its leading article (October 1).* And yet the journal that gives currency to such a figment of some diseased imagination, prints side by side with it the proclamation of Mukhtar Pasha forbidding the murder of prisoners and wounded, and the following words from its own correspondent with the army of the Czarewitch :

'I am informed on high authority, that Turkish officers have placed fezzes and Turkish cloaks on Russian wounded lying on the field, to prevent their irregulars murdering them during the night.'

The leaders of an army are either barbarous or high-minded: they do not act on high principles at one moment, and invent an ingenious reason for neglecting their wounded comrades' at the next.

We have exposed one specimen of the sort of evidence on which the Opposition was content to rely. Evidence coming from the same or a kindred source is not likely hereafter to have much weight. But the Opposition will continue, doubtless, to carp and criticise, and, if they can, to frustrate the counsels of their opponents. It is for the nation, then, to consider its own position. Our danger is not over, rather it is greater now than ever. A war, gigantic in its barbarity, which does not even approach settlement by the sword, is appalling all Europe by its past history and its terrible prospects. We have been unable, after carefully considering the facts, to acquit some amongst ourselves of a grave responsibility for this war. The falsification of all their prophecies, the recovery by the nation of calm judgment in place of passion, has not induced the Opposition leaders to relinquish their claim to guide us, has not rendered them silent from a consciousness of their own mistakes. It is for the nation, then, to judge whether it will renew any trust in those who, in spite of anarchy and disunion in their own ranks which would make the acceptance of office and its responsibilities absolutely impossible, have yet not shrunk from accumulating difficulties which they at least could not help to clear away; who, united upon no common principle, have yet sought to lead a rabble host swayed only by passion and religious fanaticism; who, in place of generous co-operation, have exhibited only a carping criticism, inconsistent with itself; have made caution impossible; have encouraged, as far as in them lay, though encouraged to its own destruction, a Power whose every advance was opposed to those principles of constitutional Government which they were pledged

* This flimsy scandal may easily be traced to its real source. An orthodox Mohammedan often prefers to die rather than have his limbs amputated: and a few such instances may have been found in the hospitals.

Vol. 144.-No. 288.

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to maintain, but which it now appears they are ready to postpone to the momentary triumph of embarrassing their political opponents; who have made a peaceful settlement of the Eastern Question hopeless, and have well-nigh made the future association of Christian and Mussulman an impossibility; and who, on their own showing, have nothing to point to as the fruit of this agitation, except a policy, which they, forsooth, would have us believe is their work- -a policy which the Government were determined to carry out from the first, but to carry out with the caution of statesmen, not with the noisy blustering of fanatics. Time will show whether the nation fails to evince her sense of gratitude for conduct such as this.

We are aware that the same charge of factious and unpatriotic carping is not justly to be brought against all the nominal leaders of that party. But if we have omitted to draw distinctions, we have done so because it is no part of our duty to point out the divergences of thought, of conduct, and of principle, that make the Liberal Party a straggling horde without discipline and without consistency. The divergences do not exist here only. Mr. Gladstone again breaks away from his party, and kindles the hopes of sedition by dangling before the eyes of convicted felons the prospect of mercy as political martyrs. Mr. Goschen has spoken, Mr. Lowe has written, to deprecate any extension of the county franchise; Mr. Gladstone defends that extension by a few commonplace platitudes; Lord Granville dallies with it, and sees no reason why it should not be granted' Lord Hartington seems to accept it-we would fain hope against his will. As we have said, however, it is not for us to point out in detail or to lament the long roll of divergences like these. Only we must refuse to acquit the bulk of the Liberal Party of factious conduct because their titular leaders have for the most part shown much moderation. An undisciplined party must suffer from the vices of its extremes.

