right naught in no wise, and I deme all vtterlie, that happe nis, ne dwelleth but a voyce, as who saieth, but an idell woorde, without any significaeion of thynge, committed to that voyce. For what place might been lefte, or dwellynge in folie, and to disordenaunce, sithe that God leadeth and constraineth all thynges by order, for this sentence is verie sothe, that nothyng hath his beeyng of naughte, to the whiche sentence, none of these old folke ne withsaied neuer, al be it so, that thei ne vnderstanden it not, by God, prince and beginner of woorkyng, but thei casten, as a maner founde-lawe, that is to saine, by the deuine ordenaunce. ment of subiecte materiall, that is to saine, of the nature of al reason. And if that any thyng is waxen or comen of no causes, than shall it seme, that thilke thyng is comen or woxen of naught. But if this ne maie not bee dooen, than is it not possible that hap bee any soche thynge, as I haue definished a little here beforne. Boecius. Howe shall it than bee (quod I) nis there than nothyng, that by right maie been cleaped, either hap, or els aduenture, or fortune? Or is there ought, all bee it so, that it is hid fro the people, to whiche thyng moten thilke thynges fleten togider, whiche that the water of thenterchaunging flood bringeth. The shippes and the stockes araced with the flood moten assemblen, and the waters imedled, wrappeth or emplieth many fortunell happes or maners, the whiche wandryng happes nathelesse, thilke declining lownesse of the yerth and the flowyng order of the slidyng water gouerneth. Right so fortune that semeth, as it suffreth with slaked or vngouerned bridles it suffreth bridles, that is to saine, to been gouerned, and passeth by thilke these woordes been couenable. Philosophie. Myne Aristotle (quod she) in the booke of his Phisike, difinisheth this thynge by short reason, and nigh to the sothe. Animadverto, inquum, idque uti tu dicis ita esse con- THIS vnderstande I wel (quod I) and I accorde me Philosophie. Yes (quod she) there is libertie of free will, ne there ne was neuer no nature of reason, that it ne had libertie or free will. For euery Boecius. In whiche maner (quod I). thing that maie naturally vsen reason it hath Philosophie. As ofte (quod she) as men dooen dome, by whiche it decerneth and demeth euery any thyng, for grace of any other thyng, and an thing. Than knoweth it by it self thynges that other thyng than thilke thyng, that men entenden been to flien, and thynges that been to desiren, and to doen, betideth by some causes, it is icleaped the ilke thyng that any wight demeth to been dehappe, right as a manne dalfe the yearth, bicause sired, that asketh or desireth he, and flieth thilke of tillyng of the field, and found there a gobet of thynge, that he troweth be to flien. Wherefore golde bedoluen, than wenen folke, that it is befall in all thynges that reason is, in hym also is libertie by fortunous betidyng. But forsothe it nis not of of willyng and of nillyng, but I ne ordaine not, as naught, for it hath his proper causes, of which who saieth, I ne graunt not, that this libertie, be causes, the cours vnforeseen and vnware, semeth euen like in al thinges. For why in the Soueraines to haue maked hap. For if the tiller of the fielde, deuines substaunces, that is to sain, in spirites, ne dolue not in the yearth, and if the hider of the judgement is more clere and will not corrumpe, gold, ne had hid the gold in that place, the golde and mightie redy to speden thynges that been dene had not been found. These been than the sired. But the soules of men moten needes been causes, of the abredgyng of fortuit hap, the whiche more free, whan thei looken hem in the speculaabredgyng of fortuit hap cometh, of causes of en- cion, or lookyng of the deuine thought, and lasse countryng, and flowyng togither to hem self, and free whan thei sliden into the bodies, and yet lasse not by thentencion of the doer. For neither the free whan thei been gathered togither, and comhider of the golde, ne the deluer of the field, ne prehended in yearthly members, but the last vnderstanden not, that the gold should haue been seruage is, whan that thei been yeuen to vices, and founde. But as I saied, it betid and ran togither, haue ifall from the possession of hir proper reason. that he dalfe there as the other had hid the gold. For after that thei haue caste awaie hir iyen, fro Now maie I thus definishe hap. Happe is an vnthe light of the soueraine sothefastnesse, to lowe ware betiding of causes, assembled in thynges, that thynges and darcke, anone thei darcken by the been doen for some other thyng. But thilke order cloude of