ton "delivered" i. e. at San Francisco. The subsequent clause about payment of a certain portion of the freight in advance is to be reconciled with this, by taking the payment in advance to be made simply on account of the freight which would be earned if the goods were delivered at San Francisco, and would be liable to be returned if they were not so delivered. [WILLES, J.-Has it not been decided that where the charterer is to insure, the freight paid in advance is not to be returned? Honyman referred to licks v. Shield, 7 E. & B. 633.] The next point is, that the freight paid in advance ought not to contribute at all. It was not in reality at risk at all, and therefore did not benefit by the amount expended: Phillips on Insurance, 4th edit. p. 154, s. 1404; ERLE, C. J.-The general rule respecting contribution to general average is well understood. With respect to this advance of freight, it is clear from the language of the charter-party that it was not in any case to be returned; therefore, the 48007. which was in the hands of the shipowner was no longer at his risk. It is clear that that portion of the freight is to contribute, but the question is, who is the party interested in it. I am of opinion that the charterer is the party interested, and that he had an interest in the ship's arriving at the port of destination to the extent of the value of the cargo increased by the advance which he had made on the freight. I need say nothing more than that, according to the general rules, the charterer is to contribute. WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. With respect to the question whether the money advanced was to be returned, it is concluded by the terms of the charter-party. The charterers were to insure, and it is clear from that, that the advance was not to be returned if the ship did not arrive at her destination. The charterer must seek from the underwriters the indemnity which the charter-party contemplated that he would have. The second question is, whether a person who has advanced money on account of freight and shipped goods on board is liable to contribute to general average in respect of the sum advanced. I apprehend that he is. It is not a question between the charterer and the underwriters of the cargo and freight. The law lays it down that general average must be contributed to by persons interested in the freight and cargo. The deft. was interested in the freight advanced in the same sense as a shipowner who had fitted up a ship with goods would be interested in the carriage thereof, so as to enable him to in sure his interest, though it would not strictly be freight. I think that this is a clear case of general average, and therefore that judgment must be for the plts. BYLES, J.- I am of the same opinion. The charterer is really the purchaser of part of the freight, and his purchased freight has been saved. Another point of view from which it may be looked at is, that the deft.'s goods have been augmented in value by the payment made. It is not, however, necessary to put it on this ground. M. SMITH, J.-I am of the same opinion. According to what seems the proper construction of the charter-party, the advance was not under any circumstances to be repaid. Both the advance, therefore, and the cargo were at the deft.'s risk, and he is liable to contribute in respect of both of them. Judgment for the plt. Attorneys for the plts., Cotterills. [C. CAS. R. CROWN CASES RESERVED. Reported by J. THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Saturday, April 20, 1865. REG. v. BJORNSEN. Murder on the high seas—British ship—Register of ship -Prima facie proof—Alien owner—17 § 18 Vict. e. · 104. A murder was committed on board a ship on the high seas, sailing under the British flag, and the accused brought to England in custody, and put on his trial for the crime. To show jurisdiction in the courts of this country it was sought to establish that the ship was a British ship, and the register of the ship at the port of London was put in evidence, wherein the owner's name was stated to be C. A. Rehder, of 14, Londonstreet, City of London, merchant. It was proved, however, that Rehder was alien born, and it did not appear that he was a denizen of this country or naturalised. It was further proved that the ship was foreign built, and that the officers and crew, including the accused, were foreigners: Held, that although the register might be primâ facie evidence of the facts stated therein, and that the ship was a British ship, yet the proof that the owner was alien born rebutted the inference from the register that he was a British subject, and he was therefore disqualified by the Merchant Shipping Act (17 § 18 Vict. c. 101), s. 18, from being the owner of a British ship: Held also, that it would not be presumed that he was denizenised or naturalised. Case reserved by Channell, B. indicted The prisoner Adolph Bjornsen was before me at the last Winter Commission for the county of Southampton, for the wilful murder, on the high seas, of one Heinrich Leonard Paul Scherck. The jury acquitted the prisoner of murder. They found him guilty of manslaughter. This verdict is to be taken for the purposes of the present case to be correct, subject to the points of law hereinafter stated respecting the jurisdiction of the court to try the prisoner for the offence. The offence was committed on board the barqué Gustav Adolph, on the 21st June last, on the high seas, at a point about five days' sail from Pernambuco, and about 200 miles from the nearest land. In opening the case to the jury the counsel for