The nation will easily judge whether the claims put forward by party feeling should be allowed any place in questions of foreign politics. A bold attempt has been made to seize this opportunity to re-unite the Liberal Party and to recover for it preponderance. The attempt, as we fancy even those who made it would now confess, has proved an egregious failure. We have now to make up our minds on the future, not as Liberals or Conservatives, but as Englishmen. The danger is not over; as this first campaign is closing, as the smoke and excitement clear away, we seem to see more plainly the vast issues that are at stake, not for England only, but for humanity. How, soon can we venture to mediate with any chance of success? It is a question

a question hard to answer hopefully. But we know, at least in some degree, the condition of both combatants now. Let a friendly but able critic describe that of Russia :

:

'I have not spoken with a single officer who does not regard success as hopeless while the personnel of the headquarter staff remains unchanged. As no change in its composition seems likely, everybody is dispirited. Whenever an army has lost confidence in its chiefs, it is pretty certain that fighting with enthusiasm is a thing of the past. . . . The health of the army is still fair, but it is evident that a few days' more cold and rain would cause a great deal of sickness. I predict that half the army will be invalided soon after the bad weather sets in. A winter campaign would be even less disastrous to the Russians than idleness through the long dreary winter months of rain, snow, and mud.'-Daily News, Sept. 27.

As it is in the camp, so also is it in the Treasury. Bankruptcy is for Russia a certainty in the event of continuance of war; bankruptcy which eventual but protracted success would hardly, if at all, enable her to retrieve. On the St. Petersburg exchange,' we read in the 'Daily News' of 26th September, the rate was again slightly lower, bringing it now below the worst point ever recorded.' In addition to all this, the recent movement in Hungary, though checked for the moment, yet portends a new source of danger for Russia. The prospect is one which might well appal the stoutest heart. Is there any prospect that in the present lull any terms would be accepted, if they were sedulously shaped so as to give to national honour a loop-hole for self-respect?

And how is it with Turkey? Bankrupt at the beginning of the war, her financial situation is now desperate. Against terrible odds she has surprised Europe by the vigour of her defence: can she hope to roll back the tide of invasion altogether, to curb internal revolt, to provide for her security against new dangers, all by the strength of her own arm? Would she resent the offer of mediation, in which every concession that she made would be to her honour, would serve as a monument not of defeat but of victory, and would secure her the gratitude instead of the distrust and suspicions of Europe? Is it possible that England might now reap the fruit of her past moderation, and, while serving no interest of her own that she need be ashamed to avow, render obedience at the same time, to the dictates not of a vague and sentimental, but of a clear and uncompromising National Morality? Surely it is an object worth trying for, though we have not, we confess, much hope of success. We must beware, however, lest by waiting too long we make mediation more difficult. We need not take for more than it is

worth

worth the resenting of mediation on the part of semi-official journals on both sides. Small as is the bit of blue sky,' we would fain hope with Sir Stafford Northcote that there may yet be a surprise which may disappoint' the most desponding prophecies. Now the combatants are locked in a deadly struggle, in which each fears lest by an unwary movement he may yield to his adversary the vantage point. But the time may come when victory and defeat are not doubtful, but irrevocable and complete. Is intervention most easy then? The victor knows his strength his sinews are strained and taut: his fire is up, and he is in the temper for the fight: all his organisation, his armies, his generals are tried by fire. Is that the moment when the Turk, if conqueror, will yield to the schooling of Europe? or when the Russian, should the scale turn in his favour, will accept a moderate indemnity for the cost of his crusade? We may guess what the Russians victorious will be: and yet, in the words of M. Thiers a fortnight before his death, 'Les Russes vaincus seront plus exigeants que les Russes vainqueurs.' We may wait too long for an easy opportunity: and in place of doubtful, wearied, anxious combatants, longing for repose and ready to accept it under any guise that will save their honour, we may find on the one hand the throttled but undying hate of the conquered, and on the other the overweening insolence of the conqueror, flushed with victory, both ready to fling back with scorn the too tardy message of peace. We were rightly cautious not to draw the sword ourselves: but overcaution will not be allowed to filch from us the chance, should it be offered, of helping to sheath the swords of others.

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH VOLUME OF THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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