ignoraunce, and be troubled by felonous procedyng, by an vneschuable betidyng togither, talentes, to the whiche talentes, whan thei apwhiche that discendeth from the well of purueigh-prochen and assenten, thei heapen and encreasen aunce, that ordeineth al thynges in hir places, and in hir times maketh, that the causes rennen and assemblen togither. the seruage, whiche thei haue ioyned to hem self. And in this maner thei been caitiues, fro hir proper libertie, the whiche thyng nathelesse, the lookyng of the deuine purueiaunce seeth, that al thynges beholdeth and seeth fro eterne, and orRupis Achæmeniæ scopulis, ubi versa sequentum Pec- deineth hem eueriche in hir merites, as thei been toribus fugit spicula, &c. predestinate, and, it is said in Greke, that all thinges he seeth, and al thinges he heareth. TIGRIS and Eufrates, resoluen and springen of o welle, in the cragges of the roche of the countrey of Achemenee, ther as the fliyng battailes fixen hir dartes, retournyng in the breastes of hem that Puro clarum lumine Phebum Melliflui canil oris folowen hem. And sone after the same riuers, Tigris and Eufrates, vnioynen and departen hir waters, and if thei comen together, and been assembled, and cleaped together into o course, than Homerus, &c. HOMER with the honie mouth, that is to saine, | Sonne is cleare by pure light. Nathelesse, yet ne maie it not by the infirme light of his beames, breaken or percen the inwarde entrailes of the yearth, or els of the sea. So ne seeth not God, maker of the greate worlde, to hym that looketh all thynges from an high, ne vnderstandeth nothynges by heauinesse of the yearth, ne the night ne withstandeth not to hym by the black cloudes, thilke God seeth in o stroke of thought, all thynges that been, weren, or shull come: and thilke God, for he looketh and seeth all thynges alone, thou maist saine that he is the verie soonne. warde also is it of the contrarie, for if the opinion bee sothe of any wight, for that he sitteth, it behoueth by necessitie that he sitte. Than is here necessitie in that one, and in that other: for in that one is necessitie of sittyng, and certes in that other is necessitie of soth. But therfore ne sitteth not a wighte, for that the opinion of the sitting his sothe, but the opinion is rather sothe, for that a wight sitteth beforne. And thus although that the cause of the sothe, cometh of that other side, as who saieth, that al though the cause of sothe cometh of the sitting, and not of the true opinion, algates yet is there a common necessitie, in that one, and in that other. Thus seweth it, that I maie make semblable skilles, of the purueighance of God, and Tum ego: en, inquam, difficiliori rursus ambiguitate of thynges to comen. For although that for that confundor, &c THAN said I thus, now am I confounded, by a more hard doubt than I was. Philosoph. What doubte is that (quod she) for certes, I coniecte now by soch things, thou art troubled. Boecius. It seemeth (quod 1) to repugnen and to contrarie greatlie, that God knoweth beforne all thinges, and that there is any fredome or libertie, for if so bee that God looketh all thynges beforne, ne God ne maie not been deceiued in no maner. Than mote it needes bee, that all thynges the whiche that the purueighaunce of God, hath seen beforne to come, for which if that God knoweth toforne, not onely the werkes of men, but also hir counsailes and hir willes, than ne shall there bee no libertie of arbitree, ne certes, there ne maie bee none other deede, ne no wille, but the ilke whiche that the deuine purueighaunce (that ne may not been deceiued) hath feeled beforne, for if that thei mighten writhen awaie, in other maner, than thei been purneighed, than ne should there be no stedfast prescience of thyng to comen, but rather an vncertaine opinion, the whiche thyng to trowen of God, I deme it felonie and vnlefull. Ne I ne proue not the ilke same reason, as who saieth, I ne alowe not, or I ne praise not thilke same reason, by whiche that some men wenen, that thei mowen assoilen, and vnknitten the knot of this question. For certes thei saine, that thyng nis not to comen, for that the purueighaunce of God, hath seen beforne that it is to comen, but rather the contrarie, and that is this, that for that the thynges is to comen, that therefore ne maie it not been bid fro the purueighaunce of God. And in this maner, this necessitie slideth ayen into the contrarie partie, ne it ne behoueth not needes, that thynges betiden that been ipurueighed, but it behoueth nedes, that thynges that been to comen been ipurueighed, but as it wer itrauailed, as who saith, that thilke answere procedeth right as though