the prosecution stated that since the prosecution had been instituted doubts had arisen as to whether the Gustav Adolph was a British ship, so as to give jurisdiction to the Court to try the prisoner for au offence committed on board the barque on the high seas, and that he should place at the disposal of the prisoner's counsel, if desired by him, all the documents in the possession of the prosecution for clearing up those doubts. The facts relating to the commission of the offence on board the ship having been proved, it was further proved that the ship in question was built at Kiel, in the duchy of Holstein, in the spring of the year 1864. That she sailed from Kiel to London, thence on the voyage in the course of which the offence was committed. All the officers and crew were foreigners; the prisoner being second mate, and the deceased the master. The ship was sailing under the English flag on the 21st June 1864. The crew were told before sailing that Mr. Rehder was sole owner. He was not a born Englishman. A certified copy of the register of the Gustav Adolph, under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, was put in by the counsel for the prosecution. It was objected that the qualification of Mr. Depth of hold from below to the upper deck plank... 12 4 British measurement. at the price of cost stipulated for, say, Hamburg burnmarks, 62,500. As further agreed upon, I shall make the necessary payment to Mr. C. L. Bock, and see to the true fulfillment of the contract, debiting you all payments made in accounts current. With regard to the vessel herself, I can in future act as your agent only, and it will thus be necessary for you to send me a power of attorney at your earliest convenience.I remain, dear Sir, your ebedient servant, PAUL EHLERS. I, Edward Lehrenger, Doctor of Laws of the Free Hanseatic town of Hamburg, Notary Public, &c., hereby certify and attest that the letter hereinbefore written was duly signed by Mr. Paul Ehlers, &c. Hamburg, 7th Jan. 1864. (Signed) [C. CAS. R. I respited sentence upon the prisoner, who is now in custody, till the next assizes, and reserved for the consideration of this court the following questions: 1. Whether I ought to have received the certified copy of the register of the ship as primâ facie evidence that the ship was a British ship. 2. If it was rightly received as primâ facie evidence, whether the letters of the 31st Dec. 1863, and of the 13th Jan. 1864, taken with the admission as to the status of Paul Ehlers, rebutted that primâ facie evidence. 3. Whether, upon the evidence, there was sufficient proof that the Gustav Adolph was a British ship. Harington for the prisoner.-It is submitted that the conviction was wrong. There was no sufficient evidence that this was a British ship. The register is only primâ facie evidence of the matters contained or recited in the register or indorsed on it: (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 107.) The register describes Rehder as sole owner, and it was proved at the trial that he was alien born. He could not, therefore, be the owner of a British ship, because sect. 18 enacts that no ship shall be deemed a British ship unless she belongs wholly to owners of the following description, that is to say, first, natural-born subjects; second, persons made denizens by letters of denization or naturalised; third, bodies corporate established under, subject to the laws of, and having their principal place of business in the United Kingdom or some British possession. There was no proof that Rehder was denizenised or naturalised. The Merchant Shipping Amendment Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 68), s. 3, shows the intention of the Legislature to exclude unqualified persons from the ownership of British ships and the privileges incident thereto. Accordingly, when a British ship is trans LEHREMAN, DR. London, 13th Jan. 1864. Paul Ehlers, Esq., of Hong Kong, p. t., Hamburg. Dear Sir, I reply to your letter of the 31st Dec. last. I hereby accept your responsibility in a contract signed the 29th May 1863 by your good self and Mr. C. L. Bock, ship-ferred to any person not qualified to be the owner of a builder of Kiel, relating to the barque-ship Gustav Adolph, now in course of construction at or near Kiel As sole owner of this vessel I beg to inclose power of attorney, and request you to be kind enough to undertake the whole and entire itting out of my above-named ship Gustav Adolph, declaring at the same time that I shall be satisfied with all and everything that you may do or cause to be done in or to her in terest. The vessel being intended for the China trade, I request at the same time that you will be kind enough to keep all the accounts, and in consideration of these services and upon condition that you charge no interest on any part of the first cost of the above vessel for which you remain under advance, I hereby promise, make over and transfer to you as verbally agreed between us, 6-7th, say six-seventh parts of all the profits arising out of this venture. On the other side it is understood between us that in case any losses should arise out of this business you share in them to the same extent as in the profits, say for six-sevenths (6-7ths). Trusting that the result may be a favourable one, I remain, dear Sir, yours truly, (Signed) C. A. REHDER. Here follow two names as witnesses to the signatures of C. A. Rehder, James L. Wulff, and T. C. Bremer, jun. It was admitted by the counsel for the prosecution that Paul Ehlers was not a natural-born British subject, and they had no evidence of