HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION. torious in every conflict. Although the winter was unusually stormy, sixty days of vigorous effort sufficed to work an entire change in the aspect of affairs, and impress the prestige of victory upon the Union flag. On the 1st of January, General Price was in triumphal possession of Southwestern Missouri; by the close of February he was a fugitive in Western Arkansas, with his army greatly reduced by capture and demoralization, and Missouri was free from armed Confederates. On the 1st of January the enemy held a large portion of Kentucky, and confronted the Union forces on a line drawn from Columbus, on the western border of the State, through Bowling Green to the Virginia line on the east. Zollicoffer and Crittenden commanded Cumberland Gap, the gateway into Virginia and Tennessee; Johnston and Buckner at Bowling Green covered Nashville and threatened Louisville. General Polk, at Columbus, watched St. Louis and Cairo, and commanded the Mississippi. These threatening clouds were soon dispersed when the Union troops resumed action. Within sixty days Kentucky was clear of Confederates. The immense line of hostile troops had been swept back into Alabama and Mississippi. Every strong place had been taken, the rebel armies dispersed, Nashville occupied, and Union authority was once more supreme in Tennessee and Kentucky. On the 1st of January, Burnside's Expedition still lingered in Northern harbors, while the enemy, warned by spies of its destination, were preparing to receive it. Within sixty days it had crowned its triumph at Roanoke Island, and loyal North Carolinians were believed to have rallied once more around the stars and stripes. All these successes had aroused the public enthusiasm, and strengthened confidence in a speedy peace, as a consequence of the advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, which had during many months had been in the hands of General McClellan, gathering force and consistency to deliver the final blow at rebellion. That immense army been the chief result of Northern efforts and resources, and it was regarded in the public mind almost as the Old Guard had been in the imperial armies of France. Its advance was looked for as the crowning movement. When the Army of the Potomac had, in July, 1861, been compelled to fall back upon Washington in a state of disorganization, the Ad ministration, dreading an assault upon the capital, summoned General McClellan to rally and re-form the broken columns. The undertaking was one demanding the abilities of an experienced commander. The young chief was comparatively an untried man, but his reputation, although resting only on the campaign of Western Virginia, had the prestige of success, which promised to retrieve the disasters of the Potomac. General McClellan had been prominent among the gradu George B. McClellan is the son of an eminent physician of Philadelphia, and was born in that city on the 3d of December, 1826. He entered the West Point Academy in 1842, graduated second in his class in 1846, and was immediately called into active service as second-lieutenant of a company of ates of a distinguished class at the Military Academy, had earned promotion under Scott in Mexico, and had enjoyed a commission of trust from the Government in relation to Cuba. He was fond of his profession, and had the advantage of youth on his side. In civil life he had earned reputation as an engineer of good administrative abilities; and at the breaking out of the war held the the position of General Superintendent of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, having previously served on the Illinois Central Railroad with fair reputation. Such was the man who, by the force of circumstances, had been called to the head of the army at a time of great national peril, and at whose disposal the Government placed the whole resources of the nation. The extent of these resources may be estimated from the official reports of the departments. The Secretary of War had reported the army at two hundred and thirty thousand men under arms; in his report of December, the figures were raised to seven hundred and thirty thousand men in the pay of the Government. In other words, five hundred thousand men had, in six months, freely and eagerly rallied around the national standard. In July, 1861, the national debt was reported to Congress by the Secretary, at ninety millions of dollars. In December, the amount had swollen to two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, showing that one hundred and sixty millions of dollars had been freely poured into the national treasury to concentrate, arm, equip, and feed the half million of men who were crowding into the ranks of the army under McClellan. The people and the public press willingly gave him credit for all that they hoped he would accomplish. Every element of success was at his command. There were gathered around him crowds of eager volunteers, of the best physical It from West Point on the 24th of September, to his reputation. In 1857 He resigned his commis sion, and became Vice-President and Engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Three years later we find him General Superintendent of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, and he was thus engaged when civil war came upon us. Ohio immediately made him major-general of her State forces, and shortly after, Pennsylvania offered him a similar position. He organized the militia of Ohio quickly and thoroughly. On the 14th of May, the Federal Government tendered him the position of majorgeneral in the U. S. Army, and assigned him to the Department of Ohio. Then followed his eampaign in Western Virginia, After the disaster st Bull Run, he was called to Washington, to command the Army of the Potomac. On the 31st of October, General Scott resigned, and General MoClellan was appointed to succeed him as generalin-chief of the armies of the United States. He organized the army with great ability, and when the advance took place, March 8th, he was restricted to the command of the Army of the Potomac. He subsequently conducted the campaiga of the Peninsula, and in the middle of August conducted the Army of the Potomac back to Wash ington, and for several days held command of the fortifications of Washington, At the close of Pope's Virginia campaign, he resumed his old command, and fought the battle of Antietam. November 7th, 1862, he was relieved by Burnside. He was the Democratic candidate for President in 1864, and resigned his commission in the fall of that year. development; unbounded supplies; the largest possible transportation, railway conveyance, telegraphic communication, and uncontrolled direction. Seven months had been spent in the organization and combination of these elements of success. As the recruits successively arrived, they were organized and employed upon the extensive works that continued to rise around the national capital, thus becoming inured to the hardships of the camp, while they were learning the duties of a soldier; and gradually, as the army increased in strength, it improved in military knowledge and efficiency. The great merit of General McClellan as an organizer was conspicuous to all who had witnessed the condition of the army in July, and compared it with the vast array that had since been instilled with the principles of soldierly life and discipline. The winter finally drew to a close, and the roads had become once more practicable for artillery and wagons. The right and left wings of the great National advance had successfully driven the enemy before them, and the moment had arrived to crush the chief rebel army, which for seven months had with impunity assumed to besiege the Federal capital. The people were fully convinced that a new battle of Bull Run would result in such signal discomfiture