ADM.] FOWLER v. Graves. [NISI PRIUS. was passed. By this it is provided, that "the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by a seaman of any ship for wages earned by him on board the ship, whether the same be due under a special contract or otherwise, and also over any claim by the master of any ship for wages earned by him on board the ship, and for disbursements made by him on account of the ship, provided always that if in any such cause the plt. do not recover 50%. he shall not be entitled to any costs, charges, or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said court." The question now before the court is, whether under the section the master's claim for his disbursements is to be preferred to the claim of a mortgagee? I think under this Act a seaman should have a maritime lien for his wages, although fixed by special contract, because before the Act he had such a lien for wages earned not under any special contract, and for a similar reason there would be a maritime lien for damage done by any ship. If this be so, then under this Act the master claiming for disbursements is to be preferred to the mortgagee, because before the Act his claim for his disbursements was entitled to a similar preference where the court could take cognisance, namely in the case of a setoff. I wish it to be distinctly understood that this judgment deals only with the 10th section of the Admiralty Court Act 1861, and does not commit the court to any construction of any previous Act. With regard to the allegations of fraud contained in the answer, they cannot be struck out, for if fraud be proved, no claim that is based upon it can be maintained. inter alia, states that the mortgage of the 15th Aug. | the 10th section of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 1863 contained a covenant that the vessel should not leave the port of London until the mortgage had been paid off, and that to secure this covenant the certificate of registry was deposited with the deft., and that this covenant contained in the mortgage was subsequently communicated to G. W. Thomas, who, nevertheless, acting in collusion with the master and behind the back of the deft. Tanner, caused the vessel to be sent to sea, the vessel of course going without any certificate of registry on board; and that the is master conspiring with G. W. Thomas to defeat the deft.'s rights, and has made fraudulent claims for wages and disbursements. Under these circumstances the deft. insists that his right as mortgagee is superior to that of as master. On the 26th July the master moved the court to reject the answer of the deft. The principal question raised is, what are the rights of a master as against the rights of the mortgagee, first, in respect of his wages, and secondly, in respect of his disbursements? To deal with the question of wages first. Formerly the master had no lien on the ship for his wages: (Smith v. Plummer, 1 Barn. & Ald. 381.) By the 16th section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, he first acquired the same rights and liens for the recovery of his wages as a seaman, but only in the case of the bankruptcy of the owner; but this restriction was taken off by the 191st section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, which enacts that "every master of a ship shall, so far as the case permits, have the same rights, liens. and remedies for the recovery of his wages which by this Act, or by any law or custom, any seaman not being a master has for the recovery of his wages." But this was not sufficient, for the seaman could not recover wages in the Admiralty Court if there were a special contract respecting the same, and as the master's wages are almost invariably determined by special contract, his position was not greatly improved by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. Now, however, this difficulty has ceased to exist, for by the 10th section of the Admiralty Court Act 1861, it is enacted that "the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by a seaman of any ship of any wages earned by him on board the ship, whether the same be due under a special contract or otherwise, and also over any claim by the master of any ship for wages earned by him on board the ship." There is no doubt that the claim of a seaman for his wages overrides that of a mortgagee; it follows, therefore, that the master claiming his wages is to be preferred also to the mortgagee. With regard to a master's disbursements, the case is somewhat different. Previous to the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 the master's only remedy was by a personal action in the courts of common law against the owner. That Act for the first time enabled the master to sue in this court for his disbursements, but only under special circumstances. The 191st section of that Act provides that, "if in any proceeding in any Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty touching the claim of a master to wages, any right of set-off or counterclaim is set up, it shall be lawful for such court to enter into and adjudicate upon all questions, and to settle all accounts then arising or outstanding and unsettled between the parties to the proceeding, and to direct payment of any balance which is found to be due." So, then, if in a suit by a master for his wages a counter claim was set up, he might prefer a claim for his disbursements, and in such case it was the practice of the court to enforce against the ship the payment of the balance due to the master in respect of disbursements as well as wages, and this equally whether the deft. was the owner or the mortgagee. But under that Act a master could not initiate a suit in this court to recover his disbursements, and it was partly to remedy this defect that NISI PRIUS. LONDON SITTINGS AFTER TERM. (Before POLLOCK, C. B. and a Special Jury.) FOWLER v. GRAVES. Policy of insurance-Concealment of name of vessel— This was an action upon a policy of insurance valued at 3001. upon every kind of goods and merchandises from Liverpool to Jamaica. The deft. pleaded: 1. A denial of the policy. 