There being, as we have said, no import or export duties, the revenues are derived from selling the monopoly of Chinese opium, and of spirits. For that privilege the farmer pays $185,000 per annum, and realizes from it a fortune in addition. There is also a tax upon estates, which yields about $15,000 per annum.

The Island of Pulo Penang was formerly a presidency of the East India Company. In certain localities it is exceedingly bracing and much frequented by residents of India seeking health. It is sixteen miles long and of an average breadth of eight miles. "Mount McAlister" being the highest of its hill ranges, is elevated 2,500 feet. It is divided from the province "Wellesly" by a narrow channel. The "dry and wet" seasons are not so distinctly marked as at other places in the East Indies.

Penang derives its importance from an unequaled freshness of climate, and from its being for many years the object of extensive cultivation of various spices and pepper, which business has, of late, been somewhat checked, attention being paid to other productions, consisting of cocoa-nut oil, betel-nut, camphor, rice, tin, sugar, rattans, and dragons' blood, which is extracted from the latter article. Boat-building is extensively carried on by the Malays. Georgetown is on the eastern end of the island, the harbor being southeast of it. The principal house of business in Penang is that of Revely & Co., American merchants, of which Mr. Currier is the head, and a gentleman well known to eastern travelers for his hospitality. The Island of "Sumatra" is nine hundred miles long, and contains 460,000 square miles, and many years since was a resort of "American shipping" to a much greater extent than it now is. Previous to the expiration of the East India Company's charter, who monopolized the English trade of the island, forty American ships annually loaded at the various pepper ports. After that occurrence, the trade being open to all British ships, competition resulted. The much regretted treaty between Great Britain and Holland, in which the former ceded all her settlements on the Islands of Sumatra and Banca, has effectually reduced the commerce of all nations on these Islands, and in the principal ports the Dutch limit the production of the two most important staples of the island.

The ports open to commerce are Acheen and Sambalang on the north end, Amalaboo, Padang, and Bencoolen on the west side, and Palembang on the east coast. The pepper ports are Delli, Langkat, Balu, China, Sirdang, and numerous smaller ones of less importance. The collection of a cargo of pepper is a tedious process-ships are often six months on the coast. Formerly the payment to the natives was made in Turkey opium or Spanish "Carolus" dollars, which command a high premium. The race of "Battus," who bring the pepper down to the coast, hoard up the proceeds, either in concealing or melting it down into ornaments, as not a dollar is ever known to leave the country.

The locality of the productions on this island are as follows:-From Banca to River Rakim, 500 miles, sago, rattans, and dragons' blood; Rakim to Diamond Point, 240 miles, black pepper; Diamond Point to Acheen Head, betel-nut. The shores of the latter tract of country are washed by the Bay of Bengal.

The productions of Sumatra, in addition to articles already enumerated, are beeswax, gambier, and camphor. Imports into Acheen and Langkat are of considerable importance, and consist in part of opium, salt, cloths, sarangs, European chintzes, and American drillings and sheetings. Their

requirements, owing to the immense population in the interior, are very large. The different races on this island are as follows:-Malays, Sampangs, and Battaks, the latter somewhat inclined to cannabalism. Acheen was formerly the largest city in Sumatra, and had 36,000 inhabitants. The population of the island is estimated at 400,000.

JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW.

DECISION IN ADMIRALTY ON APPEAL-COLLISION BETWEEN SAILING VESSELS WHEN LARBOARD TACK MAY HOLD ON.

In the United States Circuit Court. Before Judge NELSON. William H. Wells vs. the schooner Ann Caroline.

NELSON, C. J.-The libel in this case was filed by the owner of the schooner John C. Wells, against the schooner Ann Caroline, to recover damages for a collision occurring in the month of February, 1854, on the eastern shore of the Delaware Bay. The two vessels were beating up the bay in company with several other vessels in a channel about a mile wide, between Crow Shoal and the Jersey shore. The wind was N. N. W., about a five or six knot breeze; the tide flood, setting up the bay. The John C. Wells was close hauled on her larboard tack, which was her long tack from Crow Shoal to the Jersey shore; the Ann Caroline close-hauled on her starboard tack on the opposite course from the Jersey shore to Crow Shoal. The Wells was very heavy laden-the Ann Caroline in ballast. The two vessels had tacked at the Crow Shoal upon their long tack nearly at the same time, the Caroline at the time being to the leeward of the Wells, and somewhat astern of her. The Ann Caroline ran out but onehalf or two-thirds of her course, when she suddenly came round on her starboard tack, in consequence of a vessel ahead suddenly backing and obstructing her course. While on this course she came in collision with the Wells, striking her on her starboard side aft, about ten or fifteen feet from her taffrail, opening her side, and from which injury she sank to the bottom of the channel in a few minutes.