his having received letters of denization or having been naturalised. It was submitted on the part of the prisoner that these letters showed a partnership in the vessel between Rehder and Ehlers, and that it was shown by the 18th, the 38th, the 103rd, and other sections of the Merchant Shipping Acts, that the owner of a beneficial interest in a British ship must be qualified in the same way as the owner of a legal interest; that, even admitting the registration of the ship in the name of Rehder by the proper officer to be primâ fucie proof of Rehder's qualification to be an owner of a British ship, it could be no evidence of Ehler's qualification, and therefore the letters proving Ehler's interest in the ship rebutted the primâ facie evidence that she was a British ship. The 106th section of the Act was also referred to. British ship, that fact is to be notified to the registrar and the certificate of register is to be delivered up. Sect. 106, which enacts that unregistered ships shall be treated as British ships in respect of offences committed on board thereof, is limited to ships owned by persons qualified to be owners of British ships. It will be contended that as by sect. 38 no person shall be registered until he has made a declaration of ownership containing a statement of his qualification to be an owner of a British ship and other particulars, it must be presumed that Rehder has made that declaration. But sect. 97 enables the registrar for reasonable cause to dispense with such declaration. No such presumption can be made, therefore, in this case: (Reg. v. Sewell, 8 Q. B. 161.) A register is not a document required by the law of nations as expressive of a ship's character: (Le Cheminant v. Pearson, 4 Taun. 367.) As to what gives the character of a British ship independently of statute, there is no case to be found reported. The case stands thus, the prima facie evidence of the ship being a British ship is rebutted by the proof of Rehder being an alien born: A The Eagle, 1 W. Rob. 246; The Fortuna, 1 Dods. Adm. 81, 86; Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 1 H. & J. 159; certificated ship and a British ship are not couvertible terms. Prideaux (M. Bere with him) for the prosecution. -The conviction ought to be affirmed. There was evidence that this was a British ship. The question is not whether this was a British ship within the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, for a ship may be entitled to the protection of the British laws although it may not be within its provisions. The Admiralty Courts hold that the tests of a ship being a British ship are the residence of the owner = C. CAS. R.] REG. v. BJORNSEN. | [C. CAS. R. On the whole it is submitted that in this case this was a British ship for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the Admiralty to prosecute for offences committed on board of her, and it would be dangerous to hold the contrary. Harington in reply.—It is not found as a fact that Rehder was an English merchant or resident in LonCarrying any particular flag is evidence against the owner, but not for him, and is not a circumstance from which jurisdiction can be presumed against a foreigner. in the British dominions and the ship sailing under Taylor on Evid. 123, 4th edit.; ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this conviction cannot be sustained. The prisoner was convicted of manslaughter committed on the high seas, and the question is whether there was any jurisdiction to try the prisoner in England. The crime was committed on the ocean thousands of miles away from British territory, and the ground on which the prosecutor relies for jurisdiction to try in England is that the crime was committed on board a British ship, which carries with it British law, and that the case is therefore as if the crime had been committed on British land. The whole question is whether the ship was a British ship. I am clearly of opinion that there was primâ facie evidence that she was a British ship. There was evidence of a certificate of registry in London, wherein Rehder was described as the owner at that time as resident in London, and the ship was sailing under the British flag. But Rehder was described therein as sole owner, and I take it to have been proved at the trial that he was whether the prima facie evidence of its being a British ship was rebutted by the negative proof that Rehder was alien born. I am of opinion that it was. Then is the proof that he was alien bora disposed of by the presumptions relied on by Mr. Prideaux in his argument, viz., letters of denizenship or naturalisation, and is the court to make such presumptions because Rehder, being alien born, would have become liable to be proceeded against for penalties under the Merchant Shipping Act, for registering the ship as belonging to a British owner? I am of opinion that there is no presumption to justify us in inferring that letters of denizenship or naturalisation were granted to Rehder. I limit my judgment to the question of evidence, the point reserved is merely a matter of evidence. The court will further presume that the party who made the declaration of ownership was qualified according to his declaration. [BLACKBURN, J.-I own I have great difficulty in a criminal case against a third person in making any such presumptions. Sect. 107 carefully avoids saying that the register and declaration shall be proof of the contents, but says that they shall only be prima facie evidence of the matters therein.] Italien born. That reduces the question to this, is not to be presumed that a party has committed the indictable offence of making a false declaration and unduly assuming a British character: (sect. 103). [BLACKBURN, J.