er or person to be heard, to destroy the infected or infested plants or plant products contained therein. Search warrants. The Police Court or the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia shall have power, upon information supported by oath or affirmation showing probable cause for believing that there exists in any place, bundle, package, or other container in the District of Columbia any plant or plant product which is infected or infested with plant pests or disease, to issue warrants for the search for and seizure of all such plants and plant products. Rules and regulations. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture, and he is hereby required, from time to time, to make and promulgate such rules and regulations as shall be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, and any person who shall move or allow to be moved, or shall ship, transport, or carry, by any means whatever, any plant or plant products from or into the District of Columbia, except in compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed under this section, shall be punished, as is provided in section 163 of this chapter. (*May 31, 1920, c. 217, 41 Stat. 727.) "Aug. 20, 1912, c. 308, § 15;" should be read into this citation as indicated. Historical Note This section was added by a provision of the agricultural appropriation act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1921, cited to the text. See historical note under § 151, ante, of this title. STOCKYARDS AND STOCK- 201. "Stockyard owner"; "stockyard services"; "market agency"; "dealer"; defined. 202. "Stockyard" defined; determination by Secretary as to particular yard. 203. Registration of stockyard dealer or market agency; penalty for failure to register. 204. Bond and suspension of registrants. 205. General duty as to services. 206. Rates and charges generally; discrimination. 207. Schedule of rates; filing and exhibition; change in rates; suspension; penalties. 208. Unreasonable or discriminatory practices generally. Sec. 209. Liability to individuals for violations; enforcement generally. 210. Proceedings before Secretary for violations generally; action to en-. force order of Secretary. 211. Order of Secretary as to charges or practices; prescribing rates and practices generally. 212. Prescribing rates and practices to prevent discrimination between intrastate and interstate commerce. 213. Prevention of unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices. When orders effective generally. Failure to obey orders generally; punishment. 214. 215. 216. Court proceedings to enforce orders; injunction. 217. Proceedings for suspension of orders. GENERAL DEFINITIONS Section 181. Short title of chapter. This chapter may be cited as the "Packers and Stockyards Act.*" (Aug. 15, 1921, c. 64, § 1, 42 Stat. 159.) Following the word "Act," within the quotation, "1921" should be inserted. Historical Note This chapter, excepting section 204, post, constitutes an act entitled "An act to reg ulate interstate and foreign commerce in live stock, live stock products, dairy prod ucts, poultry, poultry products, and eggs, and for other purposes," cited above. See historical note under § 204, post, of this title. Section 1 of the act from which this section was derived originally read as follows: "This Act may be cited as the 'Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921.'" Notes of Decisions 1. Constitutionality.-The Packers and Stockyards Act is constitutional, the subject-matter of this legislation having to do with interstate commerce. Stafford v. Wallace (Ill. 1922) 258 U. S. 497, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735, 23 A. L. R. 229, wherein the court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, said in part: "The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of live stock arrive daily by carload and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved out to give place to the constantly flowing traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the West to the East, and from one state to another. Such transactions cannot be separated from the movements to which they contribute, and necessarily take on its character. The commission men are essential in making the sales without which the flow of the current would be obstructed, and this whether they are made to packers or dealers. The dealers are essential to the sales to the stock farmers and feeders. The sales are not, in this respect, merely local transactions. They create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop the flow; they merely change the private interests in the subject of the current, not interfering with, but on the contrary being indispensable to, its continuity. The origin of the live stock is in the West; its ultimate destination, known to and intended by all engaged in the business, is in the Middle West and East, either as meat products or stock for feeding and fattening. This is the definite and well-understood course of business. The stockyards and the sales are necessary factors in the middle of this current of commerce. "The act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It assumes that they conduct a business affected by a public use of a national character and subject to national regu lation. That it is a business within the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion. That has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illinois (Ill. 1877) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77. Nor is there any doubt that, in the receipt of live stock by rail, and in their delivery by rail, the stockyards are an interstate commerce agency. United States v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. (1912) 226 U. S. 286, 57 L. Ed. 226, 33 S. Ct. 