more serious still. Though geographically a seeming appendage to Australia, and on the highway of traffic thence to India and to China, the south-eastern part of New Guinea is, for commercial purposes, singularly isolated. For more than half the year the S.E. trade-wind renders it difficult for sailing-vessels leaving the Gulf of Papua to make the ports of Eastern Australia, and in the height of that monsoon even a steamer cannot always make its way eastward through Torres Straits against wind and current combined; and during the rest of the year it is hardly less difficult to beat through the Straits against the N.W. monsoon.* The distances from the south-east coast of New Guinea to the nearest British port available for coaling or provisioning are considerable-Brisbane being not less than 1000 miles off, and Singapore or Hong Kong three times as far -but there would be no very serious difficulty in establishing a coaling or wooding station in a secure harbour of the fine district lately visited by Mr. Macfarlane. If such a post were chosen with judgment, it might become valuable not only as a port of call, but also as the entrepôt of a well-regulated trade with the surrounding districts; and a gradual increase of friendly relations with the people might pave the way to a further advance, if that should become advisable. Mr. Macfarlane, while dilating on the attractions of the country, earnestly deprecates immigration as premature. But though any attempt of the kind would probably end in failure, it is by no means improbable that such an attempt may be made, either in the form of a rush of diggers 'prospecting' for gold, or in the more ambitious form of the New Guinea Colonising Association.' The prospectus of this Company is a curiosity, and its scheme somewhat startling. It is proposed to send out a party of some two hundred and fifty armed men to form a settlement. They are to be under military discipline, with chaplains and doctors, and the self-elected officers will, it is hoped, be appointed by her Majesty as 'Justices of the Peace for the island of New Guinea.' There is to be Divine service on Sunday, by which, and by the abstinence from work on that day, it is expected that the natives will be much impressed. The money required to maintain the scheme till it becomes selfsupporting is to be raised by debentures on the land, failing which there remain always the 'utensils of gold' described by

*But for this, and for the great difficulty of access through the reefs and islands to the eastward, New Guinea could hardly have remained so long a terra incognita; and to these causes may be added, first, the exclusiveness of the Dutch, who for so long suppressed all intercourse with places to the east of the Moluccas, and, secondly, the fact that the stream of enterprise has latterly been attracted to the more temperate regions to the southward.

the

the promoter (Lieut. R. H. Armit, R.N.) as in use among the natives, but which other travellers have somehow not observed. They are to negotiate with the natives for the sale of land, which if they will grant, so— The alternative is obvious, and suggested to the Aborigines Protection Society an application to the Colonial Office, where they were assured that if any acts of violence were committed, the strong arm of the High Commissioner of the Pacific was competent to deal even with the justices of the peace, and the chaplains, and the doctors. The Association, which had been scheming to commit the Colonial Office to a support of this thinly veiled piece of filibustering, will therefore do well to proceed with caution. It is quite possible that a large body of men, well disciplined and ably led, and backed by plenty of money, might establish themselves on the island with very important results. But any such proceeding, however well-devised, would obviously be premature until the interior has in some measure been explored, and we hope this may be undertaken before long by a responsible expedition. The unfinished survey of the coast, too, could not be put into better hands than those of Captain Moresby, aided by a scientific staff, and with a well-found ship. If the present friendly relations with the natives can be maintained, many of the difficulties of former days may be averted, and it will be little to our credit if they are not averted.

In all this we seem to assume that there will be no intrusion on the part of any foreign power. This contingency is, we think, much less imminent than has been supposed. But there is one thing we should certainly resist, viz., the formation of any more foreign convict establishments, even as near as New Caledonia. The occupation by a foreign power of any point on the southern coast opposite to Australia would, after the recent discussion of the subject, have the appearance of a menace, and we could hardly permit it. The passage of Torres Straits, however, would be secured by our holding the Prince of Wales Islands, and the opposite coast commanded by the occupation of one or two of the islands adjacent. It is difficult to see how a foreign station on the north coast could appreciably affect the interests of Australia; but it is always wise to consider such a question from the sentimental as well as from the material side, and the occupation of the eastern half of New Guinea by a foreign power would cause not only serious and, we must admit, natural disappointment, but also ill-will towards England among a large party in Australia. Their views, however, are by no means bounded by New Guinea. Crescit amor terræ quantum ipsa Australia crescit; and their 'Australian dominion' would Vol. 144.-No. 287.

P

include

include at least the whole series of great island groups extending eastwards from New Guinea as far as Fiji. We should be more inclined to sympathise with this spirit if it were accompanied by a willingness to share the burthens involved in such a policy; but when it was suggested at the time of the annexation of Fiji that, as a general principle, a colony ought to contribute towards the cost of any measure passed solely or mainly for its own benefit, or at its own request, the principle was repudiated by the Australian authorities, on the ground that they would have no control over the expenditure. But it is obvious that such control must practically lie with the central power; and the reasonableness of the suggestion, as well as the considerate and courteous tone in which it was made by Lord Carnarvon, has since been admitted by the leading Australian papers.

