FOURTH LESSON.

MILITARY POLICY AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION.

A glance at the table showing "Costs, etc., of American Wars" (page 15) is enough to raise several significant questions about the military conduct of the Revolutionary War.

How did it come about that the American colonies raised nearly 400,000 men to defeat an enemy who engaged in battle only 42,075 men? Why with such a small number of the enemy on American soil did it take nearly seven years to end the war? Much of the information necessary to answer these questions was furnished in the last lesson. The situation is thus summed up by Washington in a letter written to the President of Congress in 1780:

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not find ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for the want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the

same cause.

"Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay-the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present line we find there are some who have received $150 in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeant to them, with the mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that by the time that they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier's duty their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accouterments and stores of every kind has been double in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impossible. No person who has been a close observer of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise.

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been prolonged on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes . . . . Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and in all probability would have listened to terms long since."

"The main causes of our weakness during the Revolution cannot be appreciated unless we consider the constitution and powers of the Continental Congress. The First Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia in 1774 for the purpose of taking counsel in regard to the common interests of the colonies. War at this time not being seriously apprehended, the chief steps taken were to make a "declaration of colonial rights" and to adopt "articles of association" looking to commercial non-intercourse with Great Britain. Before adjournment provision was made for another Congress to meet on the 10th of May, 1775.

"The battle of Lexington, which took place three weeks before the meeting of the Second Continental Congress, forced that body to exercise immediately the functions of civil government. It accordingly assumed both legislative and executive powers; but having no authority to levy taxes or raise a revenue, was compelled to emit bills of credit, their redemption being pledged by the 12" United Colonies."

"The power to create and support armies was thus almost neutralized by a financial system which had no other basis than the faith of the public in the ultimate success of the American cause."

"The story of the Revolution would have been very different had local interests and prejudices been set aside and had the Continental Congress been clothed with sovereign authority to call forth and utilize the entire military and financial resources of the people."

"We need not detail the reasons which induced the Colonies to withhold from their representatives in Congress the powers indispensible to the rigorous prosecution of war. It will be enough to show that the feeble and exhaustive military policy pursued finally reduced Congress to the helpless condition of an advisory body, without power to raise or support a single soldier, except with the aid and concurrence of the states."

"Another great defect of the system of government was the combination of legislative and executive power in one deliberative assembly. In time of emergency it was as often swayed by the passions and prejudices of its members as by their wisdom and prudence. The executive power, which was exercised in the form of "resolves," continually tempted Congress to interfere at critical moments in the management of campaigns. Whether this undoubted right was exercised in ordering troops from one army to another, in the appointment or promotion of an officer, or in his removal from command, each executive act was sure to be criticized as freely by the public and the army as if it had been the act of an individual."

"With no executive head to assume the blame that would now be laid at the door of the President and his Cabinet, it was natural that reflections upon the administrative capacity of Congress should be resented at times by hasty and passionate legislation, and in proportion as that body found its conduct arraigned it felt less inclined to listen to its critics or to profit by their advice."

"Military legislation was thus made to depend upon the combined wisdom of a body of citizens who, in their individual experience, were totally ignorant of military affairs."

"Fear of a standing army and corresponding jealousy of military dictation, were added reasons for making the Continental Congress rely upon its own judgment in legislation pertaining to army matters."

"Appreciating this, Washington, in his correspondence, repeatedly apologized for intruding his opinions when, had he remained silent, the decisions of Congress might have proved fatal to the cause. As the central figure of the Revolution there was not a single mistake in our military policy that he was not called upon to confront. No apology need therefore be offered for the numerous quotations from his

letters, which are at this day as well worthy of legislative consideration as they were when first written."

When we read the pages of our so-called "popular histories" we are filled with the most pleasing sentiments with regard to the heroic patriotism of the people whose sacrifices secured for us the cherished institutions of freedom. The word freedom is written large across our horizon. We read on and we are inspired by the thought of that mass of people rising in their just indignation and shaking off the fetters of autocracy. We read the records of our triumphs in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Florida War, in the Mexican War, in the Civil War, and in the war with Spain, and as all of these wars were begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction grows upon us that with us a regular army is not necessary. This fallacy is a part of that web of deception with which the American people have for so long loved to blind their vision from the cold light of fact.

