of the moral bond, by which they are united. Of all states, that of war is most likely to call into activity the passions, which are hostile and dangerous to such a form of government. Time is yet important to our country to settle and mature its recent institutions. Above all, it appeared to the undersigned, from signs not to be mistaken, that if we entered upon this war, we did it as a divided people; not only from sense of the inadequacy of our means to success, but from moral and political objections of great weight, and very general influence.

It appears to the undersigned, that the wrongs of which the United Sates have to complain, although in some aspects very grievous to our interests, and, in many, humiliating to our pride, were yet of a nature, which, in the present state of the world, either would not justify war, or which war would not remedy. Thus, for instance, the hovering of British vessels upon our coasts, and the occasional insults to our ports, imperiously demanded such a systematic application of harbor and sea-coast defence, as would repel such aggressions; but, in no light, can they be considered as making a resort to war, at the present time, on the part of the United States, either necessary, or expedient. So also, with respect to the Indian war, of the origin of which but very imperfect information has as yet been given to the public. Without any express act of Congress, an expedition was last year set on foot and prosecuted into the Indian territory, which had been relinquished by treaty on the part of the United States. And now we are told about the agency of British traders, as to Indian hostilities. It deserves consideration, whether there has been such provident attention, as would have been proper to remove any cause of complaint, either real or imaginary, which the Indians might allege, and to secure their friendship. With all the sympathy and anxiety excited by the state of that frontier, important as it may be to apply adequate means of protection against the Indians, how is its safety ensured by a declaration of war, which adds the British to the number of enemies?

As "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has not induced the two houses of Congress to concur in declaring the reasons, or motives, for their enacting a declaration of war, the undersigned and the public are left to search, elsewhere, for causes either real or ostensible. If we are to consider the President of the United States, and the committee of the House of Representatives on foreign relations, as speaking on this solemn occasion for Congress, the United States have three principal topics of complaint against Great Britain-Impressment ;-blockades ;-and orders in council.

Concerning the subject of impressment, the undersigned sympathize with our unfortunate seamen, the victims of this abuse of power, and participate in the national sensibility on their account. They do not conceal from themselves both its importance and its difficulty; and they are well aware how stubborn is the will and how blind the vision of powerful nations, when great interests grow into contro. versy.

But before a resort to war for such interests, a moral nation will consider what is just, and a wise nation what is expedient. If the exercise of any right, to the full extent of its abstract nature, he inconsistent with the safety of another nation, morality seems to require that, in practice, its exercise should in this respect be modi.

fied. If it be proposed to vindicate any right by war, wisdom demands that it should be of a nature by war to be obtained. The interests connected with the subject of impressment are unquestionably great to both nations; and in the full extent of abstract right as asserted by each, perhaps irreconcilable.

The government of the United States asserts the broad principle, that the flag of their merchant vessels shall protect the mariners. This privilege is claimed, although every person on board, except the captain, may be an alien.

The British government asserts that the allegiance of their subjects is inalienable in time of war, and that their seamen, found on the sea, the common highway of nations, shall not be protected by the flag of private merchant vessels.

The undersigned deem it unnecessary here to discuss the question of the American claim, for the immunity of their flag. But they cannot refrain from viewing it as a principle, of a nature very broad and comprehensive; to the abuse of which the temptations are strong and numerous. And they do maintain, that before the calamities of war in vindication of such a principle be incurred, all the means of negotiation should be exhausted, and that also every practicable attempt should be made to regulate the exercise of the right; so that the acknowledged injury, resulting to other nations, should be checked, if not prevented. They are clearly of opinion that the peace of this happy and rising community should not be abandoned for the sake of affording facilities to cover French property; or to employ British seamen.

The claim of Great Britain to the services of her seamen is neither novel, nor peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance for which she contends is common to all the governments of Europe. France, as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nations claim, in time of war, the services of their subjects. Both by decrees forbid their entering into foreign employ. Both recall them by proclamation. No man can doubt that, in the present state of the French marine, if American merchant vessels were met at sea, having French seamen on board, France would take them. Will any man believe that the United States would go to war against France on this account? For very obvious reasons, this principle occasions little collision with France, or with any other nation, except England. With the English nation, the people of the United States are closely assimilated, in blood, language, intercourse, habits, dress, manners, and character. When Britain is at war, and the United States neutral, the merchant service of the United States holds out to British seamen temptations almost irresistible ;-high wages and peaceful employ, instead of low wages and war-service ;-safety in lieu of hazard; entire independence, in the place of qualified servitude.