2. A denial of the shipment of the goods. 3. A denial of the loss. 4. That certain facts material to the risk were concealed. Maude (Edward James, Q. C. with him), in opening the case, stated that the goods in question were shipped on board a steamer called the Ascalon, which left Liverpool for Jamaica on the 5th Feb. 1865, and was lost on the 15th. Bills of lading of these goods had been sent to the plt. at London, and on the 16th Feb. he received orders to insure the goods. He went to the insurance office, and effected the insurance on the 18th, but did not state the name of the vessel. The plt. and other witnesses were called, and from their evidence and that of insurance brokers called on behalf of the deft., it appeared that where a vessel was insured like the one in question it was usual to give the name of it to the underwriter. If the name were not given it would be thought that the assured did not know it. One of the witnesses for the defence, who had large experience in insurance, stated that where an insurance was effected upon "any steamer" it would be understood that the hazard had not commenced. There was also some evidence to show that in the interval between the starting of the vessel on her voyage and the effecting of the insurance the weather had been bad, and that it blew a gale from the west. The plt. admitted that, if the underwriter had known the vessel had sailed, there might have been a difficulty in effecting the insurance. POLLOCK, C. B. left it to the jury to say whether any importance attached to the disclosure of the name of the vessel to the underwriters. If a reasonable man would have been influenced by a knowledge of the name of the vessel in assessing the premium, or in accepting the risk, the concealment was a material one. The Jury gave their verdict for the deft. [ADM. bound for New York, and that the master gave the ordinary bill of lading, undertaking to deliver them in like good order at New York, but that when they were delivered one of them was in bad order, had been opened, and a piece of cloth abstracted. The answer alleged that the bill of lading contained the clause "weight and contents unknown," and that the shipowner was ignorant of the contents of the bales, but that all of them, with their contents as shipped, had been delivered. The bale in question was composed, as is usual, of a certain number of pieces of cloth placed one upon another, and covered first with a wrapper of paper, and then another of oil-cloth; then pressed so as to be compact and hard, and bound with three ropes; then surrounded with straw, and again covered with canvas, two of its sides protected by boards, and the whole bound with ropes. Upon its arrival it was received from the ship by the consignee's (the libellant's) carman and carted to his store, and there at once examined, when it was found to be without its external ropes, and to be loose instead of compact, while on one side it had been cut through all the coverings and the interior ropes, so that the pieces of cloth could be reached by the hand. Some of the pieces of cloth under the cut were soiled with finger-marks, and the bale contained but nine pieces. The invoice, which was allowed in evidence subject to objection, and was the only evidence given of the number of pieces originally in the bale, called for ten pieces. For libellant, Goeff. For resp., Larocque. BENEDICT, J.-The bill of lading in this case acknowledges the bale in question to have been in good external condition when shipped, and the master testifies that it was then in such condition. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF Upon the discharge of the cargo, the carman, Where a bill of lading for a bale of cloth_contained the words "weight and contents unknown :" Held, that the carrier was not called upon to prove the delivery of any certain number of pieces of cloth in the bale. But where the bale, when delivered from the ship, was seen to have its outer ropes removed, and its outer covering cut, and on its arrival at the store it was found that its inner covering had been also cut, and a piece of cloth was missing, and no one of the employes of the ship who stowed the bale or broke it out was called as a witness: Held, that it was incumbent on the carrier to show that the injury was only external. having one of the bales upon his cart, as the evidence shows, called for this one, when the stevedores reported from the hold of the ship, that it had not been put out, because it was in bad order and needed sewing. The Custom-house officer then passed down the word that the carman was waiting, and would take it as it was. It was accordingly put in the slings and transferred from them to the cart. The carman testifies that he took it directly to the store; that he went alone and did not stop or get off his cart by the way. He also says that when he received the bale he saw that the exterior ropes were gone, and the outer wrapper cut, and that he delivered it at the store in the same None of the crew who stowed the ship in Antwerp condition in which he received it from the ship. are produced in court, nor does the resp. call any of the stevedores or other employés of the ship who delivered the bale in New York, except