of the enemy as would not only obliterate the former defeat, but open the way to Richmond. The political situation at home required a victory to sustain the Government, and the aspect of our foreign relations demanded some military progress to sustain the position of the American diplomatist. In a military view, it was of importance that the enemy should be crushed at Manassas, because the difficulties of fol lowing an unbroken army beyond that point were formidable. The country had been devastated, the railways torn up, and the army could be supplied only by slow-moving wagons, bringing daily supplies from Washington. The position of the enemy had not been materially changed since the day of the battle of Bull Run. His strength varied from forty thousand to seventy thousand men, the main body of whom held the positions of Manassas and Centreville, which were connected by a temporary railroad laid on the surface of the ground, without grading. The works at Manassas were skilfully laid out, but had been constructed in a superficial manner, being simply dirt, trenches, and sand-forts, and were more formidable in appearance than in reality. The embrasures were intended for field-guns, but were destitute of floors. Five of them commanded the road to Centreville, extending on a line one and a half miles, and connected by rifle-pits deep enough to allow artillery to move behind them. There were substantial huts constructed for winter-quarters, sufficient to accommodate forty thousand men. The position of Centreville was naturally much stronger than that of Manassas, and the works were more numerous and better built. They consisted of eight or nine forts of a capacity of from four to twelve guns each, extending in a line and surrounded by rifle-pits. There were never any guns regularly mounted, and when the place was evacuated, wooden guns, or "Quakers," as they were called, were found in the embrasures. Much scientific skill was displayed in the design of all these works, and to a superficial eye they appeared to form a complete system of defence, commanding the approaches for many miles round. An ordinary reconnoissance would have shown that they were intended to deceive rather than to be defended; and it must be confessed they fully answered the purpose of their constructors. In February, Generals Johnston, Smith, and Stuart held Centreville, having parties thrown forward to Fairfax and Leesburg. All these places were connected by telegraph with Manassas, which drew its supplies by two lines of railroads, one leading south to Gordonsville, and the other leading to the rich valley of the Shenandoah, held by General Jackson, whose main force at Winchester, with his advance at Martinsburg, held Banks in check, and covered the railroad to Manassas. On the other hand, General T. H. Holmes commanded the Lower Potomac batteries, and General Walker, with a considerable force, held Fredericksburg. The whole force was estimated by General McClellan, at the beginning of March, at eighty thousand men, including some Virginia regiments, whose term of service was about to expire, but who had re-enlisted. The President's war order of January 27th, for a general movement of all the armies, was followed on the 31st by the following, having special reference to the Army of the Potomac : PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER, No. 1. "EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862. "Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwest of what is known as Manassas Junction-all details to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of January next. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." To this order General McClellan promptly objected, embodying his reasons in an elaborate communication to the War Department, under date of February 3d. He admitted that, by attacking the enemy's right flank by the line of the Occoquan, it would be possible to "prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre," to "remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of the wagon transportation," "and strike more directly his main railroad communication." But he objected to the plan generally, as involving "the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle (the Occoquan), and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check." And even should the execution of the plan prove successful, he thought the results "would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the Upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory-important results, it is true; but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit." On the other hand, he urged that the Lower Chesapeake Bay would afford the most avail able base of operations, and that Urbana, on the Lower Rappahannock, was the point of landing which seemed to promise the most brilliant results. It was accessible by vessels of heavy draught, was but three marches from Richmond, and was neither occupied nor observed by the enemy. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder at Yorktown, and enable the Federal army to enter Richmond, before it could be re-enforced. Should Urbana not prove practicable as a base, he proposed Fortress Monroe. An advance from either point he considered preferable to the flank movement ordered by the President, and "certain by all the chances of war." This remonstrance had the effect of inducing the President to relinquish his plan, and accept that of General McClellan. An additional inducement was probably afforded by the decision of a council of war held shortly afterwards, in which eight generals expressed themselves in favor of the advance on Richmond by way of Urbana, and four were opposed to it. In the latter part of February, a movement was commenced on the Upper Potomac, having for its object the recovery of that part of the track of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in Virginia then in possession of the rebels. On the 24th, Harper's Ferry was Occupied by a detachment from General Banks's force; and early in March, Charlestown, Martinsburg, Leesburg, and other important points were in the possession of the Federal troops. These movements had, it will be seen, an important influence upon subsequent operations. The reconstruction of the railroad was at once commenced, and the work was rapidly and successfully pushed to its completion. The obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac caused by the rebel batteries erected at Cockpit Point, Mathias Point, and other places on the right bank of the river, had for months proved a source of mortification to the Government, as also of positive inconvenience and danger to the National Capital. Transports conveying stores for McClellan's vast army could not ascend to Washington without great danger; even the passage of vessels of war was attended with risk. The city was, in fact, compelled to rely principally upon the single track of the railroad to Baltimore for communication with the outside world; and in removing his army to Urbana, McClellan had, as a matter of course, determined to convey them first by rail to Annapolis, and thence transport them by water to their new base. To the President's urgent request that he would drive the enemy from these batteries, General McClellan had interposed various objections, the chief one being that such an operation would require the movement of the entire army, which would derange the plan of campaign he had already conceived. He was satisfied that the enemy would resist with his whole strength, and that the proposed movement to the Lower Chesapeake would compel him to abandon all his positions along the Potomac and in front of Washington. But in the opinion of the President, backed by that of competent military authorities, there was no reason why an army, closely approximating in numbers to two hundred thou |