83. The only question here is whether the business done in the stockyards between the receipt of the live stock in the yards and the shipment of them therefrom is a part of interstate commerce, or is so associated with it as to bring it within the power of national regulation. A similar question has been before this court and had great consideration in Swift & Co. v. United States (Ill. 1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518. The judgment in that case gives a clear and comprehensive exposition which leaves to us in this case little but the obvious application of the principles there declared. "It is manifest that Congress framed the Packers and Stockyards Act in keeping with the principles announced and applied in the opinion in the Swift Case. The recital in § 2, par. b, of title 1 of the act [§ 183 of this title] quoted in the margin leaves no doubt of this. The act deals with the same current of business, and the same practical conception of interstate commerce. "Of course, what we are considering here is not a bill in equity, or an indictment charging conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce, but a law. The language of the law shows that what Congress had in mind primarily was to prevent such conspiracies by supervision of the agencies which would be likely to be employed in it. If Congress could provide for punishment or restraint of such conspiracies after their formation through the Anti-trust Law, as in the Swift Case, certainly it may provide regulation to prevent their formation. The reasonable fear by Congress that such acts, usually lawful, and affecting only intrastate commerce when considered alone, will prob ably and more or less constantly be used in conspiracies against interstate commerce, or constitute a direct and undue burden on it, expressed in this remedial legislation, serves the same purpose as the intent charged in the Swift indictment to bring acts of a similar character into the current of interstate commerce for Federal restraint. Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce, is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of $182. "Person"; "Secretary"; "meat food products"; "livestock"; "livestock products"; "commerce"; defined. When used in this' chapter (1) The term "person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations; (2) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture; (3) The term "meat food products" means all products and by-products of the slaughtering and meat-packing industry—if edible; (4) The term "livestock" means cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or goats-whether live or dead; (5) The term “livestock products" means all products and by-products (other than meats and meat food products) of the slaughtering and meat-packing industry derived in whole or in part from livestock; and (6) The term "commerce" means commerce between any State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside thereof; or between points within the same State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, but through any place outside thereof; or within any Territory or possession, or the District of Columbia. (Aug. 15, 1921, c. 64, § 2, 42 Stat. 159.) Historical Note This section constitutes section 2(a) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, cited above. Section 2(b) of that Act will be found set out as section 183, post, of this title. Notes of Decisions Cited without specific application.-(1924) 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 267. § 183. When transaction deemed in commerce; "State" defined. For the purpose of this chapter (but not in any wise limiting the defini tion in the preceding section) a transaction in respect to any article shall be considered to be in commerce if such article is part of that current of commerce usual in the livestock and meat-packing industries, whereby livestock, meats, meat food products, livestock products, dairy products, poultry, poultry products, or eggs, are sent from one State with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, including, in addition to cases within the above general description, all cases where purchase or sale is either for shipment to another State, or for slaughter of livestock within the State and the shipment outside the State of the products resulting from such slaughter. Articles normally in such current of commerce shall not be considered out of such current through resort being had to any means or device intended to remove transactions in respect thereto from the provisions of this chapter. For the purpose of this section the word "State" includes Territory, the District of Columbia, possession of the United States, and foreign nation. (Aug. 15, 1921, c. 64, § 2, 42 Stat. 159.) $191. Packer defined. When used in this chapter The term "packer" means any person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in commerce for purposes of slaughter, or (b) of manufacturing or preparing meats or meat food products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (c) of manufacturing or preparing livestock products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (d) of marketing meats, meat food products, livestock products, dairy products, poultry, poultry products, or eggs, in commerce; but no person engaged in such business of manufacturing or preparing livestock products or in such marketing business shall be considered a packer unless (1) Such person is also engaged in any business, referred to in clause (a) or (b) above, or unless (2) Such person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or control or otherwise, by himself or through his agents, servants, or employees, any interest in any business referred to in clause (a) or (b) above, or unless |