With regard to New Guinea, it is clearly desirable not to precipitate matters, but to leave them in statu quo as long as possible; to encourage scientific exploration, and to repress filibustering; to avoid for the present the responsibilities of a formal annexation, but to enter a caveat against annexation by any other power. It has been argued that we ought to take possession of the island, because by no other power would the interests of the people be so carefully studied. We believe that in no other country would the sentiment of responsibility be stronger, but it is doubtful whether, in the management of such races, we have not something to learn from the Dutch. The traveller visiting Java from India is often struck by the superior cleanliness and order of the villages, and the more skilful cultivation. Of course there are no inconvenient questions about liberty, or any affectation of equality between the European and the native. In some of the smaller islands the system, while still paternal,' seems more philanthropic and disinterested. Opinions will differ on the question, whether the compulsory education of a savage race by the introduction of law and order, and the discipline of forced labour, could ever be justifiably undertaken. Many persons will answer that such a system is repugnant to the genius of Englishmen. We are not concerned to speculate on the matter. No such responsibility should ever be lightly undertaken, but in the not improbable case of its being forced upon us, we should certainly stand condemned if, with all our own accumulated experience, and that of other nations, to guide us, and with our unequalled command of material resources, of political skill,-and of good intentions, we failed to solve the problem.

ART.

ART. VII.-1. Turkey in Europe. By Lieut.-Colonel James Baker. London, 1877.

2. The Russians in Bulgaria and Roumelia. By Baron von Moltke, Major, Prussian Service. London, 1854.

3. Russian Wars with Turkey. By Major Frank S. Russell. Second edition. London, 1877.

4. Kiepert's General-Karte von der Europäischer Türkei. Berlin. 1/1,000,000.

5. Artamanow, Carte du Théâtre de la Guerre en 1877. 1/1,350,000. 6. Carte de l'Etat-Major Autrichien. 1/300,000.

7. Stanford's Large Scale Map of the Seat of War in Europe. Scale nine miles to an inch.

8. Stanford's Large Scale Map of the War in Asia, with a Plan of Kars.

9. Stanford's Map of Turkey in Europe, with the Tributary States.

10. Arrowsmith's Map of the Seat of War in the East.

11. Arrowsmith's Map of the Acquisitions of Russia in Europe and Central Asia, since the Accession of Peter I. to 1876.

T has been said that 'princes fight for victory, the people for safety,' and as a rule this maxim may be said to hold good. In the present instance, whatever may be the reasons or pretexts -whichever we may elect to call them that have been put forth to justify the declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, few will venture to deny that on the one hand it is a war for conquest, which in case of victory will result in territorial aggrandisement, and on the other hand a war for existence, which in case of defeat will result in practical annihilation.

It has been the lot of the present generation to witness several great contests and to live through many great changes; dynasties have fallen, states have been blotted out and created, while a great empire has arisen on the ruin of kingdoms. Hitherto the tendency has been to consolidate and unite, small Powers have been absorbed in great ones, and no attempt has been made, as in 1815, to raise provinces into independent principalities; but, on the contrary, after every great war there has been a re-settlement in the opposite direction, and weak states have suffered to the advantage of their powerful neighbours. It seldom happens that one great empire entirely and suddenly subdues another; changes, if intended to be permanent, must usually be gradual, and any violent or extreme measure, whether in the domestic or external history of nations, is usually productive of a corresponding reaction.

It is of course impossible to predict what may be the immediate result of the contest now raging the ninth that has taken place between Russia and Turkey within the last 170 years but it may, we think, be concluded that ultimately it will tend, as always in years gone by, towards the aggrandisement of the former and the humiliation of the latter Power. Unless military prophets are indeed deceived, the Czar will still further extend his already overgrown and gigantic territories, while the Ottoman Empire will descend one, perhaps many steps towards its final ruin. Whether Russia at onceannexes huge provinces and seizes great material advantages, or whether, as is more probable with respect to Europe, some semiindendent states are created under Russian influence, the final end almost certainly be the same, as after every other war, that of the Crimea excepted, the Muscovites will have reached one more stage on the road to Byzantium.

Many, however, as have been the wars that have occurred within the memory of living men, some at no great distancefrom our shores, none perhaps have awakened such passions, none have called forth such bitter controversies or have been the cause of such wide-spread anxiety in this country, as that which is now carried on, on the borders of Europe and Asia. Nor is this a matter for surprise; the British possessions are not bounded by the 'streak of silver sea,' nor can patriotic statesmen venture to restrain their gaze to this narrow limit. Our interests, so often spoken of, but so hard to define, are contained only by the boundaries of the Empire on which the sun never sets. Nor, however little we may sympathise with her present victims, can we afford to regard with indifference one more act of aggression perpetrated by the great Power, which for centuries past has been, sometimes slowly, sometimes rapidly, but at all times surely and unscrupulously, advancing onwards.

It is imagined by some persons in this country that the present war has come unexpectedly on Russia, that the country was averse to it, that the army dreaded it, and that the government up to the last moment used every effort to avoid it; in fact, that nothing but the unyielding and infatuated obstinacy of the Turks eventually caused the peace to be broken. We must, however, differ most entirely from this estimate formed of the sincerity and single-mindedness of the Muscovite Cabinet. That the Emperor himself was desirous to avoid war is, we think, undoubted; and that he clung to the faint hopes of peace which the long course of negotiation from time to time held out, is equally certain; but as regards his counsellors the case is very different. Facts have recently come to our knowledge, which