and, after a splendid assault, effected a lodgment on the west end of the land front. Pennypacker instantly followed with his brigade, and then Bell with his. Every one of these leaders fell wounded, the former severely, the second dangerously, and Bell mortally. At five o'clock, after the most desperate fighting, foot by foot, and with the severest loss, we got possession of about half the land front. Then Abbott came up from the defensive line, the marines taking his place. Once more the attack went on. At ten o'clock, after six and a half hours of splendid fighting, the last trenches were cleared of the enemy, and Fort Fisher was ours.

General Whitney and Colonel Lamb, the commanders of the fort, with their officers and men-over eighteen hundred in all-surrendered unconditionally about twelve at night. All the works south of Fot Fisher fell also into our hands. The enemy's loss was, first, Fort Fisher and all its chain of outworks, with all their contents-seventy-two guns, some of large calibre and rifled, and one Armstrong gun-and the camp and garrison equipage and stores, including sixteen days rations; second, the loss of Cape Fear River and its facilities for running the blockade; third, a garrison of two thousand two hundred men, of whom four hundred were killed and wounded, and eighteen hundred captured. General Whitney and Colonel Lamb were wounded On our side, not a ship nor a transport was lost, and but little damage was done to the fleet. Our loss in officers and men was very largesomething over one thousand in all, of which about nine hundred fell upon the army, and two hundred on the fleet. Among these were Colonels Bell and Moore, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lyman, killed, and Colonels Curtis, Pennypacker, and Lieutenant-Colonel Coan, bly wounded. In the fleet, Lieutenants Preston and Porter were killed, and Lieutenants Lamson, Bache, and others wounded.

By some mismanagement the magazine blew up, killing about three hundred of the garrison.

The official numerical reports of casualties sustained by our forces in the fight are appended :

CHAPTER LXXIII.

Capture of Remaining Defences on Cape Fear River.-Schofield Ordered from Tennessee. Fort Anderson Taken.-Occupation of Wilmington.-Movement or Kinston.Goldsboro.-Gillmore before Charleston.-Evacuation of the City by Hardee.-Flag Restored to Fort Sumter.-Sheridan in the Valley.-His Raid.-Great Destruction of Rebel Property.-Joins Meade.

THE holding of the ports on the Cape Fear River was regarded by General Lee as of vital consequence to his position at Richmond; nevertheless, on the fall of Fort Fisher it became apparent that the other places could not be defended. On the 16th of January, the enemy blew up Forts Caswell and Campbell, and abandoned them and the works on Smith's Island, also those at Smithville and Reeves's Point, which were occupied by the navy. The whole number of guns captured exceeded one hundred and fifty. A large number of small-arms also fell into our hands, besides quantities of ordnance and commissary

stores.

On the 18th, General Paine reconnoitred in force towards Wilmington, and found the enemy about two miles distant. After a slight skirmish he fell back to his intrenchments. On the 19th, one of our dispatch boats was severely handled by the guns of Fort St. Philip, on the south bank of the river, and forced to return. The same day, General Paine made another reconnoissance, found the enemy as before, two miles distant, had another severe skirmish, and retired.

The forts which fell into the hands of the navy, up to January 21, and subsequently to the fall of Fisher, were officially reported as follows: Reeves's Point-Two ten-inch guns.

Above Smithville--Two ten-inch guns.

Smithville-Four ten-inch guns.

Fort Caswell-Ten ten-inch guns, two nine-inch, one Armstrong, and four thirty-twos (rifled), two thirty-twos (smooth), three eightinch, one Parrott (twenty-pounder), three rifled field-pieces, three guns (bored)-twenty-nine guns.

Forts Campbell and Shaw-Six ten-inch, six thirty-twos (smooth), one thirty-two (rifled), one eight-inch, six field-pieces, two mortars -twenty-two guns.

Smith's Island-Three ten-inch, six thirty-twos (smooth), two thirtytwos (rifled), four field-pieces, two mortars-seventeen guns. Reported at the other end of Smith's Island, six guns.

Total captured, eighty-three guns.

Wilmington, to which the enemy had gradually fallen back, as the force accummulated in their front, was defended by General Bragg. While these events were occurring, General Schofield, who, with the Twenty-third Army Corps, was on his way to Eastport, Mississippi, received orders to proceed with his troops to North Carolina. At that time the Department of North Carolina was created, and

Schofield assigned to its command, with orders to occupy Goldsboro' and open up communication with the coast, and unite with Sherman. In pursuance of this plan, he landed at the mouth of the Cape Fear River, February 9th, with the Third Division, Cox, near Fort Fisher. At that time, General Terry, with eight thousand men, held a line across the peninsula, formed by the ocean and the Cape Fear River, occupying Smithville and Fort Caswell, with his flanks covered by the fleet, under Admiral Porter. The enemy occupied Fort Anderson, on the west bank of the river, with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson, running across the peninsula from Cape Fear River to Masonboro' Sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonboro' Sound above his left, or passing around the swamp which covered his right. On the 11th of February, Schofield pushed forward Terry's line, supported by Cox's Division, drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in s new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force.

