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with intent to aid him in his act of hostility; sending him provisions or money ; fur. nishing arms, or troops, or munitions of war; surrendering a military post, &c., all with a like intent. These and kindred facts are overt acts of treason, by adhering to the enemy. Words, oral, written, or printed, however treasonable, seditious, or criminal of themselves, do not constitute an overt act of treason within the definition of the crime. When spoken, written, or printed in relation to an act or acts which, if committed with a treasonable design, might constitute such overt act, they are admissible as evidence, tending to characterize it, and show the intent with which the aet was committed. They may also furnish some evidence of the act itself against the accused. This is the extent to which such publications may be used, either in finding a bill of indictment or on the trial of it."

The sympathy of the masses of the people with the Government, and their hostility to those who advocated treason or sought to justify the acts of the conspirators against the Union, was manifested in the very commencement of the rebellion. In New York City the offices of the Herald, Journal of Commerce, Daily News, Day Book, and Express, were visited, on the 16th and 17th of April, 1861, by excited crowds, and compelled to raise the American flag. Some of these papers required only this hint to lend them to change their course, which had been opposed to the suppression of rebellion by force of arms; others, and among them the Journal of Commerce, the News, the Day Book, and the Freeman's Journal, continued to attack the Government, and were at length seized and forbidden to be circulated in the mails or by express. The Journal of Commerce changed editors, and was then allowed to circulate through the mails. The Nevs and Day Book were stopped, and the Freeman's Journal appeared under a new naine and with moderated tone. In several instances grand juries presented papers of this description, and this generally proved sufficient to lead ihem to change their course. In six instances, the offices were assailed and destroyed by mobs, viz.: the Democratic Standard of Concord, N. H.; the Democrat of Bangor, Me.; the Essex County Democrat, at Haverhill, Mass.; the Bridgeport Furner, at Bridgeport, Conn.; the Jeffersonian, at West Chester, Penn.; and the Sentinel, at Easton, Penn.; and in one instance only, that of the Essex County Democrat, the editor was taken from his house and subjected to personal indignities. The rioters in this case were arrested and punished. This exercise of mob authority was opposed by good citizens, and was speedily repressed. At the same tine i he feeling was very general that the authority of Government should be exercised to control, and if needful suppress those public prints which thus openly aided the rebellion. In a few instances of the most aggravated chur:icter, not exceediig ten, the Government did interfere for the suppression of such papers; and singularly enough, in four instances these were professedly religious perio«iicals. The papers thus suppressed were the Christian Observer of Philadelphia, wbich Was principally owner in Richmond, Va.; the Christian Advocate of St. Louis; the True Presbyt rian and the Western Recorder of Louisville, which were suffered to go on again after a short period on promise of better behavior, a promise which was subsequently violated; the War Bulletin, Missourian, and Evening Nevos, of St. Louis; the True American, of Trenton, N. J.; the Franklin Gazette,

of Franklin, N. Y.; and possibly one or two o:her papers of small circu ation.

The repeated and deterinined efforts of the Confederate Government to send agents and ministers to th: European courts to advocate their cause, a measure difficult of execution in consequence of the blockade; as also the frequent arrival of huse who had been engaged in political or financi:d negotiations abroad for thie benefit of the Southern Coire federacy, led the Government to keep a watchful eye on the movements of passengers, and finally tu org inize a passport system for those wlio desired to vi-it Europe, as well as for iho e returning thence to this country. This at first occasionell some uneasine-s, as it had always been our boast that the e were no restrictions upon the freedom of transit to or from the United Staies; but the good etfect of the me:isure was apparent in the arrest by its means of persons who would other wise have b en of great servi e to the Southern Confederacy.

The cintisation act of Congresi h:ving authorized the seizure of the property of those who were in rubel iup against the Government, when that property was found within the loyal Staies, money and other personal property, and vessels, belonging to personis iidentified with the rebellion, were s'iz :d to a considerab.e amount. Ultimately, it baring appeared to the Government inat in many cases the information 02 which seizures were ba-ed was the result of personal hostility or gried, and that in sume cas's tiie seizures had done injustice to parues rea ly loyal, they were discontinued. In 110 case wire money, bonds, or promissory notes reiained by Government where it was not evident that they wire intended to b: 11-ed directly frir the rebellion; a course of conduct in marked contrast with that of the Confederate leaders, wiiich we have already exhibited.

CHAPTER XI.

Modern Art of War.-Great Wars of Europe.-New Principles. "Strategy."

