The ACTUAL strength curve of Plate 12 explains in part the statement heretofore made that "our military policy has led to the prolongation of war, with all its attendant evils." For instance, the United States declared war against England in 1812, but it was two years later, 1814, before the military strength of our Government had reached a point where its superiority of force was sufficient to secure victory, after which the war was brought to a speedy termination. Had the United States in 1812 an army strong enough to defeat any enemy that might at that time have opposed it, the War of 1812 would have ended after one well-directed campaign and the nation would have been spared three years of war and the mortification of having its capital sacked by a foreign army.

In 1845 our Government declared war against Mexico, but was unable to terminate that war until two years later when its military forces had been raised to the strength necessary to overcome the Mexican resistance; and in 1861, for the want of a sufficient army to insure the stability of our Government and to fulfill the guarantees of the Constitution, the nation was plunged into four years of domestic war.

Plate 13 shows that from 1791 to 1898 there was a constant downward trend in the ratio of our Regular Army strength to the strength of population. During that period the average number of officers and enlisted men per 10,000 of population was 10.5 and the chart shows that the height of this ratio was due to the critical war periods. It is pertinent to inquire whether those critical periods would not have been avoided had the nation been provided with a military establishment commensurate to its growing territory, population and international relations. Apropos of this query, the promptness with which the French Government withdrew its troops from supporting Maximilian in Mexico, when the Civil War was ended and Napoleon was given to understand, by the United States Government, that the empire in Mexico and the presence of French troops could not be regarded with favor by the citizens of the United States, is indicative of what military preparedness will do to sustain the international relations of a government and at the same time prevent war.

Employment of Militia and Volunteers in War.

By far the greatest numbers of troops employed by the United States in all its wars up to 1917, have been in that class denominated VOLUNTEERS. During the Civil War the Government was forced to resort to the draft system, but only 2 per cent of the forces were raised in that way. Otherwise the chief reliance of our Government in times of public emergency has been upon the patriotic spirit of the people which it was felt could be depended upon to produce a sufficient number of men who would offer themselves voluntarily to serve as officers and soldiers.

It is true that the Government has always been successful in raising large numbers of volunteer soldiers, but it is also to be noted that the inducements that the Government had to offer in order to secure troops in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War resulted in constantly increasing bounties. Reliance upon a volunteer system for the procurement of soldiers in times of emergency has all of the objectionable features of a sudden and great increase in the strength of a regular army under like circumstances, but greatly magnified and, in addition thereto it is subject to the criticism that the principle of human conduct upon which the system relies, forces the stronger characters to come forward while the weaker ones remain at home and seek to avoid the dangers and discomforts of the field. Thus, the nation suffers a double loss: 1st, In the withdrawal of men from trades, business and professions without regard to any system, there is an economic loss to the communities and to the whole country; 2nd, through death and disease there is a loss of men who possess the very qualities most essential to success and consequently a lessening of the material from which leaders for the masses of troops may be developed.

Plate 15 shows the composition of the field strength of the troops employed by the United States during the war periods shown. From this chart it is evident that the great bulk of our military forces in time of war has been drawn from the civilian population. In brief, the citizen soldier was the one who has had to bear the brunt of hardships in war and this condition could not be relieved by the Regular Army because of its relative weakness in numbers at all times.

WAR OF 1812 % of

Total

MEXICAN WAR
% of
Total

64

CIVIL WAR
% of
Total

86

VOLUNTEERS

& MILITIA

REGULAR

14

36

ARMY

in Certain Wars.

98

The lesson to be drawn from these charts is the importance of proper military organization. It has been stated that "it is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small army and that the ultimate war force of the nation is to be a great army of citizen soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically. The maintenance of armies in time of peace imposes a heavy financial burden upon the nation, and the expenditure for this purpose should be kept at a minimum consistent with effectiveness for war. But reliance upon citizen soldiers is subject to the limitation that they cannot be expected to meet a trained enemy until they, too, have been trained. Our history is full of the success of the volunteer soldier after he has been trained for war, but it contains no record of the successful employment of raw levies for general military purposes.

It is therefore our most important military problem to devise means for pre

PLATE 15.-Troops Employed by the U. S. paring great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war. The organization of the Regular Army is but a small phase of this problem. It is simply the peace nucleus of the greater war army, and its strength and organization should always be considered with reference to its relation to the greater war force which cannot be placed in the field until war is imminent. The problem is one of expansion from a small peace force to a great war force. Its solution therefore involves the provision of a sufficient peace nucleus, the partial organization and training of citizen soldiers in peace, and provision for prompt and orderly expansion on outbreak of war."

NINTH LESSON.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO. TAYLOR'S CAMPAIGN.
(Based Upon "American Campaigns" by Steele.)

The Cause of War.