menne trauaileden or weren busie to enquiren, the whiche thynge is cause of the which thynges. As whether the prescience is cause, of the necessitie of thynges to comen, or els that the necessitie of thinges to comen, is cause of the purueighaunce. But I ne enforce me not now to shewen it, that the betidyng of thynges iwiste beforne is necessarie, how so or in what maner, that the order of causes hath it self, although that it ne seme not, that the prescience bryng in necessitie of betidyng, to thynges to comen. For certes, if that any wighte sitteth, it behoueth by necessitie, that the opinion be soth, of hym that coniecteth that he sitteth, and ayen thynges been to comen, therefore been thei purueighed, and not certes, for thei been purueighed, therfore ne betide thei not, nathelesse it behoueth by necessitie, that either the thynges it to comen, been ipurueyed of God, or els that the thynges, that been purueighed of God betiden. And this thyngs onelie suffiseth inough, to destroien the freedom of our arbittre, that is to sain, of our frewill. But certes, nowe sheweth it well howe farre fro the sothe. And how vpso doune is this thing, that we seen that the betidyng of temporall thynges, is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to wenen that God purueyeth the thynges to comen, for thei ben to comen. What other thynge is it but for to wene, that thilke thinges that betide whilom, been causes of thilke souerain purueighaunce, that is in God. And hereto adde I this thinges, that right as whan that I, wote that a thyng is, it behoueth by necessitie, that thilk self thing bee, and eke whan I haue knowen that any thyng shall betiden, so behoueth it by necessitie, that thilke same thynges betide. So followeth it than, that the betidyng of the thinges iwist beforne, ne maie not bee eschewed, and at the laste, if that any wighte wene a thyng, to been otherwise than it is, it nis not onely vnscience, but it is deceiuable opinion, full diuers and farre fro the sothe of science. Wherefore, if any thyng bee so to comen, that the betidyng of it, ne bee not certaine, ne necessarie, who maic weten beforne, that thilke thing is to comen. For right as science, ne maie not be medled with falsenesse, as who saieth, that if I wote a thing, it ne maie not be false that I ne wote it, right of thilke thyng, that is conceiued by science, ne maie not be none, otherwise than as it is conceived, for that is the cause why, that science wanteth lesing, as who saith, why that weting ne receiueth not lesyng of that it wote, for it behoueth by necessitie, that euery thyng bee right, as science comprehendeth it to be. What shal I than sain, in whiche maner knoweth God, beforne all the thynges to comen, if thei ne be not certain, for if that he deme, that thei been to comen vneschuably, and so maie bee that it is possible, that thei ne shullen not comen, God is deceiued, but not onely to trowen, that God is deceiued, but for to speake it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne. But if that God wote, that righte so as thynges been to comen, so shoullen thei comen, so that he wote egally, as who saith indifferently, that thyngs maie bee doen, or els not idoen. What is thilke prescience, that ne comprehendeth no certaine thyng ne stable, or els what difference is there bitwene the prescience of thilke iape, worthy De Quænam discors fœdera rerum Causa resolvit? quis tanta Deus, &c. thei cleauen alwaie certain to hemself. But the by so greate desire, to knowe thilke notificacions, that been ihid vnder the couertures of sothe? wote it ought thilke thynges, that it anguisshous de sireth to knowe? as who saieth naie. For no man ne trauaileth, for to weten thynges that he wote. And therefore the texte saieth thus. uinyng of Tiresie Deuinour, that saied. All that | parted and vnioined from his wele, and failen of I saie (quod he) either it shall be, or els it shall his beginnyng, that is to saine God. not bee, or els how moche is worthe the denine prescience, more than the opinion of mankinde, if so bee that it demeth the thynges vncertaine, as men doen. Of the whiche domes of men, the betidyng nis not certaine. But if so be, that none vncertain thynges, ne maie been in him, that is What discordable cause hath to rent, and vnioyned right certaine well of all thynges, than is the bethe bindyng or the aliance of thynges, that is to tidyng certaine of thilke thynges, whiche that he hath wiste beforne, fermely to comen, for whiche sain, the coniunccions of God, and of man? whiche it followeth, that the fredome of the counsailes, God hath established so greate battaile, betwene and of the werkes