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like Archimedes, who wanted but one fixed point to move the whole earth. But the foundation was too narrow; and in his progrefs he unawares affumes many things lefs evident than those which he attempts to prove. Although he was, not able to suspect the testimony of consciousness; yet he thought the teftimony of fenfe, of memory, and of every other faculty, might be fufpected, and ought not to be received until proof was brought that they are not fallacious, Therefore he applies these faculties, whofe character is yet in queftion, to prove, That there is an infinitely perfect Being, who made him, and who made his fenfes, his memory, his reafon, and all his faculties; That this Being is no deceiver, and therefore could not give him faculties that are fallacious; and that on this account they deserve credit.

It is strange, that this philofopher, who found himself under a neceffity of yielding to the teftimony of confcioufnefs, did not find the fame neceffity of yielding to the teftimony of his fenfes, his memory, and his understanding: and that while he was certain that he doubted, and reasoned, he was uncertain whether two and three made five, and whether he was dreaming or awake. It is more strange, that fo acute a reafoner should not perceive, that his whole train of reafoning to prove that his faculties were not fallacious, was mere fophiftry; for if his faculties were fallacious, they might deceive him in this train of reafoning; and

fo

fo the conclufion, That they were not fallacious, was only the teftimony of his faculties in their own favour, and might be a fallacy.

It is difficult to give any reason for diftrufting our other faculties, that will not reach confciousness itself. And he who diftrufts the faculties of judging and reasoning which God hath given him, must even rest in his fcepticifm, till he come to a found mind, or until God give him new faculties to fit in judgment upon the old. If it be not a first principle, That our faculties are not fallacious, we must be abfolute fceptics: for this principle is incapable of proof; and if it is not certain, nothing elfe can be certain.

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Since the time of Des Cartes, it has been fashionable with those who dealt in abftract philofophy, to employ their invention in finding philofophical arguments, either to prove thofe truths which ought to be received as firft principles, or to overturn them and it is not eafy to fay, whether the authority of firft principles is more hurt by the firft of these attempts, or by the laft: for fuch principles can ftand fecure only upon their own bottom; and to place them upon any other foundation than that of their intrinfic evidence, is in effect to overturn them.

I have lately met with a very fenfible and judicious treatise, wrote by Father Buffier about fifty years ago, concerning firft principles and the fource of human judgments, which, with great propriety,

he prefixed to his treatife of logic. And indeed I apprehend it is a fubject of fuch confequence, that if inquifitive men can be brought to the fame unanimity in the first principles of the other fciences, as in those of mathematics and natural philosophy, (and why should we despair of a general agreement in things that are felf-evident?), this might be confidered as a third grand æra in the progress of human reason.

SKETCH II.

PRINCIPLES AND PROGRESS OF MORALITY.

THE principles of morality are little understood among favages: and if they arrive at maturity among enlightened nations, it is by flow degrees. This progrefs points out the hiftorical part, as firft in order but as that hiftory would give little fatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The prefent sketch accordingly is divided into two parts, In the firft, the principles are unfolded; and the fecond is altogether historical.

PART

PART I.

PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.

SECT. I.

Human actions analysed.

THE hand of God is no where more vifible, than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our fituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of self-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires no external aid. This in particular is the case of man, the nobleft of terrestrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ftomach digefts, &c. &c. By what means? Not furely by the laws of mechanifm, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, beftowed on man for preferving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without consciousness.

Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: thefe generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is poffeffed of other powers which enable him to gratify his defires. One power, termed instinct, is exerted indeed with consciousness; but without will, and confequently without defiring or intending to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by inftinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take shelter; knowingly indeed, but with

out exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies are, like brutes, governed by instinct: they apply to the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. But men commonly are governed by defire and intention. In the progrefs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end, agreeable and difagreeable, which raife in us a defire to attain the former and avoid the latter. The will is influenced by defire } and the actions thus performed are termed voluntary.

But to have an accurate conception of human nature, it is neceffary to be more particular. Το incline, to intend, to confent, to refolve, to will, are acts of the mind preparatory to external action. Thefe feveral acts are well understood, though they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple. As every act implies a power to act, the acts mentioned must be the effects of mental powers. The mind cannot determine without having a power to determine, nor will without having a power to will.

Inftinctive actions are exerted without any previous defire or motive, and without any previous act of will. Actions influenced by defire or motives are very different. In fuch actions, will is effential to connect the defire or motive with the external act. A man who defires or is moved to perform an external act in view, muft have a power to determine