That England, whose situation is insular, who is engaged in a war apparently for existence, whose seamen are her bulwark, should look upon the effect of our principle upon her safety with jealousy, is inevitable; and that she will not hazard the practical consequences of its unregulated exercise, is certain. The question, therefore, presented, directly, for the decision of the thoughtful and virtuous mind, in this country is-whether war for such an abstract right be justifiable, before attempting to guard against its injurious tendency by legislative regulation, in failure of treaty.

A dubious right should be advanced with hesitation. An extreme right should be asserted with discretion. Moral duty requires, that a nation, before it appeals to arms, should have been, not only true to itself, but that it should have failed in no duty to others. If the exercise of a right, in an unregulated manner, be in effect a standing invitation to the subjects of a foreign power to become deserters and traitors, is it no injury to that power?

Certainly, moral obligation demands that the right of flag, like all other human rights, should be so used, as that, while it protects what is our own, it should not injure what is another's. În a practical view, and so long as the right of flag is restrained by no regard to the undeniable interests of others, a war on account of impressments, is only a war for the right of employing British seamen on board American merchant vessels.

The claim of Great Britain pretends to no further extent, than to take British seamen from private merchant vessels. In the exercise of this claim, her officers take American seamen, and foreign seamen, in the American service; and although she disclaims such abuses, and proffers redress, when known, yet undoubtedly grievous injuries have resulted to the seamen of the United States. But the question is, can war be proper for such cause, before all hope of reasonable accommodation has failed? Even after the extinguishment of such hope, can it be proper, until our own practice be so regulated as to remove, in such foreign nation, any reasonable apprehension of injury?

The undersigned are clearly of opinion that the employment of British seamen, in the merchant service of the United States, is as little reconcilable with the permanent, as the present interest of the United States. The encouragement of foreign seamen is the discouragement of the native American.

The duty of government towards this valuable class of men is not only to protect, but to patronize them. And this cannot be done more effectually than by securing to American citizens the privileges of American navigation.

The question of impressment, like every other question relative to commerce, has been treated in such a manner, that what was possessed is lost, without obtaining what was sought. Pretensions, right in theory, and important in interest, urged, without due consideration of our relative power, have eventuated in a practical abandonment, both of what we hoped and what we enjoyed. In attempting to spread our flag over foreigners, its distinctive character has been

lost to our own citizens.

The American seaman, whose interest it is to have no competitors in his employment, is sacrificed, that British seamen may have equal privileges with himself.

Ever since the United States have been a nation, this subject has been a matter of complaint and negotiation; and every former administration have treated it, according to its obvious nature, as a subject rather for arrangement than for war. It existed in the time of Washington; yet this father of his country recommended no such resort. It existed in the time of Adams; yet, notwithstanding the zeal in support of our maritime rights, which distinguished his administration, war was never suggested by him as the remedy. During

the eight years Mr. Jefferson stood at the helm of affairs, it still continued a subject of controversy and negotiation; but it was never made a cause for war. It was reserved for the present administration to press this topic to the extreme and most dreadful resort of nations; although England has officially disavowed the right of impressment, as it respects native citizens, and an arrangement might well be made consistent with the fair pretensions of such as are naturalized.

That the real state of this question may be understood, the undersigned recur to the following facts as supported by official documents. Mr. King, when minister in England, obtained a disavowal of the British government of the right to impress "American seamen,' naturalized as well as native, on the high seas. An arrangement had advanced nearly to a conclusion, upon this basis, and was broken off only because Great Britain insisted to retain the right on "the narrow seas." What, however, was the opinion of the American minister, on the probability of an arrangement, appears from the public documents, communicated to Congress in the session of 1808, as stated by Mr. Madison in these words: "At the moment the articles were expected to be signed, an exception of the narrow seas' was urged and insisted on by Lord St. Vincents, and being utterly inadmissible on our part, the negotiation was abandoned."

