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“ There is now in India an army of nearly 300,000 men at the disposal of this country, apart from 31,000 subsidiary troops and contingents from native states. In that army there are about 26,000 Europeans belonging to the Queen's service, including cavalry and infantry of the line; and 15,000 European troops in the Company's service, of every arm except cavalry, and 240,465 native troops. This last figure includes 233,699 exclusively native troops, together with 3644 European commissioned officers, and 3122 European warrant and non-commissioned officers and rank and file. The number of the commissioned officers of the Queen's troops amounts to 588. The police corps regularly organised consists of 24,015 native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates, and 35 commissioned European officers. Large and costly as this army may be, it might easily be increased, especially from the warlike tribes lately added to our dominion. Here, then, is a reserve, and an ample reserve, well organised, officered, and generally with some experience of war. How could it be said that we had no reserve? Of this immense force, 40,000 are British soldiers. Of the rest, the irregular native cavalry is just the force we most required in the late war, and could not supply from home. Here, then, is everything that we have ascribed to Russia.
“All former empires that ever pretended to hold distant countries in subjection made a fair exchange of armies, so that while Italians were holding Britain, or Numidia, or Dacia, Britons, Numidians, and Dacians were stationed in Italy, and even supplying candidates for the imperial purple. Whatever the final results, the Roman Empire would not have lasted ten years without that interchange. Russia carried on the war with forces drawn from the heart and extremities of Asia, as well as from the most northern shores of Europe ; and when we talk thoughtlessly of her overpowering population, it is these distant regions that we are unconsciously thinking of. Our case is the same as Russia's, only we have not got the sense to see it, and shall not see it till our eyes have been opened and our wits quickened by a succession of disasters.'
“ The mutual dependence of our Western and Eastern empires was clearly pointed out many years ago in these words: 'In case our enemies should prove sufficiently powerful to press us hard either in Europe or Asia, it would be a matter of inestimable importance to have it in our power to transport our military forces from Europe to Asia, and from Asia to Europe, with the greatest possible celerity, as the exigencies of war may demand. A rapid means of communicating between India and Malta, both by means of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf
, through Egypt and through Syria, would multiply tenfold the resources of Britain, and secure the defences of our possessions from Canada to Hong-Kong. Indeed, England, with her small standing army, with her population not trained and disciplined to defend their own territory against invaders, and with ministers who neglect her navy, can never be duly secured against the sudden attacks of her rivals and enemies, until she can impose some restraint on their ambition, by having it in her power to array the Sepoy on the shores of the Mediterranean, and the highlander of Scotland and the gallant sons of Erin on the banks of the Indus and the Ganges, with a degree of speed which no other power can equal. The small amount of our military force, in comparison with the enormous extent of our empire, must be counterbalanced by abundant means of communication and extraordinary rapidity of transport.'
“Russia, aware of the mistake she committed in going to war with imperfect means of transit
, is, with our money, about connecting the shores of the Caspian, the Black Sea, and the Baltic with the heart of the empire by means of railways communicating with her navigable rivers.
“In America, ten miles of railway are on the average opened every day for the accommodation of the regular traffic of the country.
“ And shall we, while enriching with railways Russia, America, France, Italy, and Austria, forget what is due to India with her boundless resources and vast population ?
* It is evident that to have the benefit of even the moral weight of our magnificent and well-appointed army in India, on the great events which are now in progress, and of the consequent changes which must necessarily flow from them, that we must have, above all things, increased facilities for moving troops and stores upwards or downwards along the line of the Indus, as well as up the Persian Gulf, or to the Red Sea, as circumstances might render necessary.
“While these pages are passing through the press, the shadow of coming events in the East is deepening and extending, and it becomes more emphatically the duty of this country to make their army in India, by proper means of transit, not only sufficient for the internal peace of that country, but that some portion of it should also, by the same means, be made available wherever and whenever the welfare or the honour of the paramount state might demand its service. There never was put forward a greater fallacy, or an error more likely to be mischievous, than that the Turkish question was of no importance in an Indian point of view. The grand problem, now in course of solution in Turkey, must affect in its results, whatever they may be, in the most immediate and powerful manner, our power and prosperity in India.
“Every act in the great drama of the war has elicited either the apprehension or the applause of the nations of the East. In the mosques of Bokhara, five thousand Moolahs prayed daily for the success of the Sultan of Room, and the name of Mouravieff is probably now repeated with awe by the Persian and the Affghan.'
The Eastern shepherd, in his solitude, pondered over, and the warrior, in his fastness, watched with kindling eye, the varying fortunes of the field, while every incident of the campaign, whether in Europe or Asia, has been minutely discussed, and will be well remembered in the bazaars throughout the length and breadth of India."
By establishing a steam and electric connexion between England and India and the confines of Central Asia, not only would the power and control of Eng: land be enhanced over her 150,000,000 widely-scattered subjects, but a great and glorious step would be taken towards securing the progress, the freedom, and the peace of the world.
