in many ways was important. Several hundred horses were brought safely out, and large amounts of stores destroyed, but these were the least important results of the expedition. The Federal cavalry was for the time completely broken down; large bodies of troops were detached from the Federal army to guard the various fords on the Potomac, and General McClellan's advance was long delayed by the necessity of leaving behind him a strong force to repel such raids in future. When he finally moved, a very considerable number of troops remained on the upper Potomac, to guard against another movement of the Confederate cavalry into Pennsylvania.

It was not long before the Federal forces in their turn made a reconnoissance. A strong column of infantry and artillery was pushed from Shepherdstown toward Leetown; but upon reaching the edge of the woods in that vicinity they halted, and on the same evening retreated rapidly, pursued by Stuart with cavalry and artillery to the Potomac. Still another attempt was made to reconnoitre General Lee's position-this time with cav alry. A large force crossed at Shepherdstown, and making a vigorous attack upon a small body of cavalry there, compelled it to return toward Martinsburg. Here General Stuart took command in person; and though the horses were nearly exhausted and the men dispirited by the events of the morning, his attack upon the Federal cavalry was so vigorous that they were driven back over the road by which they had advanced, and at nightfall had been forced to recross the Potomac.*

*The following is General Lee's report of this incident:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Camp on Washington's Run, Oct. 2, 1862. Gen. S. COOPER, Adjt. and Inspector General C. S. A., Richmond, Va. GENERAL: The enemy's cavalry, under General Pleasanton, with six pieces of artillery, drove back our pickets yesterday, in front of Shepherdstown. The 9th Virginia cavalry, which was on picket, repulsed the enemy several times, by vigorous charges, disputing the ground step by step, back to the main body. By the time his artillery reached him, Colonel W. H. F. Lee, who was in command of the brigade, was obliged to place it on the west bank of the Opequon, on the flank of the enemy as he approached Martinsburg.

No further advance of the Federal forces took place until toward the end of the month. General McClellan then crossed a considerable force both at Shepherdstown and Harper's Ferry; and driving in General Lee's advance force of cavalry, pushed his column to Kearneysville. Here he was met by Stuart with cavalry, artillery, and the Stonewall Brigade; but the force of the enemy proving too great, the troops were, after an obstinate encounter, withdrawn toward the main body. On the next day General McClellan pushed on to Charlestown, where his headquarters were established for a few hours. He then returned to Harper's Ferry.

All seemed ready now for the Federal advance, but General McClellan appears to have regarded the equipment of his forces as too incomplete to justify a forward movement. An elaborate correspondence took place upon this subject between himself and General Halleck, the Federal General-in-Chief at Washington, and the controversy finally assumed a tone of anger and bitterGeneral McClellan was greatly censured for not having cut General Lee to pieces on the day after the battle of Sharpsburg, before he could recross the Potomac; and the Federal commander's delay in advancing now, was the subject of unconcealed displeasure on the part of General Halleck and the authorities at Washington.

ness.

This now took a definite official form. On the 6th of Octo

General Hampton's brigade had retired through Martinsburg, on the Tuscarora road, when General Stuart arrived and made dispositions to attack. Lee's brigade was advanced immediately, and Hampton's ordered forward. The enemy retired at the approach of Lee along the Shepherdstown road, and was driven across the Potomac by the cavalry, with a severe loss, and darkness alone prevented it from being a signal victory. His rear was overtaken and put to flight, our cavalry charging in gallant style under a severe fire of artillery, routing squadron after squadron, killing a number, wounding more, and capturing several. He was driven through Shepherdstown, and crossed the river after dark, in no case standing a hand to hand conflict, but relying upon his artillery and carbines at long range for protection.

I regret to add that we lost one lieutenant and several privates.
I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General Commanding.

ber General Halleck sent General McClellan the following order:

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reënforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it.

To this peremptory order General McClellan replied by new complaints of deficient quartermaster stores-shoes, blankets, horses, etc. Without a thorough reëquipment of the army, and thousands of fresh horses for the cavalry, it was physically impossible for him, he declared, to make a forward movement.

It is probable that General McClellan was also actuated by an intelligent acquaintance with the character and resources of his adversary. He had been unable to gain a decisive success over General Lee at Sharpsburg, where about half the Confederate army, exhausted by long marches, had confronted him; and it was scarcely probable, he must have felt, that his success would now be more encouraging, when General Lee had filled up his ranks, and rested, provisioned, and ammunitioned his forces for another struggle. No one, perhaps, of all the Federal generals, estimated the military strength of the Southern army so justly as this officer; and his desire, at this time, seems to have been, to delay his advance into Virginia until he found himself in command of a force so considerable and so thoroughly equipped as to render success certain.

We have referred to the reconnoissances in force made to Charlestown, and toward Bunker Hill. It is probable that General McClellan had not then determined by which of the two routes he would advance. He states in his Report that he preferred the route east of the Blue Ridge; but feared that as soon as he crossed into Virginia, Lee would recross into Maryland,

and again advance toward Pennsylvania. "I have since," he says, "been confirmed in the belief, that if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in the early part of October, General Lee would have recrossed into Maryland."

The month of November, however, was now rapidly approaching, with its heavy rains and inclement days, and the Federal commander was convinced that General Lee would not undertake again to pass the Potomac, and leave a swollen river in his rear. He therefore returned to his original plan-which was also President Lincoln's-and prepared to move by the Piedmont route toward the Rappahannock.

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"The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance," he says, was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main army; seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge, by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed, as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. We depended upon Har

per's Ferry and Berlin for supplies, until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached; when that occurred, the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed, ready for action or movement in any direction. It was my intention, if upon reaching Ashby's, or any other pass, the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the Valley and endeavor to gain their rear."

Such was the plan which the Federal commander proceeded to carry into execution, in the last week of October, when his army crossed the Potomac into Virginia.

THE Federal army began to cross the Potomac at Berlin on the 26th of October, and General Lee promptly broke up his camp in front of Winchester, and moved toward the lowland.

Jackson brought up the rear, moving from his position on the Martinburg and Winchester turnpike near Bunker Hill, by Smithfield, Summit Point, and Berryville, to the vicinity of the little village of Millwood, opposite Ashby's Gap, where he halted and established his headquarters. This movement on the part of Jackson puzzled and somewhat delayed the enemy, through fear of an attack upon their flank. The remainder of the army meanwhile crossed into Culpepper.

General Stuart had promptly put his cavalry in motion, and leaving a portion to report to General Jackson, crossed the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, on the last day of October. From a spur of the mountain the wagon trains of the advancing enemy could be seen, stretching away for miles, and moving from the Potomac toward Middleburg. For several days General Stuart remained in front of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, protecting the flank of the army from that assault which we have seen was the design of General McClellan; and the small force under the Confederate leader's command repeatedly met and defeated or held in check the Federal Cavalry-at Mountsville, Aldie, Union, and elsewhere. Finding that the Federal column was steadily moving toward the Rappahannock, General Stuart notified General Jackson of his intention to move from in front of Ashby's Gap, and proceeded by way of Barbee's Cross Roads-where a portion of his command was hotly engaged with the Federal cavalry-to the lines on the Rappahannock, in front of General Lee.

Jackson remained in the Valley; and again the men of Longstreet declared, with great enjoyment of their joke, that the ec