Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics

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Cambridge University Press, 2006年3月13日
Natural law is a perennial though poorly represented and understood issue in political philosophy and the philosophy of law. In this 2006 book, Mark C. Murphy argues that the central thesis of natural law jurisprudence - that law is backed by decisive reasons for compliance - sets the agenda for natural law political philosophy, demonstrating how law gains its binding force by way of the common good of the political community. Murphy's work ranges over the central questions of natural law jurisprudence and political philosophy, including the formulation and defense of the natural law jurisprudential thesis, the nature of the common good, the connection between the promotion of the common good and requirement of obedience to law, and the justification of punishment.

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第 xi 頁 - Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals.
第 73 頁 - But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that in the least corresponds to their ideas or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system.
第 116 頁 - ... the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice...
第 76 頁 - Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.
第 116 頁 - A person who violates the rules has something others have — the benefits of the system — but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased. Another way of putting it is that he owes something to others, for he has something that does not rightfully belong to him. Justice — that is punishing such individuals — restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking...
第 58 頁 - The main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it.
第 13 頁 - P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since 5 is a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in S.
第 114 頁 - ... if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole.
第 79 頁 - The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibiHty of supporting it, if these duties were neglected.
第 81 頁 - But government extends farther its beneficial influence ; and not contented to protect men in those conventions they make for their mutual interest it often obliges them to make such conventions, and forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose.

關於作者 (2006)

Mark C. Murphy is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is the author of Natural Law and Practical Rationality, An Essay on Divine Authority, and Philosophy of Law, and is editor of Alasdair MacIntyre.

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