Mr. King seems to be of opinion, however, "that, with more time than was left him for the experiment, the objection might have been overcome." What time was left Mr. King for the experiment, or whether any was ever made, has not been disclosed to the public. Mr. King soon after returned to America. It is manifest from Mr. King's expression that he was limited in point of time, and it is equally clear that his opinion was, that an adjustment could take place. That Mr. Madison was also of the same opinion is demonstrated by his letters to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, dated the 3d of February, 1807, in which he uses these expressions. "I take it for granted, that you have not failed to make due use of the arrangement concerted by Mr. King with Lord Hawkesbury, in the year 1802, for settling the question of impressment. On that occasion and under that administration the British principle was fairly renounced in favor of the right of our flag, Lord Hawkesbury having agreed to prohibit impressments on the high seas, and Lord St. Vincents requiring nothing more than an exception of the narrow seas; an exception resting on the obsolete claim of Great Britain to some peculiar dominion over them." Here, then, we have a full acknowledgment that Great Britain was willing to renounce the right of impressment, on the high seas, in favor of our flag;-that she was anxious to arrange the subject.

It further appears that the British ministry called for an interview with Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, on this topic; that they stated the nature of the claim, the King's prerogative; that they had consulted the crown officers and the board of admiralty, who all concurred in sentiment, that under the circumstances of the nation, the relinquishment of the right was a measure, which the government could not adopt, without taking on itself a responsibility, which no ministry would be willing to meet, however pressing the exigency might be. They offered, however, on the part of Great Britain, to pass laws making it penal for British commanders to impress Ameri

can citizens, on board of American vessels, on the high seas, if America would pass a law, making it penal for the officers of the United States to grant certificates of citizenship to British subjects. This will be found, in the same documents, in a letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, dated 11th of November, 1806. Under their peremptory instructions, this proposition, on the part of Great Britain, could not be acceded to by our ministers. Such, however, was the temper and anxiety of England, and such the candor and good sense of our ministers, that an honorable and advantageous arrangement did take place. The authority of Mr. Monroe, then Minister at the court of Great Britain, now Secretary of State, and one of the present administration, who have recommended war with England, and assigned impressments as a cause, supports the undersigned in asserting, that it was honorable and advantageous: for in a letter from Richmond dated the 28th of February, 1808, to Mr. Madison, the following expressions are used by Mr. Monroe. "I have on the contrary always believed, and still do believe, that the ground on which that interest (impressment) was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of 8th November, 1806, and the explanation which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States, that it contained a concession in their favor on the part of Great Britain, on the great principle in contestation, never before made by a formal and obligatory act of their government, which was highly favorable to their interest."

With the opinion of Mr. King so decidedly expressed, with the official admission of Mr. Madison, with the explicit declaration of Mr. Monroe, all concurring that Great Britain was ready to abandon impressment on the high seas, and with an honorable and advantageous arrangement, actually made by Mr. Monroe, how can it be pretended, that all hope of settlement, by treaty, has failed? how can this subject furnish a proper cause of war?

With respect to the subject of blockades, the principle of the law of nations, as asserted by the United States, is, that a blockade can only be justified when supported by an adequate force. In theory this principle is admitted by Great Britain. It is alleged, however, that in practice she disregards that principle.

The order of blockade, which has been made a specific ground of complaint by France, is that of the 16th of May, 1806. Yet, strange as it may seem, this order, which is now made one ground of war between the two countries, was, at the time of its first issuing, viewed as an act of favor and conciliation. On this subject it is necessary to be explicit. The vague and indeterminate manner in which the American and French governments, in their official papers speak of this order of blockade, is calculated to mislead. An importance is attached to it, of which, in the opinion of the undersigned, it is not worthy. Let the facts speak for themselves.

In August, 1804, the British established a blockade at the entrance of the French ports, naming them, from Fecamp to Ostend; and from their proximity to the British coasts, and the absence of all complaint, we may be permitted to believe that it was a legal blockade, enforced according to the usages of nations. On the 16th of May, 1806, the English Secretary of State, Mr. Fox, notified our Minister at London, that his government had thought fit to direct necessary