plated it as possible, it being specified therein “that | the word mortgagor (Conte) should be taken to apply also to the assigns of the mortgagor." Conte could have assigned to the deft. or any other person when he thought proper, and was under no obligation to give notice to the plts. of such alienation. In fact, the alienation could not affect the plts.' rights as mortgagees; their rights were secure, whoever was owner of the vessel-who stood on the register was the concern not of the plts. but of Conte and the deft. and any merchants to whom the vessel might be chartered. Further, neither the ignorance of the plts. as to who was the registered owner, nor the discovery of the truth, seems to me to have misled the plts. into bringing this action, for the case of the plts. was, that they thought the deft. represented the owner was his agent. In fact, they proceeded as mortgagees to realise their security, and, as alleged, in fear that the deft., as representing the owner, was going to send the vessel to sea in an unseaworthy state. Another point raised by the plts. is, that the deft., for fraudulent purposes of his own, was about to send the vessel to sea in an unseaworthy condition. This is a very grave charge; but, in my opinion, it is not proven. No adequate ground is shown for the commission of the crime. It may be that the amount of the insurance-40007. (policies for 30007. effected by the plts., and one for 10007. by deft.)—was greater than the gross value of the vessel which, on the occasion of the transfer of the vessel from the deft. to Conte in March 1866, appears to have been taken at 25007. But the deft. declares that he made his policy of 1000l. only because he distrusted the solvency of the company from whom the plts. had obtained their policies, and after remonstrating with plts. and calling upon them to cancel their policies; and he is borne out by the result, for the company with which the plts. effected their insurance for 3000l. has since failed. Still less proven is the evidence to show that the vessel was unseaworthy, or that the deft. wished to send her to sea in an unfit condition. The vessel had been re-classed in 1862 at Lloyd's as A 1, and had been no voyage since, had only lain in St. Katherine's Dock waiting for a charter; and, in my opinion, the evidence adduced by the deft., especially that of Capt. Carr, far outweighs that for the plts., and proves that the vessel was strong and substantially seaworthy, at least for a voyage to Alexandria, and that what deficiencies there were, deficiencies in resuming gear, boats, and caulking, might very well have been supplied at Middlesborough while the vessel was being loaded, and as well after as before the 100 tons of iron cargo had been substituted for the same weight of ballast. Nor do I see any reason to think that the deft. was disinclined to have had these necessary repairs made good, or that the wharf at which the deft. was about to load the cargo was otherwise than a proper one for a ship like the Cathcart; so that, if he had any design not fairly to carry out the charter, of course he had a motive which the plts., as mortgagees, had not, to keep down the expenses of the ship. But, in my opinion, the charge of fraud falls altogether to the ground. It is hardly worth while to mention the other minor charges made at the hearing against the deft., as, for instance, that he had misappropriated the money furnished by the plts. for the supplies of the vessel, or that, contrary to the agreement of June 8, he took the vessel out of the hands of the plts.' agent at Middlesborough. Of these I find no proof whatever. Then as to the charge that the deft., even if he had a right to dismiss Capt. Seaton from the command, had none to appoint Capt. Tate unless the plts. had first approved of the references, and that, in so doing, he committed a breach of the agreement of June 8; even if this charge were proved, it would by no means MARI. CAS.-VOL. II. [ADM. follow that such a breach of the agreement would accelerate the time when the plts.' mortgage money was payable, or would justify the plts. in arresting the vessel. The sum of the case then seems to be this: the plts. arrested this vessel-to use their own words— partly because they "thought they had a right to the possession in the first instance under the transfer of the mortgage of Feb. 1, the payment of which was due on May 3, and also because they thought the deft. wanted to get the ship away in an unsatisfactory condition, and the plts. would not allow it, having given their word to the underwriters that the ship should be repaired." It turns out that in both these respects the plts. were mistaken in their opinion; neither had they right to possession under the transfer of the mortgage of Feb. 1, nor was there ground for supposing that the deft. did mean to send the ship away in an unseaworthy condition. In a word, the plts. arrested the vessel without cause. Under these circumstances, I have to consider what should be the decree of the court. I