In 1774, when Congress resolved to take troops at Boston into the pay of the United Colonies and to form a body of troops that would be available for military operations in any part of the country, two things happened: 1st, Congress then and there created a regular army in defiance of its traditional Anglo-Saxon maxim that "standing armies are dangerous to liberty," and, it then and there did the one thing that more than all others combined, ultimately secured that very liberty to which standing armies were said to be such a "menace." Having taken one bold step in the right direction Congress faltered, and there followed seven years of war. The immediate effect of the creation of the Regular Army was an enthusiastic response from the people. More men came to the American camp at Boston than were necessary to fill the numbers authorized, some of them marching a distance of 800 miles to join this new army of liberty. Had Congress then said we will have one good army, in which all citizens shall serve in turn as needed, and in which the officers shall be appointed by the commander-in-chief with the advice and consent of Congress"; there can be no doubt that the national resources would have been conserved, the period of the war with all of its attending evils shortened, and the liberty of the nation secured at the least possible cost.

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It was in June, 1775, that Congress passed the resolution creating the Regular Army and in the next breath, in July of the same year, our national legislature, recognizing the necessity of having a body of men to reinforce the Regular Army in times of emergency, recommended to the inhabitants of the United English Colonies that all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia" and at the same time Congress recommended the way in which these companies were to be organized and that the officers of each company were to be chosen by the respective companies while all officers above the rank of captain were to be appointed by the provisional assemblies or what would correspond to our present state legislatures. This body of militia could only be called out with the consent of the state legislatures and were specially intended for home defense.

The effect of this piece of legislation is at once apparent to the student. With one stroke of its pen Congress tied up, so to speak, the military man power resource of the young nation into 12 packages and delivered to each colony the one labeled with its own name. Thereafter, in order to get men for the Regular Army, the military force upon which the destinies of the United States were to depend; it was necessary for Congress to go as a suppliant to the states.

Another equally apparent evil of this military system was the option it offered to men to avoid active military service with the only real military force the country had, by enlisting in one of the militia companies. "The slow increase of the Regular Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual military establishment, one class of troops being regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our cause. The natural inclination of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the regular regiments and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third

to one-half below its prescribed strength. It may be laid down as an axiom, based upon historical proof, that a government which foregoes its right to compulsory military service becomes more and more enslaved by depending solely upon voluntary military service induced by gifts of money, land and clothing."

Twice during the Revolution Congress was impelled to vest Washington with dictatorial powers, and, finally, the system of voluntary enlistments even when stimulated by large bounties having failed to raise the men required, Congress was forced to recommend the draft. The manner in which the states responded to this measure is best portrayed in the words of Washington himself, who, on March 17, 1778, wrote to the president of one of the state councils as follows:

It gives me inexpressable concern to have repeated information from the best authority that the committees of the different towns and districts in your state hire deserters from General Burgoyne's army and employ them as substitutes to excuse the personal service of the inhabitants. I need not enlarge upon the dangers of substituting as soldiers, men who have given a glaring proof of a treacherous disposition and who are bound to us by no motive of attachment, instead of citizens in whom the ties of country, kindred and sometimes property are so many securities for their fidelity."

Such lack of appreciation in a people who were fighting for their independence, of the importance of furnishing good men to the army, is hard to understand, but it becomes incomprehensible when we consider that each of the British deserters thus enlisted was to be the recipient of a bounty, if not from the state, then from the citizen whose place he was to take in the American Army.

The bounty system was a child of the Revolution, called into being when the colonies denied Congress the power of compelling enlistments. It grew steadily during the long struggle for independence, only to reach its full maturity in our Civil War. One instance which will give an idea of the extent to which this practice was carried on during the Revolution is that related of the State of New Jersey, where, in 1780, the large sum of $1000 in excess of all Continental allowances and bounties was reached. This was in part due to the enormous depreciation of the currency and offers a very interesting comparison with the fiscal conditions of our own day.

