is essential to perfect the right to be registered, show that the handing over anything in the name of the rent would afford less facility of proof than the production of a deed operating by virtue of the Statute of Uses, which has been put in practice thousands of times since the time of Henry 8. So far, therefore, as regards the statute. Then, as to the authorities, Mr. Williams has invited our attention to some which are entitled to the very highest respect. In Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 46, is a resolution of divers justices that cestui que use at this day is immediately and actually seised and in possession of the land, so as he may have an assise or trespass before entry against a stranger who enters without title; and this by the words of the 27 H. 8, c. 10, viz., "that cestui que use shall stand and be seised," &c. And, though the report is short, it is not the less valuable, for, often in the reports of that day the most important propositions *are laid down in *108] four or five lines, and certainly lose no force by reason of their conciseness. Then, again, we have Bacon's Readings upon the Statute of Uses, which is also entitled to very great respect. So, Chief Baron Comyns, whose great work stands high in the estimation of every one in the profession, and who is the universal referee for almost every proposition, lays it down,-title Uses (I.),-that, "by the statute 27 H. 8, c. 10, cestui que use is immediately seised and in actual possession, and therefore shall have assise or trespass against a stranger before entry;" adopting the dictum in Cro. Eliz. 46. Then we have the authority of Co. Litt. 315 a, and Butler's note, which seems to me to involve the whole of the learning contained in the judgment of Tindal, C. J., in Murray, app., Thorniley, resp., 2 C. B. 217, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 496. Butler's note points out the distinction between the conveyance of a rent at common law and the limitation of a rent as an use under the statute. Then, I take notice of that which is not strictly authority, viz., Cruise's Digest. vol. 3, p. 274, s. 15, and Burton's Compendium of the Law of Real Property, § 1116; and I think I am warranted in so doing, since it is a main ground of Lord Eldon's judgment in the Britton Ferry Case (a) that the practice of conveyancers is to be taken notice of by those who administer the law,—a very wise and salutary principle; for, according to my experience, the persons intrusted with that branch of the law have ever been remarkable for ability and learning: and the argument which we have heard this day satisfies me that the mantle of those great men has not descended upon unworthy shoulders. KEATING, J.(b)-I also am of opinion that the *decision of *109] the revising barrister in this case was wrong; but I feel bound to add, that, if I had been called upon to decide the point, unaided by the light of the able argument we have heard this day, I should have come to the same conclusion. Mr. Williams has satisfied me that there is a clear distinction between the grant of a rent-charge at common law and a grant operating by virtue of the Statute of Uses. The 26th section of the Reform Act enacts that no person shall be registered in any year in respect of his estate or interest in any lands or tenements, as a freeholder, &c., unless he shall have been in the actual possession thereof, or in the receipts of the rents and profits (a) Smith v. Doe d. Lord Jersey, 2 Brod. & B. 599 (E. C. L. R. vol. 6). thereof for his own use, for six calendar months at least next previous to the last day of July in such year. In Murray, app., Thorniley, resp., 2 C. B. 217 (E. C. L. R. vol. 52), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 496, it was held that a grant of a rent-charge at common law did not give the grantee a right to be registered under that provision unless he had been in actual receipt of the rent for the prescribed period. The Chief Justice founds his judgment in that case upon the very authorities which have been brought before us to-day. He cites the 235th section of Littleton,-"And so it is, if a man grant by his deed a yearly rent issuing out of his land to another, &c., if the grantor thereafter pay to the grantee a penny or a halfpenny in name of seisin of the rent, then, if after the next day of payment the rent be denied, the grantee may have an assise, or else not, &c." Lord Coke, exemplifying his own doctrine that there is often virtue in an etcetera, explains what that means, thus,-" By this &c. is implied that the grant and delivery of the deed is no seisin of the rent; and that a seisin in law, which the grantee hath by the grant, is not sufficient to maintain an assise or any other real action, but there must be an actual seisin." Mr. Williams admits that the actual posses- [*110 sion spoken of in the Reform Act must be such an actual possession as would have entitled the party to maintain an assise. Then we find from the Anonymous Case in Cro. Eliz. 46,-which certainly derives additional authority from being cited by Chief Baron Comyns, -that, "by the statute 27 H. 8, c. 10, cestui que use is immediately seised and in actual possession, and therefore shall have assise or trespass against a stranger before entry." That therefore brings this case precisely within the ground upon which Murray, app., Thorniley, resp., was decided, and establishes the distinction between the grant of a rent-charge at common law, and a grant under the Statute of Uses. Upon these grounds I am of opinion that the revising barrister took an erroneous view of this case, and consequently that his decision must be reversed. Williams asked for costs. ERLE, C. J.