cession—we affirm with #ide—that in respect to freedom of thought and self-dependence, no degeneracy from the spirit of our ancestors can be charged against them. Their whole training—all their intellectual habits—are directly opposed to the submission of private judgment to the authority of tradition. They believe nothing but upon evidence. Nor is any sentiment more thoroughly wrought into their very being than the simplicity of the Christian religion as distinguished from the splendor of the Mosaic dispensation, and the frivolous ceremonies and observances of the Episcopal ritual. A member of the Unitarian community, unless a mere “sap,” incapable of receiving the great ideas of the fraternity, can not become a confiding Episcopalian—except perhaps he should first be carried through the sublimating process of Boston transcendentalism—preparing him for the most gullible credulity. The converts to Episcopalianism, hitherto won, were not won by conviction, but by those affinities of which we have spoken; the strength of which was overcoming when the enslaving claims of mother church were not well considered. Will these affinities be so effective against the free spirit of Unitarianism, now that the rule of faith is declared so openly to be, not the Bible, but the Bible as interpreted by tradition; when the right of private judgment is pronounced a heresy, and implicit faith required in the doctrines of the church Principles so abhorrent from every sentiment and every mental habit of an enlightened Unitarian, (and who among them is unenlightened?) can not be received in good faith by any considerable number, nor by any person whose mind has not suffered a shocking immolation. The high value placed by Unitarians on our free institutions as well as on freedom of mind, encourages us to expect of them, as a body, an

inflexible adhesion to church independence. e tendency of prelatical church polities to undermine the foundations of civil liberty, and prepare the way, at a favorable juncture, for a monarchy, is too obvious to escape the notice of the intelligent body of American Unitarians. We have reason to expect that any alarming movement towards Episcopacy, would arouse among them so strong an opposition that sloping into the mother church would be found more inconvenient even than it has been to return into the orthodox fold. We have also a ground of hope in that veneration of the Pilgrims which is entertained by their Unitarian descendants. The love of ancestry is among the most uneradicable of human sentiments; and notwithstanding a change of religious views, there lives not on earth a more enthusiastic veneration for the dead than is felt by our Unitarian fellow citizens for their emigrant forefathers. The reader must have observed how coldly they have ever received the attempts of some among themselves, and of others episcopally ordained, to cast reproach on those revered men. Nothing of the kind has ever cost us more surprise or pain than to witness the spectacle of an apostate son of the Pilgrims, gloating on the tales, true or false, of Puritan folly, which Episcopal scavengers have raked together against the good name of his ancestors. From such a soul human nature must be quite eaten out. It is a monster birth, not every day to be expected. And so long as the noble sentiment of veneration for ancestors, for which our Unitarian brethren are to be praised, remains in full force, it will require higher attractions in Episcopacy than have been noticed, to bring the body of them to dishonor their fathers by embracing her dogmas and practicing her rites. But we find the greatest encour

agement in the present aspects of orthodoxy. The o of truth":

denominated, is indeed what it was in substance, but not in form. The science of theology has made great advances since the Unitarian controversy began and was nearly concluded in this country. New philosophical theories have made plain and unobjectionable to reason, those doctrines of the orthodox, from which, owing to bungling explanations, the common sense of Unitarians revolted. Some obstacles to their restoration have also been removed by the comparatively light estimation in which the orthodox have come to hold the philosophy of dogmatic theology. Hypotheses relating to the mode of divine existence, to the origin of evil, to the atonement, to regeneration and the nature of human depravity, designed to make these doctrines clear to reason, but adapted more or less to obscure them, are now recognized by the orthodox as mere philosophical speculations, and not as matters of faith. All that is essential, for example, to orthodoxy, in respect to the vital doctrine of atonement, is that we should ascribe the salvation of man to something which Christ has accomplished by his incarnation and sufferings, and without which salvation would be impossible. Unitarians can no longer rationally address themselves to battle against those theories of the orthodox which have chased each other down the page of time and been the principal points of controversy. If they will still dissent from us, they must simply deny what lies

Vol. III. - 71

on the fo of the Bible, that Christ "diet to save men, and that man could not otherwise be saved. Whether this necessity consists in the indispensableness of his death as a means of ransoming mankind from Satan, or of appeasing divine anger, or of maintaining the authority of the Lawgiver while the penitent is pardoned, or in some other principle, orthodoxy requires only that we should believe in the necessity, and ascribe to Christ's death our salvation and the glory of it. It is thus in respect to many doctrines— it is the doctrine and not philosophical explanations, in which our faith is to be reposed. Now however much the Unitarian logomach may resist the truth, thus stripped of dubious hypotheses, he may be assured the people will not be so slow to believe. In our opinion nothing is wanted to gain the assent of the Unitarian body to an orthodox creed, except a statement of the same, made in the light of modern science, and made to attentive ears and truth-loving hearts.