"This war grew out of the annexation of Texas and our dispute with Mexico over the boundary line. Texas had achieved her independence of Mexico in 1836, and in less than a year her sovereignty was acknowledged by our Government. Soon afterwards Texas applied for annexation to the United States, and a bill to that effect passed in March, 1845.

"As had been anticipated, Mexico showed her resentment of this act, by recalling her minister at once from Washington, and terminating further diplomatic intercourse with the United States.”

Military Preparations.

"On account of this attitude on the part of the Mexican Government, and hostile demonstrations and rumors along the Rio Grande, Colonel Zachary Taylor, 6th Infantry, United States Army, acting under orders from the War Department, established a large camp of troops at Corpus Christi (Plate 16), at the mouth of the Nueces River, in the autumn of 1845."

His command consisted of the entire regular army of the United States, as it then existed, with the exception of one regiment of dragoons and three of infantry. The weakest of the regiments contained 169 rank and file and the strongest only 375.

The Mexican Army.

"The Mexican forces, including state troops and rural guards (a sort of government constabulary), were estimated at about 30,000; but a revolution led by General Parades had just overthrown the government. The changes among the higher officers, and the jealousies and confusion occasioned by this event greatly hindered the mobilization and hampered the operations of the Mexicans."

Geography.

"The territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, about 130 miles wide along the coast (Plate 16), was in dispute. Texas claimed the Rio Grande as her boundary, but as yet had exercised no jurisdiction south of Corpus Christi. For several hundred miles back from the coast this country was low and flat, covered with prairie grass, chaparral (thickets of mesquite), and cactus flats in irregular patches of greater or less area. There were also many marshes and lagoons, especially near the coast. There were trails and roads practicable for troops and artillery in almost any direction.

"South of the Rio Grande the coast and the country are of a similar character westward to the slopes of the Sierra Madre-a part of the great mountain chain that forms the backbone of the continent-the great divide between the Atlantic and the Pacific slopes. But the country is more densely covered with trees and vegetation, and the climate is hotter, unhealthier, more unbearable. This is the Tierra Caliente (the hot country). It generally contains plenty of water and grass, but in no other respect is it fit for the march of troops. The mountain slopes lead up to the high interior table-land, which falls away gradually from a general elevation of about 7500 feet at the City of Mexico, to about 4000 feet above sealevel at El Paso.

"The main road southward to this table-land broke into the mountains at Monterey; and at Saltillo, 70 miles further southward, came out upon the high plateau. From Saltillo on to San Luis Potosi, some 300 miles, the country was so dry and barren as almost to be a desert. There was not a running stream between those points. From San Luis Potosi southward the country was excellent in every way— fertile, cool, well-watered, thickly settled, and traversed by good roads."

The Mexican War was carried out by two separate campaigns, one under General Taylor, whom we have already mentioned, and the other under General Winfield Scott, the hero of Lundy's Lane in the War of 1812. Our space is too limited to recount the operations of these campaigns and we are obliged on that account to content ourselves with an effort to give the student an idea of the general plans of the two commanders and some of the salient features of their operations.

General Taylor's Campaign.

General Taylor's instructions were, "to defend Texas from invasion. and should Mexico invade it . . . . (to) employ all his forces to repulse the invaders, and drive all Mexican troops beyond the Rio Grande." Further instructions from the Secretary of War said, "the assembling of a large Mexican Army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the executive here as an invasion of the United States and the com

War Department Document No. 324.

mencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross the river with such a force will also be regarded in the same light. . . . . In case of war . . . your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas." Taylor was also authorized to call on Texas and several other near states, for volunteers, if he should need them. He was not, however, to call for volunteers until invasion actually took place, hence was to have no opportunity to train them in his winter camp at Corpus Christi. He spent the time, however, in training and drilling his regulars. They had never been assembled in large bodies before, but "four-fifths of his officers had received the benefits of professional training at the Military Academy, or in the Florida Wars."

Mexico's plan was to assemble as large a force as practicable at Matamoros, and drive all American troops beyond the Nueces.

66

Operations.

Better to carry out his instructions, General Taylor marched his little army to the Rio Grande, and at the end of March, 1846, established a camp opposite Matamoros, and a depot of supplies at Point Isabel, nine miles to the northeast on the coast. (Plate 17.) On his way he was met by a Mexican delegation sent to protest against his invasion of Mexican territory; and he himself issued a proclamation announcing the purpose of his occupation, and promising protection to the people.

Meantime a Mexican Army estimated at 6000 had assembled on the opposite side of the Rio Grande, at Matamoros, under General Ampudia. On the 12th of April Ampudia sent General Taylor an order to break up his camp within 24 hours. and withdraw to the Nueces River, or accept war as the alternative. Ampudia was superseded in command within a few days by General Arista, who was as eager for action as Ampudia.

Reprinted by special permission from " General Taylor." Copyright 1892 by D. Appleton & Co.