-The truth of a statement is not to be presumed against a stranger on the ground that the party making the statement is not to be presumed to have committed a crime.] In Rex v. Hawkins, 10 East, 211, it was held that the presumption of law being that every person has conformed to the law till something appear to rebut that presumption, it was to be taken that a person elected to a municipal office had duly taken the sacrament within a year as required by the 13 Car. 2, c. 12. [MELLOR, J.-But in this case it is an admitted fact that Rehder was not born in England. CHANNELL, B.-Suppose that a declaration of ownership had actually been put in evidence, would there have been any presumption of the truth of its contents?] In Rodwell v. Redge, 1 C. & P. 220, a theatre was presumed to have been licensed from the fact of performances having taken place there; and in Sichell v. Lambert, 15 C. B., N. S., 781, a Roman Catholic chapel was presumed to have been licensed for the celebration of marriages from the fact of marriages taking place there. A somewhat similar presumption was made in M Mahon v. Ellis and others, 14 Ir. C. L. Rep. 499. By sect. 97 the declaration of ownership can only be dispensed with where the registrar is satisfied that from any reasonable cause it cannot be made, and in that case the registrar, upon production of such other evidence, and subject to such terms as he may think fit, may dispense with the declaration. So that it is to be inferred either that the declaration of ownership was duly made, or that evidence equivalent thereto was produced before the registrar. [BLACKBURN, J.— Supposing there had been no statutory enactment affecting the question, what is the definition or character of a British ship at common law ?] There is no abstract definition to be found in the books: The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. 13, 33; The Match'ess, 1 Hag. Adm. Rep. 103; Tabbs v. Bendelack, 3 B. & P. 207; The Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob, 12. CHANNELL, B.-I also am of opinion that the conviction cannot be sustained. The offence was committed on board a ship of which the captain, mate and crew, including the prisoner, were foreigners. In one sense the ship may be taken to have been the property of Rehder, who, it was clear, was not a British-born subject. The question is, whether an English court has jurisdiction to try the foreigner for this offence. An English court can have no jurisdiction unless it is to be presumed that this was a British ship, and I can see no ground for inferring that this was a British ship. On the Merchant Shipping Act I cannot come to that conclusion, but on the evidence I agree that there was prima facie evidence that the ship was British; but the ordinary rule that primâ facie evidence may be rebutted applies in this case. I must look at the case then as presenting this fact, that the owner was an alien born. If letters of denizenship or naturalisation had been produced they would have removed that difficulty, but they were not. I sec no ground on which the court may draw the inference that one or the other may have been granted. It was then said that the ship might be a British ship, independent of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, but I can see no ground for any such inference. Some doubt might arise on sect. 106 at first sight. That section, however, has no application; it supposes the capacity to register as a British ship, but the privileges of a British ship to be lost because some requisition has not been complied with. It is therefore quite out of the question. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is established that if a ship is a British ship, it carries with it the notion that it is part of the British territory, and crimes committed on board thereof may be tried in England. I agree that the facts of the ship sailing under the British flag, and being treated as a British ship, and being registered in London, were primâ facie evidence that it was a British ship. The register was primâ facie evidence that apparently Rehder was sole owner, but it was proved that he was alien born. There would be no pretence for saying that this was a British ship, but from the circumstance of the register stating Rehder to be resident in this country at the time of the registry. That fact merely shows that he owed a temporary allegiance to this country, and in the case cited of the Indian Chief, that was the effect of the decision. For aught that appears, he might have left this country, and so his allegiance here would have ceased. The Merchant Shipping Act requires an owner to be a British subject, and sect. 106 does not apply where the sole owner is a foreigner. I do not think, therefore, that this ship could be said to be a British ship so as to make it part of British territory. MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. I will only add that Mr. Prideaux, while citing the cases which he brought before us, and which are unquestioned, was losing sight of the admitted fact in this case, that the owner was alien born. SMITH, J.