MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

§ 1. The mind susceptible of a threefold division.

THE Human Mind, regarded as a whole, is undoubtedly to be considered as constituting a nature or existence which is truly, and in the strictest sense, one and indivisible. At the same time, if we would have a correct and thorough knowledge of it, it is necessary to contemplate it in three distinct points of view. Accordingly, the leading Divisions in which the Mind presents itself to our notice, are the Understanding or Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The states of mind which are the results of the action of these leading mental departments, are appropriately expressed by the phrases INTELLECTUAL, SENSITIVE or SENTIENT, and VOLUNTARY states of the mind. -It is the object of this Abridgment to examine, in as brief a manner as possible, the Divisions which naturally come first in order, viz., the Intellect and the Sensibilities The limits which we find it necessary to assign to the present undertaking, do not allow us to enter into an examination of the distinct and important department of the Will.

§ 2. The Intellect susceptible of a subordinate division.

We begin with the Intellect or Understanding; that department of the mind by means of which we perceive, compare, and reason; and which, in its various modes of action, is the source of all our knowledge. The Intellectual part of man may be considered under two points of view, viz., the External Intellect and the Internal Intellect; in other words, intellectual states of External, and intellectual states of Internal origin.-Intellectual states of External origin depend for their existence upon

the existence and presence of external objects. If the mind were insulated and cut off from the outward and material world, or if there were no such outward world, we could not touch, nor hear, nor see. All those mental states which we express when we speak of the diversities of touch, and smell, and taste, of sound and sight, are immediately dependent on the existence and presence of something which is exterior to the intellect itself.

But there are other states of the Intellect, such, for instance, as are expressed by the words TRUTH, FALSEHOOD, POWER, INTELLIGENCE, MERIT, DEMERIT, CAUSE, OBLIGATION, &c., which are not thus closely connected with external things. And these, in distinction from those of External origin, are denominated intellectual states of Internal origin.

3. Of the connexion of the mind with the material world.

As a general statement, the knowledge which is External in its origin is acquired first; the knowledge which is Internal is subsequent. The mind, whatever may ultimately be found to be the extent of its powers of perception, appears, in the first instance, to be wholly destitute of any actual knowledge; and is first brought into action, and is put in the way of acquiring knowledge, by means of its connexion with the material or outward world.

This leads us to remark, that there is a correspondence, a mutual adaptation, between the mind and outward material things. They appear to be made for each other. The Creator has obviously established a close relation between them; and it is a striking and important fact, that, in this connexion of the mental and material world, as we have just had occasion to intimate, we are probably to look for the commencement of the mind's activity, and for the beginnings of knowledge.

The soul, considered in its relationship to external nature, may be compared to a stringed instrument. Regarded in itself, it is an invisible existence, having the capacity and elements of harmony The nerves, the eye, and the senses generally, are the chords and artificial framework which God has woven round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living and curious instru

ment, made up of the invisible soul and the bodily framework which surrounds it, is at first voiceless and silent. Nor does it appear that it will ever send forth its sounds of harmony, until it is touched and operated upon by those outward influences which exist in the various forms and adaptations of the material world. Under these influences it is first awakened into activity.

4. Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin. In accordance with what has been said, we lay down the general principles, FIRST, that during the early period of life there is an intimate connexion between the mind and the material world; and, SECOND, that far the greater portion of the mind's acts during that period can be traced to a material source. In proof of both positions, particularly the latter, we may properly attend to the following considerations.

(1.) What has been said will, in the first place, be found agreeable to each one's individual experience. If we look back to the early periods of life, we discover, not merely that our ideas are then comparatively few in number, but that far the greater proportion of them are suggested by external objects. They are forced upon us by our immediate wants; they have relation to what we ourselves see, or hear, or touch; and only a small proportion are internal and abstract. As we advance in years, susceptibilities of the mind are brought into exercise, which have a less intimate connexion with things external; and thoughts from within are more rapidly multiplied than from without. We have in some measure exhausted that which is external; and as the mind, awakened to a love of knowledge and a consciousness of its powers, has at last been brought fully into action by means of repeated affections of the senses, a new world (as yet in some degree a TERRA INCOGNITA) projects itself upon our attention, where we are called upon to push our researches and gratify our curiosity. This is the general experience, the testimony which each one can give for himself.

5. Shown further from what we notice in children.

In the second place, what has been said finds confirma

tion in what we observe of the progress of the mind in infants and children generally. The course of things which we observe in them, agrees with what our personal consciousness and remembrance, as far back as it goes, enables us to testify with no little confidence in our own case. No one can observe the operations of the mind in infants and children, without being led to believe, that the Creator has instituted a connexion between the mind and the material world, and that the greater portion of our early knowledge is from an outward source.

To the infant its nursery is the world. The first ideas of the human race are its particular conceptions of its nurse and mother; and the origin and history of all its notions may be traced to its animal wants, to the light that breaks in from its window, and to the few objects in the immediate neighbourhood of the cradle and hearth. When it has become a few years of age, there are other sources of information, other fountains of thought, but they are still external and material. The child then learns the topography of his native village; he explores the margin of its river, ascends its flowering hills, and penetrates the seclusion of its valleys. His mind is full of activity; new and exalting views crowd upon his perceptions; he beholds, and hears, and handles; he wonders, and is delighted. And it is not till after he has grasped the elements of knowledge which the outward world gives, that he retires within himself, compares, reasons, and seeks for causes and effects.

It is in accordance with what has now been stated of the tendencies of mind in children, that we generally find them instructed by means of sensible objects, or by pictures of such objects. When their teachers make an abstract statement to them of an action or event, they do not understand it; they listen to it with an appearance of confusion and vacancy, for the process is undoubtedly against nature. But show them the objects themselves, or a faithful picture of them, and interpret your abstract expressions by a reference to the object or picture, and they are observed to learn with rapidity and pleasure. The time has not yet arrived for the springing up and growth of thoughts of an internal and abstract origin.

6. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes. In the third place, the history of language is a strong proof of the correctness of the position, that the mind is first brought into action by means of the senses, and acquires its earliest knowledge from that source. At first words are few in number, corresponding to the limited extent of ideas. The vocabulary of savage tribes (those, for example, which inhabit the American continent) is in general exceedingly limited. The growth of a language corresponds to the growth of mind; it extends itself by the increased number and power of its words, nearly in exact correspondence with the multiplication and the increased complexity of thought. Now the history of all languages teaches us, that words, which were invented and brought into use one after another in the gradual way just mentioned, were first employed to express external objects, and afterward were used to express thoughts of internal origin.

Almost all the words in every language, expressive of the susceptibilities and operations of the mind, may be clearly shown to have had an external origin and application before they were applied to the mind. To IMAGINE, in its literal signification, implies the forming of a picture; to IMPRESS Conveys the idea of leaving a stamp or mark, as the seal leaves its exact likeness or stamp on wax ; to REFLECT literally means to turn back, to go over the ground again, &c. These words cannot be applied to the mind in the literal sense; the nature of the mind will not admit of such an application; the inference therefore is, that they first had an external application. Now if it be an established truth, as the history of languages seems to show that it is, that all language has a primary reference to external objects, and that there is no term expressive of mental acts which was not originally expressive of something material, the conclusion would seem to be a fair one, that the part of our knowledge which has its rise by means of the senses, is, as a general statement, first in origin. And the more so, when we combine with these views the considerations which have been previously advanced.

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