"and requires the greatest degree of invention; "for it is eafy to make additions to inventions "once begun. Now with regard to the dialecti"cal art, there was not fomething done, and fome

66

thing remaining to be done. There was absolutely nothing done: for those who profeffed the "art of disputation, had only a set of orations com

66

66

66

pofed, and of arguments, and of captious que

ftions, which might fuit many occafions. These "their scholars foon learned, and fitted to the oc"cafion. This was not to teach you the art, but "to furnish you with the materials produced by "the art as if a man profeffing to teach you the art of making fhoes, fhould bring you a parcel " of fhoes of various fizes and fhapes, from which you may provide those who want. This may

46

66

"have its ufe; but it is not to teach the art of

66

making fhoes. And indeed, with regard to rhe"torical declamation, there are many precepts "handed down from ancient times; but with

66

regard to the conftruction of fyllogifms, not

66 one.

66

66

"We have therefore employed much time and "labour upon this fubject; and if our fyftem appear to you not to be in the number of those things, which, being before carried a certain length, were left to be perfected; we hope for your favourable acceptance of what is done, "and your indulgence in what is left imper"fect."

CHAP. VI.

REFLECTIONS ON THE UTILITY OF LOGIC, AND THE

MEANS OF ITS IMPROVEMENT.

SECT. 1. Of the Utility of Logic.

MEN

EN rarely leave one extreme, without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceffive admiration of Ariftotle, which continued for fo many ages, fhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high esteem of logic as the grand engine of fcience, fhould at laft make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which seems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Those who think according to the fashion, as the greatest part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying afide prejudice, whether fashionable or unfashionable, let us confider whether logic is, or

may be made, fubfervient to any good purpose.

Its

Its profeffed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reafon, with precision and accuracy. No man will fay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing therefore that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To refolve this doubt, it may be obferved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different measure. Some have a large portion, fome a lefs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be supplied by any culture. But this natural power, even where it is the ftrongest, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement: a favage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton but his talent was buried, being never put to use; while theirs was cultivated to the best advantage.

It may likewise be obferved, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exercise of it, in various ways and in different subjects, by which the habit is acquired of exercifing it properly. Without fuch exercise, and good fense over and above, a man who has ftudied logic all his life, may after all be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgment or kill of reafoning in any science.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when in his Thoughts on Education he fays, "If you would "have your fon to reafon well, let him read Chillingworth." The state of things is much alter

ed fince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much less ftrefs is laid upon it, and lefs time confumed in it. His counsel, therefore, was judicious and feafonable; to wit, That the improvement of our reasoning power is to be expected much more from an intimate acquaintance with the authors who reafon the beft, than from ftudying voluminous systems of logic. But if he had meant, that the ftudy of logic was of no ufe nor deferved any attention, he surely would not have taken the pains to have made fo confiderable an addition to it, by his Effay on the Human Understanding, and by his Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding. Nor would he have remitted his pupil to Chillingworth, the acuteft logician as well as the best reafoner of his age; and one who, in innumerable places of his excellent book, without pedantry even in that pedantic age, makes the happieft application of the rules of logic, for unravelling the fophiftical reafoning of his antagonist.

Our reasoning power makes no appearance in infancy; but as we grow up, it unfolds itself by degrees, like the bud of a tree. When a child first draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another, we may call this the birth of his reafon; but it is yet like a newborn babe, weak and tender; it must be cherished, carried in arms, and have food of eafy digestion, till it gather ftrength.

I

I believe no man remembers the birth of his reafon but it is probable that his decifions are at first weak and wavering; and, compared with that fteady conviction which he acquires in ripe years, are like the dawn of the morning compared with noon-day. We fee that the reafon of children yields to authority, as a reed to the wind; nay, that it clings to it, and leans upon it, as if conscious of its own weakness.

When reafon acquires fuch ftrength as to stand on its own bottom, without the aid of authority, or even in oppofition to authority, this may be called its manly age. But in moft men, it hardly ever arrives at this period. Many, by their fituation in life, have not the opportunity of cultivating their rational powers. Many, from the habit they have acquired of fubmitting their opinions to the authority of others, or from fome other principle which operates more powerfully than the love of truth, fuffer their judgment to be carried along to the end of their days, either by the authority of a leader, or of a party, or of the multitude, or by their own paffions. Such perfons, however learned, however acute, may be faid to be all their days children in understanding. They reafon, they difpute, and perhaps write: but it is not that they may find the truth; but that they may defend opinions which have defcended to them by inheritance, or into which they have fallen by accident, or been led by affection.

I