What is more important for us to realize is that through the lack of a uniform military policy whereby the man-power resources of the nation could be used as needed, and only to the extent needed, our Government was forced into the adoption of expedients which resulted in the expenditure of money and the employment of numbers of men entirely out of proportion to the strength of the British forces to which they were opposed. An examination of the figures shows that in 1776 when the aggregate number of our troops reached 89,600 the British had but 20,121 and that from that time our number steadily dwindled down to 29,340 in 1781 while the British strength constantly increased till it reached 42,075. What is more significant than the fact that during the Revolution our Government called into the military service of the United States some 400,000 individual men to cope with an enemy whose strength at no time reached the comparatively small number of 43,000? We believe that this is evidence of the truth of the assertion made in our second lecture, that our history is full of the success of the volunteer soldier after he has been trained for war, but it contains no record of the successful employment of raw levies for general military purposes."

Again, with the experience of the Revolution in mind, we can easily appreciate the wisdom of Washington's advice "in time of peace prepare for war." We can understand that these words were not uttered in anything like what would to-day be called a "militaristic" spirit, but they were the expression of our most eminent citizen-patriot who always gave his best to the service of his countrymen and who has left for all true Americans a simple statement of unexcelled patriotism in these words:

"The principle by which my conduct has been actuated through life would not suffer me in any great emergency to withhold any service I could render, required by my country."

FIFTH LESSON.

SIGNIFICANT BATTLES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. (Based on "American Campaigns," Steele.)

In the previous lessons sufficient information has been furnished the student to enable him to form a conception of what is meant by military resource, military strength, and military policy.

From the historical data given and from the transcript from Washington's criticism of the military policy of our Government during the revolutionary period, we will now turn to the accounts of the military activities which culminated in victory for the Americans and their French allies with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781 after seven years of conflict.

It is not the purpose of this lesson to give a chronological account of campaigns, but rather to describe certain battles which have a significant relation to our military policy, or our want of it.

The instances chosen are those which illustrate as clearly as any:

The need for legislation based upon military requirements.

The need for trained officers to lead the troops.

The danger of trusting military command to generals who owe their appointment to political preferment and not to skill.

The need for training of our citizens to enable them to perform the duties of the soldier in times of war and the fallacy of hoping to successfully meet trained troops with untrained levies.

The fact that our ultimate success in the American Revolution was in a great measure due to the sympathetic feeling of the Whig Party in England, which gave courage to the American revolutionists and restrained certain British generals from taking more active measures to crush the patriot army, and, finally, that the winning of our independence was due more to foreign aid that came to us at a critical time from the enemies of Great Britain in Europe, than to the wisdom of the American people in their conduct of military affairs.

A brief statement of some general considerations is first necessary in order that the details which follow may have clearer meaning.

Geography. It is seen from the map (Plate 1) that the 13 original colonies occupied a comparatively narrow strip of the Atlantic coast, 1000 miles long. There were about 15 good harbors. All the important towns were on the sea shore, or on large waterways not far inland. The Hudson River, and the Chesapeake Bay with its tributary, the Susquehanna River, divided the country into three parts. If these waters could be held and guarded by the British, the rebellion would be split in three pieces. There were few roads in the country and those few were poor and lay close to the sea, or in the river valleys.

Plan of the British. The general plan which the British Ministry proposed but never could carry out was as follows: "To occupy such portion of the territory as would effectually break up the union of the patriots and to prevent intercourse among them; to blockade the coast and prevent supplies from entering by the sea; to destroy any organized armies the colonists might form; and then to suppress by degrees the guerrilla warfare into which an unsuccessful insurrection generally degenerates."

The American plan. The plan of the Americans was the simple defensive—“ to oppose the British as best they could at every point and to hold fast the line of the Hudson."

The Political Situation.

The political party in England known as the Whigs was opposed to the war; its members did as much as they could by their speeches and writings to encourage the American patriots; the relations of England and France were strained.