of mankind nis none, sith that these twoo sothfaste, or verie thynges, that is to the thought of God, that seeth all thynges, with- sain, betwene the purueiaunce of God, and free out errour of falsnesse, bindeth and constraineth will, that been singuler, and deuided, ne that thei hem to a betidyng by necessitie. And if this thyng But there nis no discorde to the very thinges, but ne wollen not been medled, ne coupled togeder? bee ones igraunted and receiued, this is to saine, that there nis no freewill, than sheweth it well, thought of man contounded and ouerthrowen, by how great destruccion, and how greate domages there folowen of thinges of mankind, for in idell the darke members of the body, ne maie not by fire of his darked lookyng, that is to saine, by the been there than purposed, and behighte medes to good folke, and paines to badde folke, sith that no vigour of his insight, while the soul is in the bodie, knowen the thyn subtell knittynges of thynges. mouyng of free courage voluntarie, ne hath not But wherefore eschaufeth it so by so great loue, to deserued hem, that is to saine, neither mede ne paine. And it should seme than, that thilke thing finden thilke notes of soth icouered, that is to is alderworst, which that is now demed for alder-saine, wherefore eschaufeth the thought of man, moste iust, and moste rightful. That is to sain, that shrewes been punished, or elles that good folke bee iguerdoned, the whiche folkes sene that hir proper wille ne sente hem to that one, ne to that other. That is to sain, neither to good ne harme, but constraineth hem certain necessitie of thynges to comen, than ne shullen there neuer been, ne neuer weren vice ne vertue, but it shullen rather be confusion of all desertes, medled without discrecion. And yet ther foloweth an other inconuenience, of the whiche there ne maie be thought no more felonous, ne more wicked, and that is thus, that so as the order of thynges is idel, and cometh of the purueiance of God, ne that nothyng nis lefull, to the counsailes of mankinde, as who saieth, that men haue no power to doen nothyng, ne will nothyng, than followeth it that our vices been referred to the maker of al good, as who saith than foloweth it, that God ought to haue the blame of our vices, sith he constraineth vs by necessitie to doen vices, than nis there no reason to hopen in God, ne to praien to God, for what should any wight hopen to God, or why should he praien to God, sith that the ordenaunce of destinie, whiche it ne hath not al foryeten itself, but it witholdeth that ne maie not been enclined, knitteth and streinthe somme of thynges, and leseth the singularities. eth al thinges, that men maie desiren. Than should Than whoso that seeketh sothenesse, he nis in neither be doen awaie thilke onely aliaunce, betwenther nother habite, for he wote not all, ne he ne God and man, that is to sain, to hopen and to praien. But by the price of right wisnesse, and of very mekenesse, wee deseruen the guerdon of diuine grace, whiche that is inestimable, that is to say, that is so great, that it ne maie not been full praised, and this is onely the maner, that is to saie, hope and praiers. For whiche it semeth that men woll speak with God, and by reason of supplicacion, ben conioined to thilke clerenes, that nis not approched no rather, or that men seken it and im- Tum illa, vetus, inquit, hæc est de providentia querela : petren it. And if men ne wene not the hope ne praiers, ne haue no strengthes, by the necessitie of things to comen receiued, what thing is there than, THAN saied she, this is (quod she) the olde question by whiche we mowen been conioyned, and cleuen of the purneighaunce of God. And Marcus Tulto thilke souerain prince of thynges. For whichelius, whan he deuided the deuinacions, that is to it behoueth by necessitie, that the linage of man- saine, in his bookes that he wrote of deuinacions, kinde, as thou song a little here beforne, bee de- he moued greatlie this question, and thou thyself But who trauaileth to weten thynges yknowe? and if that he ne knoweth hem not, what seketh thilke blinde thought? what is he that desireth any thynges, of whiche he wote right naught? as somwhat he knoweth of it, or els he ne coud not who saith, whoso desireth any thynges, needes desiren it. Or who maie followe thynges, that ne been not iwiste, and though that he seke the thynges, where shall he finde hem? What wight that is all vnconnyng and ignoraunt, maie know that for me, that is ifounde. But whan the soule beholdeth, and seeth the high thought, that is to saine God, than knoweth it togither the somme and singularities, that is to sain, the