have paid full regard to the conduct of the deft., and I have also given due weight to the case of the Evangelismos (Swab. 378), in which the Judicial Committee declined to award damages to a deft. who had innocently suffered much from the arrest of his vessel by the plt. under a mistake. Their Lordships declined because the plts. had acted bonâ fide with probable cause and without crassa negligentia, having had reason to suspect that the deft.'s vessel was one which had run his own vessel down, and got away in the night. The present case is different: the plts. had full knowledge of the facts, and must be held to the legal effect of their own engagements. If they had regarded the terms of those engagements, they would have known they had no right to arrest the vessel. Add to this the arrest of the vessel by the plts. was made on the eve of commencing a profitable voyage, and after a decision of the magistrate adverse to their claim; and the plts. have attempted to support the proceeding by making charges of fraud against the deft. which they have quite failed to prove. I think this is a case for damages; I therefore order the release of this vessel, and condemn the plts. in costs and damages, the amount of the damages to be estimated in the usual way by the registrar and merchants. March 19 and April 16, 1867. Salvage-25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 49— Objection to the jurisdiction. In a salvage suit where the defts. object to the jurisdic tion under the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, the onus of proof that the value of the property saved is under 10007. lies on them, and the statute, when prescribing the value which determines the jurisdiction, must be held to refer to the value of the property saved when first brought into a place of safety, and not at any subsequent period. This was a motion on the part of the defts. in a salvage suit for its dismissal, on the ground of a be found sufficiently detailed in the following arguwant of jurisdiction in the court. The facts will ments and judgment. Dr. Deane, Q. C.-This is a question of the jurisdiction of the court over a salvage suit, where the value of the property is considerably under 10007. (see Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 49). The case, however, of the other side is, that though the value is now less than 1000l., yet that at the time the ship was salved, the ship, freight, and cargo were worth more. It is possible that two or three months ago 2 L the property was worth more than afterwards. The salvors, however, might, under the 50th section of the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862, have ascertained the value at once, and before any deterioration, as alleged, by the improper beaching of the vessel had taken place. But though the vessel was in the salvors' hands, no such valuation took place. This, therefore, is such laches on their part that they cannot come here now to show the then value of the property. Again, the evidence of their affidavits is most unsatisfactory as to that point. On these grounds, therefore, I ask the court to dismiss the owners of the Stella from the suit, the court having no jurisdiction. I also ask for costs, for the practice in such cases is now well understood. Clarkson contra.-This is a cause of salvage, over which this court has always had jurisdiction. On the other side, therefore, the defts., lies the burden of showing that the court has none. This has not been done. Again, with reference to the valuation under sect. 50 of the Amendment Act 1862, that might have been set on foot by either of the parties; and it is easy to see why it was not-viz., because neither plts. nor defts. had any doubt at the time of the institution of the cause that the property was worth more than 1000l. The vessel was only on the sand for half an hour, and her cargo consisted chiefly of deals, and was therefore imperishable, its value at the port of shipment was 560, and the freight was over 200, and the ship had been bailed for 15007. The values in the petition were 1700l. Again, there is a total failure of evidence on the part of the other side to show the value to be under the requisite amount. The court, therefore, cannot say that it is satisfied it has no jurisdiction. Dr. Deane replied. The Court took time to consider. April 16.-Dr. LUSHINGTON.