the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether such a bridge could be constructed; that if it could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the railroad bridge; and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure, move on Winchester. and subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply the troops, and enable them to move on Winchester, independently of the bridge. The next day (Friday), I sent a strong reconnoissance to Charlestown, and under its protection, went there myself. I then determined to hold that place, and to move the troops composing Lander's and Williams's commands at once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering the reconstruction of the railroad. 66 "When I arrived at the place I found the batteau bridge nearly completed; the holding-ground proved better than had been anticipated; the weather was favorable, Having done this, and taken all the there being no wind. I at once crossed steps in my power to insure the rapid trans over the two brigades which had arrived, mission of supplies over the river, I reand took steps to hurry up the other two, turned to this city, well satisfied with what belonging respectively to Banks's and had been accomplished. While up the Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of river I learned that the President was discrossing supplies had not then become ap- satisfied with the state of affairs; but on parent. That night I telegraphed for a my return here, understood from the Secregiment of regular cavalry and four bat-retary of War that upon learning the teries of heavy artillery to come up the next day (Thursday), besides directing Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up on Friday. "Next morning the attempt was made to pass the canal boats through the liftlock, in order to commence at once the construction of the permanent bridge. It was then found for the first time that the lock was too small to permit the passage of the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah canal, and too narrow by some four or six inches for the canal boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are all large enough for the ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edwards's ferry thus used. It has always been represented to the engineers by the military railroad employees, and others, that the lock was large enough, and the differ ence being too small to be detected by the eye, no one had thought of measuring it, or suspecting any difficulty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to build the permanent bridge. A violent gale had arisen, which threatened the safety of our only means of communication; the narrow approach to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with wagons that it was very clear that, under existing circumstances, nothing more could be done than to cross over the baggage and supplies of the two brigades. Of the others, instead of being able to cross both during the morning, the last arrived only in time to go over just before dark. It was evident that the troops under orders would only be in the way, should they arrive, and that it would not be possible to subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was therefore deemed necessary to countermand the order, content ourselves with covering the reopening of the railroad for the present, and in the meantime use every exertion to establish, as promptly as possible, depots of forage whole state of the case the President was fully satisfied. I contented myself therefore with giving to the Secretary a brief statement, as I have written here." The design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the first of April, the date of my departure for the Peninsula, the railroad was in running order. As a demonstration upon the left flank of the enemy, this movement no doubt assisted in determining the evacuation of his lines on the 8th and 9th of March. On my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 28th of February, the preparations necessary to carry out the wishes of the President and Secretary of War in regard to destroying the batteries on the lower Potomac were at once undertaken. Mature reflection convinced me that this operation would require the movement of the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy would resist it with his whole strength. I undertook it with great reluctance, both cu account of the extremely unfavorable condition of the roads and my firm conviction that the proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it subsequently did, force the enemy to abandon all his positions in front of Washington. Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign to precipitate this evacuation by any direct attack, nor to subject the army to any needless loss of life and material by a battle near Washington, which could produce no decisive results. The preparations for a movement towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, however advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I had invited the commanders of divisions to meet at headquarters on the 8th of March, for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their advice and opinion in regard to their commands, when an interview with the President indicated to me the possibilty of a change in my | tions, or until the President shall hereafter orders. His excellency sent for me at a very early hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction with the affair of Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of the same facts which had before given satisfaction to his excellency again produced, as I supposed, the same result. The views which I expressed to the President were re-enforced by the result of a meeting of my general officers at headquarters. At that meeting my plans were laid before the division commanders, and were approved by a majority of those present. Nevertheless, on the same day two important orders were issued by the President, without consultation with me. The first of these was the general war order No. 2, directing the formation of army corps, and assigning their com manders. I had always been in favor of the principle of an organization into army corps, but preferred deferring its practical execution until some little experience in campaign and on the field of battle should show what general officers were most competent to exercise these high commands, for it must be remembered that we then had no officers whose experience in war on a large scale was sufficient to prove that they possessed the necessary qualifications. An incompetent commander of an army corps might cause irreparable damage, while it is not probable that an incompetent division commander could cause any very serious mischief. These views had frequently been expressed by me to the President and members of the cabinet; it was therefore with as much regret as surprise that I learned the existence of this order. The first order has been given above; the second order was as follows: [President's General War Order No. 3.] "EXECUTIVE MANSION, 'Washington, March 8, 1862. "Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. "That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake bay, shall be freed from enemy's batteries, and other obstruc give express permission. "That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to move upon the day as early as the 18th March, instant, and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day. "Ordered, That the army and navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake bay. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN "L. THOMAS, Adj. Gen." After what has been said already in regard to the effect of a movement to the lower Chesapeake it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, further than to say that the time of beginning the movement depended upon the state of readiness of the transports, the entire control of which had been placed by the Secretary of War in the hands of one of the Assist. Secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster General; so that even if the movement were not impeded by the condition imposed, in regard to the batteries on the Potomac, it could not have been in my power to begin it before the 18th March, unless the Assist. Secretary of War had completed his arrangements by that time. Meanwhile important events were occurring which materially modified the designs for the subsequent campaign. The appearance of the Merrimack off Old Point Comfort, and the encounter with the United States squadron on the 8th of March, threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsula movement. But the engagement between the Monitor and Merrimack on the 9th of March, demonstrated so satisfactorily the power of the former, and the other naval preparations were so extensive and formidable, that the security of Fort Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt; and although the James river was closed to us, the York river, with its tributaries, was still open as a line of water communication with the fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, although less promising in its details than when the James river was in our control. On Sunday, the 9th of March, informa tion from various sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his positions at Centreville and Manassas as well as on the upper and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of War were present when the most positive information | alry advance reached the enemy's lines at reached me, and I expressed to them my Centreville, passing through his recently intention to cross the river immediately, occupied camps and works, and finding and there gain the most authentic informa- still burning heaps of military stores and tion, prior to determining what course to much valuable property. pursue. The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but the adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary. Immediately after being assigned to the command of the troops around Washington, I organized a secret service force, under Mr. E. J. Allen, a very experienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was continually occupied in procuring from all possible sources information regarding the strength, positions and movements of the enemy. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined, first by the outpost and division commanders, and then by my The retirement of the enemy and the chief of staff and the Provost Marshal occupation of the abandoned positions General. Their statements, taken in which necessarily followed presented an writing, and in many cases under oath, opportunity for the troops to gain some from day to day, for a long period previous experience on the march and bivouac pre- to the evacuation of Manassas, comprised paratory to the campaign, and to get rid a mass of evidence which, by careful diof the superfluous baggage and other "im-gests and collations, enabled me to estipediments" which accumulate so easily mate with considerable accuracy the around an army encamped for a long time in one locality. A march to Manassas and back would produce no delay in embarking for the lower Chesapeake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass their rear. I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of March for a general movement of the army the next morning towards Centreville and Manassas, sending in advance two regiments of cavalry under Col, Averill with orders to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy if really in retreat; at the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary of War that it would be necessary to defer the organization of the ariny corps until the completion of the projected advance upon Manassas, as the divisions could not be brought together in time. The Secretary replied, requiring immediate compliance with the President's order, but on my again representing that this would compel the abandonment or -postponement of the movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its postpone strength of the enemy before us. Summaries showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service force accompany this report and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time and persons in high office unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude the country with Quaker gun stories of the defences and gross understatements of the numbers of the enemy. The following orders were issued for the examination of persons coming from the direction of the enemy: ["Circular.] "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Washington, Dec. 16, 1861. "The major general commanding directs that hereafter all deserters, prisoners, spies, contrabands,' and all other persons whatever coming or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the commander of the division within whose lines they may come or be brought, without previous examination by any one, except so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding the advance guard to elicit information regarding his particular post; that the division commander examine all such persons himself, or delegate such duty to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no other persons to hold any communication ment. with them; that he then immediately send At noon on the 10th of March the cav-them, with a sufficient guard, to the pro vost marshal in this city for further exam- | might determine whether we had the inforination and safe-keeping, and that strin- mation it was proposed to obtain, and that gent orders be given to all guards having I might give the necessary orders to other such persons in charge not to hold any commanders, so that the scouts should communication with them whatever; and not be molested by the guards. further, that the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately communicated to the major general commanding, or the chief of staff, and to no other person whatever. "The major general commanding further directs that a sufficient guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such guards be instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, general officers, and such staff officers as may be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraph instruments. "By command of Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN. "S. