possible to subsist his men, Gen. Stoneman was forced to return after reaching Cedar run. The following despatch from him recites the result of this expedition. "HEADQUARTERS, UNION MILLS, "We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses; no provisions for men. Bull run too high to cross. Had we stayed an hour longer we should not have got here to-day, owing to the high water in the streams. Felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at Warrenton Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and three bodies of infantry on the other side of Cedar run. Had we crossed, should not have been able to get back for high water. Had three men of 5th cavalry hit driving in enemy's pickets; one slightly wounded in the head. Enemy acted confidently, and followed us some way back on the road, but did not molest us in any way. Enemy's force consisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, and some infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Junction; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars running during night before last; probably bringing up troops from Rappahannock. Heard of two regiments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in impressing the militia and securing forage. Heard of a large force of infantry this side of Rappahannock river, having come up to Warrenton Junction from Aquia creek day before yesterday. Bridges all destroyed this side of Broad run. The aides who take this will give you further particulars. "Very respectfully. &c., "Col. COLBURN." 66 "The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. Gen. Howard will return to this camp to-morrow morning. "E. V. SUMNER, Brig.-Gen. "Gen. S. WILLIAMS." Manassas Gap railroad was thus left reaThe line of the Rappahannock and the derable body of the enemy. sonably secure from menace by any consi On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court-house to discuss the military status. The Presi dent's order No. 3. of March 8th, was considered. The following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council: 66 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Fairfax, March 13, 1863. "A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, were of the opinion— "I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers: Provided, "1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized. "2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac and, "3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries on the York river. "4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) "II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.) "N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keys, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.") This was assented to by myself, and immediately communicated to the War Department. The following reply was received the same day: "WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862. "The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objections to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution; "I. Leave such force at Manassas Junc tion as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 2. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. 44 EDWIN M. STANTON, "Sec. of War. "Major-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN.” My preparations were at once begun in accordance with these directions, and on the 16th of March the following instructions were sent to Gens Banks and Wadsworth: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "March 16th, 1862. "SIR; You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. "Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments. with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to Occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of that railway and up the Shenandoah valley, as well as through Chester gap, which might perhaps be advantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry, well intrenched. Block-houses should be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired. "Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, and probably a fourth to wards Leesburg. | To recapitulate, the most important points which should engage your attention are as follows: "1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, (a brigade,) also well intrenched, near Strasburg. "2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. "3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. "4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction and in advance, as far as the Rappahannock, if possible. "5. Great care to be excercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy. line of the Potomac and Washington. "6. The general object is to cover the "The above is communicated by command of Maj. Gen. McClellan. 66 66 S. WILLIAMS, Major-Gen. N. P. BANKS, "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "March 16, 1862. "The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges and ferries, within the abovenamed limits, will devolve upon yon, and you are to insure their security and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also protect the depots of the public stores and the transit of stores to troops in active service. 46 By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country, south of the Eastern Branch, and also on your right, and you will use every procaution to intercept mails, goods and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy's lines. "The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. "You will forward and facilitate the movements of all troops destined for the active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transit of detachments to their proper regiments and corps. "The charge of the new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition and equipment, by every opportunity. "Besides the regular reports and returns, which you will be required to render to the Adjutant-General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated report of your command, every Sunday morning, and monthly returns on the first day of each month. "The foregoing instructions are communicated by command of Maj. Gen. McClellan. 66 "S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adj. Gen. Brig. Gen. J. S. WADSWORTH, "Military Governer, Dist. of Columbia." The Secretary of War had expressed a desire that I should communicate to the War Department my designs with regard to the employment of the army of the Potomac in an official form. I submitted, on the 19th day of March the following: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Theo. Sem., Va., March 19, 1862. "SIR: I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed operations of the active portion of the army of the Potomac. "The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; also, that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows "1st. That we should collect all our available forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns. "2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the battle field. "The advantages of the Penninsula between York and James rivers are too obvious to need explanation; it is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached, and used as our main depot that we may have the shortest line of lan: transportation for our supplies, and the use of York river. "There are two methods of reaching this point "1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps. "2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown, the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York river all their available and most powferful batteries: its reduction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available forces on either or both banks of the James. "It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions which by their aid could be turned without serions loss of either time or men. the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they would well know, from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object. "It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point-there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the subjectmatter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion. "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Hon. E. M. STANTON, In the mean time the troops destined to form the aotive army were collected in camps convenient to the points of embarcation, and every preparation made to embark them as rapidly as possible when the transports were ready. A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alexandria, I met the President, by appointment, on a steamer. He there informed me that he had been strongly pressed to take Gen. Blenker's division from my command and give it to Gen. Fremont. His excellency was good enough to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I received, on the 31st, the following note: "EXECUTIVE MANSION, "Washington, March 31, 1862. "MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understand ing that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify, it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases. Yours, very truly, "A. LINCOLN. Maj. Gen MCCLELLAN." To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thousand troops which had been counted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy I would yield, and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterwards I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given to Gen. Fremont from any pressure other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken from me, or in any way detached from my com mand. At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our forces occupying Charlestown, and Shield's reaching Bunker Hill on the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, a brigade of Gen. Bank's troops, under Gen. Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our advance entered the place. The enemy having made his preparations for evacuation some days before, it was not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th the mass of Bank's corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. On the 19th Gen. Shields occupied Strasburg, driving the enemy twenty miles south to Mount Jackson. On the 20th the first division of Bank's corps commenced its movement towards Manassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the 16th. Jackson probably received information of this movement, and supposed that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Winchester, and upon the falling back of Shields to that place, for the purpose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon ensued a skirmish on the 22d, in which Gen. Shields was wounded, and an affair at Winchester on the 23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly as the exhaustion of our troops and the difficulty of obtaining supplies permitted. It is presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester were forwarded direct to the War Department by Gen. Banks. 'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "On board the Commodore, April 1, 1862. GENERAL: The change in affairs in the valley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since agreed upon. "In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as the railwill be probably important and advisable way communications are re-estabtished it to move on Staunton, but this would require secure communications, and a force of from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond, at all events not so long before it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on you, and then return on me. I fear that you cannot be ready in time, although it In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not re-enforced largely. I also assume that you may find it impossible to detach any-may come in very well with a force less thing towards Manassas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have drawn all the rebel force towards Richmond. than that I have mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When Gen. Sumner leaves Warrenton Junction, Gen. Abercrombie will be placed in immediate command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders.. Please inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things in your front. I am very truly yours, Maj. Gen. N. P. BANKS, "You are aware that Gen. Sumner has for some days been at Manassas Junction with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regiments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy the railway bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side the Rappahannock in that direction, and it seems clear that we have no Com. Fifth Corps. reason to fear any return of the rebels in "P. S. From what I have just learned, that quarter. Their movements near it would seem that the regiments of cavalry Fredericksburg also indicate a final aban- intended for Warrenton Junction have donment of that neighborhood. I doubt gone to Harper's Ferry. Of the four adwhether Johnson will now re-enforce Jack-ditional regiments placed under your son with a view of offensive operations. orders, two should as promptly as possible The time is probably passed when he could move by the shortest route on Warrenton have gained anything by doing so. I have Junction. ordered in one of Sumner's division (that of Richardson, late Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarcation. Blenker's has been detached from the army of the Potomac and ordered to report to Gen. Fremont. "Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton junction to-day. Geary is at White Plains. Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. "Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after some three thousand additional. "I will order Blenker to march on Strasburg and to report to you for temporary duty, so that should you find a large force in your front you can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report to the Adj. Gen. of the army for orders; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. "I am sir, very respectively, your obedient servant, "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com." This letter needs no further explanation than to say that it was my intention, had the operations in that quarter remained under my charge, either to have resumed the defensive position marked out in the letter of March 16, or to have advanced Gen. Banks upon Staunton as might in the progress of events seem advisible. It is to be remembered that when I wrote the preceding and following letters of April 1, I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the operations in the Shenandoah valley, the President's war order No. 3 giving no intimation of such an intention, and that so far as reference was made to final operations after driving Jackson back and taking such a position as to prevent his return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for further consideration, |