-This is a motion by the defts. in a salvage cause for dismissal of suit on the ground that the value of the property saved is under 1000, and therefore that under the 49th section of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act the court has no jurisdiction. The sole question, therefore, is as to the value of the property saved. The Stella is a Norwegian vessel of 276 tons burthen, and was bound for the port of London laden with a cargo of timber. On the 21st Nov. she struck on the Sunk Sand and was assisted by the plts. in the cause into Harwich harbour. On the same day, under the directions of Mr. Groom, the Norwegian vice-consul at Harwich, she was berthed on the beach. Possession was taken of the ship and cargo by Mr. Groom's firm, who acted as the ship's agents. Neither party availed themselves of the power given by the 50th section of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act to have the property valued by the receiver of the wreck. On the 26th Nov. the defts.' proctor wrote to the attorney of the plts. informing them that they had given bail for ship, cargo, and freight. In point of fact, the suit at that time had not been instituted. It was not instituted until two days afterwards, the 28th Nov. On the next day, the 29th Nov., an appearance-an absolute appearance-was entered on behalf of the defts., the owners of the ship's cargo. The vessel still lying on the beach, the cargo was discharged into barges and brought round into London, and there sold on the 22nd Feb. The defts. insist that the value of the property saved is under 1000%, and would prove it in the following manner: The gross freight was 2867. 13s., but this was reduced to 1347. 9s. 8d. in consequence of the expenses of discharging the cargo and conveying it to London. The cargo when sold in London on the 23rd Feb. produced in the gross 5087. 6s. 2d., [ADM. but the net proceeds amounted only to 277. 15s. id, and lastly Mr. Vaux, a shipbuilder of Harwich, valued the vessel on the 28th Feb. at 150. This would make the total of ship, freight, and cargo under 3204. On the other hand, the pits. contend that the vessel, cargo, and freight upon the arrival of the vessel at Harwich were worth more than 10007., and if now they are worth less this depreciation is due to the subsequent mismanagement and delay of the defts. The plts. call attention to the fact that the vessel was insured in the sum of 15002, and they would make use of the preliminary offer of bail by the defts. as an admission by them that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore that the value of the property saved amounted to 1000l. Their principal witness was Mr. Wates, a shipowner of Harwich, who was the contractor for conveying the cargo to London. He deposes: "That there was great and unnecessary delay in getting the cargo out of the vessel. That the vessel was most improperly berthed, and, I verily believe, sustained considerable damage whilst lying at Harwich. That at the time the vessel was brought into Harwich harbour, I have no hesitation in saying that with her cargo and stores she was worth at least 1000l., and that I would most readily have given that sum for her. That had the vessel been laid where she would have floated at spring tides she might have been taken alongside the quay, or near thereto, at Harwich and discharged the cargo, or have been towed to London for 507. or less. That had the said cargo being discharged when first brought in and sold at Harwich it would have realised a considerable sum over and above 508. Gs. 2d." This evidence is corroborated by John Vaux, the shipbuilder (who had surveyed the vessel on the beach at Harwich, on the 28th Feb., and estimated her to be worth 150%), to the extent that the vessel must have received considerable damage by lying so long on the beach, and that a great saving might have been effected if she had been laid alongside the shipyard and repaired. It is also corroborated by Joseph Mealhen, who was employed with his vessel in conveying the cargo to London, and by Thomas Adams, a smack-owner, who deposes that he surveyed the vessel when she came into Harwich in November, and again in February, and found on the second occasion that she had suffered much injury in the interval. He also says that when she was first brought into Harwich she was worth at least 6007. The clerk to the plt.'s attorney also deposes that he was in November informed by the ship's agents in Harwich that the value of the cargo when shipped at Drammen was 5607. It may be difficult to balance this conflicting evidence; but, on the whole, I am of opinion, first, that the burden of proof is upon the defts., who undertake to show that the court has not jurisdiction in this case; and, secondly, that, upon a review of their evidence, the defts have failed to establish that the value of the property saved did not exceed the sum of 1000% It is obvious that the statute, in appointing the value of the property saved to be the condition determining the court's jurisdiction, means the value of the property when first brought into safety by the salvors, and not at any subsequent period. In the present case that date was the 21st Nov and, looking to that date and to what then took place, I think that both the parties treated the value of the property as clearly over 1000Z I should, therefore, be wrong in considering that the value was then less than that sum, especially as explana tion was offered of subsequent depreciation. The motion must be dismissed with costs. Proctor for plts., Skipwith. Proctors for defts., Deacon, Son, and Rogers. [ADM. where the master binds himself; but that was a case in which there were not funds to satisfy both. In