principles, and eueriche of hem by hymself. But now while the soule is hid in the cloude, and in the darknesse of the membres of the bodie, hath not all foryetten, but yet hym remembreth the somme of thinges, that he withholdeth, and iseen beforne, that is to saine, the great somme in asketh counsaile, and retreateth depliche thinges his mind, so that he mow adden the partes, that he hath foryetten to thilke parties, that he hath witholden. Marcoque Tullio, &c. tournyng, and in the attempring or å dressing of his cartes or chariottes, and by this maner, as who saieth, maieste thou vnderstande of all other werkemenne. Is there than any necessitie, as who saieth, in our lokyng, that constraineth or compelleth, any of thilke thinges to been doen so? Boecius. Naie (quod 1) for in idle and in vaine were all the effecte of crafte, if that all thynges weren moued, by constrainyng of our iyen, or of our sight. Philosophie. The thynges than (quod she) that whan that men doen hem, ne haue no necessitie that men doen hem, eke tho same thynges first or thei bee dooen, thei been to comen without necessitie: for why ther been some thynges to betiden, of whiche the endes and the betidynges of hem, been absolute and quite of all necessitie. For certes, I ne trowe not that any manne would saine this, that the thynges that menne doen now, that theine were to betiden first, er thei wer doen. And thilke same thinges, although men hadden wiste hem beforne, yet thei haue free betidynges. For right as science of thynges present, ne bryngeth in no necessitie, to thynges that menne doen, right so to the prescience of thynges to comen, ne bringeth in none necessitie, to thinges to betiden. But thou maieste sain, that of thilke same it is doubted, as whether that of thilke thynges, that ne haue non issues and betidynges necessaries, if thereof maie been any prescience. For certes, thei semen to discorden, for thou wenest, that if that thynges been seen be fore, that necessitie followeth hem, and if neces haste isought it moche, and vtterlie and long, but yet ne hath it not been determined, ne isped fermelie and diligentlie of any of you, and the cause of this darknesse, and of this difficultie is, for that the mouing of the reason of mankinde, ne maie not mouen to, that is to saine, applien or ioyen to the simplicitie of the diuine prescience, the which simplicite of the diuine prescience, if that men mighten thinken it in any maner. That is to saine, that if men mighten thinke, and comprehenden the thinges, that God seeth himself than there dwelled vtterly no doubt, the whiche reason and cause of difficulties, I shall assaie at last to shewe and to speden, whan I haue firste ispended, and answured to thy reasons, by whiche thou art moued, for I aske why thou wenest, that thilke reasons of hem that assoilen this question, ne bee not spedfull inough ne sufficient, the whiche solucion or the which reason, for that it demeth, that the prescience is not of necessitie of thinges to come, as who saith, any other waie than thus, but that the ilke thinges, that the prescience wote beforn ne maie not vnbetiden, that is to saine, that thei moten betide. But than, if that prescience ne putteth none necessitie to thynges to comen, as thou thyself hast confessed it, and beknowe a little here beforne, what cause, or what is it, as who saith, there maie no cause bee, by whiche that the endes voluntarie of thynges, mighten be constrained to certaine betidynge. For by grace of posicion, so that thou maie the better vnderstand this that followeth, I suppose that there ne bee no presci-sitie faileth hem, thei ne might not been wiste beence: than aske I (quod she) in as moche as aper- fore, and that nothyng maie be comprehended by taineth to that, shoulden than thynges that comen science, but certain. And if tho thynges ne haue of free will, be constrained to betiding by necessi- no certain betidynges, be purueighed as certain, it tie? Boecius. Naie (quod I). Philosop. Than should be darkenesse of opinion, not sothfastnesse ayenwarde (quod she) I suppose that there be of science. And thou wenest that it be diuers, fro prescience, but that it ne putteth no necessitie to the holinesse of science, that any man should deme thinges, that trowe I that thilke same fredome of a thyng, to bee otherwise than it is itself, and the will, shall dwellen al hole and absolute, and vn- cause of this errour is, that of al the thinges, that bounden. But thou wilt saine, that albeit so that euery wight hath knowe thei wene that thỏ thinges prescience, nis not cause of the necessitie of betid been knowe, onely by the strengthe, and by the ing to