Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
OUP Oxford, 2008年2月28日 - 250 頁
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language - semantic externalism - on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell argues that it hasn't. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequences of her approach.
讀者評論 - 撰寫評論
其他版本 - 查看全部
accept agent allow analytic justification analytic sentences analytic truths animals applies argue argument bachelors are unmarried belief bright cats Chapter character claim Clay competent concept condition confirmed consequence consider contains context of evaluation context of introduction context of utterance definition distinction example explain expression extension fact false function give given Hesperus idea identity important indexicals instance intuitive Kaplan kind knowledge language linguistic logic logical truth male matter meet metaphysical modal modifier natural necessary necessity notion object pair particular perhaps philosophers Phosphorus picture positive possible worlds predicate priori problem properties proposition Quine Quine’s reason reference determiner relation respect rules seems semantic sense snow is white speaker star statements stipulate suggests suppose synonymy theory things thought true in virtue truth truth-value understand valid virtue of meaning