the Salatia, Lush. 545, the master had not personally bound himself, but had covenanted that the barque, cargo, and freight should be at all times liable after the voyage to the payment of the money. In that case the prior claim of the master before the bondholder was confirmed, and the tendency of that decision goes far to limit the Jonathan Goodhue. The claim for disbursements is on the same footing. In the Mary Anne, L. Rep., 1 Adm. 8, a claim for disbursements was given priority over a mortgage. In the case of the Union, Lush. 128, there was a bottomry bond, and a claim for seaman's wages. The owners of the cargo intervened to resist the mariner's claim, but the court eventually pronounced for its priority over that of the bondholder. In the case of the Priscilla, Lush. 1, which may be quoted to prove that the last bondholder is entitled to absolute priority, that point as appears Against this vessel four causes had been instituted; one by the master, for wages and disburse-by the reporter's note (p. 5) was not there decided; ments; two by bottomry bondholders, the bonds in each case being upon ship, freight, and cargo, and stating the master to be personally liable; and the fourth for towage. The owners of the ship had not appeared, the owners of the cargo had appeared, and given bail for the payment of the bottomry bonds. Freight had been paid into court, and the vessel had been sold. The court, reserving all questions of priorities, had pronounced in favour of the master's claim, and with respect to the bonds, had pronounced for their validity, and had condemned the proceeds of the vessel and freight in the amount, and in costs, and had condemned the owner of the cargo and their bail in the balance, if any, due, on the bonds, after the proceeds of ship and freight had been exhausted, and in costs, the amount of the claims was made up as follows: Balance in registry.................. £2,452 6 8 It thus appeared that the amount of proceeds of ship and freight was insufficient not only to pay both the master's claim and the bonds, but even the bonds alone. The bondholders, however, were secure, because they had the bail of the owners of cargo to fall back upon, but the master's lien for wages and disbursements extended only to ship and freight. A motion was now made for the payment of the master's claim out of the proceeds in the registry in priority to the bottomry bonds. Lushington in support of the motion.-The real question is, whether the owners of cargo can come here and insist that the bonds must be first of all paid out of ship and freight. The bondholders have no interest in insisting on the clause in the bond, that the master is not to seek relief. The master has a right in rem for his wages. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 gives him the same lien as a seaman. This court has since not only given him that, but also a right of priority with the seamen. No doubt, it is laid down in the Jonathan Goodhue, Sw. 524, that the bondholder has priority in a case is not necessarily to be first paid. It is not consequently, if the bondholder is secure, he equitable for the owners of cargo to oust the master's claim, they have ratified his act, its purpose was for their benefit; the ship itself has perished, or rather been given away for the benefit of incurred at Mauritius are such as properly fall on the owners of the cargo. Some of the expenses the owners of the cargo. They ask to be put in the position of the bondholders, and to be enabled to exercise a privilege of the bondholders against the master, there is no privity between them. The of the bond; they try to insist on a legal right which owners of cargo are not the assignees of the holders belongs to the bondholders alone; no one has a right to insist on this but the bondholders themselves: (The Annapolis, Lush, 355.) I ask that the master's claim be paid in priority to those of the bondholders; but in reality it is a question which does not affect their interest at all. Bruce for the owners of cargo.-The practical effect of this motion is to make cargo liable for wages. The rule on this point is clear. Where the master chooses to render himself liable on a bottomrybond, he does an act which makes it inequitable that he should seek payment of his own claim as long as that debt remains undischarged; assets will not be marshalled where the doing so can interfere with any rule laid down by this court, which is entitled to preferential regard. The question of hardship cannot be entertained by the court; if that argument were available the decisions in the Priscilla and Jonathan Goodhue could not be sustained. Clarkson for the bondholders.-This is an attempt to marshal assets. The court will not marshal assets so as to prejudice the rights of third parties (Aldrich v. Cooper, 2 W. & Tu. L. Cas. Eq. 71.) If in this case the court marshal the assets it will throw the payment of the master's wages on parties not at all liable. The cargo cannot be resorted to till ship and freight is exhausted. It is a condition precedent to the master's acting as agent for the owner of the cargo, that it be only in case of necessity he should so act, and there is an implied contract that he will allow nothing prejudicial to the cargo till ship and freight has been exhausted. Lushington in reply noticed the case of Benson v. Duncan, 3 Ex. 644. June 20.