The weather presented many obstacles to a combined movement with boats on the enemy's left. Hence General Schofield directed his attention to the enemy's right, where he would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea. Cox's and Ames's Divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Moore's Brigade of Couch's Division, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while Cox, with his other two brigades and Ames's Division, started around the swamp, covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, warned by his cavalry of Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works on both sides of the river, during the night of February 19th, and fel back behind Town Creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. Possession was thus gained of the main defences of Cape Fear River and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.

On the following day, Cox pursued the enemy to Town Creek, be hind which he was found intrenched, having destroyed the only bridge. Terry also encountered the enemy in superior force in his new position, and, in consequence, Ames's Division was brought over to the east bank during the night of the 19th. On the 20th, Cox crossed Town Creek below the enemy's position, and, reaching the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery and three hundred and seventy-five prisoners. The next morning he pushed on towards Wilmington without opposition. Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force, so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed. On the 21st, Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick River, which he had attempted to destroy, put a portion of

his troops on to Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early in the morning of February 22d, and Terry pursued the enemy across Northeast River. Our total loss in the operations from February 11th to the capture of Wilmington was about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was not less than one thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners; fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our hands.

Meantime a force of five thousand troops had been ordered forward from Newbern, under General Palmer, to occupy Kinston, with the view of moving thence upon Goldsboro' and tapping the main railway line between Richmond and Savannah. As soon as Wilmington was secured, Schofield sent Ruger's Division, Twenty-third Army Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear Inlet, by sea to Morehead City, to re-enforce the column moving from Newbern. On the 25th, finding that Palmer had not moved, as was expected, he sent Cox to take command at Newbern and push forward at once. The divisions of Couch and Cox were also sent thither, but owing to great difficulty of transportation, it was March 6th before the movement upon Kinston was commenced. On that day, Couch marched from Newbern with the Second and Third Divisions of the Twenty-third Corp, and on the 8th, General Cox advanced to Wise's Forks, where he was joined by Schofield in person. The force in front of the Union troops, consisting of Hoke's Division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest Creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut Infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men. The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between Carter's and Palmer's Divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by Ruger's Division, which was just arriving upon the field.

On the 9th the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On the 10th, the enemy, having been largely re-enforced, and, doubtless, learning of the approach of Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by Ruger's Division, a portion of that division having been rapidly transferred from the centre to the left, to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated, leaving his killed and wounded, and, during the night, fell back across the Neuse, and burned the bridge. Our loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded; that of the enemy probably about fifteen hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. Couch effected his junction with Cox on the following day.

Having no pontoon train, Schofield could not cross the Neuse until the 14th, when the enemy, having abandoned Kinston, moved rapidly towards Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, which was concentrating to oppose the advance of Sherman from Fayetteville. Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston, Schofield put a large force of troops to work upon the railroad, in aid of the Construction Corps under Colonel Wright, rebuilt the wagon bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward supplies preparatory to a further advance. He moved from Kinston on the morning of the 20th, and entered Goldsboro', with but slight opposition, on the evening of the 21st. The portion of the command which had remained at Wilmington, under Terry, moved from that point March 15th, reached Faison's Dépôt on the 20th, and, in compliance with Sherman's orders, moved from that point to Cox's Bridge, and secured a crossing of the Neuse on the 22d.

On the 8th of February, General Gillmore succeeded to the com mand of the Department of the South, with head-quarters at Hilton Head. The city of Charleston was then held by General Hardee with s force of twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men, comprising the regular garrison and the troops which had retreated from Savannah. The city had withstood during nearly three years all attempts to reduce i This, on account of its enormously strong natural position, had been comparatively easy. But now it became exposed to a series of opera tions of an entirely different nature from those which had formerly been undertaken against it. Sherman, from Savannah, was penetrating into North Carolina, and was, on February 11th, at Branchville, on the South Carolina Railroad, thus cutting Charleston off from communica tion with the interior. The defences of Cape Fear River below Fort Anderson had fallen into the hands of the Federals, and although General Bragg professed himself able to hold Wilmington, grave doubts of his ability to do so were entertained, and with the fail of Wilmington, communication with the North would be threatened. Under these circumstances, General Gillmore was no sooner in command than he landed a considerable force upon James Island, and after some sharp fighting established himself within two miles of the city. With Savannah and its communications in the hands of the Union troops, with Sherman and his large force holding the North Carolina Railroad at Branchville, with Wilmington virtually in the hands of Schofield, and Gillmore established within two miles of the city on James Island, it became very evident that Hardee had no alternative but to leave. If he could carry off his garrison it would be, under the circumstances, as much as he could hope for. This he succeeded in doing. The evacuation commenced on the 16th, and by the next night the last of the troops had left. About midnight the enemy fired the upper part of the city, burning up the railroad buildings and several thousand bales of cotton. The buildings contained, besides the cotton, a large quantity of rice and two hundred kegs of powder. About half-past three o'clock the powder blew up, with a terrific explosion, killing or mutilating about one hundred of the poor people, who were getting the rice. At daylight, the rebel rams in the harbor, near the city, were blown up.