repeat to you that I regard the importance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by the army under my immediate command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky; not only that, but the majority of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our cause, it being that which best subserves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the importance of the former. You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinions of the President when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the general government. "The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions. "So much in regard to political considerations. The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences; such is not the case. you "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, Nov. 12, 1863. movements, be careful so to treat the un- the rebels. I mean by this that it is the desire of the government to avoid unnecessary irriof individuals. Where there is good reatation by causeiess arrests and persecution son to believe that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or information to the them; but I have always found that it is enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrests shall be made except by your order or that of your generals, unless in extraor dinary cases, always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Were the population among which are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumber land Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at "If the military suggestions I have the same time cut off the railway commu-made in this letter prove to have been nications between eastern Virginia and founded on erroneous data, you are of the Mississippi. It will be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving it in your of operations. course perfectly free to change the plans rear. "Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL." Union. Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, 44 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, Feb. 14, 1862. "GENERAL: Your despatches in regard to the occupation of Dafuskie island, &c., were received to day. I saw also to-day, for the first time, your requisition for a siege train for Savannah. "After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the siege and capture of Savannah do not promise results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah river, above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its immediate results. "First. The capture of Savannah by a 'coup de main,'-the result of an instantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. "The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that you are not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advantages. "Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by a bombardment. "Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course still remains open to us; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confident you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essential; you obtain complete control of the harbor; you relieve the blockading fleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. "I do not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. "But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Charleston and its defences. There the rebellion had its birth; there the unnatural hatred of our government is most intense; there is the centre of the boasted power and courage of the rebels. "To gain Fort Sumter and hold Charleston is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route and armies in motion which have certain preliminary objects to accomplish before we are ready to take Charleston in Very truly, yours, "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major Gen. Commanding U. S. A. "Brig. Gen. T. W. SHERMAN, "Commanding at Port Royal, &c." "HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, Feb. 23, 1862. "GENERAL: You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to cooperate with the navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of staff, and Lieut. Weitzell, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first thirteen regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, (old and good regiments from Baltimore.) "The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe. "Two companies of the 21st Indiana are well drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship island will be sufficient for your purposes. "After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that two (2) light batteries fully equipped, and one (1) without horses, will be all that are necessary. 66 This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery: total, 15,255 men. The commanding general of the department of Key West is authorized to loan you, temporarily, two regiments; Fort Pickens can, probably, give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000. The object of your expedition is one of vital importance-the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi river, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance offered by Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case you will, after their capture, leave a suffi cient garrison in them to render them per fectly secure; and it is recommended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns and some troops be left at the pilot station (at the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. These troops and guns will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured. "Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault. "The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries. Here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of the river above the city. It may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order; but if there appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city. "After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac pass. reduction of New Orleans and all its ap- "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "U. S. Volunteers." The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as well. It was my intentention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in cooperation along the whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unneces sary to defend any delay which would have enabled the army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work. But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration. vessels. "Baton Rouge, Berwick bay, and Fort Livingston, will next claim your attention. "A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of A change had just been made in the gaining possession of all the rolling stock War Department, and I was soon urged you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. by the new secretary Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to secure the re-opening The occupation of Baton Rouge by a comof the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to bined naval and land force should be ac-free the banks of the lower Potomac from complished as soon as possible after you the rebel batteries which annoyed passing have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves. "I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition arc, first, the Very soon after his entrance upon office I laid before him verbally my design as to the part of the plan of the campaign to be executed by the army of the Potomac, He instructed me to which was to attack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. develop it to the President, which I did. The result was, that the President disapproved of it, and by an order of January 31, 1862, substituted one of his own. On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued without consultation with me: [President's General War Order No. 1.] EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862. "Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. "That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. "That the heads of departments and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." The order of January 31, 1862, was as follows: 46 [President's Special War Order No. 1.] EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, Jan. 31, 1862. Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after pro-, viding safely for the defence of Washing ton, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction. all details to be in the discretion of the. commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, "Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. "SIR: I ask your indulgence for the following papers rendered necessary by circumstances. "I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 1861, six day after the battle of Bull run. "I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. "Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. "The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited; they were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be shown by the past and the present. "The capital is secure against attack. the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous army, the enemy have been held in check, the State of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July. More than all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently com mitted. This army is young and untried in battle; but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable of great deeds. "That so much has been accomplished and such an army created in so short a time, from nothing will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration and the nation. Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; but there is a vast difference between that and the efficiency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied, and fortified. "In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked for an effective and movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. "Even when in a subordinate position, I always looked beyond the operations of the army of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive operations. When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command. "I confess that I did not appreciate the total absence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization and want of preparation pervaded the western armies. and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart. "Two bases of operation seem to present themselves for the advance of the army of the Potomac : "1st. That of Washington-its present position-involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manasses, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans. "The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks: an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left. "Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river, and near his batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre, (we might destroy the former;) we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by estab lishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway communication. The fords of the Occoquan below the month of the Bull run are watched by the rebels; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in the rear, (concealed by the woods.) and the arrangement of his troops "I took it for granted that they were is such that he can oppose some considernearly, if not quite, in condition to moveable resistance to a passage of that stream. towards the fulfilment of my plans. I Information has just been received, to the acknowledge that I made a great mistake. effect that the enemy are intrenching a line "I sent at once-with the approval of of heights extending from the vicinity of the Executive-officers I considered com- Sangster's (Union mills) towards Evanspetent to command in Kentucky and port. Early in January, Spriggs's ford Missouri. Their instructions looked to was occupied by Gen. Rhodes, with 3,600 prompt movements. I soon found that men and eight (8) guns; there are strong the labor of creation and organization had reasons for believing that Davis's ford is to be performed there; transportation-occupied. These circumstances indicate arms-clothing-artillery-discipline, all or prove that the enemy anticipates the were wanting. These things required time movement in question, and is prepared to to procure them. The generals in command have done their work most creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather of December; I was mistaken. "My wish was to gain possession of the eastern Tennessee railroad, as a preliminary movement, then to follow it up inmediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. "I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, resist it. Assuming for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our column (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least five or six) can reach the Accatinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax station, Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must be made by occupying in some force either the two first named places, or better, the point of junction of the roads |