mountain ridges rose on each side of the defile. On the western side the space between the foot of the mountain slope and the stream was so cut up by deep gulches as to be impassable for any troops. On the eastern side, between the stream and the foot of the mountain, was a flat plateau 40 or 50 feet above the roadway, cut into narrow tables by ravines running from the foot of the mountain slope down to the valley of the stream. Most of the ravines could be crossed by infantry, but with difficulty.

It was on these narrow tables, and around the heads of the ravines, that the main part of the fighting at Buena Vista was done. One of the tables was from one to three thousand feet wide, and the point in which it terminated came down so close to the bank of the stream as barely to leave space wide enough for a wagon to pass. At this narrow point of the road five guns of Captain Washington's battery were placed behind an embankment. They were supported by the 3rd Indiana Regiment posted on a hill between the two branches of the road back of the defile. From there the American line of battle extended up the middle of this table some 3000 yards. Lieutenant O'Brien had the other three guns of Washington's battery at the left of the infantry line, and still farther to the left the volunteer cavalry and riflemen were guarding the flanks on the mountain slopes. Bragg's battery with a regiment of infantry took position on a table to the right (west) of the angostura. Santa Anna's army came up the next day, February 22, and finding the Americans in position for battle made its dispositions for attack. General Ampudia, with a brigade of light troops, pushed out to the right of the Mexicans, and driving back the dismounted American cavalry and riflemen in that quarter, took up a position on the mountain side. Two divisions, Lombardini's and Pacheco's, were formed abreast of each other to the right (east) of the road, with Ortega's to their right and rear in reserve. Mejia's brigade got across the stream and took position to the left (west) of the road. Blanco's column formed in the road.

The Mexican Army was strong in cavalry. So General Minon's cavalry division had been detached to make a swift turning movement by the mountain roads to the east, in order to cut off the retreat of Taylor's army. The rest of the cavalry was in three bodies, one supporting each flank, and the reserve under Andrade behind the center of the line. The artillery was posted in two strong bodies behind the wings of the army. These were about the positions of the two hostile forces, when the battle opened in earnest, at dawn on the morning of February 23.

Fearful of the capture of his supplies by Minon's cavalry, Taylor, taking Jefferson Davis' regiment of Mississippi rifles and May's squadron or dragoons, went back to Saltillo, six miles away, on the evening of the 22nd, and was there when the battle began at dawn on the 23rd.

Ampudia opened the fight on the extreme left of the American position; his Soon the divisions of Lombardini and Pacheco purpose was to turn that flank. advanced against the American left flank, and Blanco's moved by the road against the right. This division soon came under such destructive fire from the batteries of Washington and Bragg, and their supports, that it was ordered by Santa Anna to halt under shelter of the ground. Mejia's brigade crossed to the east of the road. Pacheco's division, composed of recruits, almost immediately broke and fled from the field, but the rest of the Mexican forces pushed forward.

An Indiana regiment supporting O'Brien's guns was the first part of the American line to break; and soon the whole line was forced back. Finally, the American left was turned and the Mexican cavalry was in pursuit of the fleeing regiments. At this crisis Taylor returned from Saltillo with May's cavalry and all but two companies of Davis' rifles. This regiment was deployed to the left of Buena Vista, and with reinforcements that were hastened to it, it succeeded in checking the enveloping Mexicans. But the battle kept up till dark.

The Americans were so greatly outnumbered by the Mexicans, and they had to defend a position so much too extensive for their strength, that their regiments. batteries, and squadrons were kept shifting their positions all day long. They would be driven back from one point, only to reform and take up a new position.

Bragg's battery was posted first on the right flank, then it had to be withdrawn and sent to the hacienda. Later on it went into position in support of Davis' rifles, and wherever else it could do the most good. And so with the other batteries.

Finally, the Mexican reserve, Ortega's division, advanced upon the broad plateau, along which the main position of the Americans had rested in the morning. American troops were hurried to this quarter from other parts of the field as quickly as possible. As last Bragg's battery, General Taylor states in his report, "without infantry to support it, and at the imminent risk of losing its guns, came rapidly into action, the Mexican line being but a few yards from the muzzles of the pieces. The first discharge of canister caused the enemy to hesitate, the second and third drove him back in disorder and saved the day."

This ended the battle. The Mexicans withdrew from the field and fell back to Agua Nueva. Meanwhile, Minon's cavalry had attacked at Saltillo, but had been driven off by the guard of mixed troops at that point.

