to the formation of the Code. Born in 1726, his practice as an advocate seems chiefly to have been confined to Chamber Counsel; but his authority as a jurist ranked most justly high, as we have good ground for ascertaining by his pithy remarks during the two years' discussions in the Conseil d'Etat, of which he was a most assiduous attendant.

Two other distinguished barristers, MM. BIGOT-PREAMENEU and MALEVILLE, complete the group of leading jurists whom we may look upon as the chief authors of the Code. M. Bigot, like his colleagues, was far from belonging to the movement party; and Napoleon afterwards selected him for his Minister of Religion, chiefly, as he himself confessed, on account of his name! M. Maleville, whom accident places last in our list, was also a most active and useful collaboreur in this work of legislation. He published a valuable work on the discussions which took place in the Council, which is considered standard, but which unfortunately, we have not seen.1

We have left ourselves but little space to point the moral which we desire to draw from the above sketch. Are there in England materials-men- the strong Governmental will -which are requisite for producing a great legal monument such as the genius of Napoleon knew how to erect? It is impossible to avoid perceiving that France possessed certain great advantages when she commenced upon the task of consolidating and systematising her law. The two great evils that oppressed her consisted, as we have perceived, in the conflict of laws, and the conflict of jurisdictions, which prevailed throughout the country; but the latter of these evils was at once extirpated by the Revolution, which flung to the winds every remaining vestige of Feudalism. So with respect to

the Substantive Law, directly an authority arose with sufficient power to decide between two contesting systems, abundant materials existed ready to the hand of the legislator, on which codification might proceed. The Roman law being the basis of the civil system, both in the pays cou

1 Analyse raisonnée de la Discussion du Code Civil au Conseil d'Etat, 4 vols. 8vo. Paris, 1804-5.

tumier and in the pays de droit écrit, the reformers of the Revolution had within their reach the whole of the systematic and institutional writers of the Continent on the Corpus Juris, from whom orders, arrangements, divisions, and definitions were deducible at will. Pothier's works alone formed a storehouse, from which a great portion of the French Code was furnished forth. Moreover, the difficulty which is now pressing on the English public, arising from the want of a simple and uniform system of procedure, was not at all felt in France. Louis XIV., so long back as 1667, had succeeded in introducing an Ordonnance, which established uniform procedure throughout the kingdom. This procedure, though in our view defective in several particulars, was nevertheless framed on scientific principles by the ablest magistrates of that period, and it is described by M. Carré, whose work we have placed at the head of this Article, as " le résultat de la science, et de la méditation la plus profonde." The Code of Procedure, framed by Cambacérés, follows the Ordonnance almost servilely, and all the great peculiarities of French civil law proceedings, — the judge-reporter, to whom, on a curia advisari vult, the cause is referred, the judge-advocate, or Ministère Publique, the strong bias against vivâ voce evidence, the reference of commercial disputes to a lay tribunal, of domestic disputes to a family council,— all hold their place in the new Code as firmly as in the old practice. Our own system, on the other hand, with a richer repertory of Jurisprudence, as Bentham himself confesses, than the law literature of any other country contains, is nevertheless a rude and indigested mass of wealth, as to which almost the only arrangement ever applied has been alphabetical and mechanic.

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Again, we are equally to seek in England for a set of Tribonians. Our Judges, it is true, are sufficiently well endowed in years and conservatism to fit them for the task; but we have heard of late, on very high authority, and we know of the fact aliunde, that the greater portion of them cannot bring themselves to the contemplation of a reforming besom with any equanimity. Our leading advocates, on the other hand, are so engrossed with professional business, they

are moreover, from the division of labour which of latter years has prevailed, so cut up into sections, that they are unable, and become gradually unfitted, to apply the large comprehensive views which are required from the legislator. The fact cannot be denied that our system produces what in French we call specialités; the result may be that we can boast of greater perfection in the class Advocate, and in the class Judge, than our neighbours; but it is possibly incompatible with these special excellences to find the development of that order of faculties in which the tendency is predominant to regard particulars only in subordination to the whole.

Nevertheless there is ground for hope. Unless we are much mistaken, an order of men is springing up in England, from whom great services to the commonwealth in systematising and organising our law, may be hereafter obtained.