the mate, who was stationed upon the pier, and does not appear ever to have seen the bale until it was placed upon the cart. Upon this evidence it cannot be held that the carrier has shown the delivery of the bale and its contents in like order as it was shipped, although, under the bill of lading with the memorandum "weight and contents unknown," he was not called upon to show the delivery of any certain number of pieces of cloth; yet when A receipt signed by the carman who took away the bale, the fact appears that the bale, as delivered to the as in good order: Held to be explained under the circumstances. Whether the invoice is any evidence of the contents of the bale, quære. This was an action upon a bill of lading. The libel alleged that three bales of cloth were shipped in good order on board the Energie at Antwerp, carman, was in bad external condition, with its outer ropes gone and its covering cut, it was incumonly external. Failing to produce the evidence of bent upon the carrier to show that the injury was any of the persons who stowed the bale in Antwerp, or who broke it out and placed it in the slings at New York, he cannot ask the court to presume that this injury was merely external. On the contrary, the presumption is against him, and is that, if any | part of the bale was abstracted at any time, it was while in charge of the ship, where the ropes were removed and the covering cut. The evidence which the ship has produced to overcome this presumption fails to meet the requirements of the case. The only witnesses who saw the bale when landed are the carman, the custom-house officer, and the mate. The inate was on the pier, and testifies that both he and the carman examined the bale as it went on the cart, that it was then firm and in shape, and its only injury was that the outer canvas covering had been torn a little. A receipt for the bale as "in good order" is also produced, and the mate says that he read it to the carman before it was signed, and that the carman signed it without objection or remark as to the condition of the bale. I am not, however, satisfied by the evidence of the mate that, after the bale came up from the hold, any examination of it, sufficient to detect the fact that the interior coverings had been cut, was made. The carman says no examination was made. The custom-house officer, who was at the hatch superintending the landing, saw no examination; while the stevedores below, who had kept back the bale because they thought it was not in order to be delivered, were not produced, or their absence accounted for. As to the receipt, it seems to me to be explained by the circumstance that, when the bale was reported in bad order, the custom-house officer announced that the carman Would take it as it was rather than wait. The slings would be likely to keep the bale in shape, as but two of the interior ropes were cut. The injury beneath the straw would not be readily seen, as the carman in his hurry was, doubtless, satisfied that the injury was merely external, and so willing to give the receipt. It was, however, extremely careless in the carman, and had the proofs from the ship been more full, they might well have fastened the loss upon him. Upon the whole evidence, as it stands, I am therefore inclined to hold that the bale was opened in the ship, and that if any part of it was abstracted it was there done, and not in a public street in the daytime by a carman who had a few moments before given a receipt for the bale in good order. But it is insisted on the part of the resp. that the invoice is not evidence against him, and that there is, therefore, no evidence of any loss from the hale, and that the libel must for this reason be dismissed. I do not think that the case in its present position calls for a decision of the point thus made. For outside of the invoice there is the evidence that the bale was deprived of its exterior ropes, was cut through, and some of the pieces of cloth soiled, while its looseness at once satisfied a practical eye that a part of its original contents was gone. This evidence is sufficient to prevent a dismissal of the libel for want of proof of any damage, and entitles the libellant to a reference, where the amount of damage may be shown by such legal evidence as the respective parties may produce. [ADM. Forfeiture of wages is not given merely as a compensation to the owner for actual loss suffered by the seaman's misconduct; it is enforced also by way of punish ment. This action was brought by Frederick Munderloch against the barque Florence, to recover wages due to him for services as mate on board the barque. There were some immaterial questions about the rate of wages at which he was employed, as he had not signed articles; but it appeared that, after the dispute arose as to the rate of wages, the libellant was discharged, and, on leaving the ship, he took the vessel's chronometer with him to his boardinghouse, and refused to give it up till the amount which he claimed was paid. The master was compelled to apply to the police, and by their aid he recovered the chronometer without any loss to the ship. On this ground a forfeiture of all the wages was claimed. Benedict, J.