We have only taken up one bearing of the question in this notice that which refers to our present difficulty with Persia and with Russia in Central Asia. The bearings of the question in reference to Turkey, and to our commercial relations with that country, with our Eastern empire, and with the East generally, present a vast field of inquiry. The reader will find them ably expounded in Mr. Andrew's work. France, most interested in the opening of the canal of Suez, has naturally not looked on at a project which it most erroneously supposes to be a rival some feelings of rancour, and the possible and very imaginary power to be gained by the establishment of a railway along the great valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris has been a source of no little heart-burning and jealousy. It will not be a little amusing to the reader, then, after going over the recent
traffic returns of North Syria and Mesopotamia, furnished by Mr. John Kennedy, and of those countries and of Baghdad from various other sources, to find a notice of a memoir of French origin, on the comparative political and commercial importance of the route by railway by the Euphrates, and by the Suez canal, in which all the arguments are not only strongly in favour of the first, but the author actually demonstrates by figures and calculations, very carefully made, that those advantages would be much greater than have ever been propounded by its advocates in this country. Such a testimony, coming as it does from such a source, cannot be looked upon with that sceptical incredulity with which almost all great undertakings are viewed at the outset, not by philanthropists and patriots, but by the race of schemers in our own country.
DURING the earlier portion of Marmont's memorials of his time, we found him enjoying the full tide of prosperity: he had the luck to be engaged against inferior generals, and he gained a considerable portion of renown, not justified by ensuing events. The prestige attaching to his name had, indeed, become so great, that Napoleon selected him to supersede Masséna in the Peninsula, and had ample reason to regret his choice. Instead of Marmont maintaining the reputation of the French arms, he, by his own showing, spent his time in unworthy disputes with the other generals holding separate command, and thus strengthened the English power. On his own ex parte evidence, he was no match for Wellington ; and, disguise it as he may, he was out-generalled at Salamanca. But we
, shall have occasion to refer to this subject presently.
At the end of the second volume we left Marmont at Zara, opposed to the Russians and Montenegrins. Various skirmishes took place during the winter, and the rebels (as Marmont chooses to call them) suffered very condign punishment by his burning the town of Castelnovo over their heads. The next step proposed was a combined operation of the French and Austrians to capture Cattaro, but it ended in nothing ; fortunately, perhaps, for Marmont, as the Russian naval force was very large, and it would have been unfavourable to contest the sovereignty at sea with them. In the mean while the Dalmatians, who had been amicably disposed to the French at the outset, began to grow discontented at the prolonged occupation, and aided the Russians in carrying out their numberless intrigues. Hence it is not surprising that Marmont felt greatly disposed to take an active part in the war between the English and Turks, which Duckworth’s forcing of the Dardanelles appeared strongly to suggest, and proposed to join the Turks with 25,000 men. He obtained the emperor's assent, and opened negotiations with Mustapha Bairaktar, so celebrated for his devotion to the unhappy Selim ; with Passwan Oglou, and with the celebrated Ali Pacha, of Janina, to the latter of whom a field battery and abundance of matériel were sent. The sudden change which took place in the conduct of the Porte, however, overthrew all these laboured schemes, and the retreat of the Russian fleet enabled Marmont to devote his attention to a branch of military occupation for which he always showed a remarkable genius. In the expectation that his long-cherished dream would be fulfilled, and that Turkey in Europe would be broken up, and subjected to a Polish partition, Marmont paved the way by opening up roads into the interior of Dalmatia. By these means he regained a great portion of his popularity with the inhabitants, who said, in their flowery language: “During eight years the Austrians drew up and discussed plans for roads, without carrying them out: Marmont mounted on horseback to have them made, and lo! ere he descended, they were finished.” About this time, too, an envoy from Ali Pacha visited Marmont, who gives the following account of his mission:
Mémoires du Maréchal Duc de Raguse, &c. Vols. III. and IV. Paris: Perrotin.
Feb.VOL. CIX. NO. CCCCXXXIV.
This envoy was en route for Poland, in order to meet the emperor. Mehemet Effendi had experienced strange fortunes. He was a Roman and a priest, whom we found at Malta performing the duties of inquisitor, on our capture of that island. He followed us to Egypt, where we gave him employment as a civil servant. Not finding in that department the advantages he had anticipated, he determined on returning to Europe in the company of two French officers. A corsair took them, and they were carried to Janina and put in prison. One day the ci-devant inquisitor announced that he had been favoured with a vision; Mohammed had appeared to him and demonstrated that the Christian religion was false, and so our friend decided on embracing the Koran. He was immediately set at liberty. He was employed by Ali Pacha, and soon taken into favour. When he came to me, his master had authorised him to enter into negotiations with Napoleon. The vizir had decided that peace was near at hand, and foreseeing that the emperor would demand possession of Corfu and the seven islands, Ali Pacha sent Mehemet to ask that they might be handed over to him, his sole argument to convince Napoleon being : *“ Ali Pacha loves the French; a French general will come to take the command at Corfu; this vicinity will engender quarrels, and it will be unjustly said that Ali Pacha does not love the French. In order to prevent such injustice it would be better to give the island to Ali Pacha.” Mehemet Effendi joined the emperor just as the peace was being signed. The conditions were still kept secret. He made his request, and supported
it by the powerful argument I have quoted, while the emperor replied : “But how am I'to take Corfu? it does not belong to me.” “But your majesty will have it," the renegade said. “How am I to take it ?” the emperor continued; and he never altered this mode of argument, which could not possibly compromise him. Mehemet Effendi's mission was fulfilled, and he returned to his master. Afterwards, I was told, the wretched man went back to Rome, and made a public recantation.
