fire.

Gen. Hancock was placed in command of the division after the fall of Gen. Richardson. Gen. Meagher's brigade, now commanded by Col. Burke, of the 63d New York, having refilled their cartridge boxes, was again ordered forward, and took position in the centre of the line. The division now occupied one line in close proximity to the enemy, who had taken up position in the rear of Piper's house. Col. Dwight Morris, with the 14th Connecticut and a detachment of the 108th New York, of Gen. French's division, was seat by Gen. French to the support of Gen. Richardson's division. This command was now placed in an interval in the line between Gen. Caldwell's and the Irish brigades.

The requirements of the extended line of battle had so engaged the artillery that the application of Gen. Hancock for artillery for the division could not be complied with immediately by the chief of artillery or the corps commanders in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the troops, Gen. Hancock felt confident that he could hold his position, although suffering from the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, as the great length of the line he was obliged to hold prevented him from forming more than one fine of battle, and, from his advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by the batteries of the enemy on the right, which were protected from our batteries opposite them by the woods at the Dunker church.

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some of our troops to the left of his position, Gen. Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from Gen. Franklin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. It also assisted the attack of the 7th Maine of Franklin's corps, which, without other aid, made an attack against the enemy's line, and drove in the skirmishers who were annoying our artillery and troops on the right. Lieut. Woodruff, with battery I, 2d artillery, relieved Capt. Hexamer, whese ammunition was expended. The enemy at one time seemed to be about making an attack in force

upon this part of the line, and advanced a long column of infantry towards this division; but on nearing the position, Gen. Pleasonton opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, closing the operations on this portion of the field. I return to the ineidents occurring still farther to the right.

Between 12 and 1 P. M. Gen. Franklin's corps arrived on the field of battle, having left their camp near Crampton's pass at 6 A. M.. leaving Gen. Couch with orders to move with his division to occupy Maryland heights. Gen. Smith's division led the column, followed by Gen. Slocum's,

It was first intended to keep this corps in reserve on the east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might require; but on nearing Keedysville, the strong opposition on the right, developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary at once to send this corps to the assist ance of the right wing.

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On nearing the field, bearing that one of our batteries, (A.) 4th United States artillery, commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who occupied the same position as Lient Woodruff's battery in the morning, was hotly engaged without supports, Gen Smith sent two regiments to its relief from Gen. Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the ground, Gen. Smith ordered the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and Cowen's batteries, 1st New York artillery, to the threatened position, Lieut. Thomas and Capt. Cothran, com manding batteries, bravely held their positions against the advancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill.

Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d brigade of Smith's division, commanded by Col. Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania volun teers, was ordered up, and passed through Lieut, Thomas's battery, charged upon the enemy, and drove back the advance until abreast of the Dunker church. As the right of the brigade came opposite the woods it received a destructive fire, which checked the advance and threw the brigade somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries.

Gen. French having reported to Gen Franklin that his ammunition was nearly expended, that officer ordered Gen. Brooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. Gen. Brooks formed his brigade on the right of Gen. French, where they remained during the remainder of the day and night, fre quently under the fire of the enemy's artillery.

It was soon after the brigade of Col. Irwin had fallen back behind the rise of

ground that the 7th Maine, by order of Col. Irwin, made the gallant attack already referred to.

The advance of Gen. Franklin's corps was opportune. The attack of the enemy on this position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, must have been disastrous, had it succeeded in piercing the line between Gena. Sedgwick's and French's di

visions.

Gen. Franklin ordered two brigades of Gen. Slocum's division, Gen. Newton's and Col. Torbert's, to form in column to assault the woods that had been so hotly contested before by Geus. Sumner and Hooker. Gen. Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a reserve. At this time Gen. Sumner, having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the safety of the whole army.

Gen. Porter's corps, consisting of Gen. Syke's division of regulars and volunteers, and Gen. Morell's division of volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and Gen. Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault, for the purpose of piercing our centre and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to reinforce or close up

the gap.

Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of Syke's regulars had been thrown forward across the Antietam bridge on the main road to attack and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasonton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge; Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear; so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes's

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division and one small brigade of Morell's division (but little over three thousand men) to hold his important position.

Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against another attempt during that day to assault the enemy's position in front, as portions of our troops were so much scattered and demoralized. In view of these circumstances, after making changes in the position of some of the troops, I directed the different commanders to hold their positions, and being satisfied that this could be done without the assist ance of the two brigades from the centre, I countermanded the order, which was in course of execution.

Gen. Slocum's division replaced a por tion of Gen. Sumner's troops, and positions. were selected for batteries in front of the woods. The enemy opened several heavy fires of artillery on the position of our troops after this, but our batteries soon silenced them.

On the morning of the 17th, Gen. Plea-' sonton, with his cavalry division and the horse batteries, under Capts. Robertson, Tidball, and Lieut. Haines, of the 2d artillery, and Capt. Gibson, 3d artillery, was ordered to advance on the turnpike to wards Sharpsburg, across bridge No. 2, and support the left of Gen. Sumner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire of artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers were thrown out, and Capt. Tid ball's battery advanced by piece and drove off the sharpshooters with canister suffi-" ciently to establish the batteries above mentioned, which opened on the enemy with effect. The firing was kept up fer, about two hours, when, the enemy's fir slackening, the batteries were relieved by Randall's and Van Reed's batteries, United States artillery. About 3 o'clock Tidball, Robertson and IIaines returned to their positions on the west of Antietam, Capt. Gibson having been placed in position on the east side to guard the approaches to the bridge. These batteries did good ser." vice, concentrating their fire on the column of the enemy about to attack Gen. Hancock's position, and compelling it to find shelter behind the hills in rear.

Gen. Sykes's division had been in position since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. Gen. Morell had come up on the 16th, and relieved Gen. Richardson on the right of Gen. Sykes. Continually, under the vigi ant watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point.

The position of the batteries under Gen. Pleasonton being one of great exposure, the battalion of the 2d and 10th Unite States infantry, under Capt. Pollard, 24. infantry, was sent to his support. Subse

quently four battalions of regular infantry, under Capt. Dryer, 4th infantry, were sent across to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of the enemy.

The battalions of the 2d and 10th infantry, advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in numbers, and unsupported, they were unable to bring them off. The heavy loss of this small body of men attests their gallantry. The troops of Gen. Burnside held the left of the line opposite bridge No. 3. The attack on the right was to have been supported by an attack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of the 16th, Gen. Burnside's corps was moved forward and to the left, and took up a position nearer the bridge.

I visited Gen. Burnside's position on the 16th, and after pointing out to him the proper dispositions to be made of his troops during the day and night, informed him that he would probably be required to attack the enemy's right on the following morning, and directed him to make careful reconnoissances.

Gen. Burnside's corps, consisting of the divisions of Gens. Cox. Wilcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, was posted as follows: Col. Brooks's brigade, Cox's division, on the right, Gen. Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On the left was Gen. Rodman's division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade, Cox's division, in support.

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Gen. Wilcox's division was held in re

serve.

The corps bivouacked in position on the night of the 16th,

Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered Gen. Burnside to form his troops, and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders.

At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieut. Wilson, topographical engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear.

After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to Gen. Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it all hazards. The aid returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I directed Col. Sackett, inspector general, to deliver to Gen. Burnside my .positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of

the bayonet; and I ordered Col. Sackett to remain with Gen. Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly.

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania volunteers. Other troops were then thrown over, and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond.

A halt was then made by Gen. Burnside's advance until 3 P. M., upon hearing which I directed one of my ads, Col. Key, to inform Gen. Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy's position on the heights; that the movement was vital to our success; that this was a time when we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object could thereby be accomplished. That if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to inform me so at once, that his troops might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on the field. He replied that he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would' permit. Upon this report, I again immediately sent Col. Key to Gen. Burnside with orders to advance at once, if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry the heights; repeating that if he considered the movement impracticable, to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong re-enforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked Gen. Burnside's, troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge.

If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights,, from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear, our victory might thus have been much more decisive.

The following is the substance of Gen. Burnside's operations, as given in his report:

Col. Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This bridge, No. 3, is a stone structure of three arches with stone parapets. The banks of the stream on the opposite side are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches to the bridge. On the hill-side, immediately by the bridge,; was a stone fence running parallel to the stream; the turns of the roadway, as it wound up the hill, were covered by rifle

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REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN..

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pits and breastworks of rails, &c. These works, and the woods that covered the slopes, were filled with the enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in position to enfilade the bridge and its approaches.d

Gen. Rodman was ordered to cross the ford below the bridge. From Col. Crook's position it was found impossible to carry the bridge.

Gen. Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose. He sent forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th New Hampshire. These regiments made several successive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back.

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of battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a strong attack on the extreme left. To meet this attack the left division diverged from the line of march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. To fill up this it was necessary to order the troops from the second line. During these movements Gen. Rodman was mortally wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, of Gen. Rodman's division, was driven back. Col. Scammon's brigade, by a change of front to rear on his right flank, saved the left from being driven completely in. The fresh troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artillery against this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accomplish anything more. 192

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The artillery on the left were ordered to concentrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. Col. Crook brought a section of Capt. Simmons's battery to a position It was now nearly dark. Gen. Sturgis to command the bridge. The 51st New was ordered forward to support the left. -York and 51st Pennsylvania were then Notwithstanding the hard work in the early ordered to assault the bridge. Taking ad- part of the day, his division moved forvantage of a small spur of the hills which ward with spirit. With its assistance the ran parallel to the river, they moved to- enemy were checked and held at bay. wards the bridge. From the crest of this spur they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the bridge.

The division followed the storming party, also the brigade of Col. Crook's as a support. The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some five or six hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new position on the crest of the hill above the bridge.

Gen. Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, Scammon's brigade crossing as support. Gen. Wilcox's division was ordered across to take position on Gen. Sturgis's right.

These dispositions being completed about 3 o'clock, the command moved forward, except Sturgis's division, left in reserve. Clark's and Durell's batteries accompanied Rodman's division; Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and a section of Simmons's battery with Col. Crook's brigade. A section of Simmons's battery and Mullenburgh's and McMullan's batteries were in position. The order for the advance was obeyed by the troops with alacrity. Gen. Wilcox's division, with Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading from the bridge to Sharpsburg, Gen. Rodman's division. supported by Scammon's brigade, on the left of Gen. Wilcox. The enemy retreated before the advance of the troops. The 9th New York, of Gen. Rodman's division, captured one of the enemy's batteries and held it for some time. As the command was driving the enemy to the main heights on the left of the town, the light division of Gen. A. P. Hill arrived upon the field

The command was ordered to fall back by Gen. Cox, who commanded on the field the troops engaged in this affair beyond the Antietam. The artillery had been well served during the day. Night closed the long and desperately contested battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. The army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy,

The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th, or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me.

After a night of anxious deliberation and a full and careful survey of the situntion and condition of our army, the strength and position of the enemy, I concluded that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I am aware of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success; but at this critical juncture I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that moment Virginia

Lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country; extorted tribute from -wealthy and populous cities; and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another organized force able to arrest its march.

The following are among the considerátions which led me to doubt the certainty of success in attacking before the 19th:

The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long continued and severely contested battle of the 17th, together with the long day and night marches to which they had been subjected during the previous three days.

The supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from hunger. They required rest and refreshment. One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiently for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much scattered, so that they were for the time somewhat deI moralized.

In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by Gen. Meade, commanding, there were but 6,729 men present on the 18th; whereas, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 men present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men were separated from their command.

Gen. Meade, in an official communication upon this subject, dated September 18th, 1862, says:

"I enclose a field return of the corps made this afternoon, which I desire you I will lay before the commanding general. I am satisfied the great reduction in the corps since the recent engagements is not due solely to the casualities of battle, and that a considerable number of men are still in the rear, some having dropped out on the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes, good. To resist an attack in our present strong position I think they may be depended on, and I hope they will perform duty in case we make an attack, though I do not think their morale is as good for an offensive as a defensive movement."

One division of Sumner's corps had also been overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps commander' in proper condition to attack the enemy vigorously the next day.

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Some of the new troops on the left, al though many of them fought well during the battle, and are entitled to great credit, were at the close of the action, driven back, and their morale impaired.

On the morning of the 18th Gen. Burnside requested me to send him another division to assist in holding his position on the other side of the Antietam, and to enable him to withdraw his corps if he should be attacked by a superior force. He gave me the impression that if he were attacked again that morning he would not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. I visited his position early, determined to send Gen. Morell's division to his aid, and directed that it should be placed on this side of the Antietam, in order that it might cover the retreat of his own corps from the other side of the Antietam, should that become necessary, at the same time it was in position to re-enforce our centre or right. if that were needed..

Late in the afternoon I found that, although he had not been attacked, GenBurnside had withdrawn his own corps to this side of the Antietam, and sent over Morell's division alone to hold the opposite side.

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A large number of our heaviest and most efficient batteries had consumed all their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible to supply them until late on the following day.

Supplies of provisions and forage had to be brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition distributed.

Finally, re-enforcements to the number of 14,000 men-to say nothing of troops expected from Pennsylvania-had not arrived, but were expected during the day.

The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing the wounded, burying the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle.

Of the re-inforcements, Couch's division, marching with commendable rapidity, came up into position at a late hour in the morning. Humphrey's division of new troops, in their anxiety to participate in the battle which was raging, when they received the order to march from Frederick at about half-past three P. M., on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire night, and the mass of the division reached the army during the following morning. Having marched more than twenty-there miles after half-past four o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they were of course, greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refreshment. Large re-inforcements expected from Pennsylvania never arrived. During the 18th, orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th.

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