—This proceeding cannot be deemed other than an act of gross misconduct on the part of the libellant. He was not an ignorant sailor, but an intelligent chief mate. He was at the time in sole charge of the vessel, and in the position of a trustee. He is presumed to know, and must, in fact, have known, that the law gave him a perfect security, for any sum justly due to him, and that the Court of Admiralty stands always open to adjudicate upon such demands with promptness, and in the liberal spirit of the maritime law, and he deliberately undertook to decide for himself the question between him and the master, and to compel payment of his claim as he made it, by removing and unlawfully detaining a portion of the property committed to his charge. Such an act should not be allowed to pass unnoticed in a court where violations of duty far more venial in character, when committed by seamen, are constatly punished by forfeiture of wages. But it is contended here that no wages can be declared forfeited to the owner, for the owner sustained no loss, inasmuch as the chronometer was regained by the police, and returned without expense. This defence cannot prevail according to the view which I entertain of the law applicable to such cases. I am of opinion that it is the law of the sea, as well for the quarter-deck as for the forecastle, that any unlawful appropriation of any part of the vessel, her tackle, apparel, or furniture, or of the cargo, will, in a court of admiralty, be visited with forfeiture of wages, either partial or total, according to the circumstances of the case, whether actual pecuniary loss to the owner by the act be proved or not. I am aware that expressions can be found in books of high authority which seem to countenance the idea that forfeiture is but a compensation allowed to the owner for his loss to prevent circuity of action. I am also aware that in most of the reported cases of embezzlement, the amount of the forfeiture has been limited to a sum sufficient to compensate the owner for the loss resulting from the unlawful act. A careful examination of the cases satisfies me, however, that the view here taken is sustained by good authority, and rests upon principles well settled. No such limit as is contended for by the libellant is suggested by Lord Tenterden in his statement of the law of forfeiture. "It seems," he says, "that neglect of duty, disobedience of orders, habitual drunkenness, or any cause which will justify a master in discharging a his wages:" (Abbott on Shipping, part 4, c. 3, s. 4.) seaman during a voyage, will also deprive him of The language used by Chancellor Kent is: "Whatever unjustifiable conduct will warrant the act of the master in discharging a seaman during the voyage, will equally deprive the seaman of his wages: "(3 Kent, p. 198.) In the case of The Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 267, Chief Justice Marshall X In [CHAN. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Reported by THOMAS BROOKSBANK and E. STEWART ROCHE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Dec. 7, 1865, and Jan. 18, 1866. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) declares that forfeiture of salvage reward by | loss of his wages, and shall, therefore, allow him a embezzlement, and forfeiture of wages for embezzle- portion of his demand. His claim is for 75 dols.; I ment, rest upon the same ground. But it has never allow him 25 dols., but it must be without costs. been supposed that the forfeiture of salvage was limited to the amount of loss sustained by the owners of the property; nor do I understand that forfeiture of salvage for this offence has been inflicted as a method of compensating the owners for the damage sustained by them in the loss of their property. The distinction in the law of forfeiture here involved is clearly alluded to by Lord Stowell in the case of The Baltic Merchant, Ed. Ad., p. 93, and was more distinctly announced by Judge Story in Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sum. 373. the latter case, which was a case of absence without leave, the learned judge, while he finds that there was no statutory desertion, nor desertion under the maritime law, inflicts a partial forfeiture, and deems the owner entitled to withhold part of the wages due, "not merely as a compensation for the loss of the services of the second mate during the period, but something more-as a just admonition to officers having such high and responsible duties devolved upon them, and designedly departing from them.' This view has been followed by the learned judge of the Southern District of New York, who, in Scott v. Russell, Olcott, p. 261, inflicted a partial forfeiture "by way of correction and amends," and "with a view to operate as a proper check to seamen, rather than to compensate the owner." "The forfeiture authorised by law in cases of this nature," says Judge Story, in a case of insubordination, “is not given to the owner as a mere boon, but is designed to operate primarily as a warning penalty upon seamen for misconduct :" (The ship Mentor, 4 Mason, p. 97.) It is in accordance with this view of the maritime law that forfeitures are inflicted for insolence, for petty plunder of esculents, &c. ; for it cannot be supposed that in such cases the amount of pecuniary damage sustained by the owner is to be computed, and its compensation the object of the decree. Forfeiture is inflicted in these cases "for the good of the service," to adopt an expression of Judge Story in one of the cases cited. The power to withhold part of the wages is given by the maritime law, in order the better to secure faithfulness and efficient service from an ignorant, unreliable, irresponsible class of men, and this power, when exercised in a proper case, with caution, and a due regard for the weaknesses and temptations of this unfortunate class, a court of admiralty will always sustain. If such be the reason of the law of forfeiture, and such its application by the courts, I see no reason for excluding a case like the present from its operation. It comes within the letter of the law as declared by Lord Tenterden, Chancellor