-I am of the same opinion. To prove jurisdiction, the register of the ship in London was put in evidence, but when it was proved that the owner was a foreigner, the primâ facie effect of the evidence in the register was rebutted. The declaration of ownership is prior to the register being drawn up, and if the effect of the evidence of the register is got rid of it can hardly be said that Something done prior to it is not also rebutted. Conviction quashed. BAIL COURT. Reported by W. GRAHAM, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Thursday, June 15. (Before CROMPTON, J.) PEARSON v. NELL. Shipowner-Liability for contracts of masterEvidence. In an action against the registered owner of a ship it was proved that the repairs were necessary, that they were ordered by the captain, and that the deft.'s name was on the register as sole owner: Held, that there was no evidence to go to the jury. This was an action against an executor for work and labour, and on account stated. The deft. pleaded never indebted. At the trial at Leeds before the under-sheriff of Yorkshire, it appeared that the plt. was a shipbuilder at Goole, and the testator, who resided at Louth in Lincolnshire, was the registered owner of the sloop Ocean. In Dec. 1863 the Ocean arrived at the port of Goole and discharged her cargo. The master then called on the pit, and stated that he was the owner of the ship, and asked him to do [BAIL. | certain repairs. Nothing was said about credit at this time. The plt. did the repairs, and sent in his bill amounting to 16. 19s. 1d. to the master, who thereupon asked him to give him credit till he got to London, when he would send him the money. This the plt. consented to, and nothing more was done till Nov. 1861, when the master wrote from Dundee saying that he could not send the money. The plt. then wrote to the master, inclosing a bill at one month, which the master refused to accept. On the 13th Jan. 1865 the plt. having heard that Nell, the testator, was the owner, wrote to him inclosing the account for the repairs and asking for payment. This letter was answered by the deft.'s attorneys, who stated that Nell was dead, and his estate was not liable for debts contracted by the master, as he had never authorised him to pledge his credit. The plt. in cross-examination stated that he had headed the account in his books "To Capt. Chappel,” the master. The plt. and a witness who introduced the master to the plt. were the only witnesses called. The register was put in by which it appeared that Nell the testator was sole owner of the ship, and it was admitted that the charge was reasonable, that the repairs were necessary, and that the deft. was then in possession of the ship, but there was no evidence that the testator had appointed the master, or indeed any other evidence than that he was registered owner, and that the repairs were ordered by the captain. The jury found a verdict for the plt. for the full amount. Pearce, on the 12th June, obtained a rule calling on the plt. to show cause why there should not be a new trial on the ground, first, that no evidence was adduced at the trial to show that the deft.'s testator authorised Capt. Chappel to employ the plt.; secondly, misdirection of the learned assessor in not directing the jury, that on the evidence the said Capt. Chappel was the person liable to the plt.; and thirdly, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Prentice now showed cause.-There was evidence to show that the repairs were ordered by the captain, and I submit the captain has authority to bind the owner for repairs. [CROMPTON, J.-It always used to be a question of contract, and now Mitcheson v. Oliver, 5 E. & B.419; 25 L. T. Rep. 258, has brought it back to that.] These were necessary repairs, and the captain has implied authority to bind the owner in the absence of anything to the contrary. [MELLOR, J.-You must show more than that. You must show that the captain was appointed by the owner, and made the contract with his privity.] The captain says he is the principal owner : of Myers v. Willis, 17 Č. B. 77; in error, 18 C. B. 886. Middleton, in support, was not called on. CROMPTON, J.-I think that according to the case Mitcheson v. Over, which all courts must be bound by, and which I think is grounded on sound principles of law, this claim is founded on contract and not on ownership; it may depend to a certain extent on the exigency of the occasion; but that point does not arise here. It would be absurd to say that if a ship was on fire a captain could not employ men to put it out. But I think we should leave that question open, as the court did in Mitcheson v. Oliver. There Parke, B. says the verdict was against evidence; and, further on in his judgment, he says that there was some evidence for the jury. There the facts were that there was some evidence that the deft, appointed the captain. Here we must see what is the effect of the whole evidence. There is no suggestion that the jury are not to believe the plt.'s evidence, and on that we are tj ADM.] costs. see if there is any case to go to the jury. [ it appeared that on the 15th March 1864 the Annie It has long been settled that a nonsuit may Sherwood was lying at the port of New York, proceed on the plt.'s and the deft.'s undisputed chartered on a voyage from thence to Cuba, then evidence, but here it is perfectly clear that there was to Liverpool and back to Cuba or the West Indies, no case for the jury; and when I say the deft.'s and then to a final port of discharge in the United evidence, I mean that part of the plt.'s evidence | States; the time not to exceed eight months; that which is favourable to the deft. If a master in an her master hired the plt. Drinkwater as chief English port orders repairs, that is only general mate, and the plt. Beckett as cook and steward, prima facie evidence. In Mitcheson v. Oliver the deft. Drinkwater's wages to be forty-five