"In the battle of Buena Vista the strength of General Taylor's army was 4757 and 16 guns. All the troops were volunteers, except the artillery and two squadrons of dragoons. The American loss in the two days' engagement was 756, of which number 267 were killed, 456 wounded and 23 missing.'

Santa Anna started from San Luis Potosi with some 18,000 rank and file, but the hardships of his long march had been such that it is probable he had no more than 14,000 to put into the battle. His loss was 1500 to 2000 men, 294 of whom were prisoners.

General Taylor was in no condition, of course, to pursue Santa Anna's army. "He fell back to Monterey," says Wilcox, "where he remained for some months keeping open communications with the Rio Grande, superintending the forwarding of troops to reinforce Scott, and gaining the encomiums of the Mexican authorities by his wise and conciliatory civil administration."

"In all the annals of American warfare, no other such victory as that of Buena Vista can be pointed out. Upon ground unprepared for defense, with its left flank practically in the air-the space was so much too wide for the force defending it that the heights on the left could not be properly guarded-this little body of welltrained volunteers successfully resisted from daylight till dark the assaults of an enemy of three times its own strength; and at last repulsed him and kept the field. General Taylor risked a great deal at the battle of Buena Vista. The chances of victory appeared very slender, and the consequences of defeat would have been very serious for the United States. General Wilcox says in his history of the Mexican War: Had Santa Anna been successful at Buena Vista there is hardly a doubt, under the excitement that would have prevailed in Washington, that a garrison would have been left at Vera Cruz to run the gauntlet of the vomito (yellow fever), General Scott with his remaining forces ordered to the Rio Grande, and the war prolonged another year.' While we do not believe Santa Anna would have taken and sacked New Orleans,' as he boasted he would, or even that he would ever have got across the Rio Grande, he might have thrown the Americans back to that line, and set the war back where it was nearly a year before, with the best general the Mexicans had and the prestige of victory on the Mexican side.

If Taylor's army had fallen back to Monterey, or farther, without making a decisive stand, it is hard to say what might have been the outcome. If in such a case Santa Anna had continued to pursue, and could have been long enough detained in the north, it would have made General Scott's advance against the capital easier. Never has the advantage of drill and training and discipline under educated officers been better exemplified than in the battles of this campaign. In the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the American soldiers were all trained regulars. In the battle of Buena Vista, they were all volunteers except the artillery and two squadrons of dragoons. It is true that this victory could not have been won without the regular batteries which did such fine work, but with the exception of one or two regiments, no troops ever fought better than those volunteers. But they had all been in camp at Fort Brown and Camargo drilling, and in campaign serving

with regular troops, for nearly a year; and in this battle, the regiments that acquitted themselves the best were under officers, like Colonel Jefferson Davis and Henry Clay, Jr., 'who had received military training in the regular army.' Without question the best purpose of our small standing army in time of peace, is to educate officers, and it is to be regretted, as has been pointed out by an American general, that more of the wealthy young men of the country do not seek commissions in the army, and serve with it a term of years merely to fit themselves to command troops in case of war. There is no difference between American volunteers and American regulars they are both volunteers; but there is a difference between trained soldiers and untrained soldiers; between discipline and undiscipline; between a knowledge of how to take care of one's self in campaign and a lack of knowledge; between soldiers rightly trained and soldiers wrongly trained."

TENTH LESSON.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO-SCOTT'S CAMPAIGN.
(Based Upon "American Campaigns" by Steele.)

General Scott's Campaign.

"From the opening of hostilities with Mexico in the spring of 1846, Major General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the United States Army, had asked to be allowed to command the forces in the field in Mexico. But not until November, 1846, after the news had reached Washington that Ampudia had surrendered to General Taylor at Monterey, did President Polk, after much vacillation and with much reluctance, give his consent for General Scott to go to Mexico to conduct a campaign in person."

Plan.

"General Scott's plan was to capture Vera Cruz, and, with this port as his base, to march his army to the City of Mexico. (Plate 16.) Fifteen thousand troops he estimated to be the smallest number with which he could hope for success in such a campaign, 5000 of which must be regulars. To make up his army, he took from General Taylor 4000 regular and 4000 volunteer infantry, two light batteries, 500 regular and 500 volunteer cavalry. This left Taylor with a command of only some 7000 men, with which he was expected to act strictly on the defensive. The rest of the complement of 15,000 troops that General Scott counted upon, were to be volunteers raised immediately in the states. Congress, however, failed to authorize these volunteers until the end of February, 1847.