-Dr. LUSHINGTON.-The motion to the court is to pronounce the master entitled to priority of payment out of the proceeds of ship and freight now in the registry. If this motion is refused the ADM.] THE LIVERPOOL MARINE CREDIT COMPANY (LIMITED) v. HUNTER. ship and freight will be exhausted in payment of the bonds (and, indeed, will have to be supplemented by the cargo), and the master, who has no claim against the cargo will lose his remedy in rem altogether. If, on the other hand, it is granted, the result will be that the master will first be paid out of ship and freight, then the remainder of the proceeds of ship and freight will be exhausted in part payment of the bonds, and the balance will be paid by the owners of cargo. This balance, as compared with the balance in the other alternative, will of course be greater by the exact sum paid out of the proceeds of ship and freight to the master. In either case the bonds would be paid in full. The contention is solely between the master and owners of cargo. The owners of the cargo contend that the rule of the court-established in the case of the Jonathan Goodhue, Sw. 520-that the holder of a bottomry bond, upon which the master has made himself personally liable, is paid out of the proceeds of ship and freight, before the master, is an absolute rule. In support of this contention reference was made to the case of the Priscilla, Lush. 1. In that case there were two bonds, one upon ship and freight only, and the other of posterior date on ship, freight, and cargo; and the rule that a posterior bond takes precedence over an earlier bond was enforced, although the enforcement of the rule was not necessary for the protection of the posterior bond. and resulted in the earlier bond being left unpaid. For the effect of precedence being given to the posterior bond, coupled with the rule that ship and freight must be exhausted before cargo is resorted to, in payment of bottomry bonds, was, that the whole of the proceeds of ship and freight were exhausted in payment of the posterior bond, and nothing was left to satisfy the earlier bond. Whereas if the earlier bond had been paid out of proceeds of ship and freight, the remainder, supplemented by the cargo, would have been enough to discharge the second bond in full. The point, however, as to whether the rule gave an absolute priority does not seem to have been raised in argument. Mr. Clarkson further directed the attention of the court to a well-known rule of equity that no marshalling is permitted to the prejudice of third parties. In the present instance it was alleged that marshalling of assets between the master, who has ship and freight as his only securities, and the bondholders, who have ship, freight, and cargo, would work to the injury of the owners of cargo, who would thus become charged with a larger sum than they would otherwise be liable to; and further, that this additional charge would be improperly saddled upon the cargo, because, though nominally due under a bond affecting cargo, it would really represent a burden to which cargo is not liable, viz., wages and disbursements of master. On the other hand, it is argued for the master that the master's lien on ship and freight for wages and disbursements in general, takes precedence of a bottomry bond, and though this lien is liable to be postponed to a bottomry bond, for which the master has made himself personally liable, there is no absolute rule to this effect; that it is a rule only made for the protection of the bondholder, and consequently does not obtain where the bottomry bondholder does not need such protection; that in this instance the bottomry bonds will certainly be paid in full out of cargo if not out of ship and freight; that the holders therefore have no interest in claiming to be paid out of ship and freight before the master, and that the owners of cargo have no equity to insist upon the holders of the bonds pressing their claim. This is the first time the point has been raised. The general principle is clear. If a master by the terms of the bottomry bond has bound himself as well as ship and freight [V.C. W. for the payment of the bond, it would be manifestly wrong that in defeasance of his own contract he should not only not pay the bond himself, but obtain out of the proceeds of the ship and freight payment of his own claims against the owners. leaving the bottomry bondholders unpaid. Hence the rule by which the master's claim is liable under these circumstances to be postponed. But this rule frequently operates with great severity against the master, depriving him of his real remedy for recovering his wages and disbursements, and certainly ought not to