dollars per had really appointed the captain, and it was said month, and Beckett's forty dollars per month; that there was some evidence. But here the case is that accordingly the plts. entered into the service of conclusive; there was no evidence of a contract the ship in their respective capacities; that Drinkwith the deft. At the time of the contract there water signed the ship's articles on board the ship, was no mention of the deft, and the bill was sent and subsequently signed another set of ship's artiin to the captain, and entered in the plt.'s books in cles at the British consul's office at New York; that the captain's name. Afterwards the plt. sees the Beckett signed the ship's articles at the shipping captain, who applied for time, and afterwards he office of a Mr. Ferras; but that neither of the draws a bill giving him time; but he does not apply engagements were made, nor did either of the plts. to the deft. till long afterwards. Therefore there is sign the articles, in the presence of the British no doubt that the contract was with the captain, and consul at New York, according to the provisions of for that reason I think there should be a rule for a the 160th section of the Merchant Shipping Act new trial on the ground of there being no evidence, 1854. That on the 22nd March the ship, having or, in other words, on the ground of misdirection. taken in a cargo of cooperage, sailed with the pits. We cannot enter a nonsuit, as leave was not reserved. on board, and about the 20th April arrived at The case will go down for trial without payment of Cienfuegos, in Cuba, and discharged cargo there, and about the 16th May sailed from thence with a cargo of sugar for Liverpool, which port she made on the 3rd July with the plts. on board, and there docked and discharged her cargo; that Drinkwater continued on board the ship, performing his duty until the 17th Nov., when his period of eight months expired, and he then left and was discharged from the ship; that Beckett continued on board the ship performing his duty until the 21st Nov., when his time expired, and he left and was discharged; that the master did not deliver to the plts., or to either of them, or to the shipping master, an account of wages, as required by the 171st section of the Merchant Shipping Act, and the master had not paid them the respective wages due to them for the voyage, though often applied to and requested so to do. The petition then prayed the court to pronounce for 76. 10s. as due to Drinkwater, and 677. 9s. 11d. as due to Beckett, and to give them each ten days' double pay, under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, and their costs. The answer for the deft., after admitting the sums at which the plts. were hired, pleaded that it was further agreed that any sums to become due for wages under the agreement should, when so due, be payable in United States currency or its equivalent; that the agreement provided for the service by the plts. on board the vessel on a voyage from New York to Cienfuegos (Cuba), thence to a port or ports in Europe, as the master might direct, with the privilege of returning to the United States via a port or ports in the West Indies, the final port of discharge to be a northern port in the United States; and the that it was untrue that Drinkwater signed two sets agreement was limited to eight calendar months; of articles; that both Drinkwater and Beckett MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The only evidence by which it is sought to charge the deft. is proof that his name was on the register, and that Chappel acted as captain, but there is no proof that he acted as the deft.'s captain or with his knowledge. It appears to me that credit was entirely given to the captain, and all the circumstances show that the plt. treated the captain as the real person with whom he had contracted. There was no application to the deft. till after the delay, and, therefore, I think there was no evidence for the jury, and that the rule for a new trial should be made absolute. There will be a new trial without costs, as if leave had been reserved we should have entered a nonsuit. Rule absolute. Attorney for the plt., H. Clarke. COURT OF ADMIRALTY. Wednesday, April 26, 1865. (Before the Right Hon. Dr. LUSHINGTON.) THE ANNIE SHERWOOD. Seamen's wages-American dollars-Sterling and currency payments. Where in a seaman's articles it is covenanted to pay Where it was alleged that there was a specific cove- Brett and Vernon Lushington appeared for the plts.; Dr. Deane and Potter for the defts. Dr. LUSHINGTON gave judgment in this case, which came before the court on a claim made by the late chief mate and steward of the barque Annie Sherwood, for their wages. From the plts.' petition signed articles on the 19th March 1864, in the presence of a consular officer of Her Majesty at New York, and at the time of such signature fully understood the terms of such articles, and that at such time the consent of the consular officer to the engagement of the plts. had been obtained, and all conditions required with respect to such engagements had been fulfilled; that the master delivered to the shipping agent accounts of the balance of wages due to both the plts., and that the deft. had always been ready and willing to pay to the plts. the balance appearing by such accounts to be due to each of them respectively, according to the terms of the said agreement, and was so ready and willing within the time fixed for such purpose under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, but that the plts. always |