“Tactics."-Formation of soldiers.-Education of Officers.-Scientific Aspect of the Present War.-McClellan's Order.-Restoration of Discipline. — Army Organization. -Inactivity of the Enemy.-His Projects.-Hatteras Occupied.-General Fremont in Missouri. - Battle of Dug Springs.-Battle of Wilson's Creek - Death of Lyon.Retreat of the Army under Sigel. - Martial Law.- Position of Forces.--Colonel Blair's Charges.---Fremoni's Proclamation.- Manuniission.--Capture of Lexington. Advance of Fremont.--Retreat of Price.- Major Lagouyi.-Fremont Relieved.

The modern art of war, as perfected by the great captain of the pre-e.it ce:tury, may be said never to have been pra'lisel upon this continent previous to the pre-ent contest. The old coloni's developed their indepndence af er a protracted struggle, under the definsi: e military genius of the fa: her of his co intry, operating with r::re judg. ment on the olil maxims of the art. The determined vitlor, en lurance, and devotion of the men of the Reroluzionary armies were important elements of success, and in the course of the struggle, mub native

practical military caparity was evolved. Happily for the country, with the close of the struggle, peace brought with it other pursuits, and the miitary art fell, it not into disrepute, at least into disuse. The United States were too distant from the powers of Europe to be ini olved in tho:e cabals, intrigues, and coalitions, which had there prolonged the struggle against Republican France through twenty years of bloodshed, and which were fatal to Poland, and to the independent action of most small powers. So completely isolated was the American Union, that, in accordance with the farewell advice of Washington, it had no “foreign policy." If the Academy at West Point educated a certain number of young men in the theory of war, there was never any field of action for the fruits of those studies to develop themselves. In Europe, on the other hand, during the quarter of a century which followed American independence, war on a grand scule was conducted under the greatest military genius of any age. That he was a graduate of a military academy may, in some degree, have aided his progress. But he was certainly not indebted to the teachings of professors for lis wonderful success. On the contrary, they had failed to discover any thing remarkable in the student. The general principles then taught may be said to have been by him reversed. Thus the broad rule that an army occupying a central position between two others, would necessarily be defeated, because exposed to simultaneous attacks on each flank, he demonstrated was only relatively true, and that in fact such a central army occupied the strongest position, if properly handled; concentrating a strong force at the decisive point, it could meet and assail one army, in time to return and overwhelm the other. Following the same principle, France, holding a central position in reg:rd to Europe, instead of being weak in consequence, was strong, so long as her internal connections were open, and her force concentrated. A revolution was also produced in the old maxins in relation to fortified places. Their value fell immensely before the active movements of the French. It was ascertained that they were of themselves not formidable, unless they were the key or gateway to some important district. A mere fort that commanded no necessary route was found to be of little value, and the powerful combination of columns was much more effective than spadework, in the hands of an able commander. These ideas were novel, and he conquered Europe in illustrating them. When the Austrian power held Italy, and be, with furty thousand ill-clad, i!l-armed, and ill-provided, but veteran troops, turned the Alps and made his attack at Montenotte, the chances were very far from being in his favor; but genius in conception, power of combination, rapidity of movement, and unparalleled vigor in execution soon did their work upon the legions of Austria, and the veteran marshals, retiring before the blows of the "sans culotte,” exclaimed in disgust, “Who ever saw such tactics !”

Up to that time the difference between “strategy” and “tactics", was ill defined. The latter had been as old as the art of war itself. The former was the consequence of dealing in war on a large scale. The master-mind on the broad field of Europe, with numerous armies. to move, deduced broader, principles from more numerous and ex

tended facts. “Tactics” pertains to handling an army in the field; "strategy” projects the campaign, and directs the movement of the armies. “Tactics” fights the battle; “strategy” teaches when and where to fight it, and under what conditions. It remained for the master-mind of Napoleon to apply the doctrine of “long chances” to war; that is, so to arrange and plan bis campaign that it of ten battles he should lose seven, yet the results of the three gained would be such as to give him the campaign. The campaign ending at Marengo is an instance in point. While Napoleon was preparing to cross the Alps, Massena held Genoa with an obstinate valor that immortalized his name, with the view of detaining the Austrians in that corner of Italy, uniil the Grand Army should have gaineil their rear. This was accomplished, and the French troops were so disposed along the only route between the Alps and the Apennines by which Melas could retreat, that he would require to win six battles to get through, whereas the loss of one was ruin. That one he lost at Marengo. Therefore, when the English historian, Alison, wrote that the charge of Kellermann at Marengo “placed the crown on Napoleon's head," he showed a want of appreciation of the military situation, since the gain of that battle and four others would not have saved Melas from destriction if he had lost the sixth.