thinges to comen algates yet it is a signe, nature of the thynges, that been wiste or knowe, that the thinges ben to betiden by necessitie. By and it is all the contrarie: for all that euer is this maner than, although that prescience had knowe, it is rather comprehended and knowe, not neuer be, yet al gates or at lest waie, it is certain after his strength and his nature, but after the thyng, that endes of betidinges of thinges, to comen facultie, that is to saine, the power and the nature shoulden bee necessarie. For euery thing sheweth of hem that knowen. And for that this thyng, and signifieth onely, what the thing is, but it ne should now shewe by a short ensample the roundmaketh not the thing that it signifieth. For which nesse of a bodie, otherwise than the sight of the it behoueth, first to shew that nothing ne betideth, iye knoweth it, and otherwise than the touchyng. that it ne betideth by necessitie: so that it maie The lookyng, by castyng of his beames, waiteth appeare, that the prescience is signe of necessitie: and seeth from a farre, all the bodie togither, withor els if there nere no necessitie, certes thilke pre-out mouyng of itself, but the touchyng cleaueth to science ne might not be signe of thyng that nis the rounde bodie, and moueth about the environ not. But certes, it is now certain, that the proue nyng, and comprehendeth the parties by rounde of this isusteined by stedfast reason, ne shall not nesse, and the man hymself, otherwise beholdeth been ladde, ne proued by signes ne by argumentes, hym, and otherwaies imaginacion, and otherwise taken fro without, but by causes couenable and ne- reason, and otherwise intelligence: for the witte cessarie. But thou maiest saine, how maie it bee comprehendeth without forth, the figure of the that the things ne betiden not, that ben purueied bodie of man, that is vnstablished in the matter to comen? But certes, right as we trowen that the subiect. But the imaginacion comprehendeth thynges, whiche that the purneiaunce wote be.onelie, the figure without the matter. Reason forne, to comen ne be not to betiden. But that surmounteth imaginacion, and comprehendeth by ne shold we not demen, but rather although thei vniuersall lokyng, the common speache, but the shall betiden, yet ne haue thei no necessitie of hiriye of intelligence is higher, for it surmounteth the kinde to betiden: and this maiest thou lightly ap-enuironnyng of the vniuersitie, and looketh ouer perceiuen, by this that I shall sain. For we seen many thinges, whan thei been beforne our iyne, right as men seen the carter woorchyng in the VOL. I that, by pure subtilitie of thought. The ilke same simple forme of man, that is perdurable, in the diuine thought, in whiche this ought greatlie to bu G g saine, ne dooeth thyng by his proper mouing, but suffreth and lieth subiect to the figures, and to the notes of bodies without forthe, and yeldeth images idell, yeuell and vaine, in the maner of a mirroure. Whence thriueth than, or whence cometh the ilke knowyng in our soulle, that discerneth and beholdeth all thynges, and whence is the ilke strengthe, that beholdeth the singuler thynges, or els whence is the strengthe, that deuideth thynges iknowe, and thilke strength that gathered togither thynges deuided, and strength that choseth the enterchaunged waie: for somtyme it heaueth the hedde, that is to saie, that it heaueth vp the entencion, to right high thynges, and sometyme it discendeth into right lowe thynges, and whan it retourneth into hym self, it reproueth and destroyeth the false thynges, by the true thynges. considered, that the hiest strengthe for to comprehenden thynges, embraseth and containeth the lower strengthe, but the lower strength, ne ariseth not in no maner to the higher strength. For witte ne maie comprehend nothyng out of matter, ne the imaginacion, ne looketh not the vniuersalle speces, ne reason ne taketh not the simple forme, so as intelligence taketh it. But intelligence that looketh al abouen, whan it hath comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth all the thynges, that been vnder the forme, but she knoweth hem in thilke maner in whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme, that ne maie neuer bee knowen of none of that other, that is to saie, to none of tho three foresaied strengthes of the soule, for it knoweth the vniuersitie of reason, and the figure of imaginacion, and the sensible materiall coneeiued by wit, ne it ne vseth not ne of reason, ne of imaginacion, ne of witte without forthe, but it beholdeth all thynges, so as I shall saie, by a stroke of thought fermely, without discours of collacion. Certes, reason