"Owing to the recurrence of yellow fever on the coast of Mexico, Scott felt that he must be at Vera Cruz with his army by the 1st of February; and he made all of his plans accordingly. He arranged with Commodore Connor, who commanded the American fleet in Mexican waters, for his cooperation; he submitted, in full time, requisitions for transports, lighters, land transportation, siege trains, and everything that he should need; he selected the Island of Lobos as the place where he should assemble his army.

"There were all sorts of delays, for which Scott was in no way to blame; and the end of February was at hand. Only 13,000 troops were present, and there was a shortage of transports, lighters, and all material. But the expedition could not wait; if it were delayed any longer, it would have to be put off till the next fall or winter."

Operations.

"On the 2nd of March, the order was given to weigh anchor at Lobos; and by the 7th, the fleet had cast anchor again at Anton Lizardo, 18 miles southeast of Vera Cruz." (Plate 17.) "Scott was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa Anna toward Monterey, and expected on landing or attempting to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy," so every precaution was taken. (Plate 20.) "Having selected the place for landing, well without the range of

guns in the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, he had the fleet moved up on the 9th of March, and anchored in front of it. The naval guns shelled the beach, and the sand hills beyond, and the sailors landed the troops with surf-boats. No Mexican troops appeared, and by 10 p. m. the entire force had landed without an accident.

"A complete line of investment was immediately established, extending from shore to shore on either side of Vera Cruz; and batteries were set up to shell the city. Owing to delay in getting the siege material ashore, the batteries were not ready to begin work until the afternoon of the 22nd (March). General Scott then called upon the Mexican commander to surrender the town and the fort (San Juan de Ulloa). The Mexican commander declined to surrender, and the batteries opened fire. The guns of the town and fort returned the fire. The bombardment was kept up until the 26th, when Scott received a proposal of surrender from the Mexican commander; terms were agreed upon the next day. The city and fort, 5000 prisoners, and 400 guns were turned over to the Americans. General Scott's loss was 67 killed and wounded.

"In this investment the navy not only bombarded the enemy's works from the seas, but also set up a battery in line on land, which did effective work. During the siege the only interference with the Americans from the outside, was occasioned by a considerable cavalry force, which hovered around, and had to be chased away two or three times."

66

Geography.

(Plate 21.) From Vera Cruz two roads led westward across the Tierra Caliente, up through the mountains, to the plateau of Anahuac, as the great interior table-land is called, and on, to the Valley of Mexico, and the capital city at the lowest point of this bowl-shaped valley. The two roads, however, came together at El Pinal, east of Puebla. The northernmost of these roads passed through the towns of Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla, and was almost the identical route that Cortez took in 1519. This road was, in 1847, the main post road, the better of the two, and, therefore, the one selected by General Scott. The other road passed through Orizaba. The French followed this road in their invasion of Mexico in 1863.

"The road chosen crossed the Tierra Caliente to the foot-hills at Plan del Rio, about 30 miles from Vera Cruz. There it began the ascent of the mountains to the great plateau; thence it led on to the City of Mexico, more than 200 miles from Vera Cruz. Many strong defensive positions there were between the Plan del Rio and Valley of Mexico.

"As far as Jalapa the road lay in the Tierra Caliente; but from there on, to the capital, the country crossed possessed as fine a climate for campaigning as any in the world; but there was a scarcity of water from Jalapa to the Valley of Mexico. Toward the Valley of Mexico, the country became more fertile and thickly settled, and subsistence supplies in abundance could be obtained for an army.

"The topography was of such character much of the way from Vera Cruz to the capital that troops could march only on the roads. In the Tierra Caliente there was high grass and dense vegetation; over the mountains the road was shut in the passes; in the Valley of Mexico all roads rested upon causeways.

"There were five lakes in the Valley of Mexico, the remains of a single large ancient lake which had been gradually drying up for ages. Lake Chalco, which existed at the time of Scott's campaign, is dry to-day. There were no impassable rivers between Vera Cruz and Mexico, behind which an army could take a defensive position. The chief natural obstacles in Scott's way were the mountains with their impassable heights and gorges, and the lakes and marshes around the capital city."

Operations After Vera Cruz.

"After the fall of Vera Cruz the army was still short of transportation. Several expeditions were, therefore, sent out into the interior for the purpose of finding markets in which to purchase horses and mules. By this means General Scott eked