Kent, and perhaps within the more restricted language of Dr. Lushington, in the case of The Blake, 1 Lush. R. The act of the libellant was one calculated to put at considerable risk a valuable article. The ship was already cleared, and might well have been detained by his action. The master was put to the trouble of obtaining the assistance of the police, so that the case might well have permitted a deduction from the wages upon the ground of compensation for a "supposed loss," as has been done in some of the adjudged cases. I prefer, however, to place my decision upon the ground that the act was one of gross misconduct in a chief officer, a method of procedure calculated, if encouraged, to put every owner at the mercy of the crews to which he is obliged to intrust his property, an offence to be classed with the offences of insubordination, insolence, theft, and the like, and like them to be visited with the maritime penalty of forfeiture. I do not, however, think it necessary, in this case, to cast upon the libellant all the expenses of this proceeding in addition to the Collision at sea-Loss of life-Passenger-Seaman— The liability under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Viet. of the M. R. declaring their liability, as owners of a This was an appeal by the plts. against a decree certain brig, to the representatives of seamen who were drowred, in consequence of a collision at sea between the said brig and the vessel upon which the seamen were employed at the time. The case is reported 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 370, and no further statement of the facts is at all necessary. Hobhouse, Q. C. and Druce supported the appeal. Osborne, Q. C. and Haddan appeared in support of his Lordship's judgment. The arguments sufficiently appear from the judg ment of Turner, L. J., below. The authorities cited were: The African Steamship Company v. Swancy cl Dobree v. Schroder, 6 Sim. 291; on app. 2 Myl & Stevens v. Prowse, not reported; Nixon v. Roberts, 1 J. & Hem. 739; 4 L. T. Rep. The Fusilier, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 186; and The several Acts of Parliament mentioned in the judgment. Judgment was reserved until the 18th January, when Lord Justice TURNER said:-This is an appeal from a decree of the M. R. The bill is filed by the owners of a brig called the Edith Mary, stating that the said brig was, on Saturday the 13th Feb. 1864, on a voyage bound northward in ballast, and that during a severe gale of wind on that day when off Filey, in Yorkshire, she came into collision with a vessel called the the Thomas Barker, and that by that collision the said Thomas Barker was sunk and totally lost, and all the crew but two were drowned. The Thomas Barker was the property of the deft. Thomas Barker, and she was laden with coal, but she had no passengers on board, nor were there either passengers or cargo on board the Edith Mary at the time of the collision. It further states that several of the defts. in the suit, who are the personal representatives of several of the seamen who were drowned, have brought actions against the plt. to recover large sums of money by reason of the loss of the lives of these seamen, and by reason of other matters as to which it appears that their claims have since been settled. There are also other defts. to the bill who had other claims against the plts, arising out of the collision then mentioned, but it appears | that these claims have also been settled, and the only question remaining to be decided at the hearing of the cause was the extent of the plts.' liability by reason of the loss of the lives of the seamen who were drowned. The bill prays that the amount of the plts.' liability in respect of the matters aforesaid according to the Merchant Shipping Act 1862, may be declared and distributed between the defts., and all other persons who shall establish claims against the plts., and that in the meantime the defts. nay be restrained from prosecuting the action already commenced, and from commencing and prosecuting any action against the plts. touching the other matters aforesaid. Upon the hearing of the cause, the M. R. by his decree, declared that the plts. were liable o damages to the extent of 157. per registered ton of the ship Edith Mary, and the plts. undertaking o answer all claims not exceeding that amount, nd having regard to such payments as they had lready properly made to some of the parties, his ordship ordered an inquiry to what amount the lts. were liable, and the proportions thereof to hich the defts. were respectively entitled, and ayment was then directed of the proportions so to e ascertained, and an injunction was ordered to Cop proceedings in the actions. The appeal is y the plts. against this decree so far as respects e declaration, and the direction consequent upon In the course of the arguments upon the appeal everal Acts of Parliament were brought under our onsideration, namely, Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 0 Vict. c. 93; the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, 7 & 18 Vict. c. 104; the Merchant Shipping Repeal Act 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 120; and the Mercha t Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63; and the Act. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, was Iso referred to. It is upon the provisions of these cts, and, as I think, for the reasons which I shall resently state, upon the provisions of the four first them, that our determination of this case must pend, the remedy in such cases as the present ing, as was properly observed at the bar, altogeer statutory. In dealing with this case it will be nvenient to refer to these statutes in their order date. Lord Campbell's Act first introduced into e law of this country a remedy in cases of inju8 attended with the loss of life, the law up to the ne of the passing of that Act having stood thusat in case of death resulting from injury the medy for the injury died with the person. As to is Act, it is sufficient for the present purpose to te that it is expressed in the most general and mprehensive terms, and that, looking to the terms it, there can be no reasonable doubt that it was ant to extend, and must be considered to have tended, to loss of life resulting from collisions at , no less than from other causes. After the ssing of this statute, therefore, the owners sea-going vessels were liable for loss of life sing from collisions to any amount which jury might assess as the value of the life. is was the state of the law when the Merant Shipping Act 1854 was passed. By the 4th and 505th sections of this Act it was enacted follows: "504. No owner of any sea-going ship, share therein, shall, in cases where all or any of e following events occur without his actual fault privity, that is to say, . . 3. Where any loss life or personal injury is by reason of the impror navigation of such sea-going ship as aforesaid, used to any person carried in any other ship or at; 4. Where any loss or damage is by reason of y such improper navigation of such sea-going ip as aforesaid, caused to any other ship or boat, to any goods, merchandise, or other things atsoever on board any other ship or boat; be swerable in damages to an extent beyond the [CHAN. value of his ship and the freight due, and to grow due, in respect of such ship during the voyage which at the time of the happening of any such events as aforesaid is in prosecution or contracted for, subject to the following proviso; that is to say, that in no case where any liability as aforesaid is incurred in respect of loss of life or personal injury to any passenger, shall the value of any such ship and the freight thereof be taken to be less than 157. per registered ton. 505. For the purposes of the ninth part of this Act, the freight shall be deemed to include the value of the carriage of any goods or merchandise belonging to the owners of the ship, passage-money, and also the hire due, or to grow due, under or by virtue of any contract, except any such hire, in the case of a ship hired for a time, as may not begin to be earned until after the expiration of six months after such loss or damage." Upon these sections there follows a variety of provisions framed, as it would appear, for working them out. Then follows the Merchant Shipping Repeal Act 1854, by the 4th section of which it is enacted that "there shall be hereby repealed the several Acts and parts of Acts set forth in the 1st schedule hereto, to the extent to which such acts or parts of Acts are therein expressed to be repealed, and all such provisions of any other Acts, or of any charters, and all such laws, customs, and rules as are inconsistent with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854," but amongst the Acts or parts of Acts so repealed, Lord Campbell's Act does not appear. Ultimately we come to the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, which repeals the 504th and 505th sections of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, and by the 54th section enacts as follows: "The owners of any ship, whether British or foreign, shall not, in cases where all or any of the following events occur without their actual fault or privity, that is to say. . . 3. When any loss of life or personal injury is by reason of the improper navigation of such ship as aforesaid caused to any person carried in any other ship or boat; 4. Where any loss or damage is by reason of the improper navigation of such ship as aforesaid caused to any other ship or boat, or to any goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever on board any other ship or boat, be answerable in damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury either alone or together with loss or damage to ships, boats, goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever, to an aggregate amount exceeding 15l. for each ton of their ship's tonnage; nor in respect of loss or damage to ships, goods, merchandise, or other things, whether there be in addition loss of life or personal injury, or not, to an aggregate amount exceeding 87. for each ton of their ship's tonnage; such tonnage to be the registered tonnage in the case of sailing ships, and in the case of steamships the gross tonnage, without deduction on account of engine-room." That the provisions of these statutes involve cases of this description in some perplexity cannot, I think, be denied; but it does not seem to me that the perplexity is incapable of being unravalled. It was first argued for the apps., that the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act being, as it was insisted, inconsistent with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, the 4th section of the Merchant Shipping Repeal Act 1854 must be taken to have repealed Lord Campbell's Act, and that no obligation upon the owners of ships was created by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, the provisions of that Act being in the negative merely that the owners should not be liable beyond the amount specified in the Act; and, on the other hand, it was argued, on the part of the resps., that the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, of itself and independently of Lord Campbell's Act, created a liability in the owners of ships to the extent referred to in the Act |