whan it looketh any thyng vniuersall, it ne vseth not of imaginacion ne witte, and algates yet it comprehendeth the thynges imaginable, and sensible, for reason is she that definisheth, the vniuersalle of her conceipte, right thus, Man is a reasonable twoo footed beast, and how so that this knowyng is vniuersall, yet nis there no wight, that ne wote well, that a man is a thynge imaginable and sensible, and this same considereth well reason, but that nis not by imaginacion, nor by witte, but it loketh it by reasonable conceipcion. Also imaginacion, albeit so, that it taketh of witte the beginnyng, to seen and formen the figures, algates although that witte ne were not presente, yet it enuironneth and comprehendeth all thynges sensi- Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamvis afficiant inble, not by reason sensible of demyng, but by reason imaginatife. Seest thou not than, that all the thinges in knowyng, vsen more of bir facultie, or of hir power, than thei dooen of the facultie, or of power of thynges that been to knowen, ne that is no wronge, for so as euery judgemente is that deede or doyng of hym, that demeth, it behoueth that euery wight performe his werke, and his entencion, not of foraine power, but of his proper power. Quondam porticus attulit Obscuros nimium senes, &c. THAN the porche, that is to saie, a gate of the toune of Athenes there as philosophers hadden congregacion to dispute, thilk porche brought sometyme olde men, full darke in hir sentences, that is saie philosophers, that highten Stoiciens, that wende that images and sensibilities, that is to saie, sensible imaginacions, or els imaginacions of sensible thinges, were emprinted into soules, fro bodies without foorthe, as who saieth, thilke Stoiciens wenden that the soule had bee naked of hymself, as a mirrour, or a cleane perchemine, so that all figures musten first comen fro thynges, fro without in to soules, and been emprinted into soules, right as we been wonte, somtyme by a swifte pointen, to fixen letters emprinted in the smothnesse, or in the plainesse of the table of waxe, or in the parchemine, that hath no figure ne note in it. Glose. But now argueth Boece against that opinion, and saith thus. But if the thriuyng soule ne vapliteth nothyng, that is to Certes, this strength is cause more efficient, and moche more mightie, to seen and to knowen thynges, than thilke cause that suffreth and receiueth the notes and figures, impressed in maner of matter. Algates the passion, that is to saie, the sufferaunce or the witte in the quicke bodie, goeth before exitynge, and mouyng the strengthes of the thought, right so as whan that clearenesse smiteth the iyen, and moueth hem to seen, or right so as voyce or soun hurleth to the eares, and commoueth hem to hearken, than is the strengthe of the thought moued and excited, cleapeth forth to semblable mouynges, the speces that it halte within it self, and addeth the speces of the notes, and to thynges withoutforthe, and medleth the images of thynges withoutforthe, to thynges hid within hymself. strumenta sensuum, &c. BUT what is that in bodies to bee feled, that is to saie, in the taking: and in the knowyng of bodily thynges. And albeeit so that the qualities of bodies, that be obiecte fro withoutfoorthe, mouen and entalenten the instrumentes of the wittes, and all bee it so, that the passion of the bodie, that is to saine, the witte, or the suffraunce, goeth beforne the strength, or the woorchynge courage, the whiche passion or sufferaunce, cleapeth forthe the deede of the thought in it self, and moueth and exciteth in this meane while, the formes that resten within foorthe, and insensible bodies, as I haue said, our courages nis not taught or emprinted, by passion to knowe these thinges, but demeth and knoweth of his owne strength, the passion or sufferaunce, subiecte to the bodie: moche more than tho thynges been absolute, and quicke fro all talentes, or affections of bodies, as God or his angels, ne folowen not in discernyng thynges obiect fro withoutforth, but thei accomplishen and speden, the deedes of hir thought. By this reason than there comen many maner of knowynges, to diuerse and to diffryng substaunces. For the witte of the bodie, the whiche wit is naked, and dispoiled of all other knowing, thilke witte cometh to beastes, the whiche ne mowen not mouen hem self here and there, as oysters and muskelles, and other soche shelfishe of the sea, that cleauen and been nourished to rockes, but the imaginacion cometh of remuable beastes, that semen to haue talente to flien, or to desiren any thyng: but reason is alonelie the linage of man |