-Where the decision is in favour of the appellant, no costs are allowed. But, where the decision is in favour of the respondent, the general rule is to give him his costs,—the Court reserving to itself the right to modify the rule as the circumstances of each case may seem to them to render it expedient. Decision reversed. MAURICE BENISH, Appellant; THOMAS WOODZELL BOOTH, Respondent. (a) Nov. 23. The duplicate notice of objection, stamped by the postmaster pursuant to the 100th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, produced before the revising barrister, had written at the top of it the word "Copy:"-Held, that (assuming that the word "Copy" was not on the notice transmitted by the postmaster to the person objected to) the notice was well served. 1. AT a Court held to revise the lists of parliamentary voters for the city of London, Thomas Woodzell Booth, on the list of voters. of the livery of the company of distillers, objected to the name of Maurice Benish being retained on the list of voters for the parish of St. Botolph-without-Aldersgate. 2. Upon calling upon the objector to prove that he had given the notices of objection respectively required by the Registration Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 18), he duly proved the requisite notice given to the overseers, as to which therefore no question arises in the present case; and the party who had posted the notice directed by the Act to be served on the party objected to produced before the revising barrister the notice, duly stamped with the stamp of the London post-office, of which an exact transcript follows, "To Mr. Maurice Benish. *112] "I hereby give you notice that I object to your *name being retained on the list of persons entitled to vote in the election of members for the city of London. Dated, &c. "THOMAS WOODZELL BOOTH, "12, Manor Place, Walworth, S. "On the list of voters of the livery of the company of distillers." 3. It was admitted that the word "copy" on the notice produced before the revising barrister was on the said notice before it was taken to and stamped at the post-office, and that the words "Thomas Woodzell Booth," subscribed thereto, were in the proper handwriting of the objector. An objection was thereupon duly made before the revising barrister to the reception of any parol evidence to explain the state of the notice retained by the postmaster to be forwarded to the address thereon: but he admitted the party posting the notice to supply such explanation: and he did prove on oath to his, the revising barrister's, satisfaction that the word "copy" was not on the notice retained by the post-office to be forwarded to its address. 4. Thereupon the revising barrister held it to be duly proved that the objector had given the notices of objection required by the Registration Act, and called upon the party objected to to prove that he was entitled to have his name inserted in the list of voters in (a) When this case was called on upon a former day, it appeared that the appellant had delivered his paper-books, but the respondent had delivered none. As, however, the appellant had not, pursuant to the 7th rule of Hilary Term, 4 W. 4, supplied the respondent's omission on the day following that upon which the latter should have delivered his paper-books, he was not in a condition to ask for judgment. The court thereupon directed (the respondent being then prepared with his copies) that the case should stand in the paper for the next day, being desirous not to prejudice a voter's right, by striking out the appeal. See Dorsett v. Aspdin, 11 C. B. 651 (E. C. L. R. vol. 73). But see Sheddon, app., Butt, resp., 11 C. B. 27. respect of the qualification described in the list; and, on his failure to do so, he expunged his name from the said list. 5. It was contended by the appellant,-first, that parol testimony was inadmissible to prove the contents of the notice retained to be forwarded by the postmaster, the same being a judicial instrument required by statute to be in writing, and which in this case by the express words of the 100th section of the Registration Act must explain and prove and be complete in itself,-secondly, that, while the Registration *Act allows a certain latitude in the forms of notices for counties and for claims, and also of notices of objec- [*113 tion to overseers in cities and boroughs, provided the words employed be "to the like effect" as the statutory form, it admits of no such deviation in the case of borough notices to be served on parties objected to, and therefore the notice now in question was not "according to the form numbered 11 in the schedule B.," in which the word "copy" does not appear,-thirdly, that a statutory judicial written instrument must be held in law to be what on the face of it it purports to be; and that, inasmuch as the notice produced before the revising barrister purported to be a "copy," it could not be adduced by the author as the original notice required by the Act; that the word "copy" was not surplusage, because it is a term which assigns a distinctive and specific negative character to the document to which it is affixed, amounting in fact to a protest on the part of its utterer, that, as against him, such document is not to be allowed to have the effect and authority of an original,-not to have the effect, in short, in the present instance, of proving that the objector gave the notice required by the Act, without evidence of which the party objected to would not be in foro or entitled to the costs of a groundless objection, that the notice was not the less a "copy" because the words "Thomas Woodzell Booth" were in the actual handwriting of the objector, inasmuch as it was as competent for himself as for any amanuensis to make copies of his own notices; and the case was likened to that of a transcript of a foreign bill of exchange (which requires no stamp) if it bears the word "copy" on it before it is issued, and which would not become an original in the hands of an endorsee merely because the transcription was made in the handwriting of the acceptor,-fourthly, that, if the notice left with *the post-office to be forwarded to its address did not bear the word "copy," it was not a duplicate of the notice produced [*114 before the revising barrister, and could not therefore be the notice required by the Act,-fifthly, that the necessity imposed on the objector by the nature of his own argument, of contending that the notice produced by him as a duplicate was not in fact a duplicate was an inadmissible approbation and reprobation of the same instrument by the same party,-sixthly, that, as the notice was produced before the revising barrister as a duplicate original, it must be assumed that the duplicate forwarded to its address purported to be a "copy," and that, as such, the person objected to was entitled to disregard it, as not being an original, and to reckon upon the stamped duplicate being rejected by the revising barrister,-seventhly, that the objector's own case being that the notices were not "alike in their address and their contents," the authenticity of the service by the post-office was thereby destroyed, and that the production of the stamped notice ceased to be the proof of service desiderated by the statute,-eighthly, that, if the post-office had dispensed with identity in one respect, as not being essential, there was no security against its having dispensed with it in others as equally non-essential; and that, if it had certified that the word "copy" was on the notice forwarded to its address, when it was not, it might have certified the date, the address, the signature, as in duplicate, when in point of fact in the document served they might have been omitted,-ninthly, that there could be no safe reliance on service by the post-office, except on the assumption that the postmaster had rigidly followed the injunctions upon him prescribed by the Act; that he was no reliable judge of what is or is not material and essential in a judicial instrument; and that, if any discretion were left to him to determine what particulars *115] therein are essential and what are immaterial or surplusage, his stamp might authenticate as duplicates the most material deviations from the requisites of essential identity. 6. On the part of the respondent it was contended,-first, that the word "copy" was not part of the "contents" of the notice, and might be treated as surplusage,-secondly, that the notice was constituted an original duplicate by having been signed by the objector proprio manu,-thirdly, that it was proved that the duplicates were essentially alike,-fourthly, that the duplicate forwarded to the party objected to not having the word "copy," he could not be misled into treating it as not being an original instrument, and he was placed at no disadvantage by the deviation excepted to,-fifthly, that, being "alike" is not "commonly understood" as being identical,-sixthly, that no practical inconvenience could result from the construction put upon the statute by the revising barrister. 7. The names of several other persons having been expunged from several lists of voters on objection by the said Thomas Woodzell Booth, whose cases depended and were decided upon the same points of law, and such parties having given notice of appeal, their cases were consolidated with the principal case. 8. If the Court should be of opinion that due notice of objection was not given to the parties objected to, their names were to be re-inserted in the lists from which they had been expunged. 9. The stamped notice of objection produced before the revising barrister in the case of the appellant Maurice Benesh (which was in all things but the stamp identical with that above set out) was appended to and was to be taken as part of the case. *116] notices in all the other cases were precisely similar. The Hannen (with whom was Underdown), for the appellant.-The 17th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18 requires notice of objection to be given to or left at the place of abode of the person objected to. The ordinary way of proving that would be by calling the person who delivered the notice. No such proof was given here. The 100th section substitutes a delivery by post. It enacts that "it shall be sufficient, in every case of notice to any person objected to in any list of county, city, or borough voters, &c., if the notice so required to be given as aforesaid shall be sent by the post, free of postage, or the sum chargeable as postage for the same being first paid, directed to |