The main ground upon which the defence of the Ann Caroline is placed is, that she was on the starboard or privileged tack, and that it was the duty of the Wells to give way and pass to her right. This rule of navigation is admitted by the counsel for the Wells, but it is insisted, that it has no application to the relative position of the two vessels as made out upon the proofs in the case. It is claimed on his part that the Wells was to the windward of the Caroline, and ahead or above her in the channel, and that if this rule had been observed, and the Wells had ported her helm, a collision would have been inevitable; that the change of course would have brought her head against the starboard side of the Caroline, and that her proper maneuver in the emergency was to starboard her helm, which she did, and which would have avoided the other vessel if she had not ported her helm at or about the same time, which caused her to strike the Wells on her starboard side but a few feet from her stern. The controlling question in the case is whether or not the Wells was to the windward, and so far above the course of the Caroline, before the two vessels came together, as to forbid the application of this entitled rule of navigation, that when two vessels are approaching each other on opposite tacks, both having the wind free, the one on the larboard tack shall give way and pass to the right. On looking into the proofs in the case, which are very voluminous. it will be found that the testimony of the master and hands on board of the respective vessels, as usual, is contradictory-those of the Wells claiming that the course of the Caroline was to the leeward and southerly of that of their vessel, while those on the Caroline insist that her course was to the windward of the Wells.

If the case stood upon the testimony of these witnesses, we should regard it as so far conflicting and doubtful as to lead us not to interfere with the decree of the court below dismissing the libel. But there are four witnesses, master and hands upon other vessels, engaged at the same time in beating up this channel, and who were on the same tack with the Wells, but to the leeward and a little to her stern, who witnessed the collision, and the course of the vessels previous to the accident, and they all concur in confirming the testimony of the master and hands of the Wells as to the course and relative position of the two vessels. The testimony of one of these witnesses has been taken in this court and was not before the court below, which is very explicit and direct upon this question.

I do not put this case upon a rule stated in some of the books, and which was referred to in the case of the Neptune, (10 How., 581,) which states that if the vessel on the larboard tack is so far to the windward that if both persist in their course the other will strike her on the lee side abaft the beam, or near the stern, in such case the vessel on the starboard tack must give way. The objection to this rule is, that it is too precise and exact for practical use. The better opinion is that the vessel on the larboard tack must give way, even though she be a point or a point-and a-half to the windward. But while no encouragement should be held out to any very nice calculation of the vessel bound by the general rule to give way, as to the precise course of the two vessels, it is clear that she may be so far to the windward of the other, as to entitle her to keep her course, and make it a fault of the one on the starboard tack to change her course and attempt to pass to the right. In the case before us, the witnesses on the vessels accompanying the two in question, say that if the Ann Caroline had kept her course, instead of porting her helm, she would have passed under the stern of the Wells, and the place where she struck her confirms that view.

There were several considerations urged on the argument by the counsel on both sides in support of their respective views of the case, which, as they rest principally upon a controverted state of facts we do not deem it important to notice. We must, therefore, reverse the decree of the court below, and direct a reference to a commissioner to take proofs, and report upon the libelant's damages in the case.

DECISIONS IN ADMIRALTY ON APPEAL.

In the United States Circuit Court. Before Judge NELSON, October 11. John H. Brower, et al., vs. the brig Water Witch; Wm. H. Sheldon vs. the same; John Clifton vs. a quantity of cotton.

NELSON, C. J.-The libels in the first two cases were filed to recover damages for injuries to a cargo of cotton shipped in the brig Water Witch, from Lavacea, on the bay of Matagorda, Texas, to this port, in May, 1854.

The libelants were the consignees of the cotton. The libel in the third case was filed by the owner of the brig to recover his freight money. A special contract was made between the shipper at Lavacca and one MITCHELL, who represented himself as agent of the vessel. She lay at the port of Indianola, situated on the same bay as Lavacca, but several miles distant. The cotton was carried in a lighter from Lavacca to the vessel. After it was delivered from the lighter and received on board the vessel, the master refused to sign the bills of lading, upon the ground that the cotton was not in good order and condition, and pending this dispute he sailed for New York with his cargo. The shipper, on learning that the vessel had sailed without having signed the bills of lading, forwarded the bills unsigned to the consignees named in them, stating the circumstances of the refusal of the master to sign them. The consignees made advances upon the cotton. On the arrival of the vessel at this port, the master notified the consignees to whom the cotton was consigned, and discharged his cargo, but in a very damaged condition. He also demanded his freight from them, the payment

of which was refused, and the above suits afterward instituted by the respective parties.

It is proper to state further that the brig was under a charter-party from the owners to a firm in New Orleans, and that MITCHELL, with whom the contract was made for the shipment of the cotton, represented this firm. By this contract the shipper was to deliver the cotton at Lavacca, to be received on lighters by MITCHELL, and placed by him at his expense on board of the vessel, to be carried to New York for the freight of 12 cents per pound.

This agent also objected to the bills of lading, because they did not contain a stipulation that part of the cotton might be shipped on deck. The shipper refused to admit such a stipulation, as it was not contained in the agreement between the parties, which was in writing.

1. We perceive no well-founded objection to the right of the assignees to maintain these suits. They were the persons to whom the cotton was shipped, and were recognized by the master as the proper parties to receive it, and to whom it was delivered by him, and the freight demanded. They had made advances upon it in the usual way, and as between them and the owners for whose benefit the advances were made, they had the same interest in the cotton as if the bills of lading had been duly executed.