be carried beyond the exigency of the case, that is, ought not to be extended to circumstances where the bottomry bondholder would not be prejudiced by the master being paid before him. I see no reason why the owners of the cargo should be benefited at the expense of the master. For the master, though he may have bound himself for the payment of the bond to the holders thereof, has made no such contract with the owners of cargo, and they are not entitled to invoke a rule made only for the protection of the bondholder. The Court will therefore pronounce the proceeds of the ship and freight to be first applied in payment of the master's claim for wages and disbursements. V. C. WOOD'S COURT. Reported by W. H. BENNET and R. T. BOULT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. March 16 and 18, 1867. THE LIVERPOOL MARINE CREDIT COMPANY (LIMITED) v. HUNTER. Law of foreign state-Demurrer to bill to restrain proceedings-Law of Louisiana as to transfer of ships and other chattels. A British ship was transferred by the registered owner in England to the plts. by mortgage duly registered. The ship sailed to New Orleans, in Louisiana. By the law of that state transfers of chattels without delivery of possession are not recognised. The defts. (ho were British subjects with a branch firm at New Orleans, and were aware of the mortgage) commenced actions against the owner for moneys due, and obtained a writ of attachment under which the ship was seized. The mortgagees intervened, and gave bonds to the depts, who thereupon released the ship. To a bill praying that the defts. might be restrained from taking proceedings on the bonds, a demurrer was allowed. Simpson v. Fogo, 1 J. & H. 18; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 6, distinguished. This was a demurrer. The statements in the bill were as follows:In and previously to Nov. 1865, the defts. Messrs. Fernie carried on business as merchants at Liverpool under the style of "Fernie Brothers and Co..” and the defts. F. Boult, T. English, T. Brandon, and W. Hunter carried on business as merchants at Liverpool under the style of "Boult, English, and Brandon," and all the said defts., together with the deft. C. Askew, also carried on business as merchants in New Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, in America, under the style of "Hunter, Askew, and Co." The firm of Hunter, Askew, and Co. acted as the agents at New Orleans of the firms of Fernie, Brothers, and Co., and Boult, Fnglish, and Brandon, both of which firms acted as the Liverpool agents of Hunter, Askew, and Co. All the defts. were British subjects, and, except W. Hunter and C. Askew (who resided temporarily at New Orleans), were resident at Liverpool." In the V.C. W.] THE LIVERPOOL MARINE CREDIT COMPANY (LIMITED) v. HUNTER. spring of 1866 W. Hunter came to Liverpool, where he was residing when the suit commenced. Henry Lafone, a merchant of Liverpool, was the duly registered owner of the British screw steamship the Pacific. By an indenture dated the 23rd Dec. 1865, and made between Lafone of the one part, and the plts. of the other, the Pacific was mortgaged by Lafone to the plts. for 18007. and interest at 10 per cent. per annum. The mortgage was duly registered at Liverpool on the same day. In Oct. 1866 Lafone employed the firm of Boult, English, and Brandon, of Liverpool, as his brokers with respect to the steamship Pacific, and she was consigned by them, with the concurrence of Lafone, to the defts.' firm of Hunter, Askew, and Co., at New Orleans, upon the assurance and undertaking of the firm of Boult, English, and Brandon, and the personal assurance and undertaking of the deft. W. Hunter, on behalf of the said firm of Hunter, Askew, and Co., that the said firm would not attempt to take any proceedings against the said ship abroad, but would remit the freight to her mortgagees as an independent transaction; and in pursuance of such assurance and undertaking the deft. W. Hunter wrote to Hunter, Askew, and Co., at New Orleans, and instructed them, if the Pacific came consigned to them, to leave the balance of her account on its own merits, and to account for the freight independently of all other transactions. At that time Boult, Brandon, and Co. were in monetary difficulties, and therefore the consignment was changed, whereupon the undertaking was withdrawn, and upon the arrival of the Pacific at New Orleans, Hunter, Askew, and Co. commenced actions at New Orleans for debts alleged to be due to them from Lafone on other accounts, and obtained writs of attachment under which the ship was seized. Paragraph 18 of the bill was as follows: By the law of Louisiana transfers of property in chattels, without delivery of possession, are not recognised, and the title of the plts. as first mortgagees of the said steamship would have been wholly disregarded by the courts at New Orleans, if the plts. had attempted to assert the same in the said courts, and the said ship would have been sold by order of the said courts as the property of the said