The County Court Judges, by being withdrawn from engrossing professional labours at an earlier period of life than their superior brethren in the ermine, will run less risk of having

"Their nature

Subdued to what it works in, like the dyer's hand:"

and, moreover, from having a wider opportunity, and possibly more active motives, to take larger generalising views of the judicial office, and of the benefits it is capable of rendering to suitors, than any professional class which has hitherto existed in England, may probably supply, at no distant epoch, a body of practical jurists to whom the great work of systematic reform may be safely confided. Nor even now do we think that instruments are wanting to commence this great task. One name will immediately occur to all the readers of this Journal, to all who have watched the progress of Law Reform since the delivery of the great speech on the subject in the House of Commons, in 1828, by HENRY BROUGHAM. Most gladly would we see the clear mind of LORD LYNDHURST engaged in such a work. The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND, also, if he could be spared from the duties of administration, would be able, with his mastery of the Common Law, to render more service probably than any man in the empire in stripping bare antiqui juris fabulas, and retain

ing for us the substance of the good old Teutonic system, under which our country has flourished. LORD CRANWORTH would supply not only good Law and Equity, but sound reason. May we also take the liberty of mentioning Mr. JUSTICE ERLE, whose practical good sense, and sturdy adhesion to the ends of justice, are always so conspicuously shown when the technical hair-splittings of an obsolete system are brought before the tribunals? Other names too occur to us in abundance: LORD DENMAN, whose powerful intellect is bright as ever; Mr. PEMBERTON LEIGH, whom, though ambition might not stimulate, the love of country might persuade, to give to it his labours; SIR EDWARd Sugden, thoroughly master of one department; and one or two others, whose valuable labours in the Indian Law Commission and Legislative Council are not so well known in this country as they deserve. Nor is it fair to omit, even in this Review, a reference to the LAW AMENDMENT SOCIETY, the list of whose active members would well furnish much useful help.

But where is the strong government, the "particle of divine spirit," to organise such a Commission as we have been foreshadowing? Here at length we arrive at a chasm which we feel unable to bridge over. Unfortunately, in the present day, the business of Government has become so absorbing, the empire over which our ministers have to extend their vigilance is so extensive, that the head of every department is conpletely engrossed by the current details of the day. It is not the function of this Journal to intermeddle with the party politics before our eyes, to point out the shortcomings of the one leader, or to herald the promises of another; but steadily keeping our eyes on one great object,--the improvement of the Laws of England,-to which for many years our energies have been directed, we assert that the expression of the wish of the people in this matter will be sufficient to enable any Minister to take the necessary steps for accomplishing this great work. And this, at all events, is certain, that the Minister or Government, who may undertake this duty, will gain possession of a field in which indeed a champion is required, and where undying honour awaits the victor.

ART. II. - NATIONAL INTERVENTION.!

IN assigning a title to this Article, we have intentionally abstained from giving the subject of which it treats the denomination adopted by some of the latest writers on the Law of Nations, such as Professor Heffter, of the University of Berlin, in 1844; and Dr. Wheaton, in the last edition of his "Elements du Droit International," published at Leipsig in 1848, namely, the "Right of Intervention;" for we humbly conceive no such primitive or primary absolute right of intervention exists among sovereign independent nations. And may be worth while shortly to inquire whether there is any ground for recognising such a right of intervention; first, in point of legal or juridical principle; secondly, in point of usage and traditional authority; thirdly, in point of general expediency.

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First, then, such a pretended original or primitive and positive right of intervention will be found, upon inquiry, to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Sovereign States as universally recognised. In general, no such right of intervention can exist with regard to those matters which it belongs to each state to arrange in virtue of its freedom and independence; namely, the constitution and administration of its internal government. No state can legally impose upon another any particular constitution, or promote or oppose changes therein, or exercise any legislative, executive, or judicial power, civil or criminal. As little can any state exercise over another any external sovereignty. And the principle of non-intervention is thus manifestly the general rule, and intervention merely the exception.

The chief primary or original, and absolute or unconditional, rights of sovereign states are self-preservation and independence; legislative, executive, and judicial powers, civil

This Article should be taken in connection with the previous Articles on International Law. They have recently been reprinted in a compendious form, and published by Blackwood. We have much pleasure and pride in stating the name of the Author, James Reddie, Esq., of Glasgow, Advocate; a name well known to all inquirers on International Law. - Ed.