It is a remarkable fact that in the history of the world there hare been but about fifteen battles which drew aiter them such consequences as decided a war. Such a battle was Austerlitz, which was the result of masterly “strategic” movements which brought the Allies to fight at that place, and of consummate “tactical" skill which utterly destroyed them in the field. When Napoleon sat on his horse that misty morning, surrounded by his generals, with his cold gray eyes fixed with grim satisfaction on the movements of the Allied generals, as with presumptuous fatuity they marched their troops by ibe flank, from left to right, he quietly restrained the ardor of bis lieutenants by admonishing them “never to interrupt an enemy while be was making a mistake.” “If," said he, “ you stop liim now, it will be an ordinary battle; let him complete his movement, and we shall destroy him." The result was, that before the glorious “sun of Austerlitz” had set, the Alied centre was taken, and the victory won. This was but a reperition of what had occurred years before on a smaller scale, on the plateau of Rivoli. An Austrian force bad there passed to the left and rear of the French, who looked uneasily over their shoulders at what they thought a danger. “Those people are ours," said the young commander; “ we will take them at our leisure.” The unerring sagacity with which the required blow was discerned, and the celerity and vigor with which it was delivered, astounded slike friend and foe. When shut up in Mantua, with the immense Austrian armies approaching, Napoleon did not dig and “work i' the earth,” but sallied out, chose his battle-field, made ibe bridge of Arcole famous while the world stands, destroyed his enemies, and returned in triumph. Nevertheless, the ablest generals said he had no plan, and was fighting by hazard. Thus, when the army invaded Spain, and was stopped before the pass of the Somosierra, a steep acclivity, at the top of which the

guns of thirteen thousand Spanish troops were in position, the French generals reported the place impassable. Napoleon reconnoitred in person, ordered the Polish legion to charge up the pass, and take the guns. They did so, and the army proceeded. Such a movement was out of all rule, and was pronounced foolhardy. But genius is above all rules. The prompt application of common sense to the exigencies of the moment is a mark of genius. Thus an obvious want of prompt conveyance for men, where the necessity exists, of combining the strong -st force on a given point, as well in the “strategy ” of a campaign as in the “tactics” of the battle-field, produced continual changes. For this end Napoleon organized the voltigeurs, or regiments of infantry, acting with reginnents of cavalry. When required at certain points on the battle-field, the infantry man vaults behind the horseman, and a double force is thus transported with celerity to a given point. This innovation producell great discussion among military martinets and theorists—as to whei her an infantry soldier was any better for being taught cavalry exercise. A pamphlet war raged fiercely on the subject, while the real motive of the master-mind that directed the organization was not at all comprehended.

The vast strategic abilities of the great captain were not shared by his lieutenants, great as they were as “tacticians." The battle once arrangeil, each fulfilled his duties in a masterly manner. Thus of Lannes, the emperor remarket, that he found him a "pigmy, and left him a giant," referring to the abiliiy with which, as a tactician, he could handle twenty thousand men on the battle-field. Soult, he said, was the “only military head” in Sp:iin, under Joseph. He could bring his army into the field, and properly place it, bit could go no further. When Napoleon hiinself was in Spain, driving the English, under Sir John Moore, before him, he heard of the approach of the Archduke Charles, the first general of the Allies, upon Ratisbon, with two hundred thousand Austrians; he hastened to the spot, and found his own immense army so misplaced that he said to Bessières, “If I did not know your friendship, I should think you were betraying me.” He spent ihe night receiving reporis, and issuing his orders to the various corps, and thus brought about those marvellous results on the following day which caused Wellington to exclaim, “The art of war was never perfected until now.” The same strategic combination directed his armies with fatal effect upon the Allies at Lutzen and Bautzen, when, after the Russian campaign, he was struggling against combined Europe. The several corps fu filled their orders with the usual vigor, and on the field of Bauizen all that saved the Allies from annihilation, was the hesitation of Ney to follow up his advantage, from a misunderstanding of the “strategical” combination, although Jomini, present with him in the field, advised him to develop his blow.

The Allied generals were slow to learn, and unable to compete with the great captain. When prolonged war had weakened the resources of France, and Europe was banded in vast numbe s against him, their theory was not to fight, but to elude his grasp. The conquest of Europe under such a leader was effected by lieutenanıs, each of whom in his own person represented the highest order of some species of

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