We anticipate therefore, more conviction and more conversions from future discussions with Unitarians, than have hitherto been realized. We expect to see, too, a gradual assimilation of their congregations with their ministers, to an evangelical creed, until the difference between them and the old orthodox societies shall cease to be perceptible. It is in this way that their recovery to the old paths is to be effected, rather than by individual conversions and secessions from their churches to the orthodox.

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The right of civil government to maintain its own existence and authority, even at the expense of human life, seems to be an obvious corollary from its divine institution. Legislation, judicial decisions, executive orders, government itself, is a mere nullity, if life is to be held sacred and inviolable. Whatever is necessary to sustain this divine institution and to accomplish the end for which it exists, is lawful; and not only lawful, but obligatory on those to whom the administration of government is entrusted. But what can government do toward maintaining order and the supremacy of law, without force; and what force can be exerted against men whose lives may not be destroyed Civil government necessarily implies the right of arresting and punishing criminals, of suppressing domestic violence, and of defending the liberties of the people against foreign

enemies: and the officers of gov

ernment are authorized to proceed to whatever extremity is clearly necessary for these purposes. On no other condition can government exist and secure the ends of its existence. Nor is it in defense of life alone, that life may be taken. The existence and authority of government are to be maintained at every necessary sacrifice. Life itself can not be protected by government unless its authority is sustained —a thing impossible if it has no power to protect property. The government depends, for its power to protect life, on the execution and vindication of laws relating to other objects ; and all human rights depend on the stability of the government. Suppose a mob assembles for the purpose of demolishing a building or any other property. They do not intend the destruction of life. What then is the duty of

the civil authorities 2 Undoubtedly to disperse the mob, for the purpose of protecting the property, and more especially, for the sake of maintaining the authority of law. If they allow the injury to be done, and the offenders to escape punishment, it is not the right of property alone that will be put in greater jeopardy, but every right, even that of life, will be less secure, because the authority of the government itself will be impaired. Those who have broken or have seen others break a law of the land with impunity, will apprehend little danger from breaking other laws of such a pusillanimous and prostrate government. It is the duty, therefore, of the executive to disperse the mob. But how shall he do it without bloodshed He may read the riot act. But what if the reading has no effect, and the mob proceeds with the work of destruction ? Has he then any other alternative but to fire upon them and disperse them at the point of the bayonet, or allow the government, and with it, all security, both of property and life, to be trampled in the dust? Admit that a government may revive after such a shock, and retain sufficient control to preserve itself for a time; yet a frequent repetition, especially the admission of the principle that life is inviolate, must destroy all civil authority. Hence nothing seems plainer than the duty of maintaining the supremacy of the law by the destruction of life when necessary; otherwise civil government itself, a divine institution, can not be preserved. The same right to destroy the lives of foreigners belongs to the executive of a nation under certain limitations. The right of civil war, in some cases, has been virtually established by showing the right of government to disperse a mob by force of arms. In this case, not only is life liable to be justly sacrificed, but a war is inevitable, and on the part of the government just, if the mob when attacked by the police, should make resistance. A mob is indeed a revolutionary movement on a small scale, and forms in contest with the civil forces, the essential elements of a civil war. A war with a foreign power may be equally just, for it may be equally necessary to the existence of the government of a country and the accomplishment of the ends for which it is ordained of God. But it is important to make distinctions. All wars are not justifiable—most wars are unjustifiable on the part of both belligerents. So it may happen that a government may make an unjust waste of life in administering the laws over its own citizens or subjects, but this abuse of power is no sufficient argument against the right of exercising it on proper occasions. It is obvious that a government may come into collision with foreign as well as domestic enemies. In such an event, who can question the right to wage war, or in other words, to take life 2 The fact that very great vices are apt to attend an appeal to arms for national rights, is not conclusive against the right of war. A war may be lawful which is unlawfully conducted. Acts of wanton cruelty, breaches of faith, profaneness, debauchery, Sabbath breaking, and a careless waste of life and property, are immoralities in military men and on an enemy's territory, as truly as in a private citizen. Nor is the unrighteous character of nine wars out of ten, proof that the tenth is unrighteous. There are four descriptions of foreign wars; two of which are invariably wrong; the others may be right. The first two, wars of conquest and wars of