Henry Lafone the deft, in the said actions, and the proceeds of such sale would have been applied in or towards payment of the debts for the recovery of which the said actions were brought, without any regard whatever to the rights of the plts. as mortgagees of the said ship. Under the circumstances aforesaid, the only means by which the plts. could prevent the sale in manner aforesaid of the said ship and recover possession of her, was by giving bonds to the plts. in the said actions as security for the payment of the amounts which might be recovered therein, and the costs thereof, and the plts. accordingly intervened in the said actions and by their agents Messrs. Graham and Co., of New Orleans, gave to the defts. two bonds day of 1866, for the sum of both dated the as security for the payment by the plts. in this arrived. The bill prayed that the defts. might be restrained from taking or continuing any proceedings at law or in equity at New Orleans or elsewhere against the plts. or their agents, Messrs. Graham and Co., for the purpose of enforcing the said bonds, or the payment of any money under them, or under any judgment recovered or to be recovered by the defts. in any action or suit founded on the bonds; that the bonds might be delivered up to be cancelled; and that if the defts. should proceed at New Orleans or elsewhere upon the bonds, and oblige the plts. to pay any money under the said bonds, then that the defts. might be declared personally liable to the plts. for the amounts of such money, together with interest; and for other consequential relief. [V.C. W. To this bill the defts. Boult, English, and Brandon demurred. G. M. Giffard, Q.C. and Robinson, for the demurrer, contended that there was no case for relief disclosed by the bill. Simpson v. Fogo (8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 61, John. & H, 18) was altogether a different case from the present. E. E. Kay, Q.C. and Fischer, for the bill, cited Bushby v. Munday, 5 Mad. 297; The Carron Company v. Maclaren, 5 H. of L. Cas. Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104; The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I do not think this case comes within Simpson v. Fogo (ubi sup.) The conclusion at which I arrived in that case was simply this, that although it is part of the law of nations to recognise the tribunals of all countries as administering justice between their subjects pursuant to natural equity and natural justice, and to give credit in that respect to their course of procedure, yet that there are exceptions to that rule. If, for example, in examining a judgment of a foreign court (which you are at liberty to do as to anything that appears on the face of it) you find that a course of proceeding has been adopted which is at variance with the principles of natural justice, then the court will not give weight to that decision and authority, and will not recognise the foreign court as having acted pursuant to these just principles, in pursuance of which it would of course be willing to believe it had acted in the absence of any demonstration to the contrary. In some foreign courts they proceed to judgment in the absence of the party against whom the proceedings may be brought by some course of procedure which, in particular cases-for example, in Buchanan v. Rucher, 1 Camp. 65-has appeared to the courts of this country to be unjust. In the case mentioned notice was given in an imperfect manner, and the judgment was against the party, as it were, by default, although, as it appeared to the courts of this country, he had not sufficient notice of the proceedings. In such a case this court would not enforce or recognise a judgment so obtained. It was on this principle that, in the case of Simpson v. Fogo, where a judgment had been given by a court of Louisiana, which dealt with a ship as being the property and assets of the debtor, against whom proceedings had been taken, and utterly disregarded a mortgage which was a perfectly good and valid charge at the time the court was taking it into consideration, though it had not been perfected in a manner which these courts chose to recognise, and by some proceedings peculiar to themselves and not sanctioned or recognised by the general law of nations, it appeared to me that if they chose so utterly to disregard the rights of the mortgagees, then, if the ship came here, this court was at liberty to say the law of this country prevailed as to that ship, and to disregard the decision of the court of Louisiana. In one case I remember to have seen at common law, since my decision in Simpson v. Fogo, I think I was misunderstood in one respect, because, in that subsequent case it was supposed that I had acted in Simpson v. Fogo on a sort of lex talionis, namely, that if they would not recognise our law we would not recognise theirs. It was nothing of the sort, but it was simply this: finding that the other court would not recognise the title of the mortgagee to the ship, which was property in this country, and with which |