2. We should have no difficulty in this case in holding the carrier to the common law liability on the shipment of the cotton, even if no bill of lading or other agreement had been entered into by the master, as his consent to receive it on board his vessel and carry it to the port of destination subjected the ship to this liability.

But in addition to this, the agent of the charterers, in whose service the brig was at this time, and who were interested in procuring cargo, entered into a written agreement fixing the terms upon which the shipment was to be made. The vessel was bound by it, and although it does not contain the stipulations usual in bills of lading, it carries with it by implication the common law obligations of a common carrier.

We lay entirely out of view the charter-party between the owner and the firm in New Orleans, as the shipper in this case had no notice of it; and if, therefore, there had been anything in this agreement repugnant to the charter-party, it could not be permitted to affect injuriously his interests.

3. Having disposed of these somewhat technical questions, we come to the main question in the case; and that is, whether or not the damage to the cotton was the natural, if not necessary, effect of its condition at the time of shipment developed in the course of the voyage, or produced by the dangers of the naviga tion, without any fault of the ship, or whether all or any part of it is attributable to bad stowage, or absence of proper care and attention on the part of the master.

Some one hundred bales of cotton were shipped on deck. It has been argued that the right thus to ship it is fairly to be inferred from the terms of the agreement between the shipper and agent of the vessel. We think not. It is also argued that there was a usage of the trade between the ports of Texas and New York in the shipment of cotton which justified the master in shipping it on deck. We think that the proof fails altogether to establish any such usage. The freight to be paid was the usual rate for cotton under deck.

It has further been strongly argued that the whole damage to the cotton as disclosed on discharging it at this port was the effect of the country damage existing at the time of shipment, or was produced by a storm which the vessel encountered in the voyage. The evidence in the case is very conflicting upon these questions, and difficult, indeed impossible, to be reconciled. The court below caine to the conclusion that, according to the weight of it, the cotton had sustained sea damage, for which the vessel was responsible. We are inclined to concur in this conclusion. The testimony is pretty strong that the cotton was badly stowed, and, also, that sufficient attention was not paid to the sea water in the hold of the vessel by using the pumps. The cotton was very wet when discharged from the hold of the ship.

The court below, in the case of the libel of the owner to recover freight, dismissed the same after applying so much of the money awarded for damage to the cotton as equaled the freight money. This, we think, was erroneous. The consignees had each filed his libel to recover this damage, and has succeeded. It is true each set up in his answer to the suit for freight damage to the cotton by way of abatement of the sum claimed. But these parties could not thus split up the claim for damages by applying a portion in extinguishment of the freight money, and then ask for a decree for the excess over this sum. If they insist apon recovering damages on an independent suit, they cannot apply any portion of them, by way of abatement, in the suit for the freight money. The damages are an entirety.

We must, therefore, reverse the decree in the case of CLIFTON vs. a quantity of cotton, and direct a decree to be entered for the libelant for the full amount of the freight money and interest, with costs. And, as the full amount of freight, at the rate of 14 cents per pound, will be recovered, the error will be corrected in the court below, reducing the freight of the portion of the cotton carried on deck to deck freight, and at the same time holding the brig responsible for the transportation of it under deck.

The decree in the other two suits are affirmed, with costs.

DECISION IN ADMIRALTY ON APPEAL-WAGES.

In the United States Circuit Court. Shaw rs. Thomas Collier.

Before Judge NELSON.

Albert E.

The libel was filed in this case by the libelant as master of the steamboat George Law, against the respondent in personam, the owner, to recover wages for the year 1854 and 1855. The court below, on the cause being called, heard evidence sufficient to show that the libelant had been in the employ of the respondent as master of the vessel, and that the principal question was as to the amount due for the services, if any; referred it to a commissioner to take proofs as to the full extent and value of the services, and as to the payment of other deductions to be made, if any, and report thereon. The case was heard, accordingly, before the commissioner, and a balance reported in favor of the libelant of $334 74, which report was subsequently confirmed by the court, and a decree entered for that amount against the respondent. It is now objected that the court erred in referring the cause to the commissioner instead of taking testimony in open court; but we cannot perceive any foundation for this objection. The court had ascertained, from the hearing before it, that the main questions in controversy were in respect to the questions between the parties as master and owner of the vessel, and very proper, therefore, to be referred to a hearing by a commissioner. The rights of the respondent were not prejudiced, as the whole case could afterwards be presented to the court upon the proofs, and exceptions to the commissioner's report, and much of the valuable time of the court thus saved by the reference. It has also been objected that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, as the question of the service claimed in the year 1854 was upon a vessel engaged in the purely internal business and commerce of the State. But it is a sufficient answer to say that this objection has no application to the service in the year 1855, and the balance of wages decreed after deducing the payments, is less than the amount of wages for that year. A great deal of testimony has been taken as to the services on the vessel, whether as master or clerk, and as to the competency as master, the value of the services, &c. These are matters of fact, pending upon conflict of evidence which we shall not enter into. We are satisfied at the conclusion arrived at by the court below. Decree affirmed.