peace of Tilsit, and the emperor's wish to interfere in Spain, put a final check to the designs on Turkey ; Cattaro was handed over to the
T French, and tranquillity restored to the world for a short period. Marmont received his reward in the title of Duc de Raguse, which he considered the greatest compliment that could be paid him. During the peace, Marmont was engaged in negotiations with the Montenegrins, in the vain hope of inducing them to accept the government of the emperor; and, from his own showing, he could always know the state of the political thermometer, as regarded Austria, by the language held by the Ôladika. When, therefore, the Montenegrins broke out into hostility, he could not entertain the slightest doubt but that a war with Austria was imminent. Nor were his expectations frustrated. As soon as hostilities commenced in Italy, Marmont received orders to make a diversion in favour of the army of Italy. After some unimportant movements, he was summoned by the Archduke John to evacuate Dalmatia, but thought it beneath him even to answer the summons. Napoleon's march on Vienna altered the aspect of things materially. The viceroy recommenced the offensive by entering Friuli, while Marmont hurried to join him. On the route, he fought and won the battle of Gospich against a very superior force, on the same days, the 21st and 22nd of May, as the terrible battle of Essling was being fought on the left bank of the Danube. From the correspond. ence in the third volume we will here show that, while engaged in fighting his own battles, Napoleon found time to carefully watch his generals, as will be seen from the two following letters :
NAPOLEON TO MARMONT.
Bayonne, 8th May, 1808. MONSIEUR LE GENERAL MARMONT,—The pay of the army of Dalmatia is in arrears, because you have diverted 400,000 francs from the paymaster's chest to meet other expenses. Things cannot go on in this way.
The paymaster was very wrong to obey your orders. As it is the treasury which
expenses, this branch of the service cannot be kept straight with such irregularity. You have no right, under any pretext, to force the chest. You ought to demand credits from the minister; if he do not grant them, you must not incur such expenses.
This matter was evidently rankling in Napoleon's mind, for we find him writing again on May 16, 1808 :
MONSIEUR LE GENERAL MARMONT,—There is great disorder in the admini. stration of my army in Dalmatia. You have authorised a violation of the chest, amounting to nearly 400,000 francs. And yet the same amount was placed to your credit for the engineer and artillery works. It is a very considerable sum. How is it that it was not sufficient? Dalmatia costs me an immense sum ; there is no regularity there, and all this causes a degree of irregularity in our accounts, to which we are not accustomed. The paymaster is responsible for all these sums; I have ordered his recal, and he had better make haste and send in all the vouchers to certify his accounts. But all this does not justify the expense. You have no right to spend a farthing which the minister has not placed at your disposal. When you want a credit, you must ask for it.
The terms on which the archduke had entered on the campaign were very
favourable. The French army, or at least the greater part of its forces, and especially those troops who had made the campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807, were in Spain and Italy; Davoust's corps alone, about 30,000 strong, and a few other troops hurriedly organised in the depôts at home, were in Germany. Thus the allies represented the largest integer of the French army. Without wishing to treat them unjustly, we may assume that our readers are aware how mediocre these soldiers
The archduke opened the campaign with a firm and numerous army, perfectly equipped, and marched with the confidence imparted by his immense superiority. This confidence was universal, but à change soon came over the troops in the following simple way:
A French prisoner was taken on the field of the battle of Ratisbon. He was questioned, and he announced the arrival of the emperor to take the head of the army. They refused to believe him, but every prisoner repeated the same tale. From that moment, I was told—from the instant when the fact was confirmed, the archduke, who till then had displayed coolness and talent, lost his head, and only committed absurdities." And I,” Bubna, who told me the story, added, “ in order to recal him to his senses, said to him, 'But, monseigneur, why trouble yourself ? suppose Jourdan had just arrived instead of Napoleon ?", This amusing incident never left my memory. It does not attach much credit to Jourdan; but Bubna chose his name, because the archduke had fought against him for two campaigns and had always beaten him.
And it was fortunate for the French army that Napoleon was present, for the check at Essling had almost destroyed it. At that moment, so Marmont tells us, Prince Charles had in his hands the destiny of the French army: he could have destroyed it; but it appeared to him so wonderful and extraordinary that he had not been beaten, that he almost.