III.

CHAP. theory of association, which was slightly touched afterwards by Locke, but developed and pushed to a far greater extent by Hartley. "The cause,"

Experience.

he says,
"of the coherence or consequence of
one conception to another is their first coherence
or consequence at that time when they are pro-
duced by sense: As for instance from St. Andrew
the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their
names are read together; from St. Peter to a
stone, from the same cause; from stone to found-
ation, because we see them together; and for
the same cause from foundation to church, and
from church to people, and from people to tumult;
and according to this example the mind may run
almost from any thing to any thing." This he
illustrates in the Leviathan by the well-known
question suddenly put by one, in conversation
about the death of Charles I., "What was the
value of a Roman penny?" Of this discourse, as
he calls it, in a larger sense of the word than is
usual with the logicians, he mentions several
kinds; and after observing that the remembrance
of succession of one thing to another, that is, of
what was antecedent and what consequent and
what concomitant, is called an experiment, adds
that "to have had many experiments, is what we
call experience, which is nothing else but remem-
brance of what antecedents have been followed by
what consequents." +

118. "No man can have a conception of the future, for the future is not yet, but of our con

III.

ceptions of the past we make a future, or rather CHAP. call past future relatively." And again: "The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation, yet in its own nature it is but presumption." + "When we have observed antecedents and consequents frequently associated, we take one for a sign of the other, as clouds foretell rain, and rain is a sign there have been clouds. But signs are but conjectural, and their assurance is never full or evident. For though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto, yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so, eternally. Experience concludeth nothing universally. But those who have most experience conjecture best, because they have most signs to conjecture by; hence old men, cæteris paribus, and men of quick parts, conjecture better than the young or dull.”‡ "But experience is not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary." There is a presumption of the past as well as the future founded on experience, as when from having + Hum. Nat.

* Human Nat. c. 4. § 7.

+ Lev. c. 3.

III.

Unconscionableness

CHAP. often seen ashes after fire, we infer from seeing them again that there has been fire. But this is as conjectural as our expectations of the future.* 119. In the last paragraph of the chapter in the of infinity. Leviathan he adds, what is a very leading principle in the philosophy of Hobbes, but seems to have no particular relation to what has preceded. "Whatsoever we imagine is finite; therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the things named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place, and indeed with some determinate magnitude, and which may be divided into parts, nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time, nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. For none of these things ever have, or can be in

* Lev.

III.

cident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken CHAP. upon credit without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen." This, we have seen in the last section, had been already discussed with Descartes. The paralogism of Hobbes consists in his imposing a limited sense on the word idea or conception, and assuming that what cannot be conceived according to that sense has no signification at all.

matter.

language.

120. The next chapter, being the fifth in one Origin of treatise, and the fourth in the other, may be reckoned, perhaps, the most valuable as well as original, in the writings of Hobbes. It relates to speech and language. "The invention of printing," he begins by observing, "though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters, is no great But the most noble and profitable invention of all others, was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth, nor society, nor content nor peace, no more than among lions, bears and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession

III.

CHAP. of time so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of.” *

His political theory interferes.

121. This account of the original of language appears in general as probable as it is succinct and clear. But the assumption that there could have been no society or mutual peace among mankind without language, the ordinary instrument of contract, is too much founded upon his own political speculations. Nor is it proved by the comparison to lions, bears and wolves, even if the analogy could be admitted; since the state of warfare which he here intimates to be natural to man, does not commonly subsist in these wild animals of the same species. Sævis inter se convenit ursis, is an old remark. But taking mankind with as much propensity to violence towards each other as Hobbes could suggest, is it speech, or reason and the sense of self-interest, which has restrained this within the boundaries imposed on it by civil society? The position appears to be, that man, with every other faculty and attribute of his nature, except language, could never have lived in community with his fellows. It is manifest, that the mechanism of such a community would have been very imperfect. But possessing his rational powers, it is hard to see why he might not have devised signs to make known his special wants, or why he might not have attained the peculiar prerogative of his species and foundation of society, the exchange of what he liked less for what he liked better.

*Leviathan, c. 4.