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adj. Gen." "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Washington, Feb. 26, 1862. "GENERAL ORDER No. 27. * * It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, dated March 8, that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac, at that date were as follows: At Manassas, Centreville, Bull run, Upper Occoquan, and vicinity.... At Brooks's station, Dumfries, Lower Oc- .S0,000 men. .18,000 men. 4,500 men. .13,000 men. 115,500 men. About three hundred field guns and from twenty-six to thirty siege guns were with the rebel army in front of Washington. The report made on the 17th of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, corroborates the statements contained in the report of the 8th, and is fortified by the affidavits of several railroad engineers, constructors, baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for forming correct estimates were unusually good. *These affidavits will be found in the accompanying reports of the chief of the secret service corps. "All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within our lines, will be taken at once to the provost marshal of the nearest division, who will examine them in presence of the division commander or an officer of his staff designated for the purpose. This examination will only refer to such information as may affect the division and those near it, especially those remote from general headquarters. "As soon as this examination is completed-and it must be made as rapidly as possible the person will be sent, under proper guard, to the Provost Marshal General, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. Upon receiving him, the Provost Marshal General will at once send him, with his statement, to the chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will cause the necessary examination to be made. The Provost Marshal General will have the custody of all such persons. Division commanders will at once communicate to other division commanders all information thus obtained which affects them. A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville, made by Lieut. McAlester, United States engineers, on March 14, 1862, and a survey of those at Manassas, made by a party of the United States coast survey, sions as to the strength of the enemy's dein April, 1862, confirmed also my conclufences. Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, viz: one bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries; all containing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets and double cathe ridge a mile and three quarters from its poniéres. It extended along the crest of junction with the northern front to ground thickly wooded and impassable to an attacking column The northern front extended about one and one-fourth mile to Great Rocky run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillère line with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures. In addition to the foregoing orders, the division commanders were instructed, when- Manassas station was defended in all diever they desired to send out scouts to-rections by a system of detached works, wards the enemy, to make known the with platforms for heavy guns arranged for object at headquarters, in order that I marine carriages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system was ren- 12, I was informed through the telegraph, dered complete by a very large work, with by a member of my staff, that the followsixteen embrasures, which commanded the ing document had appeared in the Nahighest of the other works by about fifty tional intelligencer of that morning: feet. Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the maps appended to this report. From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impassable streams and broken ground, affording ample protection for their flanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available approaches. Although the history of every former war has conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions, defended by heavy earthworks; yet, at the commencement of this war, but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. New levies that have never been in bat tle cannot be expected to advance without cover under the murderous fire from such defences, and carry them by assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently falter and are repulsed with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions in front of Washington, with the new troops composing the army of the Potomac, during the winter of 1861-'62, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization was too prob able. The same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fought and bravely won, has twice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. My letter to the Secretary of War, dated February 3. 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement to the Peninsula would compel the enemy to retire from his position at Manassas and free Washington from danger. When the enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula campaign, as at no former period, northern Virginia was completely in our possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's bar, and were again left free to advance northward and menace the national capital. Perhaps no one doubts that the best defence of Washington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. My order for the organization of the army corps was issued on the 13th of March; it has been given above. While at Fairfax Court-house, on March 66 [President's War Order, No. 3.] "EXECUTIVE MANSION, "Washington, March 11, 1862. ally taken the field at the head of the Maj. Gen. McClellan having persondered, he is relieved from the command of army of the Potomac, until otherwise orthe other military departments, he retainPotomac. ing command of the department of the ments now under the respective commands "Ordered further, That the departof Gens. Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through, Knoxville, Tennespartment of the Mississippi; and that, unsee, be consolidated and designated the detil otherwise ordered, Maj. Gen. Halleck have command of said department. of the department of the Potomac and east Ordered, also, That the country west of the department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the mountain department, and that the same be commanded by Maj. Gen. Fremont. That all the commanders of departthem, respectively report severally and diments, after the receipt of this order by rectly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position of general-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he saw fit to make of my services, and so informed him in a note on the 12th of March, in which occur these words: "I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my public duties. Again thanking you for the official and personal kindness you have so often evinced towards me, I am," &c., &c. On the 14th of March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry with some infantry, under command of Gen. Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads were in such condition that, finding it im |