retaliation, are called offensive wars. The object of these, is either dominion, spoil, tribute, military glory, or revenge ; and they are manifestly unlawful, the greatest crimes against man which human minds can devise or human hands execute. The other two kinds of war, wars of resistance and wars of redress, are denominated defensive. A war of resistance, or one waged to repel invasion, is unlawful in several cases of frequent occurrence. When the invader aims only at the recovery of his rights; not at conquest, nor spoil, nor retaliation, but merely to obtain justice, the controversy may and ought to be settled without a resort to arms, by conceding to him his just claims. Every hopeless war of resistance is also unlawful. Life can not be innocently sacrificed in desperate undertakings. When the power of an invader is overwhelming, and resistance promises only to provoke greater injuries, it is a dictate of self-love to offer no resistance to his will. An effort to make his triumph as expensive as possible can spring only from sheer malignity. It could do no good, it would be wanton cruelty, which even when exercised towards an enemy, is highly criminal. A war of resistance is unlawful if the invader can be turned from his purpose by means less expensive than his forcible expulsion. A resort to force will cost lives on both sides, which in the view of every one who can sympathize with human suffering and with the anguish of bereaved parents, wives and children, should if possible be avoided. But the invader may refuse to desist from his attempt, except on conditions with which compliance would be unwise and perhaps even immoral. He may demand tribute, or a cession of territory, or an essential change in the government, or the delivery of unoffending citizens to death, to prostitution or to banishment. In

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some of these cases it would be morally wrong, and in others it might be bad policy, to avoid a battle, and the loss of life, by complying with his demands. A present evil might be avoided, but greater suffering might afterwards ensue. Yet it is manifest that if bloodshed can be prevented by any lawful compromise or concession not involving greater evils in the end, it ought to be done. Lives ought not to be devoted to an object which may be secured at a cheaper rate. With these exceptions and perhaps some others, wars of resistance or the sacrifice of lives in battte are lawful, and sometimes highly commendable. This follows indisputably from the right of civil government to suppress an insurrection of its own citizens. If it is lawful for a state to force its own subjects to submit to its authority at the point of the bayonet, much more is it right to force foreigners to respect the rights of person and property within its own territory. What is more absurd than to deny the lawfulness of destroying a foreign foe, at the same time admitting the lawfulness of shooting down a citizen if found in arms against the laws of his country 2 Few will assert so much. Those who question the lawfulness of repelling an invasion by force of arms, should be sufficiently self-consistent to deny the right of firing upon a mob. The same general views may be taken of wars of redress. They are unlawful in several cases, as when the offending power is will. ing but unable to repair the injury. Nations should exercise the same spirit of forbearance and forgiveness toward one another which is required of individuals. They should be willing to forgive wrongs until seventy times seven, on satisfactory evidence of repentance; and to accept of imperfect redress, if the offending party is unable to make full restitution. A generous treat

ment of enemies gains for a nation the respect of the world and affords the best safeguard againstarepetition of injuries. So, also, as in the case of a war of resistance, a war of redress is unlawful, provided success is im. probable; or if redress is likely to cost, in life and property, more than it is worth. In making this estimate, however, it should be remembered, that such wars are always waged for the double purpose of obtaining reparation for past injuries, and of preventing a recurrence of similar outrages, by inspiring the nations with becoming fear. Perhaps no war ever gained in the form of direct redress, an equivalent for its expenses. In casting a balance between the good and bad results to be expected from a war of redress, reference is to be had to the probable effect of leaving the injuries unredressed. One obvious effect would be to encourage the freebooters of the world to make a prey of such unprotected country. Still, whenevera foreign power commits depredations on our commerce, or takes possession of our soil, or butchers our countrymen, if an attempt to obtain redress will probably be defeated, or if not defeated, attended by an aggregate of evil, it is a duty to submit to the wrong. The divine institution of civil gov. ernment makes it clear that under these restrictions, wars of redress may be right, and the taking of life in them just and lawful. We suppose that an unprovoked outrage has been committed by one nation upon another; that redress has been in vain sought by negotiation, by arbitration, and in every other peaceable way. An appeal to the sword is the last and sole resort. We suppose there is a fair pospect of obtaining reparation, in this way, at less expense to human happiness than would attend an endurance of the wrong. These are the indispensable conditions of a just war of redress, but where they concur, how can the right of

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