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CHAPTER V.

JACKSON FALLS BACK FROM WINCHESTER.

THE spring campaign of 1862, in Virginia, was looked for. ward to by the Federal authorities as the decisive movement of the war-the hinge upon which the whole would turn.

Their plans were not destitute of ingenuity, and promised to be crowned with success. Several schemes were in turn resolved on and abandoned. General McClellan, we believe, was in favor of advancing up the Rappahannock, and thence marching across to York River, within about thirty miles of Richmond. President Lincoln, however, preferred the line of Manassas, and on the last day of January he issued the following special order:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable forces of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This plan not meeting the ready concurrence of General McClellan, the Federal President wrote him the following note three days afterwards:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.

Major-General McClellan:

MY DEAR SIR,-You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac: yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on York River-mine, to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

3. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would?

5. In case of disaster would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than by mine? Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

The reply of General McClellan to this note is not given, but his programme of operations, with some modifications, was subsequently adopted, and the plan of the entire campaign determined on.

Upon the Confederate capital four armies were to converge; that of Fremont from the northwest, that of Banks from the valley, that of McDowell from Fredericksburg, and that of McClellan from the peninsula, between the James and York. Fremont and Banks, having united their forces, were to drive Jackson before them, ascend the valley, cut the Confederate communications, and sweep down upon the capital from the mountains. McClellan was to march up the peninsula to the Chickalominy, and extend his right wing far up that stream; and at the same time McDowell was to advance from Fredericksburg and extend his left wing until it formed a junction with McClellan's right. By this time Jackson, it was supposed, would be defeated and swept away, and Fremont and Banks would unite with the right wing of McDowell. The line would thus form an immense semicircle, from the shores of the James to the base of the Blue Ridge, and Richmond would be enveloped on the east and the north with a cordon of fire. Before the column ascending the peninsula, 150,000-the column advancing from Fredericksburg, 40,000-and the army descending from the mountains, 50,000-in all 240,000 men, the capital of the Southern Confederacy must be evacuated, and Virginia come under the sway of the Federal authorities.

Such was the Federal programme for the spring of 1862. Toward the end of February it was obvious to General Johnston that General McClellan designed an attack on his position

at Centreville, as soon as the roads were firm, and the weather admitted of an advance. To disappoint this movement and concentrate the Army of the Potomac with that under General Magruder on the peninsula, for the defence of Richmond, Johnston now removed or destroyed his stores and baggage at Manassas, and early in March fell back toward the Rappahannock. McClellan pursued him as far as Manassas, but speedily withdrew his forces to Washington; and at this point in the coming contest we rejoin General Jackson at Winchester.

We now approach the "campaign of the valley." By his operations on this great theatre, in the spring of 1862, Jackson will be mainly estimated in that aftertime which sums up and passes judgment on all human events without fear, favor, or the prejudices of the contemporary. In the great career extending over barely two years of struggle, but so crowded with memorable scenes, the names of Kernstown and McDowell, Winchester and Port Republic, will outshine Cold Harbor, Manassas, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and even Chancellorsville. In these latter battles Jackson was one of General Lee's lieutenants, carrying out the orders of a commander-in-chief under the eye and direction of that commander. In the valley he was commanding in the field, with general orders only to control him. After the first blows struck at the enemy, it was plain that full confidence could be placed in Jackson, and what he thenceforth accomplished was due to his own brain and nerve. The result was the greatest of his campaigns; and the military student will delight to dwell upon the toiling, marching, thinking, and fighting of those three months in the valley. Tradition will cluster around the least detail, the soldier will be inseparably connected with the beautiful region which he loved so well, and old men will tell their grandchildren with pride that they "fought under Jackson in the valley."

His scheme of invading the North had been long since abandoned, and he now bent all his energies to the hard task of holding the valley against the heavy forces of the enemy about to advance upon him. He could expect no reënforcements from

General Johnston's army, which, reduced in numbers and embarrassed like his own by the process of reorganization, was barely strong enough to present a bold front to the large force under McClellan; and so deeply did the people at large sympathize with the exposed situation of the little army, that it was earnestly hoped and confidently expected, that the government would order Jackson to fall back, and give up the idea of holding his advanced position. Such was by no means the desire of Jackson; and he had resolved that nothing but the direct assault of an irresistible force should drive him from the soil he had undertaken to protect.

The days hurried on, the snows of January were succeeded by the cold rains of February; and as March approached the brisk winds began to dry the roads. On the 26th of February the Federal forces began to move. On that day, Major-General Banks crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry with a force said to number 20,000 men, afterwards swollen by reënforcements to 35,000; and on the same evening the Federal cavalry, before which Col. Ashby with his small force was compelled to retire, occupied Charlestown. General Lander was moving from above with about 11,000 troops, and these two columns, numbering in all about 46,000 men, were now posted in Jackson's front. It is doubtful if he had at disposal to meet them as many as 4,000 men; but these were excellent troops, and, to use his own words, he " did not feel discouraged." Reënforcements were expected from the upper valley, and, until these arrived, he determined to take no step backward, unless compelled to do so by numbers which he could not resist. He had realized the long train of "woes unnumbered" which would attend the occupation of the valley by the Federal forces. It gave them a foothold which not only exposed the whole country north of the Rapidan, but directly threatened the communications of Richmond. All his energies were accordingly bent to the almost hopeless task of repulsing them, and retaining possession of the country. If this valley is lost, Virginia is lost," he wrote to a friend on the 3d of March, and this extreme statement

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will serve to show his feeling. Indeed, the affection which Jackson, never an imaginative or fanciful person, had for the Valley of Virginia, was almost romantic. He always spoke of it as 66 our valley" to his soldiers; and his blows were never so sudden and dangerous as when he was compelled to leave Winchester and retreat. Even the Federal troops discovered this love of Jackson for the region, and are said to have regarded it as his property," which he would surely come back and wrest from them. Thus the feelings of the individual came to add vigor, if it had been needed, to the resolution of the soldier; and Jackson prepared to defend every foot of the country. "It is but natural," he wrote afterwards, "that I should feel a deep and abiding interest in the people of the valley, where are the homes of so many of my brave soldiers, who have been with me so long, and whose self-sacrificing patriotism has been so thoroughly tested." This affection was more than returned by the inhabitants. They speak now of Jackson as of one who belongs entirely to themselves; and one of the young ladies of the region wrote the other day, "He is such an idol with me, that I devour every line about him." He did much to conciliate this admiration and affection. His whole heart seemed to be set on defending to the bitter end the whole extent of the valley, and some of the hardest fighting of the war took place in the rough struggle for its possession.

Of Jackson's situation at the time which we have now reached the first days of March, 1862-the following extract from a letter written by him to a friend on the third will convey an accurate idea:

"My plan," he writes, "is to put on as bold a front as possible, and to use every means in my power to prevent his advance whilst our reorganization is going on. What I desire is to hold the country, as far as practicable, until we are in a condition to advance; and then with God's blessing let us make thorough work of it. .. Banks, who commands about 35,000 men, has his headquarters at Charlestown; Kelly, who has succeeded Lander, has probably 11,000, with his headquarters at Paw Paw.

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