the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the enemy, it became more convenient to embark the troops and meterial at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given. your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between In making the preliminary arrangements the two divisions, it will be best to place for the movement it was determined that one on each road. It will be best to rethe first corps, Gen. McDowell's, should main pretty near the fort for the present, move as a unit first, and effect a landing in order to give the impression that our either at the Sand-box, some four miles object is to attack Norfolk rather than south of Yorktown, in order to turn all Yorktown. You will do well, however, the enemy's defences at Ship point, How-to push strong reconnoissances well to the ard's bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should front to ascertain the position of the enemy existing circumstances render it preferable, and his pickets. I will, as soon as possiland on the Gloucester side of York river ble, re-enforce you by the 3d division of and move on West Point. your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarcation is completed, and you will be informed accor dingly. The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army by divisions, as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarcation, convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the first corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarcation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. On the 17th of March, Hamilton's division, of the 3d corps, embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with the following orders : "WASHINGTON, D. C., March 17, 1862. "You will, on your arrival at Fort Mouroe, report to Gen. Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. "R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. Gen. C. S. HAMILTON, Com. Division." On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, Gen. Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. Gen. Heintzelman was ordered to accompany it under the following in structions: 66 "My desire would be to make no impor tant move in advance until we are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. "The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from Gen. Van Vliet. "It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay. "Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. 66 Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies. "I am very truly yours, 66 "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major-Gen. Com. Brig.-Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Com. 3d Corps." 66 In consequence of the delay in the arri val of the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disembarcation I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and the 5th regular cavalry; the 2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possi ble to move Casey's division at all for | named, in all about 58,000 men and 100 several days, while the other divisions were guns, besides the division of artillery. obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of Gen. Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York river, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of Gen. J. B. Magruder. Maps which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under Gen. Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick river was represented as flowing parallel to, but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed Gen. Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of Gen. Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000 It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to re-enforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay The accompanying map of Col. Cram, U. S. Topographical Engineers, attached to Gen. Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design. It was also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, Howard's bridge, Ship point, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Young's mills, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the first corps could arrive Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarcation of the cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders of march were given for the following day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d corps, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 3d corps had not arrived, and Casey's division of the 4th corps was unable to move for want of wagons. Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Ft. Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under Gen. Wool a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. During the night of the 3rd I received a telegram from the Adj. Gen. of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all control over Gen. Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. .This order left me without any base of operations under my control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the conFlag-Officer federate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac; and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James river, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparantly wellgrounded expectations. I determined then to move the two divisions of the 4th corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg road, to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the 3d corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown; the reserves moving so as to support either corps as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the 1st corps, re-enforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his positions. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. On the 3d, the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th: Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Averill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedwick's division of the 2d corps, under Brigadier General Heintzelman, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division with Averills's cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the Newmar ket and New bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road, a sufficient force to hold that point, and cut off the garrision of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's bridge 44 Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. by the New bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's creek. "Sedwick's division will march at 8 a. m, by the Newmarket bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's bridge. “Brig. Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's division at 6 a. m., (Smith's division in ad vance,) by the James river road. The 5th regular cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's mills, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick, Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's creek. "The reserve cavalry, artillery and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m., by the New. market bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march, it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division." The following is an extract from the or der issued on the 4th, for the march of the 5th: "The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th:) "Gen. Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 a. m., via Warwick Court House and the road leading near the old ship yard, to the 'Half-way house' on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. "Gen. Couch's division will march at 6 a. m., to close up on Gen. Smith's division at the Half-way House.' "Gen. Keyes's command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the Half-way House,' so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in. "Gen. Heintzelman will move forward Gen. Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m., upon the advance guard. when the entire will advance to a point about two and three quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north, and where a road comes in from Warwick Court House. "Gen. Hamilton's division, will move at 6 a. m, and follow Gen. Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. 5 Gen. Sedgwick's division, will march at a. m., as far as the Warwick's road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Power's house, and will await further orders. "The reserve will march at 6 a. m., upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Powers's house; the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. "Gen. Sedgwick's division, will for the present, act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters." In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place | been planned-I may confess to having Ship point in our possession, together with been shocked at this order, which, with its garrison, unless they abandoned it that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, promptly. The result answered the ex- removed nearly 60,000 men from my compectation. mand, and reduced my force by more than one-third, after its task had been assigned; its operations planned; its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error. During the afternoon of the 4th, Gen. Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at Lee's mills. The nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed Gen. Keyes to attack and carry this position upon coming in front of it. Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was brought to a halt, that of Heintzelman (Porter's division) in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's bridge; that of Keyes (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's mills, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick river. The progress of each column had been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keyes's column, and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the ammunition, provisions and forage could not be brought up at all. When Gen. Keyes approached Lee's mills his left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick river, and incapable of being carried by assault. The troops composing the advance of each column were, during the afternoon, under a warm artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged when covering reconnoissances. It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following telegram was sent to me: "ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 4, 1862. "By direction of the President, Gen. McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. "L. THOMAS, "Adj. Gen. "Gen. MCCLELLAN." The President having promised, in an interview following his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated-that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had, therefore, no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I best could with the force at my command. Reconnoissances made under fire on that and the following day determined that the sources of the Warwick river were near Yorktown, commanded by its guns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on the James river, was controlled by the confederate gunboats; that the fords had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by exrensive and formidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes and the flooding of the roads, caused by the dams, had made these works apparently inaccessible and impossible to turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed and garrisoned, and connected with the defences of the Warwick by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascertained that the garrisons had been, and were daily being re-enforced by troops from Norfolk and the army under Gen. J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains made the roads to'Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition and supplies, while storms prevented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton roads, and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York river, near the army. The ground bordering the Warwick river is covered by very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few, This, with the comparative flatness of the country, and the alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough reconnoissances slow, dangerous and difficult, yet it was impossible otherwise to determine whether an assault was anywhere practicable, or whether the more tedious but sur operations of a siege must be resorted to. I made, on the 6th and 7th, close personal reconnoissances of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns, and some siege operations. Instant assault would have been simple folly. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "April 7, 1862. "Your telegram of yesterday is received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my entire force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only fifty-three thousand men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. speedily unde: my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created. "Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thou sand men have been taken from my command. Since my despatch of the 5th inst five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins, I shall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them; but were I in possession of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result. Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works, but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-Gen.at least the whole of the 1st corps to land "To the PRESIDENT, Washington D. C." On the same day I sent the following: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation. 66 "IN FRONT OF YORKTOWN, "April 7, 1862–7 p. m. "Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent, examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely. "The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, before we assault. All the prisoners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands-probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and probably more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is probably less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position. "I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the government will be as fully and as upon the Severn river and attack Gloucester in the rear. "My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsbo rough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here. “GEO. B. McCLELLAN, "Major Gen. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War." I had provided a small siege train and moderate supplies of intrenching tools for such a contingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining the character and strength of all the defences, and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to determine the point of attack and to develop the ap proaches, the troops were occupied in opening